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What this page is: Delvantic's full research page for Martin Marietta Materials Inc. (MLM) — AI-driven forensic equity research: mechanical valuation models (DCF, EPV, anchored-PE, scenario) plus three independent AI lenses (Quality / Value / Sentiment). Everything below is rendered server-side; you are not missing content that requires JavaScript. All scores are predictions and research opinions, not financial advice.
Our current read (analysis of 2026-10-07): Designation Low · Gem Score -24 (−100…+100 Quality+Value blend) · Quality 47 · Value -72 · Sentiment -9 (timing only, not weighted) · Composite fair value $304.56 vs $532.18 at analysis
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Martin Marietta Materials Inc.
MLM NYSEMartin Marietta Materials Inc. is a construction materials company that supplies aggregates and other heavy building products used across infrastructure, commercial, industrial, and residential projects. The company’s core offerings include crushed stone, sand, and gravel, supported by complementary products and services such as cement, ready-mixed concrete, asphalt, and paving solutions. Martin Marietta Materials Inc. also serves specialty markets through magnesia-based products and dolomitic lime used in industrial, agricultural, and environmental applications. Its operations are organized around quarrying, processing, and distribution networks that support large-scale building and roadwork needs. Headquartered in Raleigh, North Carolina, Martin Marietta Materials Inc. plays an important role in the North American materials supply chain by providing essential inputs for construction and infrastructure development.
Price Overview
Price History (1 Year)
Revenue & Net Income Trend
| Period | Revenue | Net Income | Net Margin | YoY/QoQ |
|---|
Key Metrics
EPS (Diluted): 18.77
Total Equity: $10.03B
Shares: 60,600,000
Total Debt: $5.61B
Cash: $67.00M
EBITDA: $2.07B
Total Debt: $5.61B
Cash: $67.00M
Revenue: $6.15B
Revenue: $6.15B
Revenue: $6.15B
Total Equity: $10.03B
Tax Rate: 19.2%
Equity: $10.03B
Total Debt: $5.61B
Cash: $67.00M
Current Liabilities: $895.00M
Long-Term Debt: $5.58B
Total Debt: $5.61B
Total Equity: $10.03B
Shares: 60,600,000
Shares: 60,600,000
CapEx: -$807.00M
Shares: 60,600,000
Stock Price: $532.18
Net Income: $1.14B
Industry Benchmarks
Income Statement (Annual)
Last updated: Aug 27, 2026 1:00am (41d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | $5.4B | $6.2B | $6.8B | $6.5B | $6.2B |
| Cost of Revenue | $4.1B | $4.7B | $4.8B | $4.7B | $4.3B |
| Gross Profit | $1.3B | $1.4B | $2.0B | $1.9B | $1.9B |
| Operating Expenses | $374.6M | $216.6M | $426.6M | -$829.0M | $452.0M |
| Operating Income | $973.8M | $1.2B | $1.6B | $2.7B | $1.4B |
| Net Income | $702.5M | $866.8M | $1.2B | $2.0B | $1.1B |
| EBITDA | $1.4B | $1.7B | $2.1B | $3.3B | $2.1B |
| EPS | $11.26 | $13.91 | $18.88 | $32.50 | $18.81 |
| EPS (Diluted) | $11.22 | $13.87 | $18.82 | $32.41 | $18.77 |
Balance Sheet (Annual)
Last updated: Aug 27, 2026 12:00am (41d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cash & Equivalents | $258.4M | $358.0M | $1.3B | $670.0M | $67.0M |
| Total Current Assets | $2.0B | $2.9B | $3.9B | $2.5B | $3.2B |
