For AI assistants & researchers — machine-readable summary of this page
What this page is: Delvantic's full research page for Berkshire Hathaway Inc. Class B (BRK.B) — AI-driven forensic equity research: mechanical valuation models (DCF, EPV, anchored-PE, scenario) plus three independent AI lenses (Quality / Value / Sentiment). Everything below is rendered server-side; you are not missing content that requires JavaScript. All scores are predictions and research opinions, not financial advice.
Our current read (analysis of 2026-08-23): Designation Watch · Gem Score +22 (−100…+100 Quality+Value blend) · Quality 83 · Value -28 · Sentiment -1 (timing only, not weighted)
Page map (sections in order; each card carries a stable
reference-name attribute you can cite):
profile-header/price-overview— company profile, live quote, market capextended-analysis— the core: three AI lens reads with findings, scores, and the analyst memofuture-predictions— our forward price-band predictionsmarket-narrative/ai-findings/gpt-critique— narrative context, cross-model findings, and an adversarial critique of our own analysis (near the end of the document)- Members-only sections (render as login gates for anonymous readers):
price-history,income-trend,key-metrics,financials(statement tables),insider-trading. The analysis above is public; the raw data tables require a free account.
More for machine readers: site briefing at
/llms.txt ·
any ticker resolves at delvantic.com/stock/TICKER ·
raw inputs are public-company filings and market data (via licensed data feeds);
every model, score, lens read, and prediction on this page is Delvantic's own analysis.
Berkshire Hathaway Inc. Class B
BRK.B NYSEBerkshire Hathaway Inc. Class B is the Class B common stock of Berkshire Hathaway Inc., an American multinational conglomerate holding company headquartered in Omaha, Nebraska. Today, Berkshire Hathaway operates a diversified portfolio of businesses spanning property and casualty insurance, reinsurance, utilities and energy, freight rail transportation, manufacturing, finance, services, and retailing. Its insurance operations, including brands such as GEICO and specialized reinsurance units, form a core part of its financial services activity, providing underwriting and risk management across multiple markets. Beyond insurance, the company owns major assets in rail transport through Burlington Northern Santa Fe and in regulated power and gas through Berkshire Hathaway Energy, alongside numerous manufacturing and consumer-facing businesses. Berkshire Hathaway Inc. Class B shares provide economic exposure to this broad, multi-sector group, giving investors access to a large, diversified corporate ecosystem that plays a significant role in insurance, infrastructure, and industrial activity in the United States and globally.
Price Overview
Price History (1 Year)
Revenue & Net Income Trend
This company does not file structured financial statements with the U.S. SEC, so quarterly figures aren't available from our filings-based data engine. Annual figures shown here come from the sources that do cover it.
| Period | Revenue | Net Income | Net Margin | YoY/QoQ |
|---|
Key Metrics
EPS (Diluted): 31.04
Total Equity: $717.42B
Shares: 2,157,334,111
Total Debt: $129.08B
Cash: $51.88B
EBITDA: N/A
Total Debt: $129.08B
Cash: $51.88B
Revenue: $410.52B
Revenue: $410.52B
Revenue: $410.52B
Total Equity: $717.42B
Tax Rate: 18.4%
Equity: $717.42B
Total Debt: $129.08B
Cash: $51.88B
Current Liabilities: N/A
Long-Term Debt: $125.76B
Total Debt: $129.08B
Total Equity: $717.42B
Shares: 2,157,334,111
Shares: 2,157,334,111
CapEx: $0.00
Shares: 2,157,334,111
Stock Price: $504.03
Net Income: $66.97B
Industry Benchmarks
Income Statement (Annual)
Last updated: Aug 15, 2026 12:01am (8d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | $354.7B | $234.1B | $439.3B | $424.2B | $410.5B |
| Cost of Revenue | — | — | — | — | — |
| Gross Profit | — | — | — | — | — |
| Operating Expenses | $57.1B | $63.2B | $117.1B | $70.0B | $73.9B |
| Operating Income | — | — | — | — | — |
| Net Income | $89.9B | -$22.8B | $96.2B | $89.0B | $67.0B |
| EBITDA | — | — | — | — | — |
| EPS | $39.70 | $-10.33 | $44.27 | $41.27 | $31.04 |
| EPS (Diluted) | $39.70 | $-10.33 | $44.27 | $41.27 | $31.04 |
Balance Sheet (Annual)
Last updated: Aug 15, 2026 12:01am (8d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cash & Equivalents | $88.2B | $35.8B | $38.0B | $47.7B | $51.9B |
| Total Current Assets | — | — | — | — | — |
| Total Assets | — | — | — | $1.2T | $1.2T |
| Current Liabilities | — | — | — | — | — |
| Long-Term Debt | $111.9B | $120.3B | $122.9B | $122.3B | $125.8B |
| Total Liabilities | — | — | — | $502.2B | $502.5B |
| Total Equity | $506.2B | $473.4B | $561.3B | $649.4B | $717.4B |
| Retained Earnings | $534.4B | $511.1B | $607.4B | $696.2B | $763.2B |
Cash Flow (Annual)
Last updated: Aug 15, 2026 12:01am (8d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Operating Cash Flow | $99.8B | -$47.1B | $107.1B | $79.3B | $46.0B |
