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What this page is: Delvantic's full research page for Barclays PLC (BCS) — AI-driven forensic equity research: mechanical valuation models (DCF, EPV, anchored-PE, scenario) plus three independent AI lenses (Quality / Value / Sentiment). Everything below is rendered server-side; you are not missing content that requires JavaScript. All scores are predictions and research opinions, not financial advice.
Our current read (analysis of 2026-08-23): Designation Watch · Gem Score +30 (−100…+100 Quality+Value blend) · Quality 21 · Value 38 · Sentiment 7 (timing only, not weighted) · Composite fair value $40.87 vs $28.05 at analysis
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profile-header/price-overview— company profile, live quote, market capextended-analysis— the core: three AI lens reads with findings, scores, and the analyst memofuture-predictions— our forward price-band predictionsmarket-narrative/ai-findings/gpt-critique— narrative context, cross-model findings, and an adversarial critique of our own analysis (near the end of the document)- Members-only sections (render as login gates for anonymous readers):
price-history,income-trend,key-metrics,financials(statement tables),insider-trading. The analysis above is public; the raw data tables require a free account.
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raw inputs are public-company filings and market data (via licensed data feeds);
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Barclays PLC
BCS NYSEBarclays PLC Sponsored ADR represents ownership in Barclays PLC, a British multinational universal bank headquartered in London. Through this structure, U.S.-based investors gain exposure to one of Europe’s major diversified banking groups. Barclays PLC today operates across retail and commercial banking, credit cards, corporate and investment banking, and wealth and private banking services. Its activities span current and savings accounts, mortgages, consumer and business lending, payments and cards, cash management, and treasury services for individuals, small and medium-sized enterprises, large corporates, and institutional clients. The firm also provides investment banking capabilities, including capital markets, advisory, and global markets services, as well as wealth management and private banking for affluent and high-net-worth clients. Barclays PLC has significant operations in the United Kingdom, the United States, and other international markets, making the Sponsored ADR a gateway to a globally active, full-service banking institution founded in England and headquartered in London.
Price Overview
Price History (1 Year)
Revenue & Net Income Trend
Barclays PLC is a foreign private issuer — it reports to the U.S. SEC once a year (on Form 20-F or 40-F) rather than filing the quarterly statements (10-Q) that U.S.-domiciled companies must submit. Our financial statements are read directly from SEC filings, so for this company only annual figures exist at the source.
This is a property of how the company files, not missing or broken data — its filing history shows 10 annual reports, the latest filed 2026-02-10, and no quarterly filings . The company may still publish quarterly results on its own investor-relations site.
| Period | Revenue | Net Income | Net Margin | YoY/QoQ |
|---|
Key Metrics
EPS (Diluted): 2.28
Total Equity: $105.35B
Shares: 4,238,770,686
Total Debt: $0.00
Cash: $345.34B
EBITDA: N/A
Total Debt: $0.00
Cash: $345.34B
Revenue: $14.96B
Revenue: $14.96B
Revenue: $14.96B
Total Equity: $105.35B
Tax Rate: 21.1%
Equity: $105.35B
Total Debt: $0.00
Cash: $345.34B
Current Liabilities: N/A
Long-Term Debt: $0.00
Total Debt: $0.00
Total Equity: $105.35B
Shares: 4,238,770,686
Shares: 4,238,770,686
CapEx: -$2.50B
Shares: 4,238,770,686
Stock Price: $27.89
Net Income: $9.66B
Industry Benchmarks
Income Statement (Annual)
Last updated: Aug 6, 2026 7:37am (17d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | $13.1B | $12.8B | $13.4B | $14.4B | $15.0B |
