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What this page is: Delvantic's full research page for BHP Group Ltd. (BHP) — AI-driven forensic equity research: mechanical valuation models (DCF, EPV, anchored-PE, scenario) plus three independent AI lenses (Quality / Value / Sentiment). Everything below is rendered server-side; you are not missing content that requires JavaScript. All scores are predictions and research opinions, not financial advice.
Our current read (analysis of 2026-08-23): Designation Watch · Gem Score -14 (−100…+100 Quality+Value blend) · Quality 50 · Value -66 · Sentiment -48 (timing only, not weighted) · Composite fair value $26.81 vs $84.49 at analysis
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profile-header/price-overview— company profile, live quote, market capextended-analysis— the core: three AI lens reads with findings, scores, and the analyst memofuture-predictions— our forward price-band predictionsmarket-narrative/ai-findings/gpt-critique— narrative context, cross-model findings, and an adversarial critique of our own analysis (near the end of the document)- Members-only sections (render as login gates for anonymous readers):
price-history,income-trend,key-metrics,financials(statement tables),insider-trading. The analysis above is public; the raw data tables require a free account.
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BHP Group Ltd.
BHP NYSEBHP Group Ltd. is a global diversified mining and resources company headquartered in Melbourne, Australia, founded in 1885. The company focuses on the exploration, development, production, and processing of major commodities including iron ore, copper, and metallurgical coal. BHP operates through key business segments such as Copper, Iron Ore, and Coal, supplying raw materials that are central to steelmaking, infrastructure development, energy transition technologies, and industrial production worldwide. The company is also developing its presence in potash, positioned to serve agricultural and fertilizer markets. BHP’s assets span large-scale mining operations and related infrastructure, with notable positions in regions rich in iron ore and copper resources. In today’s market, BHP plays a significant role as a major supplier to global steel producers, manufacturers, and energy-related industries, making it one of the most influential companies in the basic materials and industrial metals and mining sectors.
Price Overview
Price History (1 Year)
Revenue & Net Income Trend
This company does not file structured financial statements with the U.S. SEC, so quarterly figures aren't available from our filings-based data engine. Annual figures shown here come from the sources that do cover it.
| Period | Revenue | Net Income | Net Margin | YoY/QoQ |
|---|
Key Metrics
EPS (Diluted): 1.77
Total Equity: $52.22B
Shares: 5,083,000,000
Total Debt: $0.00
Cash: $11.89B
EBITDA: $25.00B
Total Debt: $0.00
Cash: $11.89B
Revenue: $51.26B
Revenue: $51.26B
Revenue: $51.26B
Total Equity: $52.22B
Tax Rate: 39.3%
Equity: $52.22B
Total Debt: $0.00
Cash: $11.89B
Current Liabilities: $15.64B
Long-Term Debt: $0.00
Total Debt: $0.00
Total Equity: $52.22B
Shares: 5,083,000,000
Shares: 5,083,000,000
CapEx: -$9.40B
Shares: 5,083,000,000
Stock Price: $84.49
Net Income: $9.02B
Industry Benchmarks
Income Statement (Annual)
Last updated: Jul 31, 2026 9:15am (23d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | $60.8B | $65.1B | $53.8B | $55.7B | $51.3B |
| Cost of Revenue | — | — | — | — | — |
| Gross Profit | — | — | — | — | — |
| Operating Expenses | $34.5B | $32.4B | $31.9B | $36.8B | $32.3B |
| Operating Income | $25.9B | $34.1B | $22.9B | $17.5B | $19.5B |
| Net Income | $11.3B | $30.9B | $12.9B | $7.9B | $9.0B |
| EBITDA | $32.7B | $39.8B | $28.0B | $22.8B | $25.0B |
| EPS | $2.24 | $6.11 | $2.55 | $1.56 | $1.78 |
| EPS (Diluted) | $2.23 | $6.09 | $2.55 | $1.56 | $1.77 |
Balance Sheet (Annual)
Last updated: Jul 31, 2026 9:15am (23d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cash & Equivalents | $15.2B | $17.2B | $12.4B | $12.5B | $11.9B |
| Total Current Assets | $26.7B | $28.7B | $23.4B | $24.3B | $22.8B |
