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What this page is: Delvantic's full research page for ASE Technology Holding Co., Ltd. (ASX) — AI-driven forensic equity research: mechanical valuation models (DCF, EPV, anchored-PE, scenario) plus three independent AI lenses (Quality / Value / Sentiment). Everything below is rendered server-side; you are not missing content that requires JavaScript. All scores are predictions and research opinions, not financial advice.
Our current read (analysis of 2026-08-27): Designation Watch · Gem Score -7 (−100…+100 Quality+Value blend) · Quality 9 · Value -18 · Sentiment -5 (timing only, not weighted)
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profile-header/price-overview— company profile, live quote, market capextended-analysis— the core: three AI lens reads with findings, scores, and the analyst memofuture-predictions— our forward price-band predictionsmarket-narrative/ai-findings/gpt-critique— narrative context, cross-model findings, and an adversarial critique of our own analysis (near the end of the document)- Members-only sections (render as login gates for anonymous readers):
price-history,income-trend,key-metrics,financials(statement tables),insider-trading. The analysis above is public; the raw data tables require a free account.
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raw inputs are public-company filings and market data (via licensed data feeds);
every model, score, lens read, and prediction on this page is Delvantic's own analysis.
ASE Technology Holding Co., Ltd.
ASX NYSEASE Technology Holding Co., Ltd. Sponsored ADR represents ownership in ASE Technology Holding Co., Ltd., a leading provider of semiconductor manufacturing services. Through this structure, international investors gain exposure to the company’s operations in integrated circuit assembly and testing without directly holding local Taiwanese shares. ASE Technology Holding Co., Ltd. focuses on advanced IC packaging, including system-in-package and wafer-level packaging, as well as comprehensive testing services that cover front-end engineering, wafer probing, and final device qualification. The company also offers electronic manufacturing services, supporting customers across the global electronics supply chain. Serving major semiconductor and electronics brands worldwide, ASE Technology Holding Co., Ltd. plays an important role in enabling high-performance chips used in consumer devices, computing, communications infrastructure, and industrial applications. Founded in 1984 and headquartered in Kaohsiung, Taiwan, it operates across Asia, the United States, and Europe, helping bridge design and fabrication with reliable back-end manufacturing and testing capabilities.
Price Overview
Price History (1 Year)
Revenue & Net Income Trend
ASE Technology Holding Co., Ltd. is a foreign private issuer — it reports to the U.S. SEC once a year (on Form 20-F or 40-F) rather than filing the quarterly statements (10-Q) that U.S.-domiciled companies must submit. Our financial statements are read directly from SEC filings, so for this company only annual figures exist at the source.
This is a property of how the company files, not missing or broken data — its filing history shows 9 annual reports, the latest filed 2026-04-01, and no quarterly filings . The company may still publish quarterly results on its own investor-relations site.
| Period | Revenue | Net Income | Net Margin | YoY/QoQ |
|---|
Key Metrics
EPS (Diluted): 0.27
Total Equity: $11.44B
Shares: 4,429,553,000
Total Debt: $7.27B
Cash: $2.87B
EBITDA: $3.69B
