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What this page is: Delvantic's full research page for Berkshire Hathaway Inc. Class B (BRK.B) — AI-driven forensic equity research: mechanical valuation models (DCF, EPV, anchored-PE, scenario) plus three independent AI lenses (Quality / Value / Sentiment). Everything below is rendered server-side; you are not missing content that requires JavaScript. All scores are predictions and research opinions, not financial advice.
Our current read (analysis of 2026-09-06): Designation Watch · Gem Score +16 (−100…+100 Quality+Value blend) · Quality 83 · Value -28 · Sentiment -1 (timing only, not weighted)
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profile-header/price-overview— company profile, live quote, market capextended-analysis— the core: three AI lens reads with findings, scores, and the analyst memofuture-predictions— our forward price-band predictionsmarket-narrative/ai-findings/gpt-critique— narrative context, cross-model findings, and an adversarial critique of our own analysis (near the end of the document)- Members-only sections (render as login gates for anonymous readers):
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Berkshire Hathaway Inc. Class B
BRK.B NYSEBerkshire Hathaway Inc. Class B is the Class B common stock of Berkshire Hathaway Inc., an American multinational conglomerate holding company headquartered in Omaha, Nebraska. Today, Berkshire Hathaway operates a diversified portfolio of businesses spanning property and casualty insurance, reinsurance, utilities and energy, freight rail transportation, manufacturing, finance, services, and retailing. Its insurance operations, including brands such as GEICO and specialized reinsurance units, form a core part of its financial services activity, providing underwriting and risk management across multiple markets. Beyond insurance, the company owns major assets in rail transport through Burlington Northern Santa Fe and in regulated power and gas through Berkshire Hathaway Energy, alongside numerous manufacturing and consumer-facing businesses. Berkshire Hathaway Inc. Class B shares provide economic exposure to this broad, multi-sector group, giving investors access to a large, diversified corporate ecosystem that plays a significant role in insurance, infrastructure, and industrial activity in the United States and globally.
Price Overview
Price History (1 Year)
Revenue & Net Income Trend
This company does not file structured financial statements with the U.S. SEC, so quarterly figures aren't available from our filings-based data engine. Annual figures shown here come from the sources that do cover it.
| Period | Revenue | Net Income | Net Margin | YoY/QoQ |
|---|
Key Metrics
EPS (Diluted): 31.04
Total Equity: $717.42B
Shares: 2,157,334,111
Total Debt: $129.08B
Cash: $51.88B
EBITDA: N/A
Total Debt: $129.08B
Cash: $51.88B
Revenue: $410.52B
Revenue: $410.52B
Revenue: $410.52B
Total Equity: $717.42B
Tax Rate: 18.4%
Equity: $717.42B
Total Debt: $129.08B
Cash: $51.88B
Current Liabilities: N/A
Long-Term Debt: $125.76B
Total Debt: $129.08B
Total Equity: $717.42B
Shares: 2,157,334,111
Shares: 2,157,334,111
CapEx: $0.00
Shares: 2,157,334,111
Stock Price: $504.03
Net Income: $66.97B
Industry Benchmarks
Income Statement (Annual)
Last updated: Aug 15, 2026 12:01am (23d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | $354.7B | $234.1B | $439.3B | $424.2B | $410.5B |
| Cost of Revenue | — | — | — | — | — |
| Gross Profit | — | — | — | — | — |
| Operating Expenses | $57.1B | $63.2B | $117.1B | $70.0B | $73.9B |
| Operating Income | — | — | — | — | — |
| Net Income | $89.9B | -$22.8B | $96.2B | $89.0B | $67.0B |
| EBITDA | — | — | — | — | — |
| EPS | $39.70 | $-10.33 | $44.27 | $41.27 | $31.04 |
| EPS (Diluted) | $39.70 | $-10.33 | $44.27 | $41.27 | $31.04 |
Balance Sheet (Annual)
Last updated: Aug 15, 2026 12:01am (23d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cash & Equivalents | $88.2B | $35.8B | $38.0B | $47.7B | $51.9B |
| Total Current Assets | — | — | — | — | — |
| Total Assets | — | — | — | $1.2T | $1.2T |
| Current Liabilities | — | — | — | — | — |
| Long-Term Debt | $111.9B | $120.3B | $122.9B | $122.3B | $125.8B |
| Total Liabilities | — | — | — | $502.2B | $502.5B |
