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What this page is: Delvantic's full research page for Airbnb, Inc. (ABNB) — AI-driven forensic equity research: mechanical valuation models (DCF, EPV, anchored-PE, scenario) plus three independent AI lenses (Quality / Value / Sentiment). Everything below is rendered server-side; you are not missing content that requires JavaScript. All scores are predictions and research opinions, not financial advice.
Our current read (analysis of 2026-08-23): Designation Watch · Gem Score -2 (−100…+100 Quality+Value blend) · Quality 66 · Value -57 · Sentiment 64 (timing only, not weighted) · Composite fair value $36.38 vs $178.07 at analysis
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profile-header/price-overview— company profile, live quote, market capextended-analysis— the core: three AI lens reads with findings, scores, and the analyst memofuture-predictions— our forward price-band predictionsmarket-narrative/ai-findings/gpt-critique— narrative context, cross-model findings, and an adversarial critique of our own analysis (near the end of the document)- Members-only sections (render as login gates for anonymous readers):
price-history,income-trend,key-metrics,financials(statement tables),insider-trading. The analysis above is public; the raw data tables require a free account.
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any ticker resolves at delvantic.com/stock/TICKER ·
raw inputs are public-company filings and market data (via licensed data feeds);
every model, score, lens read, and prediction on this page is Delvantic's own analysis.
Airbnb, Inc.
ABNB NASDAQAirbnb, Inc. is a global online marketplace that connects hosts with travelers seeking short-term stays and travel experiences. Airbnb’s platform enables individuals and property managers to list private rooms, homes, boutique accommodations, and other lodging options, while also offering a curated range of local activities and services in selected markets. The company serves leisure and business travelers, hosts, and property operators through a digital platform that supports discovery, booking, payments, reviews, and trust-and-safety tools. Its business is centered on facilitating peer-to-peer and professional hospitality supply rather than owning the properties it lists, making it an asset-light participant in the travel and lodging industry. Headquartered in San Francisco, California, Airbnb remains a major platform in the alternative accommodations market, shaping how consumers book stays and experiences across regions worldwide.
Price Overview
Price History (1 Year)
Revenue & Net Income Trend
| Period | Revenue | Net Income | Net Margin | YoY/QoQ |
|---|
Key Metrics
EPS (Diluted): 4.03
Total Equity: $8.20B
Shares: 623,000,000
Total Debt: $2.00B
Cash: $6.56B
EBITDA: $2.56B
Total Debt: $2.00B
Cash: $6.56B
Revenue: $12.24B
Revenue: $12.24B
Revenue: $12.24B
Total Equity: $8.20B
Tax Rate: 20.0%
Equity: $8.20B
Total Debt: $2.00B
Cash: $6.56B
Current Liabilities: $13.65B
Long-Term Debt: $0.00
Total Debt: $2.00B
Total Equity: $8.20B
Shares: 623,000,000
Shares: 623,000,000
CapEx: $0.00
Shares: 623,000,000
Stock Price: $178.07
Net Income: $2.51B
Industry Benchmarks
Income Statement (Annual)
Last updated: Aug 6, 2026 6:55pm (17d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | $6.0B | $8.4B | $9.9B | $11.1B | $12.2B |
| Cost of Revenue | $1.2B | $1.5B | $1.7B | $1.9B | $2.1B |
| Gross Profit | $4.8B | $6.9B | $8.2B | $9.2B | $10.2B |
| Operating Expenses | $4.4B | $5.1B | $6.7B | $6.7B | $7.6B |
| Operating Income | $429.3M | $1.8B | $1.5B | $2.6B | $2.5B |
| Net Income | -$352.0M | $1.9B | $4.8B | $2.6B | $2.5B |
| EBITDA | $515.3M | $1.8B | $1.5B | $2.6B | $2.6B |
| EPS | $-0.57 | $2.97 | $7.52 | $4.19 | $4.10 |
| EPS (Diluted) | $-0.57 | $2.78 | $7.24 | $4.11 | $4.03 |
