Business Description
Darling Ingredients Inc. develops, produces, and sells natural ingredients from edible and inedible bio-nutrients. The company operates through three segments: Feed Ingredients, Food Ingredients, and Fuel Ingredients. It offers ingredients and customized specialty solutions for customers in the pharmaceutical, food, pet food, feed, industrial, fuel, bioenergy, and fertilizer industries. The company also collects and transforms various animal by-product streams into useable and specialty ingredients, such as collagen, edible fats, feed-grade fats, animal proteins and meals, plasma, pet food ingredients, organic fertilizers, yellow grease, fuel feedstock, green energy, natural casings, and hides. In addition, it recovers and converts used cooking oil and animal fats, and residual bakery products into valuable feed and fuel ingredients. Further, the company provides environmental services, including grease trap collection and disposal services to food service establishments. It primarily operates under the Sonac, Dar Pro, Rothsay, Rousselot, Nature Safe, CleanStar, Peptan, Cookie Meal, Bakery Feeds, Ecoson, and Rendac brand names in North America, Europe, China, South America, Australia, and internationally. The company was formerly known as Darling International Inc. and changed its name to Darling Ingredients Inc. in May 2014. Darling Ingredients Inc. was founded in 1882 and is headquartered in Irving, Texas.
Business History
Generated: Jun 7, 2026 3:01pmPrice Overview
Last updated: Jun 7, 2026 4:37pm (5d ago)Price History (1 Year)
Revenue & Net Income Trend
| Period | Revenue | Net Income | Net Margin | YoY/QoQ |
|---|
Key Metrics
EPS (Diluted): 0.40
Total Equity: $4.74B
Shares: 160,157,000
Total Debt: $4.00B
Cash: $88.67M
EBITDA: $904.31M
Total Debt: $4.00B
Cash: $88.67M
Revenue: $6.14B
Revenue: $6.14B
Revenue: $6.14B
Total Equity: $4.74B
Tax Rate: -15.3%
Equity: $4.74B
Total Debt: $4.00B
Cash: $88.67M
Current Liabilities: $1.03B
Long-Term Debt: $3.86B
Total Debt: $4.00B
Total Equity: $4.74B
Shares: 160,157,000
Shares: 160,157,000
CapEx: -$380.49M
Shares: 160,157,000
Stock Price: $59.45
Net Income: $62.80M
Industry Benchmarks
Deep Analysis
Pre-flight intelligence scans the company first, then routes to the right analytical methods.
Income Statement (Annual)
Last updated: Jun 7, 2026 4:49pm (5d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2026 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | $4.7B | $6.5B | $6.8B | $5.7B | $6.1B |
| Cost of Revenue | $3.5B | $5.0B | $5.1B | $4.4B | $5.2B |
| Gross Profit | $1.2B | $1.5B | $1.6B | $1.3B | $969.5M |
| Operating Expenses | $357.5M | $500.5M | $695.3M | $809.6M | $573.7M |
| Operating Income | $884.5M | $1.0B | $949.7M | $468.2M | $395.8M |
| Net Income | $650.9M | $737.7M | $647.7M | $278.9M | $62.8M |
| EBITDA | $1.2B | $1.4B | $1.5B | $1.0B | $904.3M |
| EPS | $4.01 | $4.58 | $4.05 | $1.75 | $0.40 |
| EPS (Diluted) | — | — | — | — | — |
Balance Sheet (Annual)
Last updated: Jun 7, 2026 3:01pm (5d ago)| Metric | 2022 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2026 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cash & Equivalents | $68.9M | $127.0M | $126.5M | $76.0M | $88.7M |
| Total Current Assets | $1.1B | $1.6B | $1.9B | $1.4B | $1.6B |
| Total Assets | $6.1B | $9.2B | $11.1B | $10.1B | $10.3B |
| Current Liabilities | $752.7M | $1.1B | $998.1M | $1.0B | $1.0B |
