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What this page is: Delvantic's full research page for Bank of Montreal (BMO) — AI-driven forensic equity research: mechanical valuation models (DCF, EPV, anchored-PE, scenario) plus three independent AI lenses (Quality / Value / Sentiment). Everything below is rendered server-side; you are not missing content that requires JavaScript. All scores are predictions and research opinions, not financial advice.
Our current read (analysis of 2026-08-23): Designation Low · Gem Score -35 (−100…+100 Quality+Value blend) · Quality 8 · Value -70 · Sentiment -3 (timing only, not weighted) · Composite fair value $137.96 vs $180.82 at analysis
Page map (sections in order; each card carries a stable
reference-name attribute you can cite):
profile-header/price-overview— company profile, live quote, market capextended-analysis— the core: three AI lens reads with findings, scores, and the analyst memofuture-predictions— our forward price-band predictionsmarket-narrative/ai-findings/gpt-critique— narrative context, cross-model findings, and an adversarial critique of our own analysis (near the end of the document)- Members-only sections (render as login gates for anonymous readers):
price-history,income-trend,key-metrics,financials(statement tables),insider-trading. The analysis above is public; the raw data tables require a free account.
More for machine readers: site briefing at
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any ticker resolves at delvantic.com/stock/TICKER ·
raw inputs are public-company filings and market data (via licensed data feeds);
every model, score, lens read, and prediction on this page is Delvantic's own analysis.
Bank of Montreal
BMO NYSEBank of Montreal is a diversified financial-services provider based in North America. It operates through four main business segments: Canadian personal and commercial banking, US personal and commercial banking, wealth management, and capital markets. The bank delivers a broad range of banking and financial services to individuals, businesses, and institutions, including deposit accounts, lending solutions, payment services, investment products, advisory services, and corporate finance. Bank of Montreal maintains a significant presence in Canada with substantial operations in the United States, supporting personal banking needs like mortgages and credit cards, commercial financing for small and medium enterprises, wealth management through investment counseling and asset management, and capital markets activities such as trading, underwriting, and advisory for institutional clients. Founded in 1817 and headquartered in Toronto, Ontario, Bank of Montreal plays a key role in the North American financial landscape by offering integrated services across retail, commercial, and investment banking sectors.
Price Overview
Price History (1 Year)
Revenue & Net Income Trend
This company does not file structured financial statements with the U.S. SEC, so quarterly figures aren't available from our filings-based data engine. Annual figures shown here come from the sources that do cover it.
| Period | Revenue | Net Income | Net Margin | YoY/QoQ |
|---|
Key Metrics
EPS (Diluted): 8.13
Total Equity: $62.60B
Shares: 761,276,224
Total Debt: $0.00
Cash: $47.95B
EBITDA: N/A
Total Debt: $0.00
Cash: $47.95B
Revenue: $25.78B
Revenue: $25.78B
Revenue: $25.78B
Total Equity: $62.60B
Tax Rate: 24.5%
Equity: $62.60B
Total Debt: $0.00
Cash: $47.95B
Current Liabilities: N/A
Long-Term Debt: $0.00
Total Debt: $0.00
Total Equity: $62.60B
Shares: 761,276,224
Shares: 761,276,224
CapEx: -$1.23B
Shares: 761,276,224
Stock Price: $180.83
Net Income: $6.19B
Industry Benchmarks
Income Statement (Annual)
Last updated: Aug 5, 2026 9:37am (18d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | $19.3B | $24.0B | $22.2B | $23.3B | $25.8B |
| Cost of Revenue | — | — | — | — | — |
| Gross Profit | — | — | — | — | — |
| Operating Expenses | $7.2B | $6.1B | $8.7B | $6.0B | $9.1B |
| Operating Income | — | — | — | — | — |
| Net Income | $5.5B | $9.6B | $3.1B | $5.2B | $6.2B |