Balance Sheet (Annual)
Last updated: Aug 6, 2026 6:55pm (17d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cash & Equivalents | $6.1B | $7.4B | $6.9B | $6.9B | $6.6B |
| Total Current Assets | $12.4B | $14.9B | $16.5B | $17.2B | $18.8B |
| Total Assets | $13.7B | $16.0B | $20.6B | $21.0B | $22.2B |
| Current Liabilities | $6.4B | $8.0B | $10.0B | $10.2B | $13.6B |
| Long-Term Debt | $2.0B | $2.0B | $2.0B | $2.0B | $0 |
| Total Liabilities | $8.9B | $10.5B | $12.5B | $12.5B | $14.0B |
| Total Equity | $4.8B | $5.6B | $8.2B | $8.4B | $8.2B |
| Retained Earnings | -$6.4B | -$6.0B | -$3.4B | -$4.2B | -$5.5B |
Cash Flow (Annual)
Last updated: Aug 6, 2026 6:55pm (17d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Operating Cash Flow | $2.2B | $3.4B | $3.9B | $4.5B | $4.6B |
| Capital Expenditure | -$25.3M | -$25.0M | — | — | — |
| Free Cash Flow | $2.2B | $3.4B | — | — | — |
| Acquisitions (net) | $0 | — | — | — | — |
| Net Debt Issued / (Repaid) | -$2.0B | $0 | $0 | — | — |
| Dividends Paid | — | — | — | — | — |
| Stock Buybacks | $0 | -$1.5B | -$2.3B | -$3.4B | -$3.8B |
| Net Change in Cash | $2.1B | $2.4B | $564.0M | $93.0M | $726.0M |
Growth Trends (YoY %)
Last updated: Aug 6, 2026 6:55pm (17d ago)| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue Growth | +40.2% | +18.1% | +11.9% | +10.3% |
| Gross Profit Growth | +42.7% | +19.0% | +12.3% | +10.1% |
| Operating Income Growth | +319.7% | -15.8% | +68.2% | -0.4% |
| Net Income Growth | +637.7% | +153.1% | -44.7% | -5.2% |
| EBITDA Growth | +258.0% | -16.7% | +67.3% | -0.3% |
Deep Analysis
Risk : Reward — if the last quarter repeats
Live · as of 2026-08-23 02:38Even the bull case prices 50% below today — the ratio here measures the model-vs-market gap, not payoff odds. Another quarter like the worst recent one costs 82%.
| Case | Growth | Margin | Fair value | vs price ($178.07) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Bull — recovery | +26% | 23.5% | $88.73 | -50% |
| Base — stabilizes | +18% | 20.5% | $60.68 | -66% |
| Bear — keeps slipping | +9% | 17.4% | $40.44 | -77% |
| Stress — last quarter repeats | +12% | 11.4% | $31.39 | -82% |
Narrative Economics
market-narrative step).
Claude Reading
Starting with the raw tape: TTM revenue running roughly $13.2B ($3.61+$2.68+$2.78+$4.10 last four prints if we trust the labels), against 2024 full-year $11.1B and 2025 full-year $12.24B. That's ~11% top-line growth, matching the stated CAGR. But look carefully at the quarterly cadence: 2025-09 shows $4.10B/33.6% margin while 2024-09 showed $3.73B/36.7% — Q3 is the seasonal cash cow and margin actually compressed 310bps YoY on the peak quarter. Q2 2026 at $3.61B vs Q2 2025 $3.10B is +16.5% growth with margin expanding to 22.6% from 20.7% — that's actually the strongest data point in the file and the synthesis models seem to underweight it. Full-year 2025 NI of $2.51B was down from $2.65B in 2024 despite $1.1B more revenue, so operating leverage is negative on a reported basis, though 2023's $4.79B NI included a large deferred tax benefit and shouldn't be the comp.
On valuation, the synthesis "fair value $33.25" is not credible on its face. A business generating $4.65B operating cash flow, ~$4B+ FCF, with $6.56B net cash, growing double-digits at 20%+ net margins does not clear at 3.5x earnings or ~7x FCF — that's a distressed multiple for a category-leading platform with 83% gross margins and 56% ROIC. The DCF is either using a punitive discount rate, terminal decay to zero, or ignoring the balance sheet. The Market Forces model calling this "collapsing margins" and "losing share" is contradicted by the Q2'26 print (+16.5%, margin up YoY) and by the "Sector Leader" tag from the sector intel model. These two prior models are internally inconsistent and I'd discount the "compelling short" framing as hyperbole.