Total Debt: $7.27B
Cash: $2.87B
Revenue: $20.02B
Revenue: $20.02B
Revenue: $20.02B
Total Equity: $11.44B
Tax Rate: 19.7%
Equity: $11.44B
Total Debt: $7.27B
Cash: $2.87B
Current Liabilities: $7.71B
Long-Term Debt: $6.29B
Total Debt: $7.27B
Total Equity: $11.44B
Shares: 4,429,553,000
Shares: 4,429,553,000
CapEx: -$5.11B
Shares: 4,429,553,000
Stock Price: $39.14
Net Income: $1.24B
Industry Benchmarks
Income Statement (Annual)
Last updated: Aug 11, 2026 10:20am (57d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | $17.7B | $20.8B | $18.1B | $18.5B | $20.0B |
| Cost of Revenue | $14.3B | $16.6B | $15.2B | $15.5B | $16.5B |
| Gross Profit | $3.4B | $4.2B | $2.8B | $3.0B | $3.5B |
| Operating Expenses | $1.5B | $1.7B | $1.6B | $1.8B | $1.9B |
| Operating Income | $2.0B | $2.5B | $1.3B | $1.3B | $1.6B |
| Net Income | $1.9B | $1.9B | $1.1B | $1.0B | $1.2B |
| EBITDA | $3.7B | $4.2B | $3.1B | $3.1B | $3.7B |
| EPS | $0.43 | $0.45 | $0.26 | $0.23 | $0.29 |
| EPS (Diluted) | $0.42 | $0.43 | $0.25 | $0.22 | $0.27 |
Balance Sheet (Annual)
Last updated: Aug 11, 2026 10:20am (57d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cash & Equivalents | $2.4B | $1.8B | $2.1B | $2.4B | $2.9B |
| Total Current Assets | $9.1B | $9.3B | $8.1B | $8.5B | $9.7B |
| Total Assets | $20.9B | $22.0B | $20.7B | $23.0B | $27.6B |
| Current Liabilities | $6.7B | $7.1B | $7.0B | $7.3B | $7.7B |
| Long-Term Debt | $3.6B | $2.9B | $2.5B | $3.8B | $6.3B |
| Total Liabilities | $12.6B | $12.2B | $10.9B | $12.4B | $16.2B |
| Total Equity | $8.3B | $9.7B | $9.8B | $10.6B | $11.4B |
| Retained Earnings | $2.7B | $3.6B | $3.5B | $3.8B | $4.2B |
Cash Flow (Annual)
Last updated: Aug 11, 2026 10:20am (57d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Operating Cash Flow | $2.5B | $3.4B | $3.6B | $2.8B | $4.4B |
| Capital Expenditure | -$2.2B | -$2.3B | -$1.7B | -$2.5B | -$5.1B |
| Free Cash Flow | $336.0M | $1.2B | $1.9B | $349.5M | -$694.8M |
| Acquisitions (net) | -$5.6M | $0 | -$38.0M | -$50.5M | -$8.0M |
| Net Debt Issued / (Repaid) | — | — | — | — | — |
| Dividends Paid | — | — | — | — | — |
| Stock Buybacks | — | — | — | — | — |
| Net Change in Cash | $761.2M | -$559.5M | $286.8M | $285.7M | $495.7M |
Growth Trends (YoY %)
Last updated: Aug 11, 2026 10:20am (57d ago)| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue Growth | +17.7% | -13.3% | +2.3% | +8.4% |
| Gross Profit Growth | +22.3% | -32.0% | +5.6% | +17.8% |
| Operating Income Growth | +28.2% | -48.7% | -3.1% | +27.5% |
| Net Income Growth | +2.2% | -42.3% | -8.7% | +23.6% |
| EBITDA Growth | +16.0% | -27.0% | +0.4% | +18.7% |
Dividend History (Last 20)
Last updated: Aug 11, 2026 10:21am (57d ago)| Date | Dividend | Declaration | Record | Payment |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-07-06 | $0.42 | — | — | — |
| 2025-07-02 | $0.36 | — | — | — |
| 2024-07-02 | $0.32 | — | — | — |
| 2023-06-30 | $0.57 | — | — | — |
| 2022-06-29 | $0.47 | — | — | — |
| 2021-09-03 | $0.30 | — | — | — |
| 2020-08-13 | $0.14 | — | — | — |
| 2019-08-13 | $0.16 | — | — | — |
| 2018-08-10 | $0.16 | — | — | — |
| 2018-04-18 | $0.37 | — | — | — |
| 2017-08-09 | $0.23 | — | — | — |
| 2016-08-15 | $0.25 | — | — | — |
| 2015-08-10 | $0.32 | — | — | — |
| 2014-08-13 | $0.22 | — | — | — |
| 2013-07-30 | $0.18 | — | — | — |
| 2012-08-20 | $0.10 | — | — | — |
| 2011-08-12 | $0.09 | — | — | — |
| 2010-07-27 | $0.04 | — | — | — |
| 2009-07-27 | $0.05 | — | — | — |
| 2008-08-13 | $0.18 | — | — | — |
Deep Analysis
Risk : Reward — upside vs downside from this company's own quarters
Not computed yetNarrative Economics
market-narrative step).