| Cost of Revenue | — | — | — | — | — |
| Gross Profit | — | — | — | — | — |
| Operating Expenses | $19.7B | $22.5B | $22.8B | $22.5B | $23.9B |
| Operating Income | $30.4B | — | — | — | — |
| Net Income | $9.4B | $8.0B | $7.1B | $8.5B | $9.7B |
| EBITDA | — | — | — | — | — |
| EPS | $2.02 | $1.66 | $1.49 | $1.94 | $2.36 |
| EPS (Diluted) | $1.97 | $1.61 | $1.45 | $1.87 | $2.28 |
Balance Sheet (Annual)
Last updated: Aug 6, 2026 7:37am (17d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cash & Equivalents | $349.0B | $375.4B | $333.9B | $317.3B | $345.3B |
| Total Current Assets | — | — | — | — | — |
| Total Assets | $1.9T | $2.0T | $2.0T | $2.0T | $2.1T |
| Current Liabilities | — | — | — | — | — |
| Long-Term Debt | — | — | — | — | — |
| Total Liabilities | $1.8T | $1.9T | $1.9T | $1.9T | $2.0T |
| Total Equity | $94.3B | $93.3B | $96.8B | $97.6B | $105.3B |
| Retained Earnings | $68.0B | $71.1B | $72.4B | $75.4B | $79.8B |
Cash Flow (Annual)
Last updated: Aug 6, 2026 7:37am (17d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Operating Cash Flow | $65.9B | $40.7B | -$1.2B | $9.6B | $25.2B |
| Capital Expenditure | -$2.3B | -$2.4B | -$2.3B | -$2.1B | -$2.5B |
| Free Cash Flow | $63.6B | $38.4B | -$3.6B | $7.5B | $22.7B |
| Acquisitions (net) | — | $0 | -$3.3B | -$619.4M | — |
| Net Debt Issued / (Repaid) | $4.9B | $11.4B | $10.2B | $15.7B | $14.3B |
| Dividends Paid | — | — | — | — | — |
| Stock Buybacks | — | — | — | — | — |
| Net Change in Cash | $66.1B | $26.4B | -$41.5B | -$16.7B | $28.1B |
Growth Trends (YoY %)
Last updated: Aug 6, 2026 7:37am (17d ago)| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue Growth | -2.7% | +5.1% | +7.3% | +3.7% |
| Gross Profit Growth | — | — | — | — |
| Operating Income Growth | — | — | — | — |
| Net Income Growth | -15.4% | -11.3% | +19.9% | +13.7% |
| EBITDA Growth | — | — | — | — |
Dividend History (Last 20)
Last updated: Aug 6, 2026 7:37am (17d ago)| Date | Dividend | Declaration | Record | Payment |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-02-20 | $0.31 | — | — | — |
| 2025-08-08 | $0.16 | — | — | — |
| 2025-02-28 | $0.27 | — | — | — |
| 2024-08-16 | $0.15 | — | — | — |
| 2024-02-29 | $0.27 | — | — | — |
| 2023-08-10 | $0.14 | — | — | — |
| 2023-02-23 | $0.24 | — | — | — |
| 2022-08-11 | $0.11 | — | — | — |
| 2022-03-03 | $0.21 | — | — | — |
| 2021-08-12 | $0.11 | — | — | — |
| 2021-02-25 | $0.06 | — | — | — |
| 2020-02-27 | $0.31 | — | — | — |
| 2019-08-08 | $0.15 | — | — | — |
| 2019-02-28 | $0.21 | — | — | — |
| 2018-08-09 | $0.13 | — | — | — |
| 2018-03-01 | $0.11 | — | — | — |
| 2017-08-09 | $0.05 | — | — | — |
| 2017-03-01 | $0.10 | — | — | — |
| 2016-08-10 | $0.05 | — | — | — |
| 2016-03-09 | $0.20 | — | — | — |
Deep Analysis
Narrative Economics
market-narrative step).
AI Lens 4th lens · how AI reaches this business · 5-yr
2026-08-12Barclays' core product is information processing wrapped in regulated liability: KYC/AML review, credit decisioning, client onboarding, reconciliations, control functions and middle office are exactly the tasks cheap machine intelligence performs, and they sit inside a bank whose cost/income ratio is the primary swing factor in ROTE.
Cheap AI erodes deposit inertia: agentic money-management tools and open-banking APIs can continuously sweep balances to best rates, raising deposit betas on the UK retail and Tesco-sourced base and compressing net interest income — the single largest revenue unit — without any competitor needing a branch network.
Whether AI-driven cost extraction outruns AI-driven deposit repricing. Observable: cost/income ratio and structural cost actions versus the retail deposit mix (non-interest-bearing share, migration to savings, deposit beta disclosed in NII guidance).
A UK banking licence, ring-fenced deposit franchise, regulatory capital, a primary dealer/market-making balance sheet, and multi-decade card issuing partnerships — none of which get cheaper because inference does.