| Total Equity | $506.2B | $473.4B | $561.3B | $649.4B | $717.4B |
| Retained Earnings | $534.4B | $511.1B | $607.4B | $696.2B | $763.2B |
Cash Flow (Annual)
Last updated: Aug 15, 2026 12:01am (23d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Operating Cash Flow | $99.8B | -$47.1B | $107.1B | $79.3B | $46.0B |
| Capital Expenditure | -$13.3B | -$15.5B | -$19.4B | -$19.0B | — |
| Free Cash Flow | $26.2B | $21.9B | $29.8B | $11.6B | $25.0B |
| Acquisitions (net) | -$456.0M | -$10.6B | -$8.6B | -$396.0M | -$1.1B |
| Net Debt Issued / (Repaid) | -$752.0M | $8.2B | -$1.1B | -$1.8B | $3.0B |
| Dividends Paid | — | — | — | — | — |
| Stock Buybacks | -$27.1B | -$7.9B | -$9.2B | -$2.9B | $0 |
| Net Change in Cash | $40.3B | -$52.3B | $2.2B | $9.7B | $4.2B |
Growth Trends (YoY %)
Last updated: Aug 15, 2026 12:01am (23d ago)| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue Growth | -34.0% | +87.7% | -3.4% | -3.2% |
| Gross Profit Growth | — | — | — | — |
| Operating Income Growth | — | — | — | — |
| Net Income Growth | -125.3% | +522.8% | -7.5% | -24.8% |
| EBITDA Growth | — | — | — | — |
Deep Analysis
Risk : Reward — upside vs downside from this company's own quarters
Computed 2026-09-06 19:00A +1σ run of quarters pays +34%; a −1σ run costs 10%. Ratio 3.3:1 (μ 4.6%, σ 6.2% , 16 pairs).
Older method (repeat-worst-quarter): 4.5 : 1
| Case | Growth | Margin | Fair value | vs price ($504.03) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Bull — recovery | +7% | 25.7% | $675.37 | +34% |
| Base — stabilizes | +4% | 22.3% | $552.89 | +10% |
| Bear — keeps slipping | +2% | 19.0% | $444.27 | -12% |
| Stress — last quarter repeats | -1% | 22.3% | $465.60 | -8% |
| Upside — a +1σ run of quarters (v2) | +11% | 22.3% | $677.43 | +34% |
| Stress — a −1σ run of quarters (v2) | -2% | 22.3% | $451.60 | -10% |
Narrative Economics
market-narrative step).
Growth Outlook
Analyzed 2026-08-17 16:39The question every valuation on this page silently assumes: is this company likely to grow? Judged forward — the business, its category, the world — against what's already printed.
Claude Reading
ai-findings step) when a report is run on this ticker.
GPT Reading
The raw numbers say Berkshire is being valued less like a cyclical insurer and more like a quasi-sovereign compounding machine, and that premium is not crazy but it is no longer cheap. At roughly $1.08T of market cap against $717B of equity, investors are paying about 1.52x book for a business earning a 9.3% ROE and 5.5% ROA. That spread matters: if book compounds around high-single digits and the valuation multiple stays flat, you are looking at a similar high-single-digit shareholder return profile before any re-rating. The P/E of 16.2 sounds ordinary until you remember Berkshire’s earnings are heavily distorted by investment marks and capital gains; still, even taking the smoother measures available here, free cash flow of $25.0B is only a 2.3% FCF yield on market cap, and operating cash flow of $46.0B is only 4.3%. For a company of this maturity, those are not bargain levels.
What stands out most is the disconnect between the “mature earner” label and the actual trend in the reported numbers. Revenue has gone from $439.3B in 2023 to $424.2B in 2024 to $410.5B in 2025, a two-year decline of about 6.6%. Net income has fallen from $96.2B to $89.0B to $67.0B, down 30% in two years. The momentum flags are ugly for a reason: revenue CAGR of -3.3%, earnings CAGR of -16.6%, FCF CAGR of -27.6%, and recent earnings down 24.8% year over year. Some of that is accounting noise; with Berkshire, it always is. But you do not get to dismiss all of it. When a trillion-dollar company with vast scale is showing shrinking revenue, shrinking earnings, and a single-digit ROE while trading above 1.5x book, the burden of proof shifts to the bull case that capital allocation magic will close the gap. The balance sheet is undeniably strong — $51.9B cash and only 0.18 debt/equity against $717B of equity — but the briefing itself hints that the cash pile is actually far larger at the parent and investment level than the basic cash line captures, which cuts both ways: safety, yes, but also evidence Berkshire is struggling to deploy incremental capital at rates that justify a premium multiple.
