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What this page is: Delvantic's full research page for Clean Harbors, Inc. (CLH) — AI-driven forensic equity research: mechanical valuation models (DCF, EPV, anchored-PE, scenario) plus three independent AI lenses (Quality / Value / Sentiment). Everything below is rendered server-side; you are not missing content that requires JavaScript. All scores are predictions and research opinions, not financial advice.
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Clean Harbors, Inc.
CLH NYSEClean Harbors, Inc. is a leading environmental and industrial services company based in Norwell, Massachusetts. Clean Harbors provides hazardous and non-hazardous waste collection, transportation, treatment, recycling, and disposal services, along with emergency spill response, industrial cleaning, maintenance, and field services. Through its Safety-Kleen Sustainability Solutions segment, the company also offers parts cleaning and related environmental services to commercial, industrial, and automotive customers, as well as used-oil re-refining and recycling services. Its customer base spans manufacturing, chemical, refining, automotive, utilities, government, and other industrial sectors across North America. Clean Harbors plays a central role in helping organizations manage regulated waste streams, support operational safety, and meet environmental compliance requirements through a broad network of specialized facilities and service locations.
Price Overview
Price History (1 Year)
Revenue & Net Income Trend
| Period | Revenue | Net Income | Net Margin | YoY/QoQ |
|---|
Key Metrics TTM · through Mar 31, 2026
EPS (Diluted): 7.39
Total Equity: $2.78B
Shares: 53,501,333
Total Debt: $2.77B
Cash: $547.99M
EBITDA: $1.13B
Total Debt: $2.77B
Cash: $547.99M
Revenue: $6.06B
Revenue: $6.06B
Revenue: $6.06B
Total Equity: $2.78B
Tax Rate: 26.4%
Equity: $2.78B
Total Debt: $2.77B
Cash: $547.99M
Current Liabilities: $1.04B
Long-Term Debt: $2.76B
Total Debt: $2.77B
Total Equity: $2.78B
Shares: 53,501,333
Shares: 53,501,333
CapEx: -$404.67M
Shares: 53,501,333
Stock Price: $317.10
Net Income: $395.50M
Industry Benchmarks
Income Statement (Annual)
Last updated: Sep 7, 2026 10:45am (30d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | $3.8B | $5.2B | $5.4B | $5.9B | $6.0B |
| Cost of Revenue | $2.6B | $3.5B | $3.7B | $4.1B | $4.1B |
| Gross Profit | $1.2B | $1.6B | $1.7B | $1.8B | $1.9B |
| Operating Expenses | $847.8M | $987.9M | $1.1B | $1.2B | $1.2B |
| Operating Income | $347.9M | $634.7M | $612.4M | $670.2M | $673.4M |
| Net Income | $203.2M | $411.7M | $377.9M | $402.3M | $391.0M |
| EBITDA | $646.0M | $982.3M | $978.2M | $1.1B | $1.1B |
| EPS | $3.73 | $7.59 | $6.99 | $7.46 | $7.31 |
| EPS (Diluted) | $3.71 | $7.56 | $6.95 | $7.42 | $7.28 |
Balance Sheet (Annual)
Last updated: Sep 7, 2026 10:45am (30d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cash & Equivalents | $452.6M | $492.6M | $444.7M | $687.2M | $826.3M |
| Total Current Assets | $1.7B | $2.0B | $2.1B | $2.4B | $2.6B |
| Total Assets | $5.7B | $6.1B | $6.4B | $7.4B | $7.6B |
| Current Liabilities | $925.3M | $1.0B | $1.0B | $1.1B | $1.1B |
| Long-Term Debt | $2.6B | $2.5B | $2.4B | $2.9B | $3.0B |
| Total Liabilities | $4.1B | $4.2B | $4.1B | $4.8B | $4.9B |
| Total Equity | $1.5B | $1.9B | $2.2B | $2.6B | $2.7B |
| Retained Earnings | $1.2B | $1.6B | $2.0B | $2.4B | $2.8B |
Cash Flow (Annual)
Last updated: Sep 7, 2026 10:45am (30d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Operating Cash Flow | $546.0M | $626.2M | $734.6M | $777.8M | $866.7M |
| Capital Expenditure | -$241.9M | -$345.1M | -$422.3M | -$432.2M | -$424.9M |
| Free Cash Flow | $304.1M | $281.2M | $312.3M | $345.5M | $441.8M |
| Acquisitions (net) | -$1.3B | -$86.3M | -$119.6M | -$478.0M | $0 |
| Net Debt Issued / (Repaid) | -$7.5M | -$115.7M | -$124.0M | $484.3M | -$4.9M |
| Dividends Paid | — | — | — | — | — |
| Stock Buybacks | -$54.4M | -$50.2M | -$51.2M | -$55.2M | -$250.0M |
| Net Change in Cash | -$66.5M | $40.0M | -$47.9M | $242.5M | $139.1M |
Growth Trends (YoY %)
Last updated: Sep 7, 2026 10:45am (30d ago)| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue Growth | +35.8% | +4.7% | +8.9% | +2.4% |