| Capital Expenditure | -$13.3B | -$15.5B | -$19.4B | -$19.0B | — |
| Free Cash Flow | $26.2B | $21.9B | $29.8B | $11.6B | $25.0B |
| Acquisitions (net) | -$456.0M | -$10.6B | -$8.6B | -$396.0M | -$1.1B |
| Net Debt Issued / (Repaid) | -$752.0M | $8.2B | -$1.1B | -$1.8B | $3.0B |
| Dividends Paid | — | — | — | — | — |
| Stock Buybacks | -$27.1B | -$7.9B | -$9.2B | -$2.9B | $0 |
| Net Change in Cash | $40.3B | -$52.3B | $2.2B | $9.7B | $4.2B |
Growth Trends (YoY %)
Last updated: Aug 15, 2026 12:01am (8d ago)| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue Growth | -34.0% | +87.7% | -3.4% | -3.2% |
| Gross Profit Growth | — | — | — | — |
| Operating Income Growth | — | — | — | — |
| Net Income Growth | -125.3% | +522.8% | -7.5% | -24.8% |
| EBITDA Growth | — | — | — | — |
Deep Analysis
Narrative Economics
market-narrative step).
AI Lens 4th lens · how AI reaches this business · 5-yr
2026-08-15AI compute buildout converts into load growth and capex opportunity at Berkshire Hathaway Energy: interconnection queues, transmission, and dispatchable generation are exactly the scarce physical inputs that a compute boom bids up, and regulated utilities earn a return on the capital deployed to serve it.
Auto insurance is the one segment where cheap intelligence genuinely erodes an advantage: AI-grade pricing, telematics and claims models narrow the segmentation gap that scale used to buy, while AI shopping agents strip value from GEICO's brand-and-advertising moat by turning personal auto into a pure price-and-quote API contest.
Whether GEICO's expense-ratio and loss-cost advantage widens or narrows as competitors' models improve — observable in GEICO's combined ratio, policies-in-force trend, and ad spend per new policy versus Progressive's.
Permanent low-cost float, an AAA-grade balance sheet that can write catastrophe and mega-limit reinsurance no one else will, rail rights-of-way, regulated grid franchises, and the reputation that makes Berkshire the buyer of choice in forced-sale moments.
AI Lens thesis
AI reaches Berkshire through four separate channels that must not be blended: (1) insurance underwriting, where cheap intelligence commoditizes analytic skill but cannot commoditize the capital and regulatory license that actually absorbs loss — mildly negative for GEICO's relative edge, neutral-to-positive for Ajit Jain's capacity-scarcity reinsurance; (2) energy, where AI compute demand is a direct, sizable rate-base tailwind and dispatchable capacity becomes scarcer; (3) the operating subsidiaries — BNSF, manufacturing, retail, services — where AI is an ordinary cost-efficiency story that a decentralized, capital-disciplined structure will harvest slowly but keep, since most units are not in seat-priced software competition; (4) capital allocation, which is untouched: the scarce thing is willingness and capacity to write a $10bn check on 48 hours' notice, and abundant intelligence does not create that. Net: low substitution risk, real but modest cost benefit, one genuine competitive erosion in personal auto.
What the market may be underestimating
Upside Berkshire owns the bottleneck complements to AI rather than AI itself — power generation, transmission, industrial products, and the capital to fund utility-scale build — and it can finance that expansion at a cost of capital AI-native competitors for the same assets cannot match.
Downside Decentralization is an AI adoption tax: dozens of independently run subsidiaries with no central data or model function will deploy later and more shallowly than focused competitors, so the cost savings accrue to rivals first in the more contestable units like retail, services and auto insurance distribution.
Outcome range spread 34
Growth Outlook
Analyzed 2026-08-17 16:39The question every valuation on this page silently assumes: is this company likely to grow? Judged forward — the business, its category, the world — against what's already printed.
Claude Reading
ai-findings step) when a report is run on this ticker.
GPT Reading
The raw numbers say Berkshire is being valued less like a cyclical insurer and more like a quasi-sovereign compounding machine, and that premium is not crazy but it is no longer cheap. At roughly $1.08T of market cap against $717B of equity, investors are paying about 1.52x book for a business earning a 9.3% ROE and 5.5% ROA. That spread matters: if book compounds around high-single digits and the valuation multiple stays flat, you are looking at a similar high-single-digit shareholder return profile before any re-rating. The P/E of 16.2 sounds ordinary until you remember Berkshire’s earnings are heavily distorted by investment marks and capital gains; still, even taking the smoother measures available here, free cash flow of $25.0B is only a 2.3% FCF yield on market cap, and operating cash flow of $46.0B is only 4.3%. For a company of this maturity, those are not bargain levels.
