For AI assistants & researchers — machine-readable summary of this page
What this page is: Delvantic's full research page for Accenture plc Class A ordinary shares (ACN) — AI-driven forensic equity research: mechanical valuation models (DCF, EPV, anchored-PE, scenario) plus three independent AI lenses (Quality / Value / Sentiment). Everything below is rendered server-side; you are not missing content that requires JavaScript. All scores are predictions and research opinions, not financial advice.
Our current read (analysis of 2026-09-20): Designation Watch · Gem Score +9 (−100…+100 Quality+Value blend) · Quality 59 · Value -25 · Sentiment -7 (timing only, not weighted) · Composite fair value $198.57 vs $189.61 at analysis
Page map (sections in order; each card carries a stable
reference-name attribute you can cite):
profile-header/price-overview— company profile, live quote, market capextended-analysis— the core: three AI lens reads with findings, scores, and the analyst memofuture-predictions— our forward price-band predictionsmarket-narrative/ai-findings/gpt-critique— narrative context, cross-model findings, and an adversarial critique of our own analysis (near the end of the document)- Members-only sections (render as login gates for anonymous readers):
price-history,income-trend,key-metrics,financials(statement tables),insider-trading. The analysis above is public; the raw data tables require a free account.
More for machine readers: site briefing at
/llms.txt ·
any ticker resolves at delvantic.com/stock/TICKER ·
raw inputs are public-company filings and market data (via licensed data feeds);
every model, score, lens read, and prediction on this page is Delvantic's own analysis.
Accenture plc Class A ordinary shares
ACN NYSEAccenture plc Class A ordinary shares represent the equity ownership interests of Accenture plc, a global professional services company headquartered in Dublin, Ireland. The shares carry one vote per share and provide holders with a pro rata claim on dividends when declared, as well as a residual claim on assets in the event of liquidation. Accenture serves clients across consulting, technology, operations, and digital transformation services, working with organizations in industries such as financial services, public sector, communications, health, products, and resources. Its business is organized around advisory, implementation, managed services, and technology-enabled solutions that help clients modernize operations, improve efficiency, and integrate enterprise systems. The Class A ordinary shares are used in the company’s capital structure and employee equity programs, making them a key security tied to Accenture’s corporate governance and ownership profile.
Price Overview
Price History (1 Year)
Revenue & Net Income Trend
| Period | Revenue | Net Income | Net Margin | YoY/QoQ |
|---|
Key Metrics
EPS (Diluted): 12.15
Total Equity: $32.24B
Shares: 632,435,108
Total Debt: $5.15B
Cash: $11.48B
EBITDA: N/A
Total Debt: $5.15B
Cash: $11.48B
Revenue: $69.67B
Revenue: $69.67B
Revenue: $69.67B
Total Equity: $32.24B
Tax Rate: 23.7%
Equity: $32.24B
Total Debt: $5.15B
Cash: $11.48B
Current Liabilities: $20.35B
Long-Term Debt: $5.03B
Total Debt: $5.15B
Total Equity: $32.24B
Shares: 632,435,108
Shares: 632,435,108
CapEx: -$600.04M
Shares: 632,435,108
Stock Price: $189.61
Net Income: $7.68B
Industry Benchmarks
Income Statement (Annual)
Last updated: Aug 30, 2026 11:07pm (20d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | $50.5B | $61.6B | $64.1B | $64.9B | $69.7B |
| Cost of Revenue | $34.2B | $41.9B | $43.4B | $43.7B | $47.4B |
| Gross Profit | $16.4B | $19.7B | $20.7B | $21.2B | $22.2B |