Claude Reading
Starting with the raw numbers before touching the model outputs: ASE did $20.02B revenue in 2025 vs $17.68B in 2021 — that's a 3.2% CAGR over four years, not the 5.3% momentum figure (which reflects a shorter window). Net income of $1.24B in 2025 is *below* 2021's $1.87B and 2022's $1.91B, meaning four years on, earnings have gone backward by ~35% at peak-to-current. Gross margins have compressed from 20.1% (2022) to 17.7% (2025); operating margins from 12.1% to 8.0%. This is not a "mature earner recovering" — this is a business whose peak-cycle economics have deteriorated. Meanwhile capex ran $5.11B against $4.41B operating cash flow, producing *negative* $695M FCF. Net debt is $4.4B against $11.4B equity. At $82.65B market cap and $1.24B NI, that's a genuine 66x P/E (not 144x — the FMP figure looks stale or diluted-share adjusted oddly), and ~19x EV/EBITDA on a business earning 8% ROIC against a probable 9-10% cost of capital. That's value destruction at current returns.
The synthesis verdict of a $2.55–$3.06 fair value is absurd on its face and I dissent from the magnitude — ASE generated $4.4B of operating cash flow; even a punitive 10x OCF haircut for the capex intensity gets you to ~$20/share, not $3. The DCF is likely choking on the negative FCF print without normalizing capex (advanced packaging buildout is discretionary growth capex, not maintenance). That said, the *direction* of the synthesis is right: at $39, you're paying 8.7x sales for a business with 6% net margins and structurally declining returns on capital. A defensible fair value using normalized mid-cycle earnings ($1.6-1.8B, splitting the difference between 2021-22 peak and 2023-25 trough) and 15x — generous for a cyclical packager — gets $24-27/share. The stock is 40-60% overvalued, not 93% overvalued.
The contrarian case worth taking seriously: ASE is genuinely the #1 OSAT globally, and CoWoS-adjacent advanced packaging is the actual bottleneck for AI accelerators — TSMC can't do it all, and Amkor is smaller. If the $5B capex cycle is front-loading capacity for a 2026-27 advanced packaging boom, then 2025 margins are trough and the FCF drought is investment, not decay. The 23.6% recent earnings YoY does hint at cyclical inflection. But — and this is where I side with the market-forces read — the insider activity is damning: nine sales in three weeks against option exercises, zero opportunistic buying, during what should be the setup for the AI packaging thesis. Insiders who believe in a 2026-27 margin explosion don't dump shares in July 2026. The narrative layer correctly identifies this as a "fallen-angel" story where geopolitical/AI premium is doing all the work; I'd add that ASE has structurally underperformed peers (Amkor's margins, TSMC's advanced packaging capture) despite the same tailwinds.
Where the models are thin: the pre-flight is right that this is "traditional" but the mature_earner classification undersells the cyclicality — this is a *cyclical capital-intensive contract manufacturer* and should be valued on mid-cycle normalized earnings, not trailing. The 144x PE anchor in the synthesis is misleading and probably drove the absurd $3 fair value. The market-forces claim of "losing the advanced packaging race" is overstated — ASE is behind TSMC in CoWoS but leads in FC-BGA and SiP, and hasn't been displaced, just outpaced. The insider signal is real but every ASX insider filing shows small routine sales; scale (3-5K share sales against an $82B cap) is trivial in dollar terms even if directionally negative. The absence of quarterly data is the real analytical hole — without seeing Q1-Q3 2026 trajectory, calling the cycle inflection is guesswork. Net-net: the synthesis has the right direction and wrong magnitude; ASE at $39 is expensive against realistic normalized earnings, but not a $3 stock. Fair value $24-28, with optionality on advanced packaging capture that I'd want to see prove itself in gross margin expansion above 20% before paying up.