| Total Assets | $14.4B | $15.0B | $15.1B | $18.2B | $18.7B |
| Current Liabilities | $752.6M | $1.4B | $1.2B | $1.0B | $895.0M |
| Long-Term Debt | $5.3B | $4.5B | $4.1B | $5.5B | $5.6B |
| Total Liabilities | $7.9B | $7.8B | $7.1B | $8.7B | $8.7B |
| Total Equity | $6.5B | $7.2B | $8.0B | $9.5B | $10.0B |
| Retained Earnings | $3.2B | $3.7B | $4.6B | $5.9B | $6.4B |
Cash Flow (Annual)
Last updated: Aug 27, 2026 1:00am (41d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Operating Cash Flow | $1.1B | $991.2M | $1.5B | $1.5B | $1.8B |
| Capital Expenditure | -$423.1M | -$481.8M | -$650.3M | -$855.0M | -$807.0M |
| Free Cash Flow | $714.6M | $509.4M | $878.1M | $604.0M | $978.0M |
| Acquisitions (net) | -$3.1B | $11.0M | $0 | -$3.6B | -$685.0M |
| Net Debt Issued / (Repaid) | $2.5B | -$54.5M | -$700.0M | $1.1B | -$735.0M |
| Dividends Paid | -$147.8M | -$159.1M | -$174.0M | -$189.0M | -$197.0M |
| Stock Buybacks | $0 | -$150.0M | -$150.0M | -$450.0M | -$450.0M |
| Net Change in Cash | -$45.5M | $99.9M | $923.5M | -$612.0M | -$603.0M |
Growth Trends (YoY %)
Last updated: Aug 27, 2026 1:00am (41d ago)| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue Growth | +13.8% | +10.0% | -3.6% | -5.9% |
| Gross Profit Growth | +5.6% | +42.1% | -7.1% | +0.6% |
| Operating Income Growth | +23.9% | +32.3% | +69.6% | -46.9% |
| Net Income Growth | +23.4% | +34.9% | +70.7% | -43.0% |
| EBITDA Growth | +20.1% | +23.2% | +55.5% | -36.8% |
Dividend History (Last 20)
Last updated: Aug 27, 2026 12:00am (41d ago)| Date | Dividend | Declaration | Record | Payment |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-06-01 | $0.83 | — | — | — |
| 2026-03-02 | $0.83 | — | — | — |
| 2025-12-01 | $0.83 | — | — | — |
| 2025-09-02 | $0.83 | — | — | — |
| 2025-06-02 | $0.79 | — | — | — |
| 2025-03-03 | $0.79 | — | — | — |
| 2024-12-02 | $0.79 | — | — | — |
| 2024-09-03 | $0.79 | — | — | — |
| 2024-06-03 | $0.74 | — | — | — |
| 2024-03-01 | $0.74 | — | — | — |
| 2023-11-30 | $0.74 | — | — | — |
| 2023-08-31 | $0.74 | — | — | — |
| 2023-05-31 | $0.66 | — | — | — |
| 2023-03-03 | $0.66 | — | — | — |
| 2022-11-30 | $0.66 | — | — | — |
| 2022-08-31 | $0.66 | — | — | — |
| 2022-05-31 | $0.61 | — | — | — |
| 2022-02-28 | $0.61 | — | — | — |
| 2021-11-30 | $0.61 | — | — | — |
| 2021-08-31 | $0.61 | — | — | — |
Deep Analysis
Risk : Reward — upside vs downside from this company's own quarters
Computed 2026-10-06 02:02A +1σ run of quarters pays +15%; a −1σ run costs 67%. Ratio 0.2:1 (μ 5.4%, σ 15.8% , 16 pairs).
Older method (repeat-worst-quarter): -0.1 : 1
| Case | Growth | Margin | Fair value | vs price ($532.18) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Bull — recovery | +14% | 35.0% | $489.39 | -8% |
| Base — stabilizes | +9% | 35.0% | $426.12 | -20% |
| Bear — keeps slipping | +5% | 31.2% | $335.35 | -37% |
| Stress — last quarter repeats | -18% | 31.8% | $157.55 | -70% |
| Upside — a +1σ run of quarters (v2) | +21% | 35.0% | $610.74 | +15% |
| Stress — a −1σ run of quarters (v2) | -10% | 25.4% | $174.44 | -67% |
Narrative Economics
market-narrative step).
Growth Outlook
Analyzed 2026-08-27 01:23The question every valuation on this page silently assumes: is this company likely to grow? Judged forward — the business, its category, the world — against what's already printed.