What stands out most is the disconnect between the “mature earner” label and the actual trend in the reported numbers. Revenue has gone from $439.3B in 2023 to $424.2B in 2024 to $410.5B in 2025, a two-year decline of about 6.6%. Net income has fallen from $96.2B to $89.0B to $67.0B, down 30% in two years. The momentum flags are ugly for a reason: revenue CAGR of -3.3%, earnings CAGR of -16.6%, FCF CAGR of -27.6%, and recent earnings down 24.8% year over year. Some of that is accounting noise; with Berkshire, it always is. But you do not get to dismiss all of it. When a trillion-dollar company with vast scale is showing shrinking revenue, shrinking earnings, and a single-digit ROE while trading above 1.5x book, the burden of proof shifts to the bull case that capital allocation magic will close the gap. The balance sheet is undeniably strong — $51.9B cash and only 0.18 debt/equity against $717B of equity — but the briefing itself hints that the cash pile is actually far larger at the parent and investment level than the basic cash line captures, which cuts both ways: safety, yes, but also evidence Berkshire is struggling to deploy incremental capital at rates that justify a premium multiple.
The deeper story is that Berkshire’s quality is real, but quality is already what you are paying for. A 16.3% net margin on over $410B of revenue, low leverage, and fortress equity capital are exceptional for a diversified insurer-conglomerate. The problem is that the market cap already embeds that exceptionalism while the operating and cash-flow outputs are not accelerating. If this were at 1.2x book or 12x earnings, I would lean hard the other way because the downside on a balance sheet this sturdy is limited. At 1.5x book and 2.65x sales, I think investors are underwriting a level of resilience and future deployment optionality that leaves modest upside at best. This looks more like a durable compounder priced for durability than a mispriced compounding opportunity.
The best argument against this read is that Berkshire’s reported income statement is a poor proxy for economic earning power, and the bearish momentum signals are therefore misleading. A smart bull would point out that 2022’s -$22.8B net loss and the swings to $96.2B, $89.0B, and $67.0B are driven materially by investment-market volatility, not deterioration in the railroad, utility, manufacturing, energy, or insurance franchises. They would also say book value understates intrinsic value because many wholly owned businesses sit on the books at old carrying values, so 1.52x book may not be demanding for an entity with irreplaceable assets and superior tax-efficient capital allocation. I agree with parts of that. Berkshire deserves to trade above book and at a premium to ordinary insurers because its liabilities are unusually advantaged and its capital allocation record is unmatched. I just weigh the current price differently because the premium is no longer small, the growth metrics are not bailing you out, and even after adjusting for accounting distortions, the cash generation shown here is not sufficient to call $504 an obvious bargain.
What would change my mind is not a narrative about quality; that is already established. I would turn more constructive if the next annual set showed either a clear reacceleration in operating cash flow and free cash flow — say OCF moving above $55B and FCF back above $35B — or evidence that book value and normalized earnings power are compounding fast enough to support double-digit returns from today’s price. Likewise, a pullback toward roughly 1.3x book, which on the current equity base would imply a market cap closer to $930B and a B-share price in the low-$430s, would make the risk/reward more attractive. Absent that, I see Berkshire as an excellent company priced about where an excellent company should be.
Grok Reading
Berkshire’s 2025 print tells a story of a fortress that is no longer compounding at the rate the brand implies. Revenue slipped from $439.34B in 2023 to $424.23B in 2024 and $410.52B in 2025, a clean three-year glide that produces a −3.3% revenue CAGR and a −3.2% latest-year decline. Net income compressed harder—$96.22B to $89.00B to $66.97B—leaving a −16.6% earnings CAGR and a −24.8% year-over-year drop. At $504 the stock screens at 16.2× that reduced earnings power and 1.52× the $717.42B book value, squarely inside the long-run 1.2–1.6× band rather than at a discount. Free cash flow of $25.04B on $45.97B of operating cash flow remains enormous in absolute dollars, yet the −27.6% FCF CAGR shows the same deceleration. ROE of 9.3% and ROA of 5.5% are adequate for a diversified insurer-conglomerate but ordinary relative to the quality premium the shares have historically commanded. Debt of $129B against equity of $717B (D/E 0.18) keeps the balance sheet pristine; the reported $51.9B cash line looks thin only because Berkshire’s true liquidity sits largely in short-term Treasuries not captured here. The numbers therefore describe a mature earner whose top line and mark-to-market earnings are rolling over while the multiple has not compressed to match.