The deeper story is that Berkshire’s quality is real, but quality is already what you are paying for. A 16.3% net margin on over $410B of revenue, low leverage, and fortress equity capital are exceptional for a diversified insurer-conglomerate. The problem is that the market cap already embeds that exceptionalism while the operating and cash-flow outputs are not accelerating. If this were at 1.2x book or 12x earnings, I would lean hard the other way because the downside on a balance sheet this sturdy is limited. At 1.5x book and 2.65x sales, I think investors are underwriting a level of resilience and future deployment optionality that leaves modest upside at best. This looks more like a durable compounder priced for durability than a mispriced compounding opportunity.
The best argument against this read is that Berkshire’s reported income statement is a poor proxy for economic earning power, and the bearish momentum signals are therefore misleading. A smart bull would point out that 2022’s -$22.8B net loss and the swings to $96.2B, $89.0B, and $67.0B are driven materially by investment-market volatility, not deterioration in the railroad, utility, manufacturing, energy, or insurance franchises. They would also say book value understates intrinsic value because many wholly owned businesses sit on the books at old carrying values, so 1.52x book may not be demanding for an entity with irreplaceable assets and superior tax-efficient capital allocation. I agree with parts of that. Berkshire deserves to trade above book and at a premium to ordinary insurers because its liabilities are unusually advantaged and its capital allocation record is unmatched. I just weigh the current price differently because the premium is no longer small, the growth metrics are not bailing you out, and even after adjusting for accounting distortions, the cash generation shown here is not sufficient to call $504 an obvious bargain.
What would change my mind is not a narrative about quality; that is already established. I would turn more constructive if the next annual set showed either a clear reacceleration in operating cash flow and free cash flow — say OCF moving above $55B and FCF back above $35B — or evidence that book value and normalized earnings power are compounding fast enough to support double-digit returns from today’s price. Likewise, a pullback toward roughly 1.3x book, which on the current equity base would imply a market cap closer to $930B and a B-share price in the low-$430s, would make the risk/reward more attractive. Absent that, I see Berkshire as an excellent company priced about where an excellent company should be.
Grok Reading
Berkshire’s 2025 print tells a story of a fortress that is no longer compounding at the rate the brand implies. Revenue slipped from $439.34B in 2023 to $424.23B in 2024 and $410.52B in 2025, a clean three-year glide that produces a −3.3% revenue CAGR and a −3.2% latest-year decline. Net income compressed harder—$96.22B to $89.00B to $66.97B—leaving a −16.6% earnings CAGR and a −24.8% year-over-year drop. At $504 the stock screens at 16.2× that reduced earnings power and 1.52× the $717.42B book value, squarely inside the long-run 1.2–1.6× band rather than at a discount. Free cash flow of $25.04B on $45.97B of operating cash flow remains enormous in absolute dollars, yet the −27.6% FCF CAGR shows the same deceleration. ROE of 9.3% and ROA of 5.5% are adequate for a diversified insurer-conglomerate but ordinary relative to the quality premium the shares have historically commanded. Debt of $129B against equity of $717B (D/E 0.18) keeps the balance sheet pristine; the reported $51.9B cash line looks thin only because Berkshire’s true liquidity sits largely in short-term Treasuries not captured here. The numbers therefore describe a mature earner whose top line and mark-to-market earnings are rolling over while the multiple has not compressed to match.
The contradiction worth catching is between the tidy 16× P/E / 1.5× P/B “modest expectations” framing and the actual trajectory. Those multiples would be reasonable if earnings were troughing and float-driven book value were still compounding at low-double-digits. Instead, both revenue and reported profits are already negative, FCF quality is labeled good but shrinking fast, and secondary signals flag macro headwinds plus below-sector benchmarks. A 16× multiple on a −25% earnings year is not cheap; it is a bet that 2025 is an aberration rather than the new run-rate. With market cap already $1.08T, even the $25B FCF yield is only ~2.3%, leaving little margin of safety if insurance underwriting or the equity portfolio softens further.
