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What this page is: Delvantic's full research page for The Kroger Co. (KR) — AI-driven forensic equity research: mechanical valuation models (DCF, EPV, anchored-PE, scenario) plus three independent AI lenses (Quality / Value / Sentiment). Everything below is rendered server-side; you are not missing content that requires JavaScript. All scores are predictions and research opinions, not financial advice.
Our current read (analysis of 2026-09-23): Designation Low · Gem Score -35 (−100…+100 Quality+Value blend) · Quality 14 · Value -68 · Sentiment 5 (timing only, not weighted) · Composite fair value $46.67 vs $58.45 at analysis
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profile-header/price-overview— company profile, live quote, market capextended-analysis— the core: three AI lens reads with findings, scores, and the analyst memofuture-predictions— our forward price-band predictionsmarket-narrative/ai-findings/gpt-critique— narrative context, cross-model findings, and an adversarial critique of our own analysis (near the end of the document)- Members-only sections (render as login gates for anonymous readers):
price-history,income-trend,key-metrics,financials(statement tables),insider-trading. The analysis above is public; the raw data tables require a free account.
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The Kroger Co.
KR NYSEThe Kroger Co. is a leading American food and drug retailer headquartered in Cincinnati, Ohio. The company operates a broad network of supermarkets, multi-department stores, marketplace stores, and warehouse-style locations across the United States, serving everyday grocery needs alongside pharmacy, health, and general merchandise offerings. Its business also includes fuel centers, online grocery shopping, pickup and delivery services, and private-label products that span fresh foods, pantry staples, and household essentials. Kroger supports its retail operations with manufacturing and distribution capabilities, helping supply many of its own brand products and maintain a wide assortment across regional banners. With a focus on food, pharmacy, and convenience retail, The Kroger Co. plays a major role in U.S. consumer staples and grocery distribution.
Price Overview
Price History (1 Year)
Revenue & Net Income Trend
| Period | Revenue | Net Income | Net Margin | YoY/QoQ |
|---|
Key Metrics
EPS (Diluted): 1.54
Total Equity: $5.94B
Shares: 655,000,000
Total Debt: $15.88B
Cash: $3.33B
EBITDA: $5.22B
Total Debt: $15.88B
Cash: $3.33B
Revenue: $147.64B
Revenue: $147.64B
Revenue: $147.64B
Total Equity: $5.94B
Tax Rate: 14.7%
Equity: $5.94B
Total Debt: $15.88B
Cash: $3.33B
Current Liabilities: $18.11B
Long-Term Debt: $14.51B
Total Debt: $15.88B
Total Equity: $5.94B
Shares: 655,000,000
Shares: 655,000,000
CapEx: -$3.86B
Shares: 655,000,000
Stock Price: $59.08
Net Income: $1.02B
Industry Benchmarks
Income Statement (Annual)
Last updated: Aug 25, 2026 11:56pm (28d ago)| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 | 2026 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | $137.9B | $148.3B | $150.0B | $147.1B | $147.6B |
| Cost of Revenue | $107.5B | $116.5B | $116.7B | $113.7B | $113.2B |
| Gross Profit | $30.3B | $31.8B | $33.4B | $33.4B | $34.4B |
| Operating Expenses | $26.9B | $27.7B | $30.3B | $29.6B | $32.5B |
| Operating Income | $3.5B | $4.1B | $3.1B | $3.8B | $1.9B |
| Net Income | $1.7B | $2.2B | $2.2B | $2.7B | $1.0B |
| EBITDA | $6.3B | $7.1B | $6.2B | $7.1B | $5.2B |
| EPS | $2.20 | $3.10 | $2.99 | $3.70 | $1.55 |