AI Lens thesis
Barclays is not a software business AI can copy; it is a regulated balance sheet with a very large information-processing overhead bolted on. AI reaches it through three channels: (1) cost — controls, compliance, ops and technology delivery are automatable, and this is the biggest and most controllable channel; (2) risk — better underwriting and fraud/AML detection across UK cards, US partnership cards and Tesco Bank, where loss rates are a direct P&L line; (3) revenue architecture — AI-mediated distribution (aggregators, agents, embedded finance) threatens to demote the bank to a balance-sheet utility priced on rate, while in the investment bank AI commoditizes research and quantitative content and electronifies flow, compressing spread income even as it lowers the cost of serving. Value capture depends on whether savings are retained or competed away in deposit pricing and lending spreads — in banking, industry-wide efficiency gains historically leak to customers because the product is fungible money.
What the market may be underestimating
Upside Credit impairment is where AI pays quietly: a few tens of basis points off card and unsecured loss rates across UK/US consumer books converts straight to pre-tax profit and is invisible in headline 'AI adoption' narratives.
Downside AI raises the cost of the arms race Barclays cannot opt out of — fraud, deepfake-enabled authorized push payment scams and model risk governance — so a chunk of the efficiency dividend is spent defending the franchise rather than reaching shareholders.
Outcome range spread 41
Claude Reading
Starting with the raw arithmetic before touching the model outputs: Barclays put up $14.96B revenue in 2025 vs $12.78B in 2022 — that's roughly 5.4% CAGR, unremarkable but positive, and 2025 net income of $9.66B against $7.98B in 2022 is 6.6% CAGR with meaningful acceleration (13.7% YoY latest). Net margin of 64.5% is a nonsense number here — this is a bank where "revenue" is net interest income plus fees, so the metric is not comparable to industrials but does reflect genuine operating leverage returning. ROE of 9.2% is the number that actually matters, and it remains structurally below the ~12% cost of equity for UK banks. P/B of 1.13x on ROE of 9.2% is roughly what the Gordon growth math demands (1.13 ≈ (ROE-g)/(COE-g) with g~2%, COE~9%) — meaning the market is pricing Barclays almost exactly for its current returns, not punishing it. The "37% discount to fair value" the synthesis leans on is doing heavy lifting from a DCF that likely treats bank FCF ($22.7B) as economically meaningful, which it isn't — bank OCF/FCF is dominated by working capital swings in the loan book and deposit base and cannot be capitalized like an industrial's.
This is where I part ways with the Valuation Synthesis's $41.89 composite fair value and the implied +58.7% upside. That number is almost certainly contaminated by FCF-based methods being misapplied to a levered financial. The Narrative Economics layer actually gets this right — it flags that the "discount" is arithmetic, not story-driven, and durability is moderate. But even that framing understates the problem: at 1.13x book with 9.2% ROE, there is no discount. The stock is fair. To justify $41 you need ROE to sustainably re-rate to ~13%+, which requires either (a) UK rates staying higher-for-longer to preserve NIM, (b) the investment bank taking share without capital inflation, or (c) buybacks compressing the share count faster than book erodes. None of these are in the numbers yet — 2025 earnings growth of 13.7% is real but partly a rate-cycle gift that reverses as BoE cuts.
The contrarian case cuts both ways and I'd take the bear side more seriously than the thesis evaluator's -4 score suggests. Cash on the balance sheet of $345B against $105B equity tells you nothing about liquidity for a bank — it's regulatory positioning. The "debt_to_equity: 0" is a data error; Barclays runs on ~20x assets-to-equity like every G-SIB, and the ROA of 0.46% is the honest number — this is a thin-margin business one credit cycle from ROE collapsing to 5%. UK mortgage book repricing at higher rates is a two-year tailwind that fades; the investment bank had a strong 2025 in rates/FX that won't repeat if volatility normalizes. The bear case that "capital requirements permanently impair ROE" (weight 69) is the correct structural view — Basel 3.1 endgame in the UK adds ~10-15% RWA inflation for market risk businesses over 2026-28, which mechanically caps ROE near 10%.