The strongest opposing case starts with 2022’s −$22.8B loss, which mechanically wrecks multi-year CAGRs and makes the subsequent recovery look weaker than operating reality. Strip unrealized investment swings and Berkshire’s underlying insurance float, BNSF, Berkshire Hathaway Energy, and manufacturing earnings have historically been far stickier than the GAAP NI series implies; a normalized mid-cycle earnings power closer to the $80–90B zone would put the stock nearer 12–13×, which is attractive for this franchise. The 1.52× book multiple also sits only mid-cycle, and any large cash deployment—another precision-castparts-scale deal or accelerated buybacks below 1.4×—would re-rate the equity. Net margin of 16.3% and a still-fortress balance sheet give the bull the raw materials for that re-rating if capital allocation stays sharp post-Buffett transition anxiety.
I would flip to a clear undervalued call if trailing-twelve-month operating earnings (ex-mark-to-market) re-accelerate above $90B while the P/B drifts under 1.30×, or if a transformative acquisition is announced at a demonstrably accretive price. Conversely, another year of revenue contraction combined with ROE stuck below 9% at a 1.5×+ book multiple would push me to outright overvalued.
Qwen Reading local experiment · off-panel
The number that decides this case is the 9.33% ROE sitting under a 1.52x book multiple, and the answer it gives is "roughly fair, with the sum-of-parts argument doing the heavy lifting." Berkshire's 2025 net income of $66.97B on $410.5B of reported revenue yields the stated 16.2x P/E, but that revenue line is a chimera for an insurer-conglomerate: it blends insurance premiums, BNSF freight, utility regulated revenue, manufacturing sales, and mark-to-market equity gains into a single figure that no operating multiple can meaningfully attach to. The P/S of 2.65x and EV/Revenue of 2.84x are noise. What matters is the return on the $717.4B equity base, and 9.33% is at the low end of the 10–12% band that the framework says justifies 1.0–1.3x book. On pure ROE arithmetic, 1.5x book is a stretch.
The reason the market still pays 1.5x is that book value understates the operating businesses. BNSF, the utilities, and the manufacturing units are carried at historical cost, not replacement value, while the $300B-plus equity portfolio (the Pre-Flight's "$325B+ cash position" almost certainly refers to this combined liquid-asset base, not the $51.88B cash-and-equivalents line on the balance sheet) is already marked to market. A rough sum-of-parts adjustment of 20–30% on the operating-book component lifts the justified multiple to 1.5–1.7x, which brackets the current 1.52x. Normalizing earnings by blending 2024's $89.0B and 2025's $67.0B (and discarding 2023's $96.2B as equity-market-inflated and 2022's −$22.8B as a drawdown outlier) gives a run-rate of roughly $75–78B, putting the effective P/E closer to 13.8–14.3x than the headline 16.2x. For a diversified financial with a regulated-utility and railroad franchise, 14x normalized earnings is unremarkable, not cheap.
The prior model layer is mostly unhelpful here. The "mature_earner" classification is correct. The Momentum block's −16.6% earnings CAGR and −27.6% FCF CAGR are five-year figures anchored to the 2022 loss year and the 2021 base; for an insurer whose "earnings" swing with the S&P, those CAGRs measure equity-market volatility, not business deterioration. The "Below Sector Benchmarks" and "Macro Headwinds" tags carry no supporting data in the briefing. Market Forces failed to produce an analysis, so there is no prior fair value to test against. The "Good Cash Flow Quality" tag is a non-observation for a company whose operating cash flow of $45.97B and FCF of $25.04B move with float, premium timing, and investment income rather than with earnings power.
The strongest case against a "fairly valued" call is the ROE itself. At 9.33%, Berkshire is earning below a reasonable 9.5–10% cost of equity, which means the 1.5x book multiple is not being earned on a pure return basis. A smart bear would also point to the post-Munger capital-allocation risk: the equity portfolio is a concentrated US-large-cap book, the float structure depends on a benign insurance loss environment, and the $129B debt line (while modest at 0.18x equity) is real leverage in a rising-rate scenario. The 2025 revenue decline from $424B to $410B, even if partly a reporting artifact, is the first year-over-year drop in the five-year series and warrants watching. I weigh these concerns, but they are already priced into a 1.5x multiple that sits at the top of Berkshire's historical 1.2–1.6x range; the market is not paying for growth, it is paying for the optionality of the operating assets and the equity book.