| EPS (Diluted) | $2.17 | $3.06 | $2.96 | $3.67 | $1.54 |
Balance Sheet (Annual)
Last updated: Aug 25, 2026 11:30pm (28d ago)| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 | 2026 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cash & Equivalents | $1.8B | $1.0B | $1.9B | $4.0B | $3.3B |
| Total Current Assets | $12.2B | $12.7B | $12.9B | $15.3B | $14.5B |
| Total Assets | $49.1B | $49.6B | $50.5B | $52.6B | $50.0B |
| Current Liabilities | $16.3B | $17.2B | $16.1B | $15.9B | $18.1B |
| Long-Term Debt | $11.3B | $10.1B | $10.2B | $15.8B | $14.5B |
| Total Liabilities | $39.7B | $39.6B | $38.9B | $44.3B | $44.0B |
| Total Equity | $9.4B | $10.0B | $11.6B | $8.3B | $5.9B |
| Retained Earnings | $24.1B | $25.6B | $26.9B | $28.7B | $28.9B |
Cash Flow (Annual)
Last updated: Aug 25, 2026 11:56pm (28d ago)| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 | 2026 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Operating Cash Flow | $6.2B | $4.5B | $6.8B | $5.8B | $7.3B |
| Capital Expenditure | -$2.6B | -$3.1B | -$3.9B | -$4.0B | -$3.9B |
| Free Cash Flow | $3.6B | $1.4B | $2.9B | $1.8B | $3.5B |
| Acquisitions (net) | — | — | — | — | — |
| Net Debt Issued / (Repaid) | -$1.4B | -$552.0M | -$1.3B | $5.6B | -$497.0M |
| Dividends Paid | -$589.0M | -$682.0M | -$796.0M | -$883.0M | -$885.0M |
| Stock Buybacks | -$1.6B | -$993.0M | -$62.0M | -$4.2B | -$2.7B |
| Net Change in Cash | $134.0M | -$806.0M | $868.0M | $2.1B | -$625.0M |
Growth Trends (YoY %)
Last updated: Aug 25, 2026 11:56pm (28d ago)| Metric | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 | 2026 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue Growth | +7.5% | +1.2% | -1.9% | +0.4% |
| Gross Profit Growth | +4.7% | +5.0% | +0.1% | +3.0% |
| Operating Income Growth | +18.7% | -25.0% | +24.3% | -50.9% |
| Net Income Growth | +35.6% | -3.6% | +23.2% | -61.9% |
| EBITDA Growth | +12.5% | -12.3% | +14.0% | -26.4% |
Dividend History (Last 20)
Last updated: Aug 25, 2026 7:37am (28d ago)| Date | Dividend | Declaration | Record | Payment |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-08-14 | $0.39 | — | — | — |
| 2026-05-15 | $0.35 | — | — | — |
| 2026-02-13 | $0.35 | — | — | — |
| 2025-11-14 | $0.35 | — | — | — |
| 2025-08-15 | $0.35 | — | — | — |
| 2025-05-15 | $0.32 | — | — | — |
| 2025-02-14 | $0.32 | — | — | — |
| 2024-11-15 | $0.32 | — | — | — |
| 2024-08-15 | $0.32 | — | — | — |
| 2024-05-14 | $0.29 | — | — | — |
| 2024-02-14 | $0.29 | — | — | — |
| 2023-11-14 | $0.29 | — | — | — |
| 2023-08-14 | $0.29 | — | — | — |
| 2023-05-12 | $0.26 | — | — | — |
| 2023-02-14 | $0.26 | — | — | — |
| 2022-11-14 | $0.26 | — | — | — |
| 2022-08-12 | $0.26 | — | — | — |
| 2022-05-12 | $0.21 | — | — | — |
| 2022-02-14 | $0.21 | — | — | — |
| 2021-11-12 | $0.21 | — | — | — |
Deep Analysis
Risk : Reward — upside vs downside from this company's own quarters
Computed 2026-09-23 02:03A +1σ run of quarters pays -59%; a −1σ run costs 77%. Ratio -0.8:1 (μ 0.5%, σ 3.0% floored by absolute, 16 pairs).
Older method (repeat-worst-quarter): 3.8 : 1
| Case | Growth | Margin | Fair value | vs price ($58.45) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Bull — recovery | +1% | 9.2% | $237.51 | +306% |
| Base — stabilizes | +1% | 8.0% | $203.76 | +249% |
| Bear — keeps slipping | +0% | 6.8% | $170.95 | +192% |
| Stress — last quarter repeats | +1% | 0.4% | $10.87 | -81% |
| Upside — a +1σ run of quarters (v2) | +4% | 0.8% | $23.71 | -59% |
| Stress — a −1σ run of quarters (v2) | -2% | 0.5% | $13.31 | -77% |
Narrative Economics
market-narrative step).