Claude Reading
The Q1 2026 print is the elephant in this file: $1.36B revenue producing $1.51B in net income, a 111% margin, which is obviously a one-time gain (almost certainly the divestiture of a business line, or an insurance/legal recovery). Strip that out and MLM's underlying earnings trajectory is materially weaker than the composite suggests. Trailing four quarters ex-that-quarter show roughly $6.9B in revenue and maybe $1.3B in "clean" net income — but 2024 delivered $2.0B NI on $6.54B revenue (a 30.6% net margin, itself flattered by gains), and 2025 delivered $1.14B on $6.15B. So on any normalized basis, earnings are down materially year-over-year, revenue contracted 5.9%, and the "mature earner" label is doing a lot of work to disguise what is actually a cyclical business rolling over. The -43% recent earnings YoY is the tell.
At $532 and a 28.4x P/E, MLM trades like a compounder while the P&L behaves like a late-cycle aggregate producer with pricing power but shrinking volumes. EV/EBITDA of 18.2x for a company with 7.5% ROIC and 6.1% ROA is aggressive — this is a capital-heavy business ($5.6B debt against $67M cash is a striking mismatch, and only $978M FCF against a $37.8B market cap gives a 2.6% FCF yield). The synthesis's $314 fair value implies a ~15x P/E on normalized ~$1.2B earnings, which is actually right in the historical industrial fairway. I think the synthesis is directionally correct but the -41% gap is probably too aggressive: aggregates businesses genuinely deserve a premium to generic industrials because reserves are irreplaceable and pricing is quasi-monopolistic in local markets. A fairer anchor is probably 20-22x normalized earnings, or roughly $380-430.
The contrarian case worth taking seriously: aggregates pricing has run at high-single-digits for three years and shows no sign of breaking, IIJA disbursements are actually accelerating into 2026-2027 as projects move from design to construction, and MLM's Q2 2026 revenue of $1.95B is the highest quarterly print in the file — suggesting the volume trough may already be behind us. If 2026 delivers $7.2B revenue and 20% operating margins, you get ~$1.4B in normalized earnings and the multiple compression story weakens considerably. The bear needs a housing recession that hasn't shown up in the data yet. Also worth flagging: the insider activity is entirely awards and tax-withholding F-InKind — zero open-market buying OR selling, which is genuinely neutral, not the bearish "no insider transactions" the secondary signal implies. Management isn't dumping.
Where I dissent from the prior stack: the pre-flight thesis that the market prices "sustained margin expansion or infrastructure supercycle" is right, but the synthesis $314 anchor treats MLM like it should trade at generic industrial multiples, which understates the durable moat in aggregates reserves. The narrative layer's 50-60% narrative premium claim is overstated — probably closer to 25-35%. What worries me more than the models flag: the balance sheet. $5.6B debt against $67M cash and $1.79B OCF means net leverage is meaningful (~3x EBITDA), and if rates stay high while volumes soften, refinancing math gets uglier. Also, the Q1 2026 $1.51B NI needs to be understood before anyone underwrites this — that's the single most important disclosure gap in the file. I land on overvalued but not by 41%; fair value ~$400-430, current $532 offers ~20% downside to fair, not 41%. Not a short candidate given the moat, but not a buy here either — wait for either a $420 handle or evidence that H2 2026 volumes are inflecting up.
GPT Reading
What jumps out first is that the income statement is being flattered by non-operating noise while the underlying business is good but not good enough for this price. The clearest tell is 2026-03-31: $1.36 billion of revenue and $1.51 billion of net income, a 111% net margin that is obviously not repeatable. That one quarter makes any trailing P/E look cheaper than the operating business deserves. On the annual view, revenue has gone from $6.78 billion in 2023 to $6.54 billion in 2024 to $6.15 billion in 2025, so this is not a growth story in the reported numbers. Net income in 2025 was $1.14 billion, down sharply from $2.00 billion in 2024, and even the 2024 operating income of $2.71 billion looks inconsistent with the gross profit line and likely includes a large gain as well. In other words, the business is profitable and cash generative, but the recent accounting earnings series is not clean enough to justify paying a premium multiple on headline EPS.