| Gross Profit Growth | +35.7% | +2.5% | +9.7% | +3.4% |
| Operating Income Growth | +82.5% | -3.5% | +9.4% | +0.5% |
| Net Income Growth | +102.6% | -8.2% | +6.5% | -2.8% |
| EBITDA Growth | +52.1% | -0.4% | +9.5% | +4.5% |
Dividend History (Last 20)
Last updated: Sep 7, 2026 10:45am (30d ago)| Date | Dividend | Declaration | Record | Payment |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2007-02-02 | $0.00 | — | — | — |
| 2007-01-29 | $0.46 | — | — | — |
| 2006-07-27 | $0.46 | — | — | — |
| 2005-07-27 | $0.46 | — | — | — |
| 2005-01-27 | $0.46 | — | — | — |
| 2004-07-28 | $0.46 | — | — | — |
| 2004-01-28 | $0.46 | — | — | — |
| 2003-07-29 | $0.46 | — | — | — |
| 2003-01-29 | $0.46 | — | — | — |
| 2002-07-29 | $0.46 | — | — | — |
| 2002-01-29 | $0.46 | — | — | — |
| 2001-07-27 | $0.21 | — | — | — |
Deep Analysis
Risk : Reward — upside vs downside from this company's own quarters
Not computed yetNarrative Economics
market-narrative step).
Claude Reading
Let me do the arithmetic before I touch any model output. TTM revenue is $6.06B, TTM net income is $395.5M, giving a 6.5% net margin and a 42.3x trailing P/E at $317. TTM free cash flow is $442M, which is a 2.6% FCF yield on a $16.74B market cap. Revenue grew 2.4% from 2024 to 2025 ($5.89B to $6.03B), and the most recent quarter-over-quarter print shows $1.46B in March 2026 versus $1.55B in June 2025 — a 5.8% sequential decline that is partly seasonal (Q1 is the trough, Q2 the peak) but the year-over-year comparison of $1.46B to $1.43B is only 2.1% growth. Earnings are actually shrinking: 2025 NI of $391M is below 2024's $402M, and the March 2026 quarter's $63.2M is the weakest print in the eight-quarter window. The "5.2% revenue CAGR" and "2.7% earnings CAGR" in the momentum block are artifacts of the 2021→2022 M&A step-change; strip that out and you have a business growing 2-3% with flat-to-declining profitability. ROIC of 10% is adequate but not exceptional, and the 14.8% ROE is flattered by a leverage ratio (D/E of 1.0) that is, frankly, unremarkable for the sector.
Now the models. The Valuation Synthesis lands at $78-88 fair value, a 75% discount to spot. I ran my own DCF: $442M FCF growing at 5% for five years, 4% terminal growth, 9.5% discount rate, net debt of $2.14B, 52.8M shares — I get roughly $145 per share. At 6% growth and 9% discount, maybe $175. The synthesis number is too punitive because it bakes in 3-4% growth and a 10-11% discount rate on a business that has a genuinely recurring Safety-Kleen platform with pricing power and a real M&A optionality kicker. But I am firmly in the "overvalued" camp. At 43x earnings and 17x EV/EBITDA, CLH trades at a 60-80% premium to WM and RSG, and the only fundamental differentiator is the Safety-Kleen recurring-revenue mix, which is real but not worth a 2x multiple premium. The FCF yield of 2.6% is below the 10-year Treasury, meaning you are paying growth-stock prices for a value-stock cash-flow profile. The Thesis Evaluation's claim that the market is pricing in a 40.9% FCF CAGR is overstated — a more honest read is that the market is pricing in 15-20% FCF growth over five years, which is still 5-7x the demonstrated rate. Either way, the gap between what the business is producing and what the price demands is the core problem.
The Narrative layer's framing — 60-65% defensible cash-flow math, 35-40% ESG/regulatory premium — is the most intellectually honest of the model outputs, but I'd shift the split. I'd say 40-50% of the price is defensible even at optimistic (but reasonable) assumptions, and 50-60% is the "regulated essential services + ESG mandate" premium that institutional allocators are paying for portfolio construction rather than for cash-flow yield. That premium is durable in the sense that ESG mandates aren't going away, but it is not a moat; it is a flow of capital that can redirect if relative valuations shift. The bear case in the narrative layer — "a waste-hauling company growing 5-7% with a labor-cost headwind" — undersells the problem because the actual growth is 2-3%, not 5-7%. The insider data is pure noise: seven F-InKind entries of 40-1,343 shares each (restricted stock vesting) and one 789-share sale. No executive is buying, no one is dumping. Zero signal.
