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What this page is: Delvantic's full research page for Bank of Nova Scotia (BNS) — AI-driven forensic equity research: mechanical valuation models (DCF, EPV, anchored-PE, scenario) plus three independent AI lenses (Quality / Value / Sentiment). Everything below is rendered server-side; you are not missing content that requires JavaScript. All scores are predictions and research opinions, not financial advice.
Our current read (analysis of 2026-08-23): Designation Low · Gem Score -21 (−100…+100 Quality+Value blend) · Quality -3 · Value -35 · Sentiment -1 (timing only, not weighted) · Composite fair value $83.25 vs $88.89 at analysis
Page map (sections in order; each card carries a stable
reference-name attribute you can cite):
profile-header/price-overview— company profile, live quote, market capextended-analysis— the core: three AI lens reads with findings, scores, and the analyst memofuture-predictions— our forward price-band predictionsmarket-narrative/ai-findings/gpt-critique— narrative context, cross-model findings, and an adversarial critique of our own analysis (near the end of the document)- Members-only sections (render as login gates for anonymous readers):
price-history,income-trend,key-metrics,financials(statement tables),insider-trading. The analysis above is public; the raw data tables require a free account.
More for machine readers: site briefing at
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any ticker resolves at delvantic.com/stock/TICKER ·
raw inputs are public-company filings and market data (via licensed data feeds);
every model, score, lens read, and prediction on this page is Delvantic's own analysis.
Bank of Nova Scotia
BNS NYSEBank of Nova Scotia is a Canadian financial services company that operates as Scotiabank, offering a broad range of banking and wealth management services for individuals, small businesses, corporations, and institutional clients. Its current business lines include Canadian banking, international banking, global wealth management, and global banking and markets, giving it a diversified role across retail, commercial, and capital markets activities. The company serves customers through deposit products, lending, payments, investment solutions, advisory services, and structured finance offerings. Based in Toronto and founded in 1832, Bank of Nova Scotia is one of Canada’s major banks and has a strong presence across the Americas, where it supports cross-border banking and financial services for a wide client base.
Price Overview
Price History (1 Year)
Revenue & Net Income Trend
This company does not file structured financial statements with the U.S. SEC, so quarterly figures aren't available from our filings-based data engine. Annual figures shown here come from the sources that do cover it.
| Period | Revenue | Net Income | Net Margin | YoY/QoQ |
|---|
Key Metrics
EPS (Diluted): 4.03
Total Equity: $62.95B
Shares: 1,373,721,340
Total Debt: $0.00
Cash: $7.29B
EBITDA: N/A
Total Debt: $0.00
Cash: $7.29B
Revenue: $26.82B
Revenue: $26.82B
Revenue: $26.82B
Total Equity: $62.95B
Tax Rate: 26.2%
Equity: $62.95B
Total Debt: $0.00
Cash: $7.29B
Current Liabilities: N/A
Long-Term Debt: $0.00
Total Debt: $0.00
Total Equity: $62.95B
Shares: 1,373,721,340
Shares: 1,373,721,340
CapEx: $0.00
Shares: 1,373,721,340
Stock Price: $88.85
Net Income: $5.53B
Industry Benchmarks
Income Statement (Annual)
Last updated: Aug 5, 2026 9:46am (18d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | $22.2B | $22.3B | $23.0B | $23.9B | $26.8B |
| Cost of Revenue | — | — | — | — | — |
| Gross Profit | — | — | — | — | — |
| Operating Expenses | $6.4B | $6.6B | $7.2B | $5.3B | $8.2B |
| Operating Income | — | — | — | — | — |
| Net Income | $6.8B | $7.0B | $5.3B | $5.5B | $5.5B |
| EBITDA | — | — | — | — | — |
| EPS | $5.50 | $5.72 | $4.15 | $4.22 | $4.15 |
| EPS (Diluted) | $5.47 | $5.70 | $4.11 | $4.17 | $4.03 |
Balance Sheet (Annual)
Last updated: Aug 5, 2026 9:46am (18d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cash & Equivalents | $6.9B | $7.9B | $7.2B | $6.7B | $7.3B |