I dissent from the synthesis's fair_value call only in the direction of its magnitude — I agree with "fair" but reject the $41.89 anchor. My read: BCS at $27.89 is close to fairly valued, with a modest 10-15% upside case if buybacks continue at the 2025 pace and NIM holds through 2026, and 20% downside if UK enters recession and credit costs normalize from cyclically low levels. The 2.2% dividend yield is real but unremarkable versus Lloyds or NatWest at 5-6%. The mature_earner archetype is correct; the pre-flight thesis about "modest premium to book despite below-target ROE" is the most honest framing in the entire stack. What would change my mind: a print showing ROE sustainably above 11%, or a Basel endgame outcome materially softer than feared. Neither is visible in the current data, and the quarterly revenue detail is entirely missing from this file — which is itself a red flag for how much I should trust any trajectory claim.
GPT Reading
What stands out first is how much of the “cheap bank” case here depends on whether you trust the accounting inputs, because several of the machine-friendly ratios are plainly distorted for a bank. A 64.6% net margin, 7.95x sales, negative EV/revenue, zero debt-to-equity, and $22.73B of free cash flow are not decision-useful in the way they would be for an industrial company. For Barclays, the cleaner anchors in this packet are earnings, book value, ROE, and the direction of those over time. On those terms, Barclays is improving but not exceptional: net income has risen from $7.08B in 2023 to $8.49B in 2024 and $9.66B in 2025, while revenue moved from $13.44B to $14.42B to $14.96B. That is a decent operating progression, but the key number is still return on equity of 9.17% against a 1.13x price-to-book. A bank earning roughly 9% on equity should not obviously trade above book unless investors believe that return is heading materially higher and sustainably.
That is why I do not buy the more aggressive fair-value output pointing to the low-$40s. At the current $27.89 price and $94.28B market cap against $105.35B of equity, the market is valuing Barclays at only a modest discount to what I’d consider justified for a sub-10% ROE bank in a regulated, mature market with real macro sensitivity. The earnings trend is undeniably good: 2025 net income is up 13.7% year over year and up about 36% versus 2023. But this still has the look of a recovery in profitability rather than evidence of a structurally better franchise. If Barclays can only convert $105.35B of equity into a 9.17% ROE, then 1.13x book already bakes in some expectation that returns move toward 11-12%. That may happen, but the current numbers do not prove it. On earnings, 12.3x P/E is not expensive, yet for large banks that multiple is only attractive if the quality and durability of earnings are clearly improving faster than capital intensity. Here, the improvement is real, but not decisive.
The story the numbers tell me is that Barclays is a competent but still middle-of-the-pack bank being priced close to where it deserves to be. Revenue growth of 5.5% CAGR over the period is respectable, and earnings CAGR of 16.8% looks strong, but that earnings line is volatile: net income was $9.44B in 2021, dropped to $7.98B in 2022, then $7.08B in 2023 before recovering to $9.66B in 2025. That is not a straight-line compounding story; it is a cyclical bank earnings stream. The dividend yield of 2.2% is also not high enough by itself to create a compelling valuation floor if rates fall and banking multiples compress. My base read is that fair value is around tangible economic book-to-slight-premium territory, which puts the stock around where it trades today, maybe somewhat higher if management shows another year of double-digit earnings growth without needing more capital. I would not call it overvalued, but I also do not see a clean case that it is dramatically undervalued.
The strongest argument against my cautious view is simple and respectable: Barclays has now put together two consecutive years of earnings recovery, from $7.08B to $8.49B to $9.66B, while revenue has also climbed each year from $12.78B in 2022 to $14.96B in 2025. If that trajectory is the start of a normalized earnings base rather than a cyclical rebound, then 12.3x earnings and 1.13x book are too low, especially for a bank with $345.34B of cash and a franchise diversified across retail and investment banking. A bull would also say that the low reported ROE understates where returns are headed, and that once Barclays demonstrates a clean path to 11-12% ROE, the stock can re-rate toward 1.3x-1.4x book, which would indeed support something closer to the high-$30s or even low-$40s. I weigh that argument less heavily because the current packet shows the destination only as aspiration; the actual delivered ROE is still 9.17%, and banks do not get paid for target slides forever.
What would change my mind is very specific. If Barclays can produce another year of earnings above $10.5B while lifting ROE above 10.5% without equity materially ballooning, I would move bullish quickly because that would show the recent earnings recovery is translating into a better return engine, not just a cyclical upswing. Conversely, if revenue stalls near $15B and net income slips back toward the $8B area, the stock deserves to move below book and into the low-$20s. In other words, the next debate is not about whether Barclays is profitable; it is about whether it can sustainably earn enough on its capital base to justify more than roughly 1.1x book. Until that is proven, this looks more fairly valued than mispriced.