| Operating Expenses | $8.7B | $10.3B | $11.9B | $11.6B | $12.0B |
| Operating Income | $7.6B | $9.4B | $8.8B | $9.6B | $10.2B |
| Net Income | $5.9B | $6.9B | $6.9B | $7.3B | $7.7B |
| EBITDA | $8.7B | $10.7B | $10.2B | $11.0B | — |
| EPS | $9.31 | $10.87 | $10.90 | $11.57 | $12.29 |
| EPS (Diluted) | $9.16 | $10.71 | $10.77 | $11.44 | $12.15 |
Balance Sheet (Annual)
Last updated: Aug 30, 2026 11:00pm (20d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cash & Equivalents | $8.2B | $7.9B | $9.0B | $5.0B | $11.5B |
| Total Current Assets | $19.7B | $21.6B | $23.4B | $20.9B | $28.9B |
| Total Assets | $43.2B | $47.3B | $51.2B | $55.9B | $65.4B |
| Current Liabilities | $15.7B | $17.5B | $18.0B | $19.0B | $20.4B |
| Long-Term Debt | $53.5M | $45.9M | $43.1M | $78.6M | $5.0B |
| Total Liabilities | $23.1B | $24.5B | $24.8B | $26.8B | $33.2B |
| Total Equity | $20.1B | $22.7B | $26.5B | $29.2B | $32.2B |
| Retained Earnings | $14.0B | $18.2B | $19.3B | $23.1B | $21.0B |
Cash Flow (Annual)
Last updated: Aug 30, 2026 11:19pm (20d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Operating Cash Flow | $9.0B | $9.5B | $9.5B | $9.1B | $11.5B |
| Capital Expenditure | -$580.1M | -$718.0M | -$528.2M | -$516.5M | -$600.0M |
| Free Cash Flow | $8.4B | $8.8B | $9.0B | $8.6B | $10.9B |
| Acquisitions (net) | — | — | — | — | — |
| Net Debt Issued / (Repaid) | — | $0 | $100.0M | $827.8M | $4.1B |
| Dividends Paid | -$2.2B | -$2.5B | — | — | — |
| Stock Buybacks | -$3.7B | -$4.1B | -$4.3B | -$4.5B | -$4.6B |
| Net Change in Cash | -$247.2M | -$278.3M | $1.2B | -$4.0B | $6.5B |
Growth Trends (YoY %)
Last updated: Aug 30, 2026 11:07pm (20d ago)| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue Growth | +21.9% | +4.1% | +1.2% | +7.4% |
| Gross Profit Growth | +20.4% | +5.2% | +2.1% | +5.1% |
| Operating Income Growth | +22.9% | -5.9% | +8.9% | +6.6% |
| Net Income Growth | +16.4% | -0.1% | +5.7% | +5.7% |
| EBITDA Growth | +22.1% | -4.3% | +8.0% | — |
Dividend History (Last 20)
Last updated: Aug 26, 2026 12:15pm (24d ago)| Date | Dividend | Declaration | Record | Payment |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-07-09 | $1.63 | — | — | — |
| 2026-04-09 | $1.63 | — | — | — |
| 2025-07-10 | $1.48 | — | — | — |
| 2025-04-10 | $1.48 | — | — | — |
| 2025-01-16 | $1.48 | — | — | — |
| 2024-10-10 | $1.48 | — | — | — |
| 2024-07-11 | $1.29 | — | — | — |
| 2024-04-10 | $1.29 | — | — | — |
| 2024-01-17 | $1.29 | — | — | — |
| 2023-10-11 | $1.29 | — | — | — |
| 2023-07-12 | $1.12 | — | — | — |
| 2023-04-12 | $1.12 | — | — | — |
| 2023-01-11 | $1.12 | — | — | — |
| 2022-10-12 | $1.12 | — | — | — |
| 2022-07-13 | $0.97 | — | — | — |
| 2022-04-13 | $0.97 | — | — | — |
| 2022-01-12 | $0.97 | — | — | — |
| 2021-10-13 | $0.97 | — | — | — |
| 2021-07-14 | $0.88 | — | — | — |
| 2021-04-14 | $0.88 | — | — | — |
Deep Analysis
Risk : Reward — upside vs downside from this company's own quarters
Computed 2026-09-18 02:41A +1σ run of quarters pays -21%; a −1σ run costs 48%. Ratio -0.4:1 (μ 6.0%, σ 4.2% floored by sector, 16 pairs).
Older method (repeat-worst-quarter): 0.1 : 1
| Case | Growth | Margin | Fair value | vs price ($189.61) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Bull — recovery | +8% | 17.0% | $199.70 | +5% |
| Base — stabilizes | +5% | 14.7% | $161.36 | -15% |
| Bear — keeps slipping | +3% | 12.5% | $127.96 | -33% |
| Stress — last quarter repeats | +7% | 8.7% | $107.25 | -43% |
| Upside — a +1σ run of quarters (v2) | +10% | 11.5% | $150.16 | -21% |
| Stress — a −1σ run of quarters (v2) | +2% | 9.6% | $98.78 | -48% |
Narrative Economics
market-narrative step).