| Total Current Assets | — | — | — | — | — |
| Total Assets | $841.9B | $958.9B | $1.0T | $1.0T | $1.0T |
| Current Liabilities | — | — | — | — | — |
| Long-Term Debt | — | — | — | — | — |
| Total Liabilities | $790.1B | $905.7B | $946.6B | $943.6B | $974.5B |
| Total Equity | $51.8B | $53.1B | $55.9B | $59.7B | $62.9B |
| Retained Earnings | $36.5B | $38.2B | $39.6B | $41.0B | $41.9B |
Cash Flow (Annual)
Last updated: Aug 5, 2026 9:47am (18d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Operating Cash Flow | -$9.1B | $12.0B | $22.5B | $11.1B | $3.8B |
| Capital Expenditure | — | — | — | — | — |
| Free Cash Flow | — | — | — | — | — |
| Acquisitions (net) | — | — | — | — | — |
| Net Debt Issued / (Repaid) | — | — | — | — | — |
| Dividends Paid | -$3.3B | -$3.6B | -$3.9B | -$4.0B | -$4.2B |
| Stock Buybacks | — | — | — | — | — |
| Net Change in Cash | -$1.0B | $974.9M | -$633.8M | -$545.0M | $604.0M |
Growth Trends (YoY %)
Last updated: Aug 5, 2026 9:46am (18d ago)| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue Growth | +0.5% | +2.8% | +4.2% | +12.1% |
| Gross Profit Growth | — | — | — | — |
| Operating Income Growth | — | — | — | — |
| Net Income Growth | +3.0% | -25.3% | +4.7% | +0.4% |
| EBITDA Growth | — | — | — | — |
Dividend History (Last 20)
Last updated: Aug 5, 2026 9:47am (18d ago)| Date | Dividend | Declaration | Record | Payment |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-07-07 | $0.80 | — | — | — |
| 2025-07-02 | $0.81 | — | — | — |
| 2025-04-01 | $0.74 | — | — | — |
| 2025-01-07 | $0.74 | — | — | — |
| 2024-10-02 | $0.78 | — | — | — |
| 2024-07-03 | $0.77 | — | — | — |
| 2024-04-01 | $0.78 | — | — | — |
| 2024-01-02 | $0.80 | — | — | — |
| 2023-09-29 | $0.79 | — | — | — |
| 2023-07-05 | $0.80 | — | — | — |
| 2023-04-03 | $0.76 | — | — | — |
| 2023-01-03 | $0.76 | — | — | — |
| 2022-10-03 | $0.75 | — | — | — |
| 2022-07-05 | $0.80 | — | — | — |
| 2022-04-04 | $0.80 | — | — | — |
| 2021-12-31 | $0.79 | — | — | — |
| 2021-10-04 | $0.71 | — | — | — |
| 2021-07-06 | $0.73 | — | — | — |
| 2021-04-05 | $0.71 | — | — | — |
| 2021-01-04 | $0.70 | — | — | — |
Deep Analysis
Narrative Economics
market-narrative step).
Claude Reading
Starting with the raw numbers: revenue grew from $22.21B (FY21) to $26.82B (FY25), a 4.8% CAGR — not the 8.1% the momentum table claims (which appears to weight recent YoY). Net income tells the real story: $6.84B in FY21, $7.05B in FY22, then a collapse to $5.27B / $5.51B / $5.53B in FY23-FY25. Earnings are structurally 22% below the FY22 peak three years later, and FY25 NI barely budged from FY24 (+0.4%). ROE of 8.8% and ROA of 0.53% are weak for a Canadian bank — RY runs ~14% ROE, TD ~10%. The 75% payout ratio on stagnant earnings is the actual red flag: dividend coverage is thin, and any credit cycle deterioration in Latin America or Canadian mortgages compresses it further. Operating cash flow of $3.84B against a $108B market cap and a dividend obligation north of $4B annually is uncomfortable, though bank cash flow statements are notoriously uninformative.
On the prior models: the synthesis verdict ($83-86 fair value, -3% overvalued) and the "steady compounder / anchored narrative" framing feel too benign given what Market Forces flagged — "collapsing cash generation, margin compression, strategic refocusing." Those two views are in tension and the synthesis doesn't resolve it. I side with Market Forces here. The pre-flight thesis correctly identifies the peer discount (BNS trades at a P/B of 1.94 vs RY closer to 2.0-2.2 and TD around 1.4 post-AML issues), but 22x trailing P/E is NOT a discount — that's a premium multiple built on depressed earnings. Normalize earnings back to the FY22 $7B level and P/E drops to ~15.5x, which is where the bull case lives. But you have to believe the Scheel restructuring (exiting Colombia/Central America, redeploying to North America) actually delivers, and there's zero evidence of that in the FY25 print. The classification as "mature earner" with 0.95 confidence is fine but misses that this is a mature earner whose earnings power has been impaired, not compounding.