GPT Reading
The core fact here is that ASE is being valued like a scarce AI infrastructure winner while its reported economics still look like a cyclical, capital-intensive outsourced assembly and test business. On 2025 numbers, revenue was $20.02B, only modestly above $18.05B in 2023 and still below the 2022 peak of $20.81B, yet the market cap is $82.65B. That is 4.1x revenue on a business with 17.7% gross margin, 8.0% operating margin, and 6.2% net margin. Net income of $1.24B against that valuation is the obvious problem: even if the stated 144x P/E is distorted by ADR/share-count quirks, the earnings yield is only about 1.5%. For a company generating ROIC of 8.1% and ROE of 10.9%, that multiple only makes sense if margins and returns are on the cusp of a structural reset upward. The historical record does not show that. In fact, 2022 was materially better: $20.81B revenue, $2.52B operating income, $1.91B net income. Today’s stock price is asking investors to pay far more for a business still earning well below its last cycle peak.
What stands out even more is the cash flow mismatch. Operating cash flow of $4.41B looks healthy, but capex of $5.11B drove free cash flow to negative $694.8M. That is not a one-off quirk you can wave away in this industry; it is central to the investment case. If ASE must keep spending at that level to maintain technology relevance in advanced packaging and testing, then accounting earnings overstate owner earnings. If capex normalizes sharply, the bull case improves, but then you have to explain why this year’s investment intensity should be capitalized as value-creating rather than merely defensive. Net debt is about $4.4B ($7.27B debt less $2.87B cash), so the balance sheet is not distressed, but it is hardly so pristine that investors should ignore the burden of funding growth in a low-margin business. A 23.6x EV/EBITDA multiple paired with negative FCF is rich for a supplier whose five-year revenue CAGR is just 5.3%.
The market is clearly paying for a narrative that ASE’s advanced packaging exposure will convert a mature OSAT model into something closer to a strategic tollbooth. I do not dismiss that outright; there is real scarcity in advanced packaging capacity, and AI/HPC content should be favorable to mix. But the numbers supplied here still do not show the fruits of that thesis in a durable way. Gross margin in 2025 was 17.7%, below 20.1% in 2022 and only modestly above 15.8% in 2024. Operating margin at 8.0% remains miles away from the kind of mid-teens level that could justify 4.3x EV/revenue. Even the recent recovery — revenue up 8.4% and earnings up 23.6% — looks more like rebound from a cyclical dip than evidence of a new earnings architecture. The “mature earner” label is much closer to reality than any implication that this should trade like a high-quality compounder.
The best case against my view is straightforward: this may be exactly the wrong moment to value ASE on trailing margins and FCF because the company is in the investment phase of a multiyear advanced-packaging upcycle. If 2025 capex of $5.11B is front-loaded for capacity that will be filled by AI accelerators, chiplets, and high-bandwidth-memory related packaging demand, then negative free cash flow today could precede a very strong cash harvest in 2027-2028. On that reading, the comparison to 2022 misses the point because mix is changing, not just volumes. A smart bull would also argue that $1.24B of net income is depressed relative to underlying earnings power, and that even a return to roughly $2.0B of net income with better pricing could make today’s valuation look less absurd, especially if investors are willing to underwrite geopolitical supply-chain scarcity. I weigh that differently because this business has had ample opportunity across cycles to demonstrate sustained margin expansion, and the data shown still points to a company where higher demand triggers higher spend almost as reliably as it triggers higher profits.
What would change my mind is not another quarter of revenue growth; it is proof that growth is translating into structurally better economics. Specifically, I would want to see operating margin move decisively above the 2022 level of 12.1% and stay there, with annual net income pushing past $2.0B while free cash flow turns clearly positive even after elevated investment. If ASE can show, say, $21B-$22B revenue with more than $2.5B operating income and at least $1B of positive FCF, then the case that advanced packaging has changed the model becomes real rather than aspirational. Short of that, a stock at $39 is pricing the destination while the financials still resemble the old business.