Where the data is genuinely thin: we have no segment-level revenue or margin split between Safety-Kleen (recurring) and the environmental services/project arm (lumpy, M&A-dependent). Without that, you cannot assess whether the recurring-revenue mix is expanding or whether the project arm is dragging. The quarterly seasonality (Q1 net margin 4.3% vs. Q2 8.2%) means any single-quarter comparison is misleading, and the TTM window smooths over a business that is clearly cyclical at the margin. The balance sheet is fine — $826M cash against $2.97B debt, current ratio 2.34 — but it is not a fortress, and the $425M annual capex is a real drag that keeps FCF at 7.3% of revenue rather than the 12-15% you'd want for a 43x multiple. The contrarian bull case is straightforward: CLH is a strategic acquisition target, Safety-Kleen is a platform a larger player would pay 25-35x EBITDA for, and a takeout at a 25% premium puts the stock at $396. But that is a speculative catalyst, not a fundamental justification, and it has not materialized in three years of data.
GPT Reading
Grok Reading
Advanced Analysis Forensic deep-dive · separate lenses
Clean Harbors has grown revenue from $4.17B in 2022 to $6.06B in 2026 (roughly 45 percent cumulative), with gross margin holding steady near 31 percent and operating margin settling around 11 percent after a 2023 spike to 12.6 percent. Free cash flow has accelerated from $134M to $467M over the same span, and the OCF-to-net-income ratio of 1.89x confirms that reported earnings are well backed by actual cash. Negative accruals of -4.7 percent of assets and a Beneish M-score of -2.77 rule out the most common earnings-manipulation patterns. The business is self-funding and does not need external capital to operate or service its obligations.
Capital allocation discipline is a genuine strength: diluted share count has shrunk from 54.7M to 53.5M, stock-based compensation is only 0.6 percent of revenue, and buybacks run at 345 percent of SBC. Management is concentrating per-share value rather than diluting it. The one structural constraint is net debt of $2.1B against $669M of liquid cash, which makes the balance sheet a constraint rather than a cushion, though at roughly 2.5-3x EBITDA it is serviceable for a company generating $467M in annual FCF.
Insider tape is unremarkable: the recent entries are overwhelmingly F-InKind tax withholdings on vesting restricted stock, with a single small open-market sale of 789 shares ($225.8K) and no open-market purchases. No red flag, no strong conviction signal either. The business is a mature earner in a defensive, recurring-revenue sector, and the data shows a well-run operation that is improving on a cash basis even as top-line growth moderates.
Verify before trusting this (5)
- 10-K segment detail: what share of the $6.06B revenue is recurring contract vs. project-based, and what is customer concentration (top-10 customer %)?
- Convertible or term-loan covenants tied to the $2.1B net debt: leverage ratios, interest-coverage tests, and any maturity wall in the next 24 months.
- 2023 net-income spike to $438.8M vs. ~$375-395M in subsequent years: confirm whether it included a one-time tax benefit, asset sale, or acquisition-related gain.
- Capex trajectory: is the $467M FCF sustainable if capex normalizes upward as the company invests in new treatment capacity?
- Insider ownership percentage and any upcoming option/RSU vesting cliffs that could create near-term selling pressure.
Clean Harbors trades at $317.10 against a composite fair value of $88.46 and a signal-adjusted FV of $78.40, implying a 259% premium over deserved value. Even the most generous single method, the DCF at $102.33, is only 32% of the current price, and the EPV floor of $60.73 is a mere 19%. The e2e synthesis flags this as 'Potentially Overvalued' with -75% upside, and I find that verdict conservative given the magnitude of the gap. The business is solid (quality 45), earnings are high-quality (score 3), and the cash generation is real, but none of that justifies a 30x+ earnings multiple for a company growing 5-7% with a labor-cost headwind. The market appears to be pricing CLH as a 20%+ compounder with expanding margins and a wide structural moat, when the actual profile is a regulated essential-services utility with steady but modest growth. The 'ESG moat' narrative is doing heavy lifting in the multiple that the underlying economics do not earn.
Verify before trusting this (4)
- Latest earnings call: any evidence of acceleration above 7% revenue growth or margin expansion that would justify a higher terminal multiple in the DCF
- Segment-level growth rates for Safety-Kleen vs. industrial services to confirm whether the 5-7% aggregate is masking a faster-growing sub-segment
- Net debt trajectory and share buyback pace over the next 4 quarters to see if the equity value is being artificially supported by balance-sheet shrinkage
- Any pending M&A pipeline or regulatory changes (e.g., new hazardous-waste mandates) that could structurally raise the growth rate above the 5-7% base case
This lens hasn't been run for this ticker yet.
This lens hasn't been run for this ticker yet.