Growth Outlook
Analyzed 2026-08-26 00:04The question every valuation on this page silently assumes: is this company likely to grow? Judged forward — the business, its category, the world — against what's already printed.
Claude Reading
The raw numbers tell a less dramatic story than "structurally challenged retailer trapped between Walmart and Amazon." Revenue is essentially flat at $147-150B for four straight years — this is the definition of a mature GDP-tracker, not a business in decline. The real problem is the $1.32B loss in the Nov-2025 quarter, which is what tanked FY2026 net income to $1.02B (vs. $2.67B prior) and inflated the trailing P/E to 38x. Strip that quarter out and the other three quarters annualize to roughly $2.8B in NI — right in line with the $2.16-2.67B run rate of the prior two years. On normalized earnings of ~$2.7B against a $36.2B cap, you get a P/E closer to 13.4x, not 38x. That single charge (almost certainly Albertsons breakup fees and related litigation reserves) is doing enormous damage to every ratio the synthesis engine is anchoring on.
The synthesis verdict of $41.61 signal-adjusted fair value looks mechanically wrong for this reason. EV/EBITDA of 9.8x is not a distressed multiple — it's roughly in line with WMT's historical range and above COST's grocery-only segment. FCF of $3.46B against a $36.2B cap is a 9.6% FCF yield, and FCF CAGR is actually +9.5% even as reported earnings collapsed — which is the tell that the earnings compression is non-cash/one-time. Operating cash flow of $7.31B on $147B revenue is exactly the kind of durable cash machine that anchors a 12-15x normalized multiple, implying fair value of $54-68. The market at $59 is pricing this roughly correctly on normalized earnings, not embedding a 37% narrative premium.
Where I disagree with the model stack: the Market Forces layer calls this "structurally challenged" and "permanently impaired," but the gross margin actually expanded from 21.4% (FY22) to 23.3% (FY26) — that's 190 bps of expansion during the exact period Walmart and Amazon supposedly crushed them. Private label penetration and pharmacy mix are working. The Narrative layer's claim that $58 embeds "belief in merger completion" is stale — the Albertsons deal died in December 2024, and the stock is *higher* now than it was pre-breakup. So the narrative premium theory is falsified by price action. The contrarian case here is actually the bull case: the model consensus is over-indexed on a single ugly quarter and a dead merger narrative, and the balance sheet (debt/equity 2.67x, current ratio 0.80) looks scarier than it is for a company converting $7.3B in operating cash annually. That said, the bear has real ammunition: ROIC of 8.7% is below WACC for a capital-intensive retailer, recent revenue YoY of 0.4% confirms zero organic growth, and the 87% payout ratio is only "safe" if you normalize earnings — on GAAP trailing it's unsustainable. Insider activity is pure vesting noise, tells us nothing.
The careful contrarian argument against my bullish lean: grocery is a share-loss business against Walmart's grocery unit (growing MSD) and Aldi/Costco (growing HSD in food), and Kroger's 0.4% revenue growth in a 3% inflation environment means real volumes are declining ~2-3% annually. That's the slow bleed that eventually shows up in deleverage on fixed costs and margin compression — the 190 bps of gross margin expansion could reverse. Also, $15.88B debt against $5.94B equity with a 0.80 current ratio is not a fortress; a recession that compressed operating margins from 1.3% to 0.5% would be genuinely dangerous. I dissent from the synthesis "overvalued at $41.61" verdict but not from a general caution — this is a fairly-valued mature cash cow, not a value opportunity and not a short. The $41.61 target requires believing the trailing GAAP earnings are the true run rate, which the FCF and prior years contradict.
GPT Reading
The number that matters here is not the optically absurd 38x P/E; it is the gap between depressed accounting earnings and still-solid cash generation. Kroger did $147.6 billion of revenue in FY2026, basically flat versus $147.1 billion the year before and still below the $150.0 billion posted in FY2024, so this is not a growth story. But it also produced $7.31 billion of operating cash flow and $3.46 billion of free cash flow after a hefty $3.86 billion of capex. Against a $36.2 billion market cap, that is roughly a 9.6% FCF yield. For a grocer with entrenched scale, that is not expensive. The market cap also sits at just 0.26x sales and EV/revenue of 0.35x. This is a low-margin business, yes, but investors often make the mistake of over-fixating on net income in years when one-off charges swamp the underlying engine.