| EBITDA | — | — | — | — | — |
| EPS | $8.24 | $14.24 | $4.10 | $6.76 | $8.14 |
| EPS (Diluted) | $8.23 | $14.20 | $4.09 | $6.76 | $8.13 |
Balance Sheet (Annual)
Last updated: Aug 5, 2026 9:37am (18d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cash & Equivalents | $66.3B | $62.2B | $55.4B | $46.3B | $48.0B |
| Total Current Assets | — | — | — | — | — |
| Total Assets | $702.2B | $809.5B | $919.0B | $1.0T | $1.0T |
| Current Liabilities | — | — | — | — | — |
| Long-Term Debt | — | — | — | — | — |
| Total Liabilities | $661.3B | $759.0B | $864.2B | $941.8B | $986.8B |
| Total Equity | $40.9B | $50.5B | $54.7B | $59.9B | $62.6B |
| Retained Earnings | $25.2B | $32.1B | $31.9B | $33.0B | $33.7B |
Cash Flow (Annual)
Last updated: Aug 5, 2026 9:37am (18d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Operating Cash Flow | $31.3B | $3.5B | $6.8B | $20.6B | $7.3B |
| Capital Expenditure | — | — | -$1.2B | -$1.1B | -$1.2B |
| Free Cash Flow | — | — | $5.6B | $19.5B | $6.0B |
| Acquisitions (net) | — | — | -$10.7B | — | — |
| Net Debt Issued / (Repaid) | — | — | — | — | — |
| Dividends Paid | -$2.1B | -$1.8B | -$1.9B | -$2.7B | -$3.6B |
| Stock Buybacks | — | — | — | — | — |
| Net Change in Cash | $25.5B | -$4.1B | -$6.8B | -$9.1B | $1.7B |
Growth Trends (YoY %)
Last updated: Aug 5, 2026 9:37am (18d ago)| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue Growth | +24.0% | -7.4% | +5.1% | +10.6% |
| Gross Profit Growth | — | — | — | — |
| Operating Income Growth | — | — | — | — |
| Net Income Growth | +74.6% | -67.8% | +67.7% | +19.0% |
| EBITDA Growth | — | — | — | — |
Dividend History (Last 20)
Last updated: Aug 5, 2026 9:38am (18d ago)| Date | Dividend | Declaration | Record | Payment |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-07-30 | $1.22 | — | — | — |
| 2026-04-29 | $1.22 | — | — | — |
| 2025-07-30 | $1.18 | — | — | — |
| 2025-04-29 | $1.15 | — | — | — |
| 2025-01-30 | $1.11 | — | — | — |
| 2024-10-30 | $1.12 | — | — | — |
| 2024-07-30 | $1.12 | — | — | — |
| 2024-04-26 | $1.10 | — | — | — |
| 2024-01-29 | $11.20 | — | — | — |
| 2023-10-27 | $10.72 | — | — | — |
| 2023-07-27 | $11.14 | — | — | — |
| 2023-04-27 | $10.57 | — | — | — |
| 2023-01-27 | $10.70 | — | — | — |
| 2022-10-31 | $10.24 | — | — | — |
| 2022-07-29 | $10.85 | — | — | — |
| 2022-04-29 | $10.42 | — | — | — |
| 2022-01-31 | $10.55 | — | — | — |
| 2021-10-29 | $8.56 | — | — | — |
| 2021-07-30 | $8.52 | — | — | — |
| 2021-04-30 | $8.54 | — | — | — |
Deep Analysis
Narrative Economics
market-narrative step).
Claude Reading
Starting with the raw numbers: BMO printed FY2025 revenue of $25.78B (+10.6% YoY) and net income of $6.19B (+19% YoY), continuing a recovery from the 2023 trough of $3.10B NI that was distorted by Bank of the West acquisition costs and PCL builds. The 5-yr revenue CAGR of 7.8% is respectable for a Big Five Canadian bank, and net margin of 24% with ROE of 9.9% is decent but not exceptional — RY and NA both run ROEs in the mid-teens. P/B of 2.2x is the crux: you're paying a premium price for a below-premium return on equity. That's the single most important tension in this file and none of the prior models framed it that way.
Where I disagree with the synthesis: the DCF fair value of $138 (signal-adjusted $148) implying 18% overvaluation looks mechanically driven by the depressed 2023 base and modest FCF CAGR of 3.7%. Banks are not DCF-friendly — operating cash flow swings wildly with working capital on the loan book, and $7.28B OCF on $25.78B revenue understates true earnings power. A cleaner lens is P/E-to-ROE: at 22x earnings and ~10% ROE, BMO trades richer than RY (~13x, ~15% ROE) and TD (~11x, ~14% ROE post-AML issues). On peer-relative terms the stock looks expensive, not because DCF says so but because you're paying more per unit of shareholder return than competitors offer. The thesis evaluation's -6 score and "market prices tepid growth from a bank delivering 12%" framing gets the earnings acceleration right but ignores that the 41% earnings CAGR is a rebound artifact, not a run-rate.