| Long-Term Debt | $1.4B | $3.3B | $4.4B | $3.9B | $3.9B |
| Total Liabilities | $2.8B | $5.3B | $6.4B | $5.6B | $5.5B |
| Total Equity | $3.3B | $3.8B | $4.6B | $4.4B | $4.7B |
| Retained Earnings | $2.3B | $3.1B | $3.7B | $4.0B | $4.1B |
Cash Flow (Annual)
Last updated: Jun 7, 2026 4:49pm (5d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2026 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Operating Cash Flow | $704.4M | $813.7M | $899.3M | $839.3M | $1.1B |
| Capital Expenditure | -$274.4M | -$392.8M | -$557.0M | -$332.5M | -$380.5M |
| Free Cash Flow | $430.0M | $420.9M | $342.3M | $506.8M | $679.2M |
| Acquisitions (net) | -$195.5M | -$2.0B | -$1.2B | -$206.7M | -$26.6M |
| Debt Repayment | — | — | — | — | — |
| Dividends Paid | — | — | — | — | — |
| Stock Buybacks | -$167.7M | -$125.5M | -$52.9M | -$34.3M | -$34.7M |
| Net Change in Cash | -$12.6M | $81.1M | $114.3M | -$47.1M | -$8.2M |
Analyst Estimates (Annual)
Last updated: Jun 7, 2026 2:58pm (5d ago)| Metric | 2028 | 2029 | 2030 | 2031 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue |
$6.9B $6.9B – $7.0B
|
$6.9B $6.9B – $6.9B
|
$7.0B $6.7B – $7.2B
|
$9.2B $8.8B – $9.4B
|
| EBITDA |
$1.4B $1.4B – $1.4B
|
$1.4B $1.4B – $1.4B
|
$1.4B $1.4B – $1.5B
|
$1.9B $1.8B – $1.9B
|
| Net Income |
$763.1M $593.0M – $959.8M
|
$630.3M $616.8M – $717.7M
|
$754.8M $718.9M – $781.6M
|
$824.8M $785.6M – $854.1M
|
| EPS | — | — | — | — |
Growth Trends (YoY %)
Last updated: Jun 7, 2026 4:49pm (5d ago)| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2026 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue Growth | +37.8% | +3.9% | -15.8% | +7.4% |
| Gross Profit Growth | +23.2% | +7.5% | -22.3% | -24.1% |
| Operating Income Growth | +16.3% | -7.7% | -50.7% | -15.5% |
| Net Income Growth | +13.3% | -12.2% | -56.9% | -77.5% |
| EBITDA Growth | +17.8% | +4.8% | -32.1% | -10.0% |
Insider Trading (Recent)
Last updated: Jun 7, 2026 4:49pm (5d ago)All SEC Form 4 codes
- P Purchase
- Open-market or private purchase of shares.
- S Sale
- Open-market or private sale of shares.
- A Award / grant
- Grant or award of securities (RSUs, options, etc.) under Rule 16b-3.
- D Return to issuer
- Securities disposed back to the company under Rule 16b-3.
- F In-kind (tax)
- Shares withheld or delivered to pay the option-exercise price or tax — not an open-market sale.
- I Discretionary
- Discretionary transaction under an employee plan — Rule 16b-3(f).
- M Option exercise
- Exercise or conversion of a derivative (option/RSU) into shares — exempt.
- C Conversion
- Conversion of a derivative security into the underlying shares.
- E Short expiration
- Expiration of a short derivative position.
- H Long expiration
- Expiration or cancellation of a long derivative position with value received.
- O OTM exercise
- Exercise of an out-of-the-money derivative.
- X ITM exercise
- Exercise of an in-the-money or at-the-money derivative.
- G Gift
- Bona fide gift of securities.
- L Small acquisition
- Small acquisition under Rule 16a-6.
- W Inheritance
- Acquisition or disposition by will or the laws of descent.
- Z Voting trust
- Deposit into or withdrawal from a voting trust.
- J Other
- Other acquisition or disposition (explained in a Form 4 footnote).
- K Equity swap
- Transaction in an equity swap or similar instrument.
- U Tender / buyout
- Disposition via tender of shares in a change-of-control transaction.