Grok Reading
The numbers tell a recovery story the market refuses to underwrite. Barclays has grown revenue from $12.78B in 2022 to $14.96B in 2025 at a 5.5% CAGR, while net income climbed from the $7.08B trough in 2023 to $9.66B—a 13.7% year-over-year jump and a 16.8% earnings CAGR that is doing real work. Operating cash flow of $25.23B and free cash flow of $22.73B against a $94B market cap are not the signature of a zombie franchise. At $27.89 the stock clears 12.3x earnings and 1.13x book ($105.35B equity); that is a discount to what a bank printing nearly $10B of annual profit and holding $345B of cash equivalents would normally command if ROE were merely adequate. The market is effectively capitalizing this franchise for mild FCF decline and permanent UK stagnation even as reported earnings are moving the other way.
What stands out against the clean growth print is the return on equity: 9.2% is below any reasonable cost of equity for a universal bank and well short of the mid-teens management rhetoric that bulls keep recycling. ROA of 46 basis points confirms the same capital intensity problem. The 2.2% dividend yield is also thinner than the 4% “safe fortress” narrative claims, so income buyers are not getting paid to wait. Several model outputs are internally inconsistent with the raw tape—the composite fair-value engine spits out $42–$45 (+50–60% upside) yet still labels the name fair value on “mixed signals,” while FCF quality is flagged poor even though absolute FCF covers the market cap in roughly four years. Negative EV/revenue and a reported debt-to-equity of zero are data artifacts, not economics; they should not drive the call, but they do warn that ratio shopping on this feed is hazardous.
I read the stock as undervalued on the earnings trajectory and the book-value floor, not on a narrative re-rating. The 1.13x P/B already embeds sub-par ROE; if management merely sustains the current $9–10B net-income run-rate and edges ROE toward 11%, the multiple does not need heroics to move. The transatlantic discount and post-2008 overhang explain why the re-rating has not happened, but they do not justify pricing in ongoing earnings contraction when the last two years show the opposite.
The strongest case against this is straightforward: capital requirements and UK structural drag permanently cap ROE in the high single digits, so 1.1x book is fair, not cheap. A smart opponent would note that 2021 net income was already $9.44B—today’s $9.66B is barely a cycle high—and that revenue growth of 3.7% recently is uninspiring once rate-tailwinds fade. Macro headwinds, mortgage-margin compression, and the risk that the investment bank’s contribution proves cyclical rather than structural all argue the market’s zero-growth discount is earned. Poor cash-flow quality flags and the gap between reported net margin (an implausible 65% on this feed’s revenue definition) and economic reality further suggest the income statement is flattering the franchise. I weigh this less heavily because the absolute earnings and FCF dollars are rising, the P/B cushion is real, and the bear case requires ROE to stagnate forever at 9% with no capital return acceleration—possible, but already in the price.
I would flip to fairly valued or overvalued if trailing ROE stalls below 9% through the next two reporting seasons, if the UK retail net-interest margin compresses enough to reverse the earnings CAGR, or if regulators impose a step-up in capital that cuts the buyback/dividend capacity that currently supports the equity story. A sustained print above 12% ROE or a clear acceleration in distributions would push me to higher conviction on the upside.
Big-3 Panel — where each AI stands
Advanced Analysis Forensic deep-dive · separate lenses
Revenue has ground higher from 13.1B in 2021 to 15.0B in 2025, and net income has rebuilt from a 7.1B trough in 2023 back to 9.7B in 2025 — the highest of the five-year window. OCF/NI of 3.13x and accruals of -1% of assets say the reported profits are backed by cash, not by receivable or accrual build. Diluted share count came in at 4.24B in 2025 versus 4.79B in 2021, a roughly -3% CAGR, so per-share value is being concentrated rather than diluted — an unusually shareholder-friendly posture for a European universal bank. For a bank, the fortress cash figure and Altman Z of 0.09 are largely artifacts of applying non-bank frameworks to a balance sheet dominated by deposits and trading liabilities, so I discount both. The signal I do trust: earnings are re-accelerating, cash generation is real (22.7B FCF in 2025), and the buyback is genuine. What I cannot see from this data is credit quality, capital ratios (CET1), trading VaR, or exposure concentration — all decisive for a bank's true quality.