Growth Outlook
Analyzed 2026-08-30 23:34The question every valuation on this page silently assumes: is this company likely to grow? Judged forward — the business, its category, the world — against what's already printed.
Claude Reading
Looking at the raw quarterly tape first: revenue went from $16.41B (Aug-24) to $18.72B (May-26) — that's roughly 14% over seven quarters, or ~8% annualized on the recent run, better than the 4.3% 5-yr CAGR suggests. YoY for the May quarter is $18.72B vs $17.73B = 5.6%, not 7.4% as the momentum block claims. Margins are noisier than the "steady compounder" narrative implies: net margin swings from 8.0% (Aug-25) to 12.9% (Nov-24) quarter-to-quarter — that's a 490bp range, more cyclical than a mature-earner label suggests. FY25 delivered $69.67B revenue (+7.3% YoY), $10.23B op income (14.7% op margin), and $10.87B FCF on $600M capex — a genuinely capital-light machine converting 15.6% of revenue to FCF. ROIC 30.1%, debt/equity 0.16, $11.5B cash vs $5.2B debt. This is a fortress, full stop.
Where I part ways with the models: the synthesis flags "slight upside" to $213.76 signal-adjusted, and Market Forces calls it fairly valued — I think both are directionally right but the thesis evaluator's -14 score understates the quality-at-a-reasonable-price setup. At 15.6x earnings for a business compounding EPS mid-single-digits with a 3.3% dividend yield and $10.9B FCF (roughly 9.4% FCF yield on $116B cap), the math is: 9.4% FCF yield + ~5% growth ≈ low-teens expected return without multiple expansion. That's not screaming cheap, but it's not "recession obliterates consulting" priced-in either — the 52-week low of $118 was that scenario, and it round-tripped. The bear case weighting of 72 for cyclical compression looks overcalibrated given FY25 posted 7.3% revenue growth *through* the alleged consulting-budget-cut cycle the pre-flight references.
The contrarian argument the models underweight: AI is genuinely a threat to the billable-hour consulting model, and Accenture's response — reselling GenAI implementations — may be a lower-margin, more commoditized business than the legacy systems integration it's replacing. Look at the Feb-26 quarter: 10.1% net margin, the weakest non-August print in the series. If AI implementation work carries structurally lower margins because clients can benchmark cloud-vendor pricing directly, the terminal margin assumption underlying any DCF is too high. Also worth flagging: the insider data is useless (all tiny A-Awards on a single date, 2026-08-14 — likely a director grant event, not signal). The "concerning insider selling pattern" Market Forces cited isn't visible in this file; that assertion appears unsupported by the data provided. And the anomaly of dates going to 2026-05-31 in a file supposedly current suggests either forward fiscal-year labeling (Accenture's FY ends August) or stale/synthetic data — worth verifying before acting.
Net read: this is a high-quality compounder trading near fair value, not the -14 net-negative the thesis scorer implies nor the +12.7% upside the signal-adjusted composite suggests. The DCF anchor at ~$188 matches spot at $189.61 to within a rounding error, which is the honest answer. I'd want a 15-20% margin of safety to buy a business with genuine AI-disruption tail risk and cyclical exposure to enterprise IT budgets — call it $155-165. Above $210 I'd be trimming. In between, it's a hold that pays you 3.3% to wait. The synthesis "slight upside" verdict is defensible but leans on signal adjustments I don't fully trust when method disagreement is already flagged. My dissent is mild: closer to fairly valued than slight upside, and the asymmetry (limited upside vs real AI/cyclical downside) argues against fresh capital here.