Compensation-plan codes (A, D, F, M) are routine and rarely directional. Open-market P (buy) and S (sale) carry the most signal.
| Date | Insider | Type | Shares | Price | Value |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-05-07 | Hill Randy L | A-Award | 701.00 | $37.64 | $26,386 |
| 2026-05-07 | Schroder Soren | A-Award | 261.00 | $37.64 | $9,824 |
| 2026-05-07 | Schroder Soren | A-Award | 2,650.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-05-07 | Stoffel Kurt | A-Award | 2,650.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-05-07 | Hill Randy L | A-Award | 261.00 | $37.64 | $9,824 |
| 2026-05-07 | Hill Randy L | A-Award | 2,650.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-05-07 | Guimaraes Enderson | A-Award | 2,650.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-05-07 | GOODSPEED LINDA | A-Award | 2,650.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-05-07 | Clark Celeste A. | A-Award | 130.00 | $37.64 | $4,893 |
| 2026-05-07 | Clark Celeste A. | A-Award | 2,650.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-05-07 | Barden Larry | A-Award | 261.00 | $37.64 | $9,824 |
| 2026-05-07 | Barden Larry | A-Award | 2,650.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-05-07 | Aspell Robert Patrick | A-Award | 2,650.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-05-07 | Adair Charles L | A-Award | 2,650.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-05-01 | MANZI JOSEPH | S-Sale | 3,000.00 | $63.89 | $191,670 |
| 2026-03-09 | Finnimore Mark Joseph | A-Award | 2,079.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-03-09 | Finnimore Mark Joseph | F-InKind | 1,113.00 | $51.92 | $57,787 |
| 2026-03-09 | Colpaert Jeroen | A-Award | 9,252.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-03-09 | Colpaert Jeroen | F-InKind | 4,580.00 | $51.92 | $237,794 |
| 2026-03-09 | van der Velden Jan | A-Award | 14,803.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
Narrative Economics
Delvantic AI Findings
The raw quarterly trajectory is the most important thing in this file and the prior models are underweighting how favorable it actually is. Revenue went $1.38B → $1.48B → $1.56B → $1.72B → $1.55B, and — more importantly — net income went -$26M → $13M → $19M → $57M → $134M. That April 2026 quarter is a 8.7% net margin, the highest in over a year, on revenue up 12% YoY. Annual NI of $63M is a trough artifact dominated by a Q1 2025 loss and a soft Q2-Q3; the run-rate exiting the period is closer to $400-500M annualized if the Q4+Q1 cadence holds. FCF of $679M against a $9.45B market cap is a ~7.2% FCF yield, and that's on trough EBITDA. The P/E of 42 (the canonical metric, not the 148x the synthesis cites) is backward-looking noise.
I largely agree with the synthesis verdict's direction — this is a cyclical at trough being mis-multipled — but I think the framing "Disconnected from Fundamentals" is overwrought and the pre-flight's "violent disagreement" language overstates the drama. EV/EBITDA of 13.95x on TTM (which itself contains trough quarters) is not screaming cheap; it's reasonable-to-cheap for a bioprocessor with real FCF. The 0.97x P/S and 1.26x P/B are the actually compelling anchors. Where I dissent from the bullish chorus: the market-forces model claims "100%+ upside" — that requires renewable diesel feedstock economics (Diamond Green Diesel JV) to revert to 2022-2023 levels, and there's no evidence in this file that's happening. The Q1 2026 NI spike could be a one-time DGD distribution or a tax item; I'd want the 10-Q before extrapolating 8.7% margins.
The contrarian case is real and the models brush past it. Revenue 3-year CAGR is -4.9%; 2023 was the cycle peak at $6.79B/$648M NI and we are structurally below that. Renewable diesel faces (a) RIN/LCFS credit price compression, (b) 45Z tax credit transition uncertainty, (c) used cooking oil import competition from China that crushed feedstock spreads, and (d) overcapacity in US renewable diesel. None of those are cyclical; some are structural. If DGD economics are permanently lower, mid-cycle earnings power isn't $4/share, it's maybe $2.50, which at a 15x multiple is $37 — well below the current $59.45. The insider data is useless (all routine May awards, no open-market buying to confirm management conviction at trough), and the balance sheet is suspiciously incomplete — no total debt disclosed, which for a capital-intensive bioprocessor that did a multi-billion DGD buildout is the single most important number missing. Darling carried roughly $4B+ in debt historically; at current EBITDA that's a leverage ratio worth worrying about, and the synthesis ignored this entirely.