That said, the bear case isn't wrong on direction, just magnitude. At $178 / $105.7B market cap, EV of roughly $101B against ~$4B FCF is ~25x — not $33 fair value territory, but also not cheap for an 11% grower with regulatory overhang in Barcelona, NYC, Paris, and now increasingly in secondary US markets. The insider activity is genuinely ugly: ~2.1M shares sold across two days in late July 2026 with zero offsetting buys and only a token gift. That's not routine 10b5-1 noise, that's a coordinated distribution near highs, and it deserves weight. The Q1 seasonality (Q1'26 $2.68B, only +18% vs Q1'25 $2.27B but margin still just 6%) shows the business remains highly seasonal and Q1/Q4 profitability is thin — the "22.6% net margin" headline is a Q2/Q3 phenomenon.
A careful contrarian pushing back on my skepticism would note: Chesky has been signaling the Experiences/Services relaunch as a genuine second act, the platform has never had meaningfully lower churn or higher take-rate optionality than now, and 44x P/E on a company with a net cash balance sheet, no capex, and 38% FCF conversion is closer to 30x on an ex-cash FCF basis — reasonable for a category-defining brand. Fair. But the counter is that Booking.com trades at ~20x forward earnings with faster growth and better margins, and Expedia at ~14x — ABNB's premium to peers is what's stretched, not the absolute multiple. I'd anchor fair value at roughly 25-28x FCF on ~$4.2B, or ~$110-125B EV, translating to roughly $130-150/share including net cash. That's a 15-25% overvaluation, not 80%. I dissent hard from the $33 composite but agree directionally with "overvalued." The Market Forces "short opportunity" framing is too aggressive given Q2'26's actual reacceleration; the Narrative layer's "anchored, moderate durability" read is closest to correct. Insider selling + Q3 margin compression + regulatory drift + premium to Booking are the four things I'd watch; a break of $160 would confirm the re-rating, while a Q3'26 print above $4.3B with margin holding 34%+ would force a rethink upward.
GPT Reading
Airbnb still looks like an excellent business, but the numbers here do not support paying a premium-growth multiple. Revenue is growing, yet only at a rate that is becoming ordinary for a company already at $12.24B of sales: 2025 revenue grew 10.3% to $12.24B from $11.10B, and the latest quarter rose 16.5% year over year to $3.61B from $3.10B, while 1Q26 grew 18.1% off an easy base. That is healthy, not explosive. More importantly, profit conversion is not marching upward with scale. Annual operating income was essentially flat at $2.54B in 2025 versus $2.55B in 2024 despite the extra $1.14B of revenue, implying operating margin compressed from 23.0% to 20.8%. Net income fell from $2.65B to $2.51B even as revenue advanced. On a quarterly basis, the business remains strongly seasonal, with margins swinging from 6.0% in 1Q26 to 22.6% in 2Q26 and 33.6% in 3Q25. That is fine operationally, but it argues against a software-like multiple.
The quality of the franchise is obvious in the gross margin and cash generation. An 82.9% gross margin and $4.65B of operating cash flow on $12.24B of revenue are elite. The balance sheet is also a strength: $6.56B of cash against just $2.00B of debt gives Airbnb real resilience and optionality. Return metrics are high, with ROE at 30.6% and ROIC at 55.9%, which tells you the platform model is economically attractive. But valuation already capitalizes that strength and then some. At $178, the stock trades around 44x earnings, 9.1x sales, and 39x EV/EBITDA. Those are demanding multiples for a company with roughly 10%-11% top-line growth, flat operating profit, and slight net income decline. If Airbnb were compounding revenue 20%+ with clear evidence that margins were re-expanding, I could tolerate that setup. Here, the market is paying for moat, brand, and optionality as if the next leg of growth is already visible in the P&L. It isn’t.
What stands out most is that the “mature earner” framing is basically right, while some of the more dramatic bearish language is overstated. This is not a deteriorating business with collapsing economics. The data show a very profitable global marketplace with strong cash generation, modest balance-sheet risk, and continued growth. But it is maturing, and the stock price has not fully acknowledged that maturation. The annual numbers since 2023 show the issue clearly: revenue rose from $9.92B to $11.10B to $12.24B, while operating income went $1.52B to $2.55B to $2.54B. Airbnb has already harvested a large chunk of the obvious post-COVID operating leverage. From here, sustaining a 44x P/E likely requires either a new growth engine or a renewed margin expansion cycle. The raw data do not yet show either. Add a cluster of insider selling in late July 2026, including seven-figure share dispositions, and it is hard to argue management behavior is signaling a bargain.