That said, the underlying engine is not healthy enough to call this cheap outright. Annual operating income fell from $4.13 billion in FY2023 to $3.10 billion in FY2024, rebounded to $3.85 billion in FY2025, then collapsed to $1.89 billion in FY2026. Net income followed the same pattern: $2.24 billion, $2.16 billion, $2.67 billion, then $1.02 billion. Even if part of that decline reflects unusual items, the reported economics weakened materially. The quarterly sequence reinforces that concern: Kroger earned $617 million and $465 million in the comparable 2024 quarters, then $610 million and a startling negative $1.32 billion in 2025’s later quarter. A grocery retailer lives and dies by a few tenths of margin, and annual operating margin at 1.28% leaves no room for strategic mistakes. With debt of $15.9 billion against just $3.3 billion of cash, a current ratio of 0.80, and debt/equity of 2.67x, this is not a balance sheet you want to pair with a structurally deteriorating margin profile.
What stands out to me is that the valuation debate is being framed too dramatically in both directions. The bearish models leaning on earnings are directionally right that the business has lost earnings power, but they overstate the overvaluation because FY2026 earnings are clearly not a clean base for multiple work. The bullish instinct that “0.26x sales means bargain” is also too glib because grocery sales are low quality when net margin is only 0.69% and returns can be crushed by modest wage, shrink, or price investment pressure. Kroger today looks like a steady but ex-growth distributor of food whose normalized earning power is probably much closer to the FY2024-FY2025 band than FY2026 trough, yet whose strategic ceiling remains low. If normalized net income is, say, $2.2-$2.7 billion rather than $1.0 billion, the stock is trading more like 13-16x earnings, which is not demanding for a defensive staple but not obviously cheap for a business with negative three-year revenue CAGR and heavy reinvestment needs.
The strongest pushback to my more balanced-to-slightly-bearish view is the cash flow. A smart bull would say the market is buying $3.46 billion of annual FCF, not $1.02 billion of net income, and they would have a point. They would also note gross profit rose to $34.4 billion in FY2026 from $33.4 billion in FY2025 despite flat sales, implying mix or merchandising resilience, and ROIC near 8.7% is not broken for this sector. If Kroger can hold revenue around $148 billion, sustain gross margin around 23.3%, and restore operating income merely to the $3.0-$3.8 billion range, today’s price could look fine or even modestly cheap. I weigh that less heavily because grocery cash flow can flatter underlying economics when working capital and depreciation support reported FCF while true competitive intensity is rising. In this business, if operating margin settles closer to 1.3% than 2.5%, the multiple should stay capped.
What would change my mind is evidence that FY2026 was a genuine one-off trough rather than the start of a lower-margin era. Specifically, I would want to see quarterly net income return consistently into the $600 million-plus range without large special items, annual operating income recover above $3.0 billion, and free cash flow remain above $3.0 billion without cutting capex below maintenance needs. Conversely, if revenues stay flat around $34 billion a quarter but normalized net margins cannot get back above roughly 1.5%, then even $59 is too high for what is ultimately a capital-intensive, no-growth grocer. As it stands, the stock is not egregiously expensive on cash flow, but it is too expensive to underwrite confidently without proof that FY2026 earnings damage is reversible.
Grok Reading
The numbers on Kroger describe a mature grocery franchise that has stopped growing and is bleeding operating leverage. Revenue is effectively flat across the cycle—$147.64B in the latest annual period versus $147.12B the year before and $150.04B the year before that—while the top-line CAGR sits at –0.8%. What has changed is profitability: operating income collapsed from $3.85B to $1.89B, net income from $2.67B to $1.02B, and the November 2025 quarter alone printed a $1.32B loss that dragged the trailing net margin to 0.7%. That single distorted year is why the reported P/E prints at 38x; strip out the hit and you are looking at something closer to the mid-teens on a $2.2–2.7B normalized earnings base, which is still rich for a zero-growth food retailer trapped between Walmart’s scale and Amazon’s logistics. Free cash flow of $3.46B on $7.31B of operating cash remains the bright spot and is what keeps the equity from looking broken, but capex of $3.86B shows how capital-intensive the model stays even after store rationalization talk.