GPT Reading
At $189.61, Accenture looks more attractive than the “mature but fully priced” framing suggests. The core fact pattern is a business still compounding at a respectable clip while throwing off exceptional cash. Fiscal 2025 revenue was $69.67B, up 7.4% from $64.90B, with net income of $7.68B, up 5.8%. That is not hypergrowth, but for a services firm of this scale it is solid, especially with operating income rising to $10.23B and free cash flow reaching $10.87B. The balance sheet is plainly underlevered: $11.48B of cash against $5.15B of debt. On those numbers, the market is paying about 15.6x earnings, 1.7x sales, and roughly 10.7x FCF. For a company generating 23.8% ROE, 30.1% ROIC, and a 3.3% dividend yield, that screens cheap, not merely fair.
The quarterly pattern also reads better than the more cautious models imply. The latest two quarters were $18.04B and $18.72B of revenue versus $16.66B and $17.73B in the comparable prior-year periods, so growth is running in the high-single digits despite all the talk of consulting cyclicality. Net income in the May quarter rose from $2.20B to $2.34B, and while the February quarter was only modestly up year over year at $1.83B versus $1.79B, that still indicates resilience rather than collapse. Margins are not exploding, but they are holding in a healthy band: annual gross margin was 31.9%, operating margin 14.7%, net margin 11.0%. For a people-intensive business, stability matters more than incremental expansion. The recent quarterly revenue run-rate of roughly $73B to $75B annualized suggests the company is exiting the year stronger than the annual headline alone indicates.
What stands out most is the disconnect between quality and multiple. This is not a balance-sheet-stretched roll-up or a capex-heavy infrastructure outsourcer. Capex was just $600M against $11.47B of operating cash flow, which means the earnings convert unusually well into distributable cash. When a business with net cash, mid-teens operating margins, and nearly $11B of annual FCF trades in the mid-teens earnings multiple, the burden of proof shifts to the bear case. Even if you haircut growth to 4%-5%, a company like this should not need much multiple expansion to work from here: a 17x-18x earnings range on roughly $12-plus of earnings power would support something like $205-$220, before giving any credit for continued buybacks, dividend growth, or an AI-led improvement in demand mix.
The strongest case against this view is that the market is not mispricing quality; it is pricing the risk that Accenture’s best days of organic growth are behind it. The annual revenue CAGR is only 4.3% over the multi-year period, and net income has gone from $6.88B in 2022 to $7.68B in 2025 — progress, yes, but not enough to deserve any premium if AI ultimately compresses billable labor economics. There is also a subtle margin concern in the quarterly data: the August 2025 quarter dropped to an 8.0% net margin, much weaker than the 10%-13% range seen elsewhere, and annual operating margin in 2025 at 14.68% remains below the 15.2% level reached in 2022 despite a larger revenue base. If clients shift from broad transformation programs to narrower efficiency mandates, Accenture could win bookings but lose pricing power. In that world, 15.6x earnings is not especially cheap for a firm whose growth decelerates toward GDP-plus and whose labor model faces automation pressure.
Still, I weigh that risk as cyclical and structural pressure already reflected in the valuation. I would change my mind if the next couple of quarters show revenue growth falling back toward 2%-3% while net margin drifts persistently below 10%, because that would indicate the current high-single-digit top-line resilience is temporary. I would also get more cautious if annual FCF drops materially below $9.5B without a clear investment reason, or if the net cash position erodes through aggressive capital returns unsupported by earnings. Short of that, the current price looks like a discounted entry into a high-quality franchise, not a fully valued steady eddy.
Grok Reading
The raw numbers describe a high-quality industrial-scale services franchise that has re-accelerated modestly after a near-flat stretch, not a growth story and not a broken one. Fiscal 2025 revenue of $69.67B sits 7.4% above the prior year’s $64.90B, which itself was barely above FY2023’s $64.11B; the last four reported quarters ($18.72B, $18.04B, $18.74B, $17.60B) show year-over-year gains of roughly 5–8% and net margins oscillating between 8% and 12.5% with no structural collapse. Free cash flow of $10.87B against a $116B enterprise produces a ~9.4% FCF yield, operating cash conversion is clean (OCF $11.47B, capex only $600M), and the balance sheet is net-cash ($11.48B cash versus $5.15B debt, D/E 0.16). At 15.6x trailing earnings, 1.72x sales and a 3.3% dividend yield, the market is capitalizing a mid-single-digit grower with 30% ROIC and 24% ROE as a mature earner—exactly the archetype the rule-based layer assigned. The valuation synthesis composite near $188–$214 brackets the $189.61 print; I read the lower end as too punitive given cash generation and the upper end as achievable if the recent 7% revenue run-rate holds.