Grok Reading
The raw numbers describe a cyclical OSAT franchise that has only partially climbed out of the 2023–24 trough and is still far from the earnings power the market is capitalizing. Revenue recovered to $20.02B in 2025 from $18.47B and $18.05B the prior two years, an 8.4% bounce, yet remains below the $20.81B peak of 2022. Net income of $1.24B is up 24% year-over-year but sits 35% below the $1.91B printed in 2022 and even trails 2021’s $1.87B. Gross margin improved to 17.7% from 16.3%, operating margin to 8.0%, net to 6.2%—respectable sequential progress, but nowhere near the 20.1% gross and 12.1% operating margins of the last up-cycle. Meanwhile free cash flow is deeply negative at –$695M after $5.11B of capex against $4.41B of operating cash flow. The balance sheet can fund it for now (net debt roughly $4.4B, debt-to-equity 0.64, current ratio 1.26), but ROIC of 8.1% and ROE of 10.9% show that the capital being deployed is not yet earning its keep. At $39.14 and an $82.7B enterprise, the stock trades at roughly 67× trailing earnings (or the reported 144× depending on the share count convention), 8.7× sales and 23.6× EV/EBITDA for a business whose five-year revenue CAGR is only 5.3%. That multiple embeds a permanent step-change in returns that the income statement has not delivered.
The contradiction with the quantitative models is not that they flag overvaluation—they are directionally correct—but that their $2.55–$3 fair-value anchors look like a unit or ADR-conversion artifact and understate the cyclical floor. Even so, applying a generous mid-cycle multiple of 18–20× to a normalized $1.5–1.7B earnings run-rate still leaves intrinsic value well below $30, and closer to the low-to-mid $20s if margins mean-revert. Heavy insider sales after large option exercises reinforce that management is not treating $39 as cheap. The market narrative of “irreplaceable AI packaging chokepoint plus geopolitical nearshoring” is doing almost all the valuation work; the fundamentals remain those of a capital-intensive contract manufacturer with mid-single-digit growth and single-digit returns on incremental capital.
The strongest opposing case is that the $5.1B capex wave is precisely the advanced-packaging build-out (fan-out, 2.5D/3D, CoWoS alternatives) that will structurally lift mix and utilization once AI/HPC volumes scale. If ASE captures durable share of that wallet, gross margins could push back through 20% and operating margins toward the low teens, turning the current negative FCF into a multi-year compounding machine and justifying a higher terminal multiple. Geopolitical fragmentation of the supply chain could also keep utilization elevated longer than historical cycles, and the 23.6% earnings rebound already visible in 2025 may be the first inning rather than the last. Those are real options; they are simply already priced as if they are certainties.
I would reverse the overvalued call only if the next two reported years show free cash flow turning sustainably positive above $1.5B while operating margin clears 12% and revenue growth accelerates into the mid-teens on evidence of share gains in high-density advanced packaging—not just a cyclical volume bounce. Absent that evidence, the stock remains a narrative premium sitting on mediocre economics.
Big-3 Panel — where each AI stands
Advanced Analysis Forensic deep-dive · separate lenses
ASE is a mature, at-scale semiconductor assembly/test and EMS operator running roughly $20B in revenue with net income of $1.24B in the latest year. Reported earnings look real: OCF/NI of 2.55x, accruals at -8.3% of assets, Beneish M of -3.04 and Altman Z of 4.29 all point to clean accounting, and share count has crept only 0.4% CAGR with SBC just 0.4% of revenue - per-share value is not being eroded. That's a genuinely healthy integrity profile. The business trajectory, however, has softened versus the 2021-2022 peak. Gross margin fell from 20.1% in 2022 to 15.8-17.7% in 2023-2025, and operating margin roughly halved from 12.1% to 8.0%. Net income is down from $1.91B (2022) to $1.24B (2025) even as revenue recovered to $20.02B. FCF is the sharpest concern: after $1.87B in 2023 it collapsed to $349M in 2024 and to -$695M in 2025, driving the balance sheet from a modest position into $4.4B net debt against only $2.87B cash. Capex intensity is doing the damage - consistent with the industry-wide advanced packaging build-out - but it means the survival math depends on that spend converting into future returns. Liquidity is adequate (16+ quarters of runway at current burn), dilution discipline is strong, and insider selling by Uang Du-Tsuen and Chen Jeffrey is steady but small relative to a $82B cap - not a governance red flag on this tape, though the zero-buy pattern is worth noting. Overall: a solid, cyclical, well-run industrial-tech business with clean books, but with margin compression and cash-flow strain that prevent a higher grade.