| Total Assets | $108.9B | $95.2B | $101.3B | $102.4B | $108.8B |
| Current Liabilities | $16.4B | $16.9B | $19.0B | $14.3B | $15.6B |
| Long-Term Debt | — | — | — | — | — |
| Total Liabilities | $53.3B | $46.4B | $52.8B | $53.2B | $56.6B |
| Total Equity | $55.6B | $48.8B | $48.5B | $49.1B | $52.2B |
| Retained Earnings | $46.8B | $40.3B | $39.8B | $40.0B | $42.7B |
Cash Flow (Annual)
Last updated: Jul 31, 2026 9:15am (23d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Operating Cash Flow | $27.2B | $32.2B | $18.7B | $20.7B | $18.7B |
| Capital Expenditure | -$6.6B | -$5.9B | -$6.7B | -$8.8B | -$9.4B |
| Free Cash Flow | $20.6B | $26.3B | $12.0B | $11.8B | $9.3B |
| Acquisitions (net) | -$480.0M | — | -$5.9B | — | — |
| Net Debt Issued / (Repaid) | -$7.8B | -$2.2B | $4.9B | -$2.2B | $2.5B |
| Dividends Paid | -$10.0B | -$20.3B | -$14.6B | -$9.1B | -$8.2B |
| Stock Buybacks | — | — | — | — | — |
| Net Change in Cash | — | — | -$4.7B | $234.0M | -$629.0M |
Growth Trends (YoY %)
Last updated: Jul 31, 2026 9:15am (23d ago)| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue Growth | +7.0% | -17.3% | +3.4% | -7.9% |
| Gross Profit Growth | — | — | — | — |
| Operating Income Growth | +31.7% | -32.8% | -23.5% | +11.0% |
| Net Income Growth | +173.4% | -58.2% | -38.9% | +14.2% |
| EBITDA Growth | +21.6% | -29.6% | -18.4% | +9.5% |
Dividend History (Last 20)
Last updated: Jul 31, 2026 9:15am (23d ago)| Date | Dividend | Declaration | Record | Payment |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-03-06 | $1.46 | — | — | — |
| 2025-03-07 | $1.00 | — | — | — |
| 2024-09-13 | $1.48 | — | — | — |
| 2024-03-07 | $1.44 | — | — | — |
| 2023-09-07 | $1.60 | — | — | — |
| 2023-03-09 | $1.80 | — | — | — |
| 2022-09-01 | $3.50 | — | — | — |
| 2022-02-24 | $2.68 | — | — | — |
| 2021-09-02 | $3.57 | — | — | — |
| 2021-03-04 | $1.80 | — | — | — |
| 2020-09-03 | $0.98 | — | — | — |
| 2020-03-05 | $1.16 | — | — | — |
| 2019-09-05 | $1.39 | — | — | — |
| 2019-03-07 | $0.98 | — | — | — |
| 2019-01-10 | $1.82 | — | — | — |
| 2018-09-06 | $1.12 | — | — | — |
| 2018-03-08 | $0.98 | — | — | — |
| 2017-09-07 | $0.77 | — | — | — |
| 2017-03-08 | $0.71 | — | — | — |
| 2016-08-31 | $0.25 | — | — | — |
Deep Analysis
Narrative Economics
market-narrative step).
Claude Reading
BHP at $84 with a stated 47x P/E and $9B net income on $51B revenue is not a stock trading at trough-cycle earnings in any conventional sense — it's a $215B market cap on FY25 operating income of $19.5B, which is roughly 11x EV/EBIT ex-debt, and 16.7x EV/EBITDA per the file. That's not screamingly cheap for a diversified miner with revenue declining -7.9% YoY and a 5-year revenue CAGR of -2.4%. The P/E optic of 47x is likely distorted by impairments/one-offs (FY24 saw the Samarco and nickel writedowns), because $9B NI on 5.3B shares is ~$1.70 EPS, and consensus underlying EPS is closer to $2.50-3.00 — putting the "real" P/E in the high-20s to low-30s. Still not cheap for a business whose operating income fell from $34B (FY22) to $19.5B (FY25), a 43% peak-to-trough decline.
The synthesis verdict of $26 fair value is where I part ways hard. A DCF that spits out $26 on a business generating $18.7B in operating cash flow and $9.3B FCF is either using punitive normalized commodity assumptions (sub-$70 iron ore in perpetuity) or a discount rate that treats BHP like a distressed miner. At $84, market cap / FCF is ~23x — expensive but not absurd if you believe copper (Escondida, Oak Dam, the Filo/Josemaria JV) offsets iron ore decay. The narrative-economics layer calling this a "221% premium to DCF" is overconfident about the DCF's inputs; commodity DCFs are notoriously sensitive to terminal price assumptions and the $26 number implies iron ore mean-reverts to marginal cost and stays there. That's a possible scenario, not a base case. The pre-flight thesis (normalized EPS $4-5, P/E 17-21x) is directionally more honest but I'd anchor normalized EPS closer to $3.00-3.50 given structural iron ore headwinds from Simandou coming online in 2025-26 and Chinese steel demand plateauing.