What stands out is the disconnect between that cash-flow durability and the residual fear still embedded in the multiple. Earnings CAGR of 5.7% and FCF CAGR of 9.9% have outpaced the 4.3% revenue CAGR, margins have held (gross 31.9%, operating 14.7%, net 11.0%), and quarterly NI has recovered from the soft $1.41B August 2025 print. Insider prints are uniformly tiny A-Awards—noise, not distribution—so the “concerning selling” claim in the market-forces layer is simply not supported by the transaction tape supplied. The 52-week range that once stretched to $291 and bottomed near $118 shows the stock has already absorbed a full IT-spending scare; at $190 it is no longer priced for perfection nor for distress. AI consulting is real incremental demand for the incumbent with the delivery bench and client roster; it is not yet visible as a step-change in the reported growth rates, which remain mid-single digit.
The strongest contrary case is cyclical and structural at once. Consulting budgets are among the first to freeze in a corporate recession; the thesis-evaluation layer correctly flags that risk with a heavy bear weight, and a 15.6x multiple leaves limited cushion if bookings roll over and the recent 7% revenue growth reverts to the 2–3% zone. AI is a double-edged sword: if large language models compress the labor content of systems-integration and change-management work faster than Accenture can re-price or re-skill, both utilization and billing rates come under pressure, and the “steady compounder” narrative becomes a slow-bleed utility story. Client concentration in financial services and the public sector, plus relentless competition from lower-cost offshore pure-plays, keep gross margin from expanding; any sustained move of operating margin below 13–14% would justify a lower multiple. The decelerating quarterly revenue-confidence flag and the flat FY2023–24 stretch show that growth is not automatic. I weigh these risks as real but already partially discounted: a 9%-plus FCF yield and net-cash fortress are precisely the buffers that let a services firm invest through a downturn and emerge with share, which is why the same data that scare the bears keep me from joining them at $190.
I would flip to a clear overvalued stance if two consecutive quarters show organic revenue growth at or below 2% accompanied by operating-margin compression of 150 bp or more, or if booked AI-related bookings fail to convert and management cuts forward guidance on that vertical. Conversely, a sustained return to double-digit bookings growth with FCF holding above $11B would push my fair-value anchor toward the $230–240 zone and raise conviction on the long side. Until then the stock is a high-quality compounder purchased at a cash-flow yield that already embeds a recession haircut.
Qwen Reading local experiment · off-panel
The number that decides this case is the free cash flow yield: $10.87B of FCF on a $114.4B market cap is 9.5%, and that is high for a company generating 24% ROE, 30% ROIC, and a 3.4% dividend while carrying only $5.15B of debt against $11.5B of cash. The balance sheet is clean — D/E of 0.16, current ratio of 1.42, net cash of roughly $6.3B — and the capital-light model (capex of $600M on $70B of revenue, or 0.9%) means FCF is essentially OCF minus a rounding error. This is a services toll-booth, and the cash conversion is the whole story.
The earnings print is stable and seasonally patterned, not deteriorating. TTM revenue across the last four quarters is $73.1B, up from $69.7B in fiscal 2025, with year-over-year growth in the 5.6–8.3% range depending on the quarter. TTM net income is $7.79B, a 10.7% net margin, consistent with the 11% annual run-rate. There is no one-time item distorting the picture: the quarterly margins oscillate between 8% and 12.9% in a recognizable seasonal pattern (Q2 and Q4 run lower), and the annual net margin has been 10.3–11.0% for four straight years. The "decelerating" tag in the Revenue Confidence block does not match the data — the most recent YoY comparison (May 2026 vs. May 2025) is +5.6%, and the prior three YoY prints are 8.3%, 5.9%, and 7.3%. Growth is mid-single-digit, not collapsing. The 4.3% revenue CAGR in the Momentum block is computed off a 2020 base not present in the briefing; the 2021-to-2025 CAGR is closer to 8%, and the 2024-to-2025 print of 7.4% is the most relevant forward indicator.