The best counterargument is that I am underestimating the durability and scarcity of the asset. There are not many consumer internet platforms with global brand power, structurally high margins, net cash, and more than $4.5B of annual operating cash flow. If 1H26 is the start of a re-acceleration rather than a temporary lift, the multiple could hold. The latest two quarters did improve year-over-year revenue growth versus the 2025 annual pace, and quarterly net income also improved in absolute dollars from $642M to $816M in the June quarter. A bull would also point out that 2023 net income was distorted higher at $4.79B, so the earnings CAGR looks worse than underlying economics; by normalized earnings power, 2024-2026 may be steadier than the headline suggests. I weigh those points less heavily because the burden of proof is on a $105.7B company priced at 9x sales. Great business quality is not the same thing as undervaluation.
What would change my mind is simple: if Airbnb can show that 2026 revenue growth sustains in the mid-teens while operating margin climbs back above 23%-24% instead of stalling around 21%, then the premium would start to look earned. Concretely, I would want to see full-year 2026 revenue above roughly $13.8B with operating income above $3.2B and operating cash flow pushing past $5.2B. Short of that, I would need a materially lower price. Around $130-$140, the stock would be easier to underwrite on existing fundamentals; at $178, too much future success is already paid for.
Grok Reading
The raw numbers describe a high-quality but clearly maturing platform, not a compounding growth engine. Airbnb printed $12.24B in 2025 revenue, up just 10% from $11.10B the prior year and continuing the steady deceleration from the 40%+ post-COVID bounce; the trailing revenue CAGR sits at 11.1% with recent YoY at 10.3%. Net income came in at $2.51B for a clean 20.5% net margin, but that figure is actually down from $2.65B in 2024 and a distant cry from the anomalous $4.79B in 2023, producing a –27.6% earnings CAGR. Quarterly seasonality remains extreme—Q3 delivers 33–37% net margins and $1.37B profits while Q1 collapses to 6% margins and ~$150–160M—yet the full-year operating margin has settled at 20.8% after the earlier peak. Gross margin holds at an elite 83%, operating cash flow reached $4.65B, the balance sheet is fortress-like with $6.56B cash against only $2.0B debt and a 0.24 debt-to-equity ratio, and returns are outstanding (ROE 30.6%, ROIC 56%). Those are the hallmarks of a durable, asset-light cash machine. What they are not is a business still growing into a 44× P/E, 9.1× sales, or 39× EV/EBITDA multiple at a $178 share price and $106B enterprise value.
The valuation synthesis calling the stock 80%+ overvalued relative to a ~$33–36 DCF is directionally correct even if the absolute fair-value pin is too punitive; more realistic multiples for a 10% grower with 20% margins would land closer to 25–30× earnings or 5–6× sales, implying a mid-$90s to low-$120s range. Insider activity reinforces the caution: the last ten filings are almost entirely large open-market sales totaling well over 2 million shares in a two-day window at the end of July 2026. The market narrative of “platform monopoly / winner-take-most lodging distribution” is still firmly anchored and explains why the stock can trade at a several-hundred-percent premium to fundamental cash-flow value, but the quantitative momentum and secondary signals (decelerating revenue confidence, macro headwinds, unusual selling) show the story is already fraying at the edges.
The strongest counter-argument is that Airbnb still converts revenue into cash at extraordinary rates, possesses genuine two-sided network effects and brand pricing power that hotels and OTAs have failed to replicate, and could re-accelerate via experiences, longer-term stays, or corporate travel. A bull would correctly note that 38%-ish incremental FCF margins and a net-cash balance sheet give the company enormous strategic flexibility, that structural share shift from traditional hotels continues in many markets, and that a 44× multiple is not outrageous if management can push revenue growth back into the mid-teens while holding or expanding the 20%+ net margin. Those points have merit; the business quality is real. I simply weigh the observed growth trajectory and current multiple more heavily: 10% top-line growth and flat-to-down earnings do not support an 8–9× sales multiple when regulatory risk in core cities is rising and the easy post-pandemic mix shift is exhausted.
Sustained quarterly revenue growth re-accelerating above 15–16% YoY for two consecutive periods, coupled with operating margins expanding back through 25%, or a material capital-return program that shrinks the share count while the multiple holds, would force a reassessment toward fair value.