Verify before trusting this (6)
- CET1 ratio, leverage ratio, and liquidity coverage ratio in the latest annual report
- Loan-loss provisions and Stage 3 (NPL) trend across 2023-2025
- Whether the 2024 diluted share jump to 6.18B reflects an AT1 conversion, warrant, or accounting reclassification
- Investment bank revenue mix and RWA density trend
- Outstanding conduct/litigation provisions and any material regulatory actions
- Actual buyback authorization size and pace versus SBC issuance
The e2e composite fair value is $41.89 and the signal-adjusted figure $44.53, implying roughly 50-60% upside from the $28.05 price. The anchored-PE method alone lands at $41.89, so the composite is not being dragged by a runaway DCF or peer multiple - it is a coherent read that Barclays trades at a mid-single-digit earnings multiple when a normalised UK diversified bank arguably deserves 8-9x. Earnings quality is flagged as good, so no meaningful haircut is warranted on the deserved value.
Verify before trusting this (5)
- CET1 ratio and trajectory vs regulatory floors
- IB revenue mix and RoTE by segment - is the group RoTE really tracking to 12%
- UK mortgage book credit metrics and provisioning trend
- Buyback pace and remaining authorisation
- Guidance on NIM sensitivity to BoE rate path
The tape is modestly risk-on (regime +47, VIX 15.3), which is a gentle tailwind for a diversified bank like BCS, but with beta 0.88 the lift is muted - this is not a high-torque name that rides euphoria. The narrative is explicitly minimal intensity with low cult coefficient: no one is telling a story about Barclays right now, which means neither mania nor panic is pressing the tape. That vacuum is itself the dominant sentiment fact - price action will be driven by fundamentals and rates, not by flows chasing a story. 3-year momentum is positive (+11.9pp) and the recent news flow shows Barclays acting as the price-target-setter for OTHER names, which subtly reinforces its 'credible sell-side house' status rather than 'zombie bank.' Offsetting that, macro sensitivity is negative: 10y at 4.72% and a UK-lender profile mean the fallen-angel discount stays anchored. Analyst tone is workmanlike, not enthusiastic. Net: crosswinds roughly cancel, with a slight negative lean from macro/rates on UK banks offset by a supportive risk-on tape and constructive multi-year momentum.
Verify before trusting this (4)
- Any shift in UK gilt yields or BoE guidance that would change UK-bank sentiment
- Whether European bank sector rotation picks up in a sustained risk-on regime
- Emergence of a capital-return narrative (buyback upsize, dividend hike) that could ignite the dormant story
- Analyst target revision cluster on UK banks - up or down
Barclays is not a software business AI can copy; it is a regulated balance sheet with a very large information-processing overhead bolted on. AI reaches it through three channels: (1) cost — controls, compliance, ops and technology delivery are automatable, and this is the biggest and most controllable channel; (2) risk — better underwriting and fraud/AML detection across UK cards, US partnership cards and Tesco Bank, where loss rates are a direct P&L line; (3) revenue architecture — AI-mediated distribution (aggregators, agents, embedded finance) threatens to demote the bank to a balance-sheet utility priced on rate, while in the investment bank AI commoditizes research and quantitative content and electronifies flow, compressing spread income even as it lowers the cost of serving. Value capture depends on whether savings are retained or competed away in deposit pricing and lending spreads — in banking, industry-wide efficiency gains historically leak to customers because the product is fungible money.
None surfaced.
Verify before trusting this (8)
- Cost/income ratio trajectory
- Group headcount and severance charges
- Guided cost base versus delivery
- Open banking payment volumes UK
- Aggregator-sourced deposit inflows
- Mortgage broker/AI channel share
- Net interest margin and deposit beta
- Structural hedge roll benefit
This lens hasn't been run for this ticker yet.
When we made this prediction on Aug 14, 2026, BCS was $28.09. We expect it to be $33.00 by Feb 2027, and we consider it great value under $24.00. This is an early model (v0.6.0) — the direction is more reliable than the exact price. Made Aug 14, 2026.
Blue is our prediction, starting the day we made it. Grey is a slower route to the same place — the same destination, taking longer. Black is the actual price, so you can see how we are doing.