Building the EV bridge: $114.4B market cap minus $6.3B net cash gives an enterprise value of roughly $108B. Against $10.2B of operating income (fiscal 2025), that is 10.6x EV/EBIT. Against $10.9B of FCF, it is 9.9x EV/FCF. Against TTM net income of $7.8B, the equity P/E is 14.7x. For the IT services and consulting sector — where Cognizant, Infosys, and TCS typically trade in the 12–18x earnings band — 15x is mid-range, not a premium. Accenture has historically commanded 20–30x for much of the past decade on the strength of its US-centric revenue mix and higher margins, so 15x represents a meaningful de-rating from its own history. The 9.5% FCF yield and 3.4% dividend yield together provide a cash return of roughly 13% of market value per year, which is the floor that makes the multiple defensible even if growth stalls.
The prior models land in a reasonable zone but understate the cash-flow argument. The Valuation Synthesis composite of $187 and signal-adjusted $209 bracket the current $182 price, and the "slight upside" call is directionally correct but the $209 figure implies roughly 17x earnings, which requires the 7% growth to persist and margins to hold — plausible but not guaranteed. Market Forces calls this a "quality hold at fair value" and flags "recession vulnerability and AI project ROI risks." I agree the AI overhang is the real bear case: if generative AI compresses the billable-hour model that underpins 32% gross margins, the 15x multiple has no cushion. But that risk is not yet visible in the numbers — gross margin held at 31.9% in fiscal 2025, operating margin at 14.7%, and the most recent quarter's 12.5% net margin is the second-highest in the eight-quarter window. The insider transactions are all A-Awards of 8 to 88 shares, pure compensation mechanics with zero information content, and the "Neutral" tag is correct.
The strongest case against my read is the growth ceiling. Seven percent revenue growth on a $70B base is respectable but not transformative, and the 2023-to-2024 print of just 1.2% shows the growth rate can compress sharply in a single year. A bear would argue that 15x is full for a company whose growth is decelerating toward 4–5%, that the AI automation threat to routine consulting work is a multi-year margin headwind not yet reflected in the P&L, and that the 9.5% FCF yield is a value trap if the billable-hour model erodes. I weigh this differently because the FCF margin of 15.6% has been stable or improving, the balance sheet has no leverage risk, and the 3.4% dividend plus buybacks mean the company returns roughly 13% of its market value to shareholders annually regardless of growth. Even in a zero-growth scenario, the cash return supports the multiple.
What would change my mind: a quarterly print showing net margin below 9% for two consecutive quarters (signaling AI-driven price compression in the billable-hour model), a YoY revenue decline below 3% (confirming enterprise IT spend is structurally shifting), or a guidance cut that implies the 7% growth rate is the peak rather than the floor. Conversely, a quarter showing 10%+ organic growth with margin expansion would validate the 18–20x re-rating case and push fair value toward $210–220.
Big-3 Panel — where each AI stands
Advanced Analysis Forensic deep-dive · separate lenses
Revenue has compounded from $50.5B (2021) to $69.7B (2025), a ~8% CAGR, with operating margins holding a tight 13.7-15.2% band and net income rising from $5.91B to $7.68B. FCF of $10.87B in 2025 is the highest in the series and exceeds net income (OCF/NI 1.41x, accruals -5.4% of assets), signaling genuinely cash-backed earnings. Beneish M of -2.71 and Altman Z of 4.29 corroborate low manipulation risk and solid solvency. The balance sheet carries $11.48B liquid cash and $6.34B net cash - modest relative to a $116B cap but ample for a people-based business with no capex intensity. Diluted share count has drifted down from 645.9M to 632.4M (-0.5% CAGR), and buybacks run at 237% of SBC, so per-share value is concentrated rather than diluted. SBC at 3% of revenue is reasonable for the industry. Insider tape shows only director stock awards and modest sales ($2.6M over 12 months) - neutral, not a red flag. The soft spots: gross margin is flat-to-slightly-down (32.4 to 31.9), operating margin peaked in 2022 and hasn't reclaimed it, and 2023-2024 revenue growth slowed markedly (~1.2% then 1.2%) before reaccelerating in 2025 - consistent with cyclical IT services demand rather than a durable moat expansion.