The contrarian bear case the models undersell: Canadian bank NIMs have benefited from the 2022-2024 rate cycle, and the BoC is now cutting. BMO's US book (Bank of the West legacy) is concentrated in California commercial real estate — a segment with unresolved office/multifamily stress. PCLs of ~$800M+/quarter have been elevated but arguably not yet at cycle peak if Canadian housing softens meaningfully (variable-rate mortgage resets in 2025-2026 are a known overhang). The narrative layer's "US expansion finally paying off" story is exactly the kind of just-so explanation that shows up near local highs. Meanwhile the bull case — that market underprices 12% growth — conflates cyclical rebound earnings with structural growth. I'd bet against the bull.
Data quality flags: no debt figure (banks don't report debt-to-equity meaningfully anyway, so the 0 reading is a data artifact, not a signal — ignore the "fortress balance sheet" implication from that field), no quarterly breakdown to assess trajectory, ROA of 0.59% is normal for a bank but reminds us that leverage does the heavy lifting on that 9.9% ROE. The 2.64% dividend yield with 58% payout ratio is sustainable but not compelling — you can get 4%+ from utilities with less credit-cycle risk. Where I partially agree with synthesis: fair value in the $140-155 range is defensible; where I dissent is on the "wait for re-rating catalyst" implication — I think the more likely catalyst is downward, via a credit cycle turn or NIM compression, not upward via US synergy realization. My read is overvalued, not fair-valued.
GPT Reading
At $180.83, BMO looks expensive for the returns it is actually producing. The cleanest way to see it is price-to-book versus ROE: the bank trades at 2.20x book on a 9.9% ROE. For a bank, that is a rich multiple unless you believe returns are heading materially higher and sustainably. Yet the last five years do not show a smooth compounding machine; they show volatile earnings. Net income went from $5.51B in 2021 to $9.62B in 2022, then collapsed to $3.10B in 2023, recovered to $5.20B in 2024, and reached $6.19B in 2025. Revenue has grown more steadily, from $19.32B to $25.78B over that span, but the margin structure has not. A 24.0% net margin in 2025 is fine, not premium enough to justify paying more than 22x earnings and over 5.3x sales for a diversified bank.
The market seems to be rewarding the story of a larger, more diversified franchise before the economics have fully shown up. On the current numbers, shareholders are paying $126.66B in market cap for $62.60B of equity and $6.19B of annual earnings. That is a roughly 4.9% earnings yield and a 9.9% return on book equity, which is not a compelling spread for a bank with integration and credit-cycle exposure. Free cash flow of $6.05B against the current market cap is also only about a 4.8% FCF yield. Even if one argues bank FCF is not the primary valuation lens, it still does not rescue the stock. The dividend yield at 2.64% is modest, and with a 57.8% payout ratio, there is room to grow it, but not enough to make the current entry price self-evidently attractive.
What stands out most is the mismatch between growth optics and underlying quality of that growth. Revenue CAGR of 7.8% is respectable, and the recent 10.6% revenue growth plus 19% earnings growth will tempt people into extrapolation. But the five-year earnings CAGR figure is heavily distorted by the depressed 2021 base and the dramatic 2023 drop; it overstates the reality of this earnings stream. A bank whose net income can swing from $9.62B to $3.10B and then back only partway to $6.19B should not get the same multiple as a stable high-ROE compounder. If BMO were producing 13-15% ROE consistently, 2.2x book might be arguable. At sub-10% ROE, the burden of proof is on the bull case, and the current price assumes that proof is already in hand.
The best case against my view is straightforward: 2025 may be the first year where the larger franchise starts to normalize after a messy period, and the market may be looking through temporarily depressed profitability. Revenue hit a record $25.78B, up from $23.30B in 2024 and above the pre-volatility 2022 level of $23.95B. Net income rose 19% year over year to $6.19B. If that recovery continues, today's 22x trailing P/E could compress quickly on forward numbers, and 2.2x book may be less crazy if ROE marches back into the low teens. The large cash balance of $47.95B and continued positive operating cash flow of $7.28B also support the idea that this is not a balance-sheet-stressed story. In other words, the stock may be expensive on backward-looking metrics precisely because the income statement is still catching up to the enlarged platform.