Net: I land bullish but more measured than the synthesis. At $59, you're paying ~14x trough EV/EBITDA and ~1x sales for a business generating $679M FCF with a credible path to $800M-$1B if DGD stabilizes (not recovers to peak). Downside to $40 if renewable diesel is structurally impaired; upside to $80-90 if Q4/Q1 margins prove sustainable and 45Z clarity arrives. The asymmetry favors longs but not as dramatically as "100%+ upside" suggests — I'd say roughly 35% upside / 30% downside over 18 months, skewed by the fact that the most recent quarter's $134M NI print is genuinely encouraging and the FCF is real. Starter position justified; the missing debt disclosure and unconfirmed DGD margin sustainability prevent a full conviction sizing.
GPT Critique
Darling Ingredients presents a mixed financial picture, with recent data revealing a cyclical business struggling to regain momentum. The quarterly performance shows improvement with a revenue increase from $1.38B to $1.55B over four quarters and a significant net income rise in the most recent quarter to $134.3M, reflecting an 8.7% margin. Despite these positive signals, the annual figures paint a different story, with revenue declining from a peak of $6.79B in 2023 to $6.14B in 2026, and net income plummeting from $647.7M to $62.8M over the same period. The company's free cash flow of $679.2M against a market cap of $9.45B provides a decent yield, but the P/E ratio of 42 suggests that the market is pricing in a challenging environment, likely due to renewable diesel segment concerns.
Opus asserts that Darling is a cyclical at trough, undervalued, and suggests a fair value range of $70-75. I agree with his assessment that the company is at a cyclical low, given the recent improvement in quarterly margins and free cash flow strength. However, I disagree with his valuation range. The structural issues in the renewable diesel market, highlighted by Opus, such as credit price compression and competition from China, suggest that the recovery in margins may not be as robust as anticipated. The revenue CAGR of -4.9% and the earnings CAGR of -68.9% underscore the risk of assuming a swift recovery in earnings power. Opus's reliance on a potential $800M-$1B FCF scenario seems optimistic without more concrete evidence of stabilization in the renewable diesel segment.
The Delvantic AI Findings' narrative of "Disconnected from Fundamentals" seems appropriate, but I find the language more fitting than Opus does. The valuation metrics like EV/EBITDA of 13.95x and P/S ratio of 0.97x reflect a company priced for uncertainty, yet not necessarily for bargain acquisition. The potential structural impairments in the renewable diesel segment weigh heavily against a quick return to previous earnings levels. Furthermore, the missing debt information is concerning, particularly for a capital-intensive business like Darling, which historically carried significant leverage.
A skeptic of both our views might argue that the market has already priced in much of the bad news and that the current price reflects a reasonable balance of risks and potential rewards. They would point to the absence of insider buying as a lack of confidence from management and highlight the incomplete balance sheet as a red flag. Additionally, they might question the sustainability of the recent improvement in quarterly margins, suggesting it could be a temporary anomaly rather than a sign of fundamental recovery.
Advanced Analysis Forensic deep-dive · two lenses
Both lenses are telling me the same thing from different angles: the quality score at -14 says this is a legit cash machine being roughed up by the cycle but carrying too much debt into it, and the value score at -25 says $59 already credits a mid-cycle recovery without paying me for the leverage. That's not a setup I chase. I love that FCF actually rose to $679M through the earnings collapse, the buyback is real (338% of SBC, shares down 1.1% CAGR), and accounting is clean — those are the things that let you hold a cyclical through pain. But a 1,000bp gross margin compression and 90% earnings drop against $3.9B net debt means if RD margins stay broken into 2025, the equity gets re-rated lower, not higher. At $59 I have no margin of safety and no edge.