The contrarian read that nobody's making: BHP's dividend is the real story and it's under quiet pressure. Payout ratio at 90.5% on depressed earnings, with $9.3B FCF barely covering $6B+ in dividends after $9.4B capex — and capex is heading higher, not lower, as copper growth projects (Filo del Sol acquisition ~$3B, Jansen potash Stage 2) ramp. The 2.9% yield is not the 8% the bull narrative claims (that's ASX-listed BHP with franking credits, not the ADR), and it's vulnerable. Insider activity is essentially nil — two tiny director share awards — which is neither bullish nor bearish but tells you management isn't buying at $84 either. Debt-to-equity reads as 0 in the file which is clearly a data error; BHP carries ~$14B in net debt, still manageable at ~0.7x EBITDA but not the fortress the bull story implies.
I land between the synthesis ($26, absurdly low) and the current price ($84, pricing in copper optionality that's real but 5+ years out). Fair value on normalized $3 EPS at 18-20x — appropriate for a mature miner with copper leverage and above-sector ROIC of 29% — is $55-65. That makes BHP roughly 30-40% overvalued today, not 69%. The market-forces "neutral" call and the narrative layer's "fragile durability" verdict are both closer to right than the synthesis. I'd dissent from the $26 fair value as unrealistic while agreeing with the overvalued direction. Catalyst to revisit: iron ore breaking below $85/ton sustainably (currently ~$100), or a dividend cut announcement, either of which likely takes the stock to the $60s where the risk/reward inverts. The ROIC of 29% and operating margin of 38% are genuinely high-quality metrics that a $26 DCF ignores entirely — this isn't a value trap, it's a quality cyclical priced for a soft landing that may not come.
GPT Reading
What jumps out first is that the headline valuation multiples look absurd for a miner, but the operating history says the opposite of a classic overvalued growth stock. At $84.49, BHP carries a $214.6B market cap against FY2025 revenue of $51.3B, operating income of $19.5B, net income of $9.0B, operating cash flow of $18.7B, and free cash flow of $9.3B. That is not a weak business being bid to fantasy levels; it is a very large, still highly profitable asset base with a trough-ish earnings profile. The reported 47.6x P/E is the wrong anchor here because BHP earned $30.9B in 2022, $12.9B in 2023, $7.9B in 2024, and then rebounded to $9.0B in 2025. On that sequence, current earnings are clearly depressed versus mid-cycle, while operating profit actually improved to $19.5B from $17.5B last year despite lower revenue, which tells you cost and mix held up better than the net line suggests. For a diversified major miner, I care much more about normalized cash earnings and balance-sheet resilience than a single-year P/E printed near the lower part of the commodity cycle.
The raw data tell a company that is expensive versus book, but not obviously expensive versus durable earning power. A price-to-book of 8.2x looks rich until you remember miners’ accounting book values rarely capture the replacement value of tier-one ore bodies and long-life infrastructure. More useful is that BHP generated a 17.3% ROE and 29.3% ROIC in FY2025 with $11.9B of cash and apparently no net leverage flagged in the data. Even after $9.4B of capex, it still produced $9.3B of free cash flow. That is a 4.3% FCF yield on market cap at a point when commodity realizations are not especially strong; for a fortress miner with scarce assets, that is not screaming cheap, but it is nowhere near the “fair value $26” kind of disconnect implied by the model outputs. In fact, a $26 equity value would imply roughly a $66B market cap, or about 7x current-year free cash flow and barely 3.4x operating income for one of the world’s premier miners. That would only make sense if you believed today’s earnings are still massively overstated and set to collapse, which the recent operating improvement does not support.
The key tension is that the top line has gone nowhere for years—$60.8B in 2021, $65.1B in 2022, then down to $53.8B, $55.7B, and $51.3B—and earnings CAGR over the period is deeply negative. So this is not a secular growth story masquerading as value. It is a high-quality cyclical. That means the stock should not command a premium multiple indefinitely, but it also means simplistic DCFs often fail because they lock in a weak point in the cycle and haircut terminal values on businesses whose economics are inherently mean-reverting. The 38.0% operating margin in FY2025 is still elite for a “bad” year, and the business kept current ratio at 1.46 with a 2.9% dividend yield despite a 90% payout ratio. That payout ratio is elevated and tells you distributions are not as oversecured as income investors may think, but it also reflects depressed accounting earnings rather than balance-sheet stress. My read is that the market is valuing BHP as a scarce, low-leverage owner of long-duration mineral assets with cyclical upside, and that is broadly reasonable.