I still weigh that less heavily because the stock price leaves too little room for execution risk. To justify $180+, I would want evidence that the recent revenue growth converts into a materially better return profile, not just higher scale. Specifically, I would need to see net income push decisively above the 2022 peak-adjusted range on a sustained basis, or at minimum a clear move in ROE from 9.9% toward 12%+ without a deterioration in capital strength or payout discipline. If the next annual cycle shows earnings closer to $7.5B-$8.0B with ROE above 12% and book value continuing to grow, I would revisit the premium multiple. Short of that, this looks like a good bank priced like a better bank.
Grok Reading
The raw numbers tell a recovery story that has already been paid for. BMO’s net income climbed from the $3.10B trough in fiscal 2023 to $5.20B and then $6.19B in 2025, with revenue hitting a record $25.78B (+10.6% year-on-year). That bounce is real and reflects digestion of Bank of the West, yet the absolute return profile remains soft: ROE sits at just 9.89% and ROA at 0.59%. For a diversified bank, a sub-10% ROE at 2.20× book and 22.2× earnings is the central contradiction. Equity of $62.60B is generating only about $6.2B of profit; the market is capitalizing that stream at $127B as if mid-teens returns are imminent. Free-cash-flow of $6.05B against $6.19B of net income is high quality, and the 57.8% payout supporting a 2.64% yield is sustainable, but neither metric justifies a 22× multiple when the earnings power on capital is still mediocre. Revenue CAGR of 7.8% and recent 19% earnings growth look healthy until you remember the 2023 base was depressed by acquisition charges; FCF CAGR of only 3.7% is the cleaner signal of underlying momentum.
The valuation synthesis that lands near $148 (18% below the $180.83 screen price) is directionally correct even if the precise DCF is noisy. A bank earning roughly 10% on equity historically clears closer to 1.3–1.6× book once integration risk is fully priced; 2.2× book embeds an assumption that ROE will expand 300–400 bp and stay there. Net margin of 24% is respectable, yet the reverse-DCF implied growth of ~3% that the market allegedly prices is less comforting than it first appears: Canadian bank multiples have compressed before when credit costs normalize, and the current multiple already assumes the benign part of the cycle persists. Debt-to-equity printing at zero is a reporting artifact for a deposit-funded institution and should not be read as fortress leverage; the real balance-sheet test will be provision rates if Canadian housing or U.S. commercial real estate softens.
The strongest counter-argument is that the market is simply late to the synergy story. Bulls can point to the clean 19% earnings jump, high revenue confidence, and the fact that BMO now carries the most meaningful U.S. footprint among the Big Five—precisely the diversification Canadian institutions have sought for a decade. If Bank of the West expense saves and cross-sell finally lift group ROE toward 13–14%, the 22× P/E becomes a growth multiple rather than a value trap, and the stock can compound from here while still looking cheaper than RY or TD on a growth-adjusted basis. The thesis score of only –6 and the “steady-compounder” narrative both leave room for that re-rating. I weigh this less heavily because the ROE gap is still wide two-plus years after close; hope is not yet visible in the 9.9% return on equity, and paying 2.2× book for hope has been a poor risk-reward in prior Canadian bank cycles.
I would flip to neutral or constructive if fiscal 2026 prints ROE at or above 12.5% with stable credit costs, or if the shares revisit the mid-$150s while the earnings trajectory remains intact. A clear step-up in U.S. segment margins or a sustained FCF CAGR above 8% would also force a rethink of the multiple ceiling.