Big-3 Panel — where each AI stands
Advanced Analysis Forensic deep-dive · separate lenses
Airbnb is a structurally high-quality business: 83% gross margins, 20%+ operating margins, and $4.65B of FCF on $12.24B revenue (a ~38% FCF margin). Revenue has scaled from $5.99B (2021) to $12.24B (2025), a ~20% CAGR, while OCF/FCF has expanded every single year. The balance sheet is a fortress: $11.01B liquid cash, $9.02B net cash, Altman Z of 5.39, and no external funding need. Earnings quality is clean - accruals at -8.5% of assets indicate conservative accrual behavior, and reported net income is well-supported by cash (FCF has exceeded net income in 4 of 5 years; the 2023 net income spike was a deferred tax valuation allowance release, not core earnings). Dilution is well-controlled for a tech platform: diluted shares fell from 680M (2022) to 623M (2025), a net reduction, with buybacks running 184% of SBC. That said, SBC at 13% of revenue (~$1.6B) is a real economic cost that gets masked by GAAP margins - true cash compensation intensity is high. Operating margin also compressed from 23% (2024) to 20.8% (2025) even as revenue grew, suggesting reinvestment or cost creep worth watching. The insider tape is a genuine yellow flag: 90 sells for $629M with zero buys over 12 months, headlined by co-founder Joe Gebbia unloading ~$316M in two days. This is likely 10b5-1 diversification by billionaire founders rather than a fundamental signal, but the one-sidedness and scale deviate from norms and deserve attention.
Verify before trusting this (5)
- Whether the July 2026 Gebbia sales were executed under a pre-arranged 10b5-1 plan
- Composition of 2025 opex growth - is margin compression from Services/Experiences reinvestment or core cost creep?
- Geographic and regulatory concentration (EU short-term rental rules, NYC-style bans) in the 10-K risk section
- Take-rate trend and nights-booked growth vs revenue growth to confirm pricing vs volume mix
- Nature of the 2023 net income spike ($4.79B vs $3.88B FCF) - deferred tax asset release confirmation
The e2e composite fair value of $36.38 (EPV floor) implies -81% downside, but that number is almost certainly a runaway low-end anchor - EPV on a capital-light growth platform with mid-teens FCF margins understates deserved value badly. I discount it heavily rather than take it literally. A more honest deserved-value range for a Strong-quality, asset-light, FCF-generative platform with ~13% of revenue in SBC leakage and moderating growth is roughly 20-25x maintainable FCF, landing somewhere in the $90-130 per share zone depending on how much you credit the moat narrative. Against $178, that leaves the stock priced for continued platform dominance, resilient take rates, and no material regulatory drag - i.e. the bull case is already in the tape.
Verify before trusting this (5)
- Nights-booked growth trajectory and ADR trend in next print
- Take-rate direction and any hint of host-side pricing pressure
- SBC dollars vs revenue - is the ratio flattening or growing
- Regulatory rulings in top-10 metros
- Free cash flow conversion vs adjusted EBITDA gap
The pressure on ABNB is decisively positive. The Aug 7 print did two things at once: beat and raise (validating the platform-monopoly story) AND handed the market a new, cleaner narrative hook - AI as a margin lever, endorsed on the call by the CEO. The stock gapped ~14-17% to a four-year high, which is the market re-rating the story, not the fundamentals. Coverage since has been uniformly constructive (four-year high, 'is it a buy', AI pays off), with zero visible bear counter-narrative in the flow.
Verify before trusting this (4)
- Whether sell-side target revisions follow the print - silence after a 17% gap would be a tell that the move is retail/momentum-led
- Durability of the AI-margin story in Q3 commentary and any concrete opex/take-rate numbers
- Any re-emergence of regulatory headlines in major cities, which is the dormant bear catalyst
- Rate-cut path - if the payrolls-driven cut narrative fades, high-multiple consumer names give back first
This lens hasn't been run for this ticker yet.
When we made this prediction on Aug 10, 2026, ABNB was $178.07. We expect it to be $154.00 by Feb 2027, and we consider it great value under $130.00. This is an early model (v0.6.0) — the direction is more reliable than the exact price. Made Aug 10, 2026.
Blue is our prediction, starting the day we made it. Grey is a slower route to the same place — the same destination, taking longer. Black is the actual price, so you can see how we are doing.