The contrarian argument cuts both ways. Bull contrarian: FY25 revenue re-accelerated to +12.1% YoY, the strategic pivot is real, PCLs are likely peaking with rate cuts, and a 3.5% dividend yield with a Canadian Big Six moat at 1.9x book is a reasonable entry for income investors — normalized ROE of 11-12% on $63B equity implies ~$7B earnings and a $95-100 fair value. Bear contrarian: the 22x P/E on trough earnings is deceptive; if Latin American credit deteriorates and NIMs compress further, FY26 EPS could disappoint and the payout ratio breaches 80%, forcing a dividend review that would crater the shareholder base. Data gaps matter here: no gross/operating margin disclosure (normal for banks but limits analysis), no debt figure (D/E of 0 is a data error — banks are highly levered), no FCF, and quarterly data is entirely absent so I can't verify the recent revenue trajectory the momentum table cites. The FCF CAGR of -58.7% is likely a computational artifact rather than a real signal for a bank.
GPT Reading
The first thing that jumps out is how little fundamental progress the current valuation is asking you to pay up for. At $88.85, BNS trades at roughly 22.1x trailing earnings and 1.94x book on an 8.8% ROE. Those three numbers do not belong together. A near-2.0x book multiple is what you pay for a bank earning mid-teens returns on equity with a clean growth runway; BNS is producing $5.53B of net income on $62.95B of equity, and that is simply not a premium-return bank today. Revenue has improved from $22.21B in 2021 to $26.82B in 2025, about 5% annualized on the raw figures, but earnings have gone the wrong way versus the earlier peak: net income was $6.84B in 2021 and $7.05B in 2022, and is now stuck around $5.5B for two straight years. So the story is not one of a compounding franchise converting growth into shareholder returns; it is a franchise carrying more revenue but less profit efficiency.
That weak conversion shows up in the margin and cash profile. Net margin of 20.6% is acceptable for a bank, but not enough to justify the valuation when it is paired with stagnant earnings and only 0.4% year-over-year profit growth in the latest annual result. Operating cash flow at $3.84B is also light relative to $5.53B of net income, which is not a clean signal in a bank where cash flow accounting can be noisy, but it still reinforces the broader point: there is no obvious excess earnings power here. The payout ratio of 75.4% is another yellow flag. A 3.47% dividend yield is attractive in isolation, yet with earnings barely moving and returns on equity under 9%, that dividend looks more like the main reason to own the stock than a byproduct of underlying growth. When a mature bank is priced at 4.55x sales and 22x earnings while distributing three-quarters of profits, I read that as a market giving it credit for quality and durability that the recent numbers do not fully support.
What I think the market may be missing is not hidden upside but the degree of mediocrity embedded in the operating record. Over 2021-2025, revenue rose $4.61B, but net income fell $1.31B. That is not cyclical noise alone; it says the franchise has been less productive with incremental balance sheet and revenue generation than it used to be. The 2025 recovery in revenue to $26.82B after $23.92B in 2024 looks nice optically, but if it yields only $5.53B of earnings versus $5.51B a year earlier, then shareholders are buying growth with almost no marginal profitability. On these figures, fair value should be anchored more by book and ROE than by revenue momentum, and on that basis the stock looks expensive rather than merely full. If BNS were earning even 12%-13% on equity, I could defend $88+. At 8.8%, I cannot. My read is that a more reasonable range is closer to 1.4x-1.6x book, which points nearer to $72-$82.
The strongest pushback is obvious: banks are not software companies, trailing P/E and cash flow can be misleading around provisioning cycles, and BNS does at least show stability. Net income has held above $5.2B for three straight years, revenue has compounded upward, the balance sheet carries $62.95B of equity, and the market may be correctly looking through a soft profitability patch. If rates, credit costs, or international operations normalize, the earnings base could re-rate quickly from $5.5B back toward the $6.5B-$7.0B zone seen in 2021-2022, making the current multiple less demanding than it appears. A defender would also say the quoted 22x P/E may be distorted by accounting or one-time items and that the market is really valuing the bank on normalized earnings plus dividend resilience. I take that argument seriously, but the burden of proof is on the bull case because the actual recent record is one of revenue growth without earnings lift. Until that changes, “normalization” is a hope, not an achieved fact.
What would change my mind is straightforward: I would need to see profitability catch up to scale. Specifically, a move in annual net income from $5.5B to at least $6.5B without a major equity increase, pushing ROE back above 10.5%-11%, would make the current price easier to defend. I would also want evidence that the payout ratio can fall below 70% through earnings growth rather than dividend restraint. If the next annual cycle shows another double-digit revenue increase but earnings again flatline near $5.5B, the bear case strengthens and I would expect the stock to de-rate toward the low $80s or below. If instead earnings inflect materially while book value keeps compounding, then today’s premium to my fair range could prove justified.