The real operating story is more modest: a high-quality aggregates franchise with pricing power and decent cash conversion, but with cyclical volumes and capex intensity that cap the multiple. Gross profit was basically flat at $1.88-2.02 billion from 2023 to 2025 even as revenue slipped, which suggests pricing and mix have protected profitability. Operating cash flow of $1.79 billion and free cash flow of $978 million in 2025 are healthy, but against a $37.8 billion market cap that is only about a 2.6% FCF yield. EV/EBITDA at 18.2x and EV/revenue at 6.1x are rich for a business with negative revenue CAGR, recent revenue down 5.9% year over year, and recent earnings down 43% excluding whatever one-off is embedded in March 2026. Balance sheet risk is manageable rather than alarming — $5.61 billion debt against $10.03 billion equity and a 3.6x current ratio — but cash on hand is only $67 million, so this remains a business that relies on steady operating generation through the cycle.
What the market appears to be paying for is duration: the belief that aggregates scarcity, infrastructure funding, and local market power make Martin Marietta a quasi-compounder rather than a cyclical materials producer. I understand that argument. The quarterly cadence from 2025 into 2026 does show some resilience: revenue rose from $1.16 billion in 2025 Q1 to $1.36 billion in 2026 Q1 and from $1.61 billion in 2025 Q2 to $1.95 billion in 2026 Q2, so there is a rebound underway operationally. But even giving credit for that, the current valuation implies much more than a rebound. At $532, investors are paying about 28x earnings, 3.2x book, and over 5x sales for a business earning 7.5% ROIC and 11.3% ROE on the annual figures provided. Those returns are fine, not elite. To earn this valuation cleanly, I would want either sustained high-single-digit volume growth, or proof that normalized free cash flow can move well above $1.5 billion; the data here does not show either.
The best counterargument is that annual numbers are temporarily depressed or distorted and therefore the stock is optically expensive at the wrong point in the cycle. If March 2026 contained a major gain, then trailing earnings overstate value on one metric; but the opposite can also be argued for operating earnings if 2025 revenue and profit were hurt by weather, project timing, or mix while price-cost fundamentals remained intact. Q2 2026 revenue of $1.95 billion versus $1.61 billion a year earlier is a real 21% jump, and even with a lower net margin of 12.9%, absolute net income still improved to $251 million from $328 million only if one excludes differing tax and one-time items; that could set up stronger second-half comparisons. This is also not a heavily levered story, and the low payout ratio means nearly all cash can be recycled into acquisitions, reserves, and buybacks. If you believe the franchise deserves a scarcity premium because replacement cost is enormous and permitting barriers are real, then standard industrial multiples will always look too low.
What would change my mind is simple and specific: if the next two quarters show revenue holding near or above a $7.0 billion annual run rate, operating margins normalizing above 25% without one-time gains, and free cash flow tracking toward at least $1.4-1.5 billion annualized, then the current premium would have a factual basis. I would also revisit a more constructive stance if the stock corrected into the low-$400s without a deterioration in cash generation, because then you would be paying closer to 20-22x a cleaner earnings base and roughly a 3.5%+ FCF yield for a strong hard-asset franchise. As it stands, this is a good company priced like a great growth company, and the reported numbers do not support that leap.