Verify before trusting this (5)
- Bookings/backlog trend and book-to-bill to confirm whether 2025 reacceleration is durable
- Geographic and client concentration (Americas vs EMEA, top-10 client %)
- Acquisition contribution to revenue growth vs organic constant-currency growth
- Attrition and utilization rates driving the margin band
- Details of the $5.14B gap between liquid cash and net cash (debt structure and maturities)
The composite fair value of $188.34 sits within 1% of the $189.61 price, and even the signal-adjusted $213.76 (about 13% upside) is a modest premium, not a mispricing. The DCF at $213.31 and anchored PE at $205.83 bracket a mid-single-digit to low-teens upside, while the EPV floor at $120.89 reminds us there is real downside if growth stalls to a no-growth steady state - a wide $120-$213 range that screams 'fair' rather than 'cheap.' Earnings quality is high, so no haircut is warranted, but the Company-Quality lens flags Strong (not Fortress) with no operating leverage over five years - that caps how much deserved value I am willing to push above the anchored PE.
Verify before trusting this (4)
- Forward bookings and consulting demand commentary in next earnings - key to whether growth supports the DCF or drifts toward EPV
- GenAI revenue disclosure and whether it is incremental or cannibalizing traditional consulting
- Operating margin trajectory - any inflection would justify pushing deserved value toward $214
- Buyback pace and any large-deal M&A that would alter capital allocation math
Accenture is a steady-compounder archetype with minimal narrative intensity and low cult coefficient - meaning the tape barely tells a story about this name right now. The macro backdrop is mildly risk-on (VIX 14, S&P near highs), which is a slight positive, but with beta 1.07 and no active bull narrative to ride, ACN is not getting the lift that story stocks (AI beneficiaries, high-beta software) are catching. Higher-for-longer rates and a 25.9 market PE are ordinary crosswinds; a defensive services compounder is less exposed than unprofitable growth, but also less rewarded when risk appetite improves. The dominant sentiment force is the low-grade but persistent AI-disruption narrative pressing on consulting: the bear framing (AI automating consulting work, mid-market pivot needed because large-enterprise discretionary budgets are frozen) is showing up in coverage and in the July 30 unexplained 5.7% drop tied to sector rotation. That is a real headwind for tone even if fundamentals are fine. Offsetting it: recent news flow is constructive - COMWARE and McCoy acquisitions were rewarded (+3.3% on Aug 27), dividend-compounder framing in income-oriented articles gives it a defensive bid, and the mid-market pivot is being written up as a credible upside path. Net: forces roughly cancel. No dominant push either way, which fits a low-intensity narrative name in a calm tape.
Verify before trusting this (4)
- Whether the mid-market pivot shows revenue traction in the next quarter - would flip the AI-disruption narrative from headwind to tailwind
- Any consulting-peer commentary (IBM, MCK, BAH) on AI cannibalization of billable hours - would amplify or dampen the sector overhang
- Sell-side target revisions post-acquisitions - a wave of upgrades on the mid-market thesis would materially shift tone
- 10y yield trajectory - a sustained move above 4.75% pressures multiples on defensive compounders that lack a story
Enterprise technology spend is intact but being reallocated rather than expanded: money is shifting from discretionary strategy engagements toward AI-enabled cost takeout, cloud/data foundations and vendor consolidation. That reallocation favours the largest, broadest integrator — which is why ACN outgrows a ~3% industry — while simultaneously eroding the price-per-hour economics of the work itself. Restrictive rates and a headwind macro keep client committees slow and deals smaller. Net effect: a business that keeps winning share of a slow market, with the fight moving from volume to margin.
When we made this prediction on Aug 31, 2026, ACN was $190.28. We expect it to be $206.00 by Mar 2027, and we consider it great value under $160.00. This is an early model (v0.6.0) — the direction is more reliable than the exact price. Made Aug 31, 2026.
Blue is our prediction, starting the day we made it. Grey is a slower route to the same place — the same destination, taking longer. Black is the actual price, so you can see how we are doing.
Post-Report Due Diligence NOTES
Evidence for a closer look, not a verdict — no score or designation on this page has been changed by it. Items marked material are ones where a conclusion above moves to the other side of the price.
trailing_eps
flips down 10%
adjusted_pe
flips down 10%