Big-3 Panel — where each AI stands
Advanced Analysis Forensic deep-dive · separate lenses
BMO is a scaled diversified bank with revenue climbing from 19.3B in 2021 to 25.8B in 2025 (about 7.5% CAGR) and net income of 6.19B in the latest year. Reported liquid cash of 47.95B and self-funding operations mean survival risk is not a real question - the Altman Z of 0.15 flag is a model artifact (Z-score is not calibrated for banks, whose balance sheets are structurally asset-heavy and leveraged by design). OCF/NI of 2.68x and mildly negative accruals point to clean earnings quality with no aggressive accrual build. Net income has been choppy - 5.51B, 9.62B, 3.10B, 5.20B, 6.19B - reflecting the Bank of the West acquisition digestion, PCL swings, and integration costs rather than a broken franchise. The concern that actually matters for quality is dilution: diluted share count moved from 669.6M to 761.3M, a 3.3% CAGR, meaning per-share value is being handed away to fund acquisitions and regulatory capital. For a mature earner this is a real drag on compounding. Nothing in the data suggests a distressed or low-integrity operator; it looks like a workmanlike, regulated, mid-tier-quality global bank.
Verify before trusting this (5)
- Whether the diluted share growth reflects BoTW acquisition consideration vs ongoing DRIP/at-market issuance
- CET1 ratio and regulatory capital trajectory post-BoTW
- PCL (provision for credit losses) trend and US commercial/CRE exposure
- Segment mix: US P&C, Canadian P&C, Wealth, Capital Markets contributions
- Whether recent quarters show integration costs normalizing
The e2e composite pegs fair value at $137.96 and the signal-adjusted FV at $148.03, both well below the $180.82 print. That is a -18% implied upside, or put differently, the market is paying a 22-31% premium to blended intrinsic estimates for a diversified Canadian bank that is still digesting its US acquisition. The anchored-PE cross-check lands in the same neighborhood ($137.96), so this is not a single runaway method - the methods agree the stock is above deserved value. Quality is Solid (8) which supports a deserved-value uplift versus a distressed peer, but 3.3% annual dilution is a real per-share tax that argues against paying above blended FV. Earnings quality is good, so no additional haircut, but nothing here justifies the ~24% gap either. The bull case requires US expansion earnings to accelerate meaningfully from here; the bear case notes that story is not yet in the numbers and NIM tailwinds are cyclical. Verdict: priced for the good outcome to actually show up. This is Rich, not egregiously overvalued - a bank rarely trades to catastrophic multiples - but there is no discount to buy.
Verify before trusting this (4)
- US segment PPNR run-rate and whether integration synergies are showing up in efficiency ratio
- Guidance on credit normalization and PCL trajectory
- Buyback vs issuance cadence - any pivot away from net dilution
- NIM sensitivity disclosure and duration positioning as rates move
BMO sits in a calm risk-on tape (VIX 15, S&P near highs) which is a mild positive for a beta-1.15 Canadian diversified bank, but the pressure is muted because this is a low-cult, moderate-intensity steady-compounder story - not the kind of name that leverages a euphoric backdrop. The narrative is intact but unexciting: US expansion 'finally paying off' is the bull frame, and analyst/media tone (the TSX:BMO 'looks reasonable' piece, 144% 5yr return recap) is constructive without being pushy. There is no active de-rating force and no mania - the story is doing its job quietly. The offsetting pressure is macro-mechanical: 10y at 4.63%, market PE 27.7, and FX/payrolls volatility looming Friday all sit as low-grade headwinds for a rate-sensitive lender, and the bear frame (duration risk, credit normalization being ignored) is the exact narrative crack that a soft NFP or a credit blip could pry open. The Aug 25 Q3 print is the near-term sentiment gate - until then the tape is a gentle tailwind, the narrative is neutral-to-slightly-positive, and news flow (ETN launches, ETF commentary) is benign filler. Net: forces roughly cancel, tilting a hair positive on regime.
Verify before trusting this (4)
- Aug 25 Q3 2026 print - any crack in US earnings acceleration or PCL uptick activates the bear frame
- Friday US payrolls and any repricing of the front end - hot print pressures duration book, soft print raises credit concerns
- Sector rotation signals: if regional US banks or Canadian peers start diverging, watch for BMO-specific analyst target revisions
- Any shift in the 'US expansion paying off' narrative in sell-side notes going into the print
This lens hasn't been run for this ticker yet.
When we made this prediction on Aug 7, 2026, BMO was $180.82. We expect it to be $166.00 by Feb 2027, and we consider it great value under $150.00. This is an early model (v0.6.0) — the direction is more reliable than the exact price. Made Aug 7, 2026.
Blue is our prediction, starting the day we made it. Grey is a slower route to the same place — the same destination, taking longer. Black is the actual price, so you can see how we are doing.