The best bear case is straightforward: on current numbers the stock is not cheap. An 8.4x sales multiple and 16.7x EV/EBITDA are full for a miner, revenue is down 7.9% year over year, five-year revenue CAGR is negative 2.4%, five-year FCF CAGR is negative 11.9%, and net income in FY2025 is less than one-third of FY2022. If iron ore remains structurally weak because China’s property malaise becomes a long slog, BHP may be more ex-growth and more iron-ore-dependent than the “future-facing copper” narrative suggests. In that world, the market is indeed overpaying for quality and balance sheet. I take that seriously, especially because the dividend payout ratio near 90% leaves less room for disappointment than many investors assume. But I weigh it differently because the company is still throwing off nearly $19B of operating cash flow in this softer environment, and the balance sheet gives it time. The data do not look like a value trap under financial strain; they look like a cyclical franchise carrying a quality premium.
What would change my mind is either directionally clear deterioration or evidence of stronger normalization. If FY2026 free cash flow slips materially below $7B while operating margins fall from ~38% toward the high-20s without a corresponding reset in the share price, I would move bearish fast; that would say FY2025 was not trough-like but an earnings plateau on too-high expectations. Conversely, if revenue stabilizes back above $55B and net income moves into the low-to-mid teens of billions with capex held around current levels, the current price would look much easier to justify and likely still not fully reflect upside from a better commodity tape. The biggest swing factor is not a modeling tweak; it is whether the next 12-18 months show BHP’s FY2025 cash generation as a floor or a fading peak.
Grok Reading
BHP’s income statement tells a clear downcycle story that the $84.49 price refuses to acknowledge. Revenue has slid from the $65.1B peak in FY2022 to $51.3B in FY2025, a −2.4% CAGR, while net income collapsed from $30.9B to $9.0B (−16.5% earnings CAGR). Free cash flow followed, down to $9.3B on $9.4B of capex, producing a skinny 4.3% FCF yield at the current $215B enterprise. Operating margin is still excellent at 38% and ROIC prints a strong 29%, proving the asset base (Pilbara iron ore, Escondida copper) remains world-class, yet the market is paying 47.6× trailing earnings, 8.4× sales and 16.7× EBITDA for a business whose top line is shrinking and whose dividend yield has compressed to just 2.9% on a 90% payout. Those are growth-stock multiples on a mature, cyclical earner facing explicit macro headwinds from Chinese steel demand. The $26 DCF spit out by the valuation engine is too draconian—replacement cost and mid-cycle earning power are higher—but even a generous normalization to $13–15B of net income still leaves the shares at 14–16×, rich for a miner with negative revenue momentum and limited reinvestment runway after the dividend.
The copper-transition narrative is the only coherent justification for the premium, yet it is being asked to do too much work. Copper optionality is real and multi-year, but it has not offset the iron-ore earnings hole; FY2025 operating profit of $19.5B is still 43% below the FY2022 peak despite whatever copper contribution already exists. Balance-sheet strength (effectively net-cash, $11.9B cash, current ratio 1.46) and FCF quality are genuine positives, yet they are already fully reflected in the 8.2× price-to-book multiple—an extraordinary rating for a capital-intensive bulk-commodity producer. Insider activity is non-existent beyond trivial award vesting, offering no signal of internal conviction at these levels.
The strongest counter-argument is the trough-earnings defense: if spot iron ore re-accelerates and copper prices hold elevated, net income could snap back toward $18–20B and the forward multiple would compress into the low teens, making today’s price merely early rather than wrong. High incremental margins mean modest volume or price recovery drops heavily to free cash flow, and the oligopolistic quality of BHP’s tier-one assets has historically supported premium multiples through cycles. I weigh this less heavily because the same data already show a 14% earnings rebound in the most recent year without any multiple relief; the market has simply re-rated the shares higher as earnings fell, embedding the recovery before it arrives. A 2.9% yield with almost no retained earnings also leaves little margin of safety if China stimulus disappoints again.
I would reverse to neutral or constructive if FY2026 net income prints above $15B with iron ore holding >$110 and copper >$9,500, or if management guides copper volume growth that demonstrably offsets iron-ore EBITDA decline within two years. A 20%+ drawdown that lifts FCF yield above 6.5% while margins stay intact would also flip the risk/reward.