Balance-sheet optics reinforce the structural bind rather than relieve it. Total debt of $15.88B against only $3.33B of cash and $5.94B of equity produces a 2.67 debt-to-equity ratio and a current ratio of 0.80; the failed Albertsons combination removed the principal path to scale without lightening the leverage left behind. Gross margin held near 23%, yet operating margin compressed to 1.3%—well below the 2–2.8% band of prior years—so the productivity and private-label narrative has not yet shown up in the P&L. At $59 the stock trades at 0.26x sales and roughly 10x trailing FCF on equity value (closer to 14x on enterprise value), multiples that only work if margins re-expand and the market re-rates Kroger as a higher-quality compounder. The data do not yet support that escape.
I therefore read the shares as modestly overvalued: a defensive cash generator priced for a transformation that the income statement has so far refused to confirm. The valuation-synthesis fair-value band around the low-to-mid $40s is directionally right once you refuse to capitalize a depressed earnings year at a growth multiple; $59 embeds too much credit for an unproven mix shift and a merger that is already dead.
The strongest counter-argument is the cash-flow floor and the distorted multiple itself. A $36B market cap against $3.5B of recurring FCF and a 2.4% dividend yield gives downside support that pure P/E screens miss, and the 38x headline multiple is mechanically inflated by the one-time loss quarter rather than by exuberant expectations alone. On a mid-cycle $2.4B net-income assumption the forward multiple compresses into the low-to-mid teens—historically unremarkable for grocery—and same-store stickiness plus private-label penetration could still grind modest margin recovery without any heroic platform story. A skeptic of the bear case would also note that EV/EBITDA near 9.8x is not extreme versus staples peers and that revenue confidence remains intact at the quarterly level. I weigh those points as real supports against a collapse, not as justification for paying $59 today; they argue for a higher floor than a deep-value screen implies, but they do not erase flat sales, failed M&A optionality, and still-compressed operating returns.
Margin proof is the clearest falsifier. Two consecutive quarters of operating margin back above 2.0% with stable or rising identical-store sales, or a credible alternative scale transaction that does not reload the balance sheet, would force a re-rating toward fair value and flip me. Conversely, another sub-1.5% operating-margin print or an FCF drop below $2.5B would confirm the structural-squeeze thesis and push the stock toward the low-$40s composite already flagged by the models.
Big-3 Panel — where each AI stands
Advanced Analysis Forensic deep-dive · separate lenses
Kroger is a mature, self-funding operator: revenue has ticked from $137.9B (2022) to $147.6B (2026) with gross margin quietly expanding from 22.0% to 23.3%, and free cash flow averaging roughly $2.6B/yr with a strong $3.46B in the latest year. Earnings quality checks are clean - OCF/NI of 3.65x, accruals -8.3% of assets, Beneish M -3.1, and Altman Z of 4.3 (safe) - so the reported profits look real. Diluted shares fell from 754M to 655M (-3.5% CAGR) with buybacks at 1065% of SBC, meaning per-share value is genuinely being concentrated rather than leaked to comp. The concerns are structural to the model rather than accounting-driven. Operating margin is thin and choppy (2.5, 2.8, 2.1, 2.6, 1.3%), and the latest year shows a sharp drop to 1.3% OpM with net income collapsing to $1.02B from $2.67B - a material earnings step-down that needs explanation (likely Albertsons deal termination charges, but that must be verified). Net debt of ~$12.5B against $3.3B liquid cash means the balance sheet is a constraint, not a cushion; grocery is a razor-thin, competitive business (Walmart, Costco, Amazon, Aldi) where a bad year can quickly compress the FCF that funds the buyback. Insider tape is neutral-to-mildly-negative: zero open-market buys, one $1.8M sale by Cosset, rest are routine awards and tax withholdings. Nothing screams distress, nothing screams conviction - consistent with a mature earner running its playbook.
Verify before trusting this (5)
- Cause of 2026 operating margin drop to 1.3% and net income falling to $1.02B - is this Albertsons merger termination cost, litigation, or operating deterioration?
- Composition and maturity ladder of the ~$12.5B net debt position; interest coverage and covenant headroom
- Alternative-profit (KPM media, financial services) contribution to gross margin expansion - real durable driver or one-time?