Grok Reading
The raw numbers paint a mature aggregates franchise whose top line is going the wrong way while the market still pays growth-stock rent. Annual revenue fell from $6.78B in 2023 to $6.54B in 2024 to $6.15B in 2025—a roughly 4.7% revenue CAGR decline and a recent year-over-year drop of about 5.9%. Reported net income swung from an inflated $2.00B in 2024 down to $1.14B in 2025; strip out the Q1 2026 oddity ($1.51B NI on $1.36B revenue and a 111% margin, almost certainly a one-time gain) and underlying earnings power is closer to the $250–$400M quarterly band with mid-teens to low-20s margins, not the triple-digit aberration. Free cash flow of $978M on $1.79B of operating cash flow is real and respectable, but it is being generated by a business whose ROIC sits at 7.5% and ROE at 11.3%—returns that do not justify a 28.4x P/E, 18.2x EV/EBITDA, or 5.2x sales when the enterprise already carries $5.61B of debt against only $67M of cash. At $532 the equity is capitalizing roughly $38B of market value on a shrinking revenue base; the composite models’ ~$314 fair-value anchor (implying ~41% downside) is directionally consistent with what a no-growth industrial multiple of 15–18x normalized earnings would produce.
What stands out is the gap between cash-flow quality and growth reality. FCF is solid, the balance sheet is serviceable at 0.56 debt-to-equity, current ratio 3.6, and gross margin has held near 31% with operating margin around 23%. That is the profile of a well-run mature earner, not a secular compounder. Quarterly revenue has oscillated between $1.16B and $1.95B without a clear upward slope; the most recent print of $1.95B is still below the $1.88B of late 2024. Earnings CAGR is negative, recent earnings YoY is –43%, and the dividend yield is a token 0.62% with a low payout. Insiders show only routine awards and an in-kind transfer—no accumulation that would signal conviction at these prices. The market is therefore paying a premium multiple for volume growth and multi-year infrastructure tailwinds that have not yet shown up in the reported P&L.
The strongest counter-argument is that aggregates are local oligopolies with genuine pricing power, high replacement costs, and structural demand from underfunded U.S. roads, bridges, and housing. Bulls will cite the still-healthy absolute FCF, margin resilience even as volumes soften, and the possibility that 2025–2026 revenue declines are mid-cycle noise rather than structural decay; they will also note that EV/EBITDA of 18x is not outrageous if mid-teens returns on capital can be sustained through a multi-year public-works supercycle and bolt-on consolidation. A smart opponent would also argue that the $314 DCF-style anchor underweights terminal pricing power and treats a one-time earnings spike as contamination rather than evidence of asset value. I weigh that less heavily because the multi-year revenue and earnings CAGRs are already negative, ROIC is sub-8%, and roughly half the current price appears to rest on narrative persistence rather than delivered cash flows; until volumes and organic growth reappear, the premium is a hope multiple, not a demonstrated one.
What would flip the view is a clear re-acceleration: two consecutive quarters of mid-single-digit or better organic volume growth with pricing holding, full-year 2026 revenue back above $6.5B and climbing, and ROIC pushing through 10% without another large one-time gain. A material debt paydown that restores net cash flexibility, or a sustained FCF yield that compresses the multiple from the inside, would also force a re-rating higher. Absent those, the stock remains priced for an infrastructure and housing upcycle the income statement has not yet confirmed.
Big-3 Panel — where each AI stands
Advanced Analysis Forensic deep-dive · separate lenses
Martin Marietta looks like a well-run mature earner in a structurally advantaged niche (aggregates/heavy building materials). Revenue rose from $5.41B (2021) to a peak of $6.78B (2023) and settled at $6.15B (2025), while gross margin expanded from 24.9% to 30.7% - real operating leverage on a cyclical top line. 2024 operating margin (41.4%) and net income ($2.00B) are distorted by a divestiture gain; normalizing to 2025's 23.4% OpM and $1.14B net income still shows meaningfully higher through-cycle profitability than 2021. FCF of $978M in 2025 with OCF/NI of 1.27x and accruals of -1.4% of assets indicate reported earnings are backed by cash, not accrual games (Beneish -2.65 confirms).