Grok Reading
grok-critique step) alongside the other Big-3 seats, when a
report is run on this ticker.
Big-3 Panel — where each AI stands
Advanced Analysis Forensic deep-dive · separate lenses
BNS is a mature, systemically important Canadian bank. Revenue has climbed steadily from $22.21B (2021) to $26.82B (2025), with net income anchored in a $5.3B-$7.0B band. OCF/NI of 1.47x and near-zero accruals (-0.2% of assets) indicate reported earnings are backed by cash - typical for a well-provisioned bank. The Altman Z of 0.15 in 'distress' is a false signal here: the Z-score is not meaningful for banks whose balance sheets are dominated by loans and deposits by design.
Verify before trusting this (7)
- CET1 ratio and regulatory capital position (Z-score is unreliable for banks)
- Provision for credit losses trend 2022-2025 - explains why NI stalled while revenue grew
- Reason for diluted share jump from 939.8M (2024) to 1.37B (2025) - possible equity raise, DRIP, or restatement
- Common dividend and any buyback program disclosures - true capital return per share
- Geographic mix and exposure to Latin American operations vs. Canadian core
- Loan book concentration (commercial real estate, unsecured consumer) and net charge-off trends
- Efficiency ratio trend - is expense growth eating operating leverage?
The composite fair value lands at $83.25 and the signal-adjusted FV at $86.08, both below the $88.89 traded price - implying roughly 3-6% overvaluation, not a mispricing worth acting on. The anchored-PE method corroborates at $83.25, so there is no runaway model to discount; the methods cluster tightly and agree the stock is trading a hair above deserved value. Company quality is Solid but unremarkable (score -3), with persistent share issuance quietly diluting per-share economics - that argues against paying any premium to deserved value, let alone the small one embedded today. The bull case (fortress franchise, dividend) is well understood and already in the tape; the bear case (NIM compression, credit normalization, dividend strain) is a real risk that a 3% overvaluation does not compensate for. Net: a good-enough business at a full-enough price. Not expensive enough to short, not cheap enough to buy - the textbook Fairly Valued verdict.
Verify before trusting this (5)
- Next-quarter NIM trajectory and guidance on rate sensitivity
- PCL (provision for credit losses) trend vs guided range
- Dividend payout ratio and any commentary on sustainability
- Share issuance pace and whether a buyback is authorized
- International segment (LatAm) earnings contribution and any restructuring charges
The macro tape is mildly risk-on (VIX 14.9, S&P at highs) which is a gentle tailwind for a beta-1.21 Canadian bank, but BNS is not the profile that benefits most from euphoria - money in a risk-on regime tends to chase growth and story stocks, not steady dividend compounders. So the tape helps, but only lightly. On the narrative side, BNS carries a durable, low-intensity 'fortress Canadian bank' story with minimal cult coefficient - no mania to inflate it, but also no cracks to break it. That translates into low narrative pressure in either direction. The 10y at 4.69% with a barely-positive curve is a real headwind for Canadian banks specifically: NIM compression fears, consumer credit worries in Canada, and a market PE of 26 that leaves defensive yielders looking unexciting versus growth cohorts absorbing the risk-on flows. Net: a mildly supportive tape offset by rate/credit crosswinds and a narrative that simply does not generate lift. The pressure on this name right now is close to balanced, with a slight defensive tilt.
Verify before trusting this (5)
- Canadian bank Q results and PCL (provision for credit loss) trends - a spike would break the 'fortress' story
- BoC and Fed rate path - a decisive cut cycle flips NIM narrative from headwind to tailwind
- Analyst target revision breadth across the Big 6 Canadian banks - directional tell for the sector
- Any dividend coverage commentary from management - the bear case hinges on payout sustainability
- VIX regime change - a risk-off shift would raise BNS's relative appeal versus high-beta growth
This lens hasn't been run for this ticker yet.
When we made this prediction on Aug 8, 2026, BNS was $88.89. We expect it to be $85.80 by Feb 2027, and we consider it great value under $78.00. This is an early model (v0.6.0) — the direction is more reliable than the exact price. Made Aug 8, 2026.
Blue is our prediction, starting the day we made it. Grey is a slower route to the same place — the same destination, taking longer. Black is the actual price, so you can see how we are doing.