Big-3 Panel — where each AI stands
Advanced Analysis Forensic deep-dive · separate lenses
BHP shows the hallmarks of a mature, self-funding resource giant: $11.89B liquid cash equal to net cash (zero net debt at the liquidity line shown), $9.29B trailing FCF, Altman Z of 3.97 (safe zone), and OCF/NI of 1.92x with accruals at -8.6% of assets - all pointing to reported earnings backed by cash. Diluted share count barely moved from 5.07B to 5.08B over five years (0.1% CAGR), so per-share value is not being quietly eroded. Operating margin remains high in absolute terms (31.5-52.4% range), consistent with a low-cost iron-ore and copper franchise. However, the trajectory is unmistakably cyclical rather than compounding: revenue peaked at $65.1B in 2022 and has fallen three straight years to $51.26B in 2025 (-21%); net income collapsed from $30.9B (2022) to $7.9B (2024) before a partial recovery to $9.02B; FCF has more than halved from $26.32B (2022) to $9.29B (2025); and operating margin round-tripped from 52.4% to 31.5% to 38%. This is commodity-price sensitivity, not deterioration of the franchise, but it is real earnings variability. Insider tape shows only tiny director share awards - no directional signal. No mechanical red flags on M-score (n/a) or accruals. Overall the business looks structurally sound and conservatively financed, with the durability question resting on commodity cycles and capital allocation into large capex projects rather than on accounting or balance-sheet risk.
Verify before trusting this (6)
- Gross debt, lease obligations, and closure/rehabilitation provisions behind the reported net cash figure
- Capex commitments and funding plan for copper (Escondida, Filo/Josemaria area) and any potash spend
- Segment mix and iron-ore realized price sensitivity driving the 2022-2025 earnings swing
- Dividend policy and payout ratio versus FCF through the cycle
- Any material contingent liabilities (Samarco/Brumadinho-related, tax disputes) not reflected in headline metrics
- Reconciliation of gross margin shown as 0 (likely a classification artifact) with actual cost structure
The e2e synthesis pins composite fair value at $25.46 and signal-adjusted at $26.32, implying roughly -69% downside from the $84.49 price. All three methods cluster tight (DCF $25.78, EPV floor $29.48, anchored PE $20.80), which reduces the odds this is a single runaway model - the anchored PE and EPV are backward-looking, cycle-averaged reads, and even the more generous DCF lands near $26. That consistency is the key signal: this is not one method misbehaving, it is three saying the current price embeds peak-cycle iron ore and copper economics as permanent. Company quality is Strong, which lifts deserved value - but even generously adding a quality premium of 30-40% to the EPV floor gets you to roughly $38-42, still less than half the tape. The bull case (structural copper scarcity, potash optionality, fortress balance sheet) is real but is exactly what everyone already owns BHP for; it is priced in. Net income and FCF have already halved from 2022 peaks per the quality lens, yet the equity has not derated to match - that is the mispricing, and it points the wrong way for buyers here.
Verify before trusting this (5)
- Realized iron ore and copper prices vs consensus deck in the latest half-year
- Jansen potash capex schedule and first-production timing
- Any guidance change on unit costs at WAIO and Escondida
- Dividend policy commentary - payout ratio at mid-cycle prices
- Whether the DCF's commodity price deck matches current forward curves or uses a lower normalization
The market tape is mildly constructive (regime +22, VIX 16, S&P near highs) but that neutral-to-friendly backdrop is not what is setting the price for BHP. What matters here is the narrative layer: a cyclical, late-stage story with fragile durability and low cult support, anchored to Chinese iron ore demand and a copper energy-transition thesis that the bear case is actively challenging via China property weakness and cyclical copper overcapacity. With beta only 0.83, BHP is not getting whipped by the broad tape - it is being marked by its own commodity story, and that story is weakening. Momentum confirms the pressure: -7.9% recently versus a -2.4% long-run drift, and -6.4pp of 3-year relative decay. That is the tape telling you the marginal narrative buyer has stepped away, even as equities broadly hold up. Nothing in the 72-hour news flow (a small non-core asset divestiture to Faraday Copper) provides a narrative catalyst either direction. Net: a fading late-cycle commodity narrative pressing on a name whose defensive beta cannot fully offset it - a real, ordinary headwind, not a decisive one.
Verify before trusting this (4)
- Chinese steel/iron ore demand data prints and property policy signals
- Copper price action and inventory trends for signs of the transition narrative reasserting or breaking
- Analyst target revisions and any downgrades tied to commodity deck cuts
- Whether momentum stabilizes or the -7.9% leg extends into a full narrative break
This lens hasn't been run for this ticker yet.
When we made this prediction on Aug 3, 2026, BHP was $84.49. We expect it to be $74.00 by Feb 2027, and we consider it great value under $40.00. This is an early model (v0.6.0) — the direction is more reliable than the exact price. Made Aug 3, 2026.
Blue is our prediction, starting the day we made it. Grey is a slower route to the same place — the same destination, taking longer. Black is the actual price, so you can see how we are doing.