What would change my mind in either direction: a quarterly print (the briefing has no quarterly data) showing operating earnings ex-equity below $15B annualized would confirm the ROE is structurally below cost of equity and push fair value toward 1.3x book (~$435/share, 14% below current). Conversely, a sustained equity-market rally lifting the portfolio return above 12% while insurance underwriting stays flat would push ROE above 11% and justify 1.6–1.7x book (~$560–590/share). The absence of segment-level data, the equity portfolio's composition, and the insurance loss ratio are all gaps in this briefing that prevent a tighter range.
Big-3 Panel — where each AI stands
Advanced Analysis Forensic deep-dive · separate lenses
The balance sheet is essentially unassailable. Liquid cash of $373.31B against net cash of $244.23B (34.6% of market cap) means survival risk is not a live question at any conceivable stress level. Free cash flow runs $22-30B in normal years (2025: $25.04B), fully self-funding, and the diluted share count has declined every year from 2.27B (2021) to 2.16B (2025), a -1.2% CAGR — per-share value is being concentrated. Earnings quality passes mechanical checks: OCF/NI of 1.17x, accruals just 1.3% of assets, no Beneish flag. Altman Z of 2.5 sits in the grey zone but that is a known artifact of insurance/financial conglomerates where the ratio is a poor fit, not a distress signal given the cash pile.
Verify before trusting this (5)
- Operating earnings ex-investment-gains by segment (insurance underwriting, BNSF, BHE, manufacturing) to confirm operating durability behind GAAP volatility
- Insurance float trend and combined ratios at GEICO and reinsurance units
- Composition of the $373B liquid position (T-bills vs equities) and any concentration in top equity holdings
- Succession/governance disclosures post-Buffett transition
- Reason for 2024 FCF dip to $11.62B (working capital, capex at BNSF/BHE, or one-offs)
Without a formal e2e fair-value handoff, I anchor on what Berkshire actually is: ~$373B in liquid cash (roughly $173/B-share of the $504 price is cash and equivalents), a marked-to-market equity book, and a collection of operating businesses (insurance, BNSF, BHE, manufacturing/services) that earn durable, cash-backed profits. At a $1.08T market cap, the market is paying a reasonable but not cheap multiple on the operating earnings power once you strip out cash and the equity portfolio. Historically Berkshire has traded around 1.4-1.6x book; at current levels it sits toward the upper end of that band, which is consistent with 'fairly valued' rather than a gift.
Verify before trusting this (4)
- Pace and price of Q buybacks in the 10-Q (best real-time signal of management's own valuation view)
- Operating earnings ex-investment gains trend across insurance underwriting, BNSF, and BHE
- Cash and Treasury bill balance and any large deployment (acquisition or equity purchase)
- Float growth and insurance combined ratio
The market tape is modestly risk-on (VIX 14.3, S&P near highs) but at beta 0.61 BRK.B captures little of that lift - it is a defensive, cash-rich insurance conglomerate that neither benefits meaningfully from euphoria nor gets punished in mild stress. There is no active narrative pulling capital in or out; the stock is not part of the AI trade, not a rate-sensitive REIT, not a story stock. That absence of narrative is itself the dominant sentiment fact: BRK.B trades on its own gravity, not on tape or theme. Recent momentum has been soft (-3.3% CAGR, underperforming) which suggests some rotation OUT of defensives and into higher-beta risk assets as the risk-on regime persists - a mild headwind, but ordinary crosswind territory, not decisive. Higher long rates (10y 4.63%) are a small net positive for the float-earnings story but the market is not currently pricing that in as a narrative. Analyst tone is not flagged as diverging. Net: a genuinely balanced read - no dominant force in either direction, just quiet drift while risk-on money chases higher-beta names elsewhere.
Verify before trusting this (3)
- Any Buffett succession or capital-deployment headline that could inject a narrative (either direction)
- Whether the risk-on regime persists - a VIX spike would flip BRK.B into a relative safe-haven bid
- Signs of a defensive rotation back in (breadth narrowing, mega-cap growth stalling)
The macro setup is a two-sided coin for Berkshire uniquely: a 4.63% 10y and elevated front-end rates pay the cash mountain and float handsomely, while simultaneously suppressing housing-linked manufacturing, retail furnishings and freight volumes, and raising utility financing cost. Firm P&C pricing in a steady insurance cycle supports underwriting. Net effect is a business that self-hedges the cycle — the world can neither accelerate it much nor break it, which is exactly why the honest call is flat-to-modestly-growing earnings power rather than a directional inflection.
Prediction unavailable. valuation-synthesis has no result for BRK.B — the prediction needs its fair-value anchors.