- Same-store sales trend and unit-volume vs price trajectory to confirm whether real demand is intact
- Post-Albertsons strategic capital allocation plan - is buyback pace sustainable at current FCF?
Price is $58.45 vs a composite FV of $52.23 and a signal-adjusted FV of $41.61, implying -11% to -29% downside on the synthesis. The three methods disagree sharply: DCF says $70.54 (relies on multi-year FCF durability I'm skeptical of in thin-margin grocery), EPV floor is $26.15 (a bear-case sanity check, not a target), and anchored-PE lands at $41.68 - the anchored multiple is the most defensible read for a mature, low-growth grocer and it says the stock is ~29% rich. Earnings quality is clean (no haircut needed), which is why I won't lean on the EPV floor. Deserved value for a Solid-but-not-fortress grocer with thin margins, real leverage, and a nagging 2026 earnings drop probably sits in the high-$40s to low-$50s - roughly the composite. That means today's price already bakes in successful execution of the pharmacy/private-label/AI transformation the bulls describe. If any of that slips, or if the 2026 dip turns out to be operating rather than one-time Albertsons noise, the multiple compresses fast. Not a short, but not a value setup either - you're paying for the turnaround before it's proven.
Verify before trusting this (4)
- Is the 2026 earnings step-down a one-time Albertsons-related charge or operating deterioration - segment detail in next 10-K/transcript
- Pharmacy and private-label gross margin trajectory vs prior year
- Buyback pace and net leverage post-Albertsons resolution
- Digital/AI-driven same-store productivity metrics management is willing to disclose
The tape is mildly risk-on and KR's 0.41 beta means broad macro cross-currents barely register - higher rates and a stretched market PE are background noise for a defensive grocer, not an active press. What matters for this name is the narrative, and right now the narrative is getting a small, favorable jolt: the nationwide Instacart rollout combining groceries and prescriptions across 2,200+ pharmacies is exactly the 'disciplined digital pivot without Amazon-style burn' story bulls have been selling, and it landed in headlines this week with an upside-framed 17% target piece attached. That is the kind of news flow that reinforces the turnaround archetype rather than challenges it. Cross-currents are real but modest. Walmart's post-earnings selloff and price-war spend hangs over the whole grocery cohort as a reminder that margin pressure is structural, and the Albertsons merger overhang remains the swing factor no one can price. Narrative intensity is 'strong' but durability only 'moderate' and cult is low - meaning this is a story stocks lean on but do not levitate on, so the push here is a genuine crosswind, not a mania. Net: a mild tailwind driven by fresh, on-narrative news in a calm tape, with the merger uncertainty capping how far sentiment can run.
Verify before trusting this (4)
- Any DOJ/FTC or state-AG update on the Albertsons merger - the single biggest sentiment swing factor
- Sell-side target revisions in the wake of the Instacart rollout (analyst tone catching up to the story)
- Whether WMT's price-war commentary triggers KR guidance concerns on the next print
- Digital sales / delivery attach-rate metrics that would validate or crack the omnichannel narrative
Food-at-home spending keeps growing in nominal terms, but the growth is accruing disproportionately to scale discounters and club formats while conventional supermarkets hold flat. Kroger's answer is margin architecture rather than volume: own brands, pharmacy, retail media, automation and buybacks. That answer works as long as unit volumes don't slip, and it is being tested by a slowing sector, a value-stretched low-income shopper, macro headwinds with a 4.7% 10-year rate raising the bar on capex, and tariff/wage cost pressure. The independent structural question — whether AI-mediated or delivery-app-mediated shopping erodes the store's basket control — is real but slow-moving; Kroger's owned fulfillment and loyalty data give it a defensible, if unspectacular, seat. Net: a durable, essential, low-growth utility of a business in a category that is quietly consolidating around scale.
When we made this prediction on Aug 26, 2026, KR was $58.61. We expect it to be $60.80 by Feb 2027, and we consider it great value under $46.00. This is an early model (v0.6.0) — the direction is more reliable than the exact price. Made Aug 26, 2026.
Blue is our prediction, starting the day we made it. Grey is a slower route to the same place — the same destination, taking longer. Black is the actual price, so you can see how we are doing.