Verify before trusting this (5)
- Confirm 2024 net income includes divestiture/one-time gain and quantify normalized figure
- Debt maturity schedule and covenant headroom on the $5.5B net debt
- Aggregates volume vs price mix behind margin expansion
- Customer/geographic concentration in public-infrastructure vs private-construction exposure
- M&A cadence and goodwill balance given consolidation strategy
The composite fair value of $330.14 (signal-adjusted $314.08) sits roughly 40% below the $532.18 price, implying the market is paying a premium of about $200/share over deserved value. The DCF at $223 and EPV floor at $145 both scream expensive; only the anchored-PE at $728 argues for upside, and that method is almost certainly extrapolating peak-cycle earnings and a full multiple - a classic runaway output that deserves a heavy discount. Averaging the two cash-based methods gets you to a deserved value in the $200s; even generously blending in a normalized earnings multiple gets you to the mid-$300s at best. The Strong quality grade justifies paying above EPV and DCF - aggregates is a local-monopoly business with pricing power - but a Strong (not Exceptional) business carrying $5.5B net debt does not justify a 60%+ premium to the composite. What is priced in: continued mid-to-high single-digit pricing gains, sustained infrastructure tailwind, no housing air pocket, and margin expansion from here. That is a heroic stack of assumptions. A cyclical wobble in residential or an IIJA spending disappointment would compress both earnings and the multiple simultaneously.
Verify before trusting this (5)
- Forward aggregates pricing guidance and volume outlook in next earnings call
- Residential end-market exposure and any signs of volume slowdown
- IIJA-driven public infrastructure backlog conversion pace
- Normalized (mid-cycle) EBITDA margin assumption underlying the anchored-PE method
- M&A pipeline and capital allocation given the net debt load
The macro tape is mildly risk-on (VIX 15.2, S&P near highs) and MLM's 1.11 beta means it participates, but this is a steady-compounder aggregates name, not a story stock that catches bid in euphoria. The active narrative (infrastructure pick-and-shovel, moderate intensity, low cult) is intact but tired; analysts are 'somewhat bullish' - lukewarm tone that neither propels nor punishes. The Lhoist North America deal closing on Aug 24 is a concrete narrative refresh (consolidation optionality box ticked) and a modest tailwind for the story. Working against the name: 10y at 4.64% is a persistent headwind for building-materials names tied to housing and public works financing, and MLM has underperformed the tape ('lagged behind the broader market over the past year', -4.7% CAGR). The bear framing that MLM is ~70% above DCF is out there but not intense - it is a valuation whisper, not a de-rating catalyst. Net: no dominant force in either direction. The stock is drifting under moderate, offsetting crosswinds - a risk-on tape it does not fully harvest, a decent but stale narrative, and a rates backdrop that keeps a lid on multiple expansion.
Verify before trusting this (4)
- Any housing or infrastructure data print that could crack or reinforce the multi-year tailwind narrative
- Analyst target revisions post-Lhoist close - upgrades would meaningfully lift sentiment
- 10y yield direction; a sustained move below 4.4% would ease the sector headwind
- Sector rotation signals - if capital rotates into cyclicals/materials, MLM's beta gets rewarded
The world MLM sells into is bifurcating: publicly funded heavy civil work is funded and steady, while rate-sensitive private construction — housing, warehouse, light commercial — is contracting under a 4.64% long bond and macro headwinds. For a locally monopolistic aggregates supplier, that mix shift is survivable because pricing is set on replacement cost and scarcity of permitted reserves, not on marginal demand. Aggregates remain non-discretionary and non-substitutable, immune to technological displacement. The realistic forward shape is low-single-digit volumes plus mid-single-digit price plus bolt-on M&A — call it high-single to low-double-digit revenue growth with expanding unit margin. That is a genuinely growing business, and also a business structurally incapable of the compounding rate embedded in the current price.
When we made this prediction on Aug 27, 2026, MLM was $528.61. We expect it to be $483.00 by Feb 2027, and we consider it great value under $400.00. This is an early model (v0.6.0) — the direction is more reliable than the exact price. Made Aug 27, 2026.
Blue is our prediction, starting the day we made it. Grey is a slower route to the same place — the same destination, taking longer. Black is the actual price, so you can see how we are doing.
Post-Report Due Diligence NOTES
Evidence for a closer look, not a verdict — no score or designation on this page has been changed by it. Items marked material are ones where a conclusion above moves to the other side of the price.
trailing_eps
flips down 25%
adjusted_pe
flips down 25%