Verify before trusting this (6)
- Capex plan and expected inflection point for advanced-packaging investments to convert into FCF
- Debt maturity schedule and covenant headroom given the swing to $4.4B net debt
- Customer concentration in advanced packaging (likely NVIDIA/AMD/Apple exposure)
- Whether recent insider sales are 10b5-1 planned or discretionary
- Segment split between ATM (packaging/test) and EMS margins to understand mix pressure
- Return on incremental invested capital in the current capex cycle
The composite fair value of $3.06 and signal-adjusted $2.55 versus a $38.97 price implies a 93% overvaluation - this is almost certainly a runaway model, not reality. ASE earned roughly $2.50-3.00 per ADS in normalized years and trades around 13-15x earnings, which is a middle-of-the-road multiple for a scaled, cyclical OSAT with clean accounting and real cash generation. I discard the DCF ($1.30) and EPV ($2.43) as unusable; the anchored-PE at $7.19 also looks stale or on a different share basis. On honest quality-adjusted numbers, deserved value sits in a band around the current price. The Company-Quality lens flags margin compression, negative FCF, and rising net debt while capex accelerates for advanced packaging - that is exactly what caps the deserved multiple. The bull case (AI packaging, CoWoS-adjacent demand, reshoring) is real but is already partially in the tape after a strong run; the bear case (cyclical peak, low-moat contract manufacturer) is equally live. Net: no visible margin of safety, but no glaring overpricing either. A cheap call requires the price to come in - I would want mid-$30s or lower before leaning in on valuation alone.
Verify before trusting this (5)
- Advanced packaging (CoWoS/FOPLP) revenue mix and utilization in the next quarterly transcript
- Capex guidance vs operating cash flow - is FCF turning back positive in 2025?
- Net debt trajectory and any signs of dividend/buyback pressure
- Customer concentration disclosures and any pricing give-backs to hyperscaler-tied OSAT demand
- Whether the anchored-PE input was built on TWD-denominated EPS vs USD ADS - reconcile share basis
The macro tape is a mild tailwind: risk-on regime (+47), VIX 15.5, S&P near highs. With beta 1.58, ASX is a high-sensitivity name that normally amplifies this tape, and the July 21 +8.5% move on AI-packaging/LEAP commentary shows the market is willing to reward the AI/advanced-packaging angle when it flares. That is the live tailwind on this ticker right now. Against that, the prevailing narrative is flagged as 'fallen-angel, strong intensity, fragile durability' with a loud bear framing that the price embeds peak AI/reshoring euphoria. That kind of fragile story is the type that snaps on any capex-normalization headline, and the 10y at 4.65% plus a 26x market PE is exactly the backdrop that punishes long-duration, narrative-priced cyclicals hardest. News flow in the last 72h is neutral-to-soft (ADR complex opened lower, routine monthly revenue release, no fresh catalyst), and momentum internals (rising D/E, weakening cash generation) give bears easy ammunition if the tape turns. Net: the risk-on/AI-packaging tailwind and the fragile-narrative/rates headwind roughly offset, with a slight lean to tailwind while the tape holds.
Verify before trusting this (5)
- Any AI-capex guidance cut or OSAT peer warning that would crack the fragile narrative
- TSMC/Nvidia advanced-packaging commentary and CoWoS/LEAP capacity headlines
- VIX break above 20 or a risk-off flip — high-beta names like ASX would lead down
- Analyst target revisions after the July 2026 monthly revenue print
- Taiwan/China geopolitical headlines that swing the 'chokepoint' premium
This lens hasn't been run for this ticker yet.
Prediction unavailable. No usable fair-value anchor — composite, DCF and anchored-PE are all absent from valuation-synthesis. Typical for pre-profit / narrative-platform names where those methods don't apply.