My play: zero position today, this goes on the watchlist with a hard bid at $48 and a scale plan down to $42. At $48 I start a 1% starter — that's mid-cycle EBITDA at trough multiples and the leverage finally compensated. I add another 1.5% at $43-44 if it gets there without a balance sheet event (watch the $137M short-term debt roll and any covenant chatter). What flips me to aggressive earlier, even at $55+, is a tangible turn in DGD/renewable diesel margins — RIN prices firming, BTC clarity, or a clean quarter where segment EBITDA inflects — because then the quality lens dominates and the cycle thesis is confirmed. What kills it: another leg down in gross margin next print, or any hint the rendering core (not just DGD) is structurally weaker. Until then, I'm patient. Fair is not a reason to buy.
Darling's earnings quality looks legitimate — accruals at -3.8% of assets, OCF/NI of 4.69x, Beneish M of -2.67, and no mechanical red flags. The company is a net buyer of its own shares (diluted share CAGR -1.1%, buybacks 338% of SBC, SBC just 0.4% of revenue), which is genuinely shareholder-friendly capital discipline. FCF rebounded to $679M in the latest year, up from $507M and $342M prior, suggesting working capital release and capex moderation are real.
But the operating business is deteriorating sharply. Gross margin compressed from 26.2% (2021) to 15.8% (latest), operating margin from 18.7% to 6.4%, and net income collapsed from $738M (2022) to $63M — roughly a 90% decline. Revenue is also off the 2023 peak. This is consistent with renewable diesel/Diamond Green Diesel economics rolling over and core rendering spreads compressing, but the magnitude is severe and FCF/NI now diverges wildly (4.69x), meaning the headline earnings number is being propped up by non-cash items.
The balance sheet is the other constraint: $3.91B net debt against $88.7M liquid cash, with $137M short-term debt exceeding cash on hand. At current depressed earnings, leverage ratios are stretched. Altman Z of 2.37 sits in the grey zone — not distressed, but not comfortable. Insider activity is neutral-to-slightly-negative (14 sells, 0 buys), with awards dominating the tape.
Verify before trusting this (6)
- Diamond Green Diesel JV contribution and whether renewable diesel margins are cyclical or structurally impaired (BTC/PTC transition, RIN/LCFS prices)
- Debt maturity ladder and covenant headroom against compressed EBITDA
- Whether the $63M net income includes large non-cash impairments/JV equity losses that explain the OCF/NI divergence
- Segment-level margin breakdown: Feed, Food, Fuel — where exactly the margin compression is concentrated
- Capex trajectory and whether the FCF rebound is sustainable or driven by deferred investment
- Customer/feedstock concentration in the rendering business
No e2e fair-value composite was handed over, so I anchor on the business: ~$9.45B market cap plus ~$3.9B net debt = ~$13.3B EV against a packaged-foods/rendering base business (Feed + Food) that historically does $700M-$1B+ of segment EBITDA, plus a renewable diesel JV (DGD) currently in a cyclical trough. On a normalized basis (mid-cycle DGD contribution restored, gross margins partially recovering from the 1,000bp compression), $13B EV is roughly 7-8x mid-cycle EBITDA — that's a fair, not cheap, multiple for a leveraged cyclical with collapsed near-term earnings.
On trough numbers the stock looks expensive (P/E is meaningless with earnings down ~90%); on normalized numbers it looks reasonable but not a steal. The market appears to be looking through the renewable diesel cycle and crediting some recovery — which is rational but not generous. To call this clearly cheap I'd want either (a) a sub-$50 price that gives me >20% margin to mid-cycle, or (b) tangible evidence the DGD/RD margin trough has turned. Today it's a coin-flip on price: fair compensation for fair risk.
Verify before trusting this (5)
- DGD segment EBITDA run-rate and management commentary on RD/SAF margin trajectory
- Net debt / leverage covenant headroom and any refinancing schedule
- Feed and Food segment gross margin recovery vs the 1,000bp compression
- Capex guidance and FCF conversion to confirm buyback can continue
- Any one-time charges inflating the earnings collapse vs structural margin loss