The contradiction worth catching is between the tidy 16× P/E / 1.5× P/B “modest expectations” framing and the actual trajectory. Those multiples would be reasonable if earnings were troughing and float-driven book value were still compounding at low-double-digits. Instead, both revenue and reported profits are already negative, FCF quality is labeled good but shrinking fast, and secondary signals flag macro headwinds plus below-sector benchmarks. A 16× multiple on a −25% earnings year is not cheap; it is a bet that 2025 is an aberration rather than the new run-rate. With market cap already $1.08T, even the $25B FCF yield is only ~2.3%, leaving little margin of safety if insurance underwriting or the equity portfolio softens further.
The strongest opposing case starts with 2022’s −$22.8B loss, which mechanically wrecks multi-year CAGRs and makes the subsequent recovery look weaker than operating reality. Strip unrealized investment swings and Berkshire’s underlying insurance float, BNSF, Berkshire Hathaway Energy, and manufacturing earnings have historically been far stickier than the GAAP NI series implies; a normalized mid-cycle earnings power closer to the $80–90B zone would put the stock nearer 12–13×, which is attractive for this franchise. The 1.52× book multiple also sits only mid-cycle, and any large cash deployment—another precision-castparts-scale deal or accelerated buybacks below 1.4×—would re-rate the equity. Net margin of 16.3% and a still-fortress balance sheet give the bull the raw materials for that re-rating if capital allocation stays sharp post-Buffett transition anxiety.
I would flip to a clear undervalued call if trailing-twelve-month operating earnings (ex-mark-to-market) re-accelerate above $90B while the P/B drifts under 1.30×, or if a transformative acquisition is announced at a demonstrably accretive price. Conversely, another year of revenue contraction combined with ROE stuck below 9% at a 1.5×+ book multiple would push me to outright overvalued.
Big-3 Panel — where each AI stands
Advanced Analysis Forensic deep-dive · separate lenses
The balance sheet is essentially unassailable. Liquid cash of $373.31B against net cash of $244.23B (34.6% of market cap) means survival risk is not a live question at any conceivable stress level. Free cash flow runs $22-30B in normal years (2025: $25.04B), fully self-funding, and the diluted share count has declined every year from 2.27B (2021) to 2.16B (2025), a -1.2% CAGR — per-share value is being concentrated. Earnings quality passes mechanical checks: OCF/NI of 1.17x, accruals just 1.3% of assets, no Beneish flag. Altman Z of 2.5 sits in the grey zone but that is a known artifact of insurance/financial conglomerates where the ratio is a poor fit, not a distress signal given the cash pile.
Verify before trusting this (5)
- Operating earnings ex-investment-gains by segment (insurance underwriting, BNSF, BHE, manufacturing) to confirm operating durability behind GAAP volatility
- Insurance float trend and combined ratios at GEICO and reinsurance units
- Composition of the $373B liquid position (T-bills vs equities) and any concentration in top equity holdings
- Succession/governance disclosures post-Buffett transition
- Reason for 2024 FCF dip to $11.62B (working capital, capex at BNSF/BHE, or one-offs)
Without a formal e2e fair-value handoff, I anchor on what Berkshire actually is: ~$373B in liquid cash (roughly $173/B-share of the $504 price is cash and equivalents), a marked-to-market equity book, and a collection of operating businesses (insurance, BNSF, BHE, manufacturing/services) that earn durable, cash-backed profits. At a $1.08T market cap, the market is paying a reasonable but not cheap multiple on the operating earnings power once you strip out cash and the equity portfolio. Historically Berkshire has traded around 1.4-1.6x book; at current levels it sits toward the upper end of that band, which is consistent with 'fairly valued' rather than a gift.
Verify before trusting this (4)
- Pace and price of Q buybacks in the 10-Q (best real-time signal of management's own valuation view)
- Operating earnings ex-investment gains trend across insurance underwriting, BNSF, and BHE
- Cash and Treasury bill balance and any large deployment (acquisition or equity purchase)
- Float growth and insurance combined ratio
The market tape is modestly risk-on (VIX 14.3, S&P near highs) but at beta 0.61 BRK.B captures little of that lift - it is a defensive, cash-rich insurance conglomerate that neither benefits meaningfully from euphoria nor gets punished in mild stress. There is no active narrative pulling capital in or out; the stock is not part of the AI trade, not a rate-sensitive REIT, not a story stock. That absence of narrative is itself the dominant sentiment fact: BRK.B trades on its own gravity, not on tape or theme. Recent momentum has been soft (-3.3% CAGR, underperforming) which suggests some rotation OUT of defensives and into higher-beta risk assets as the risk-on regime persists - a mild headwind, but ordinary crosswind territory, not decisive. Higher long rates (10y 4.63%) are a small net positive for the float-earnings story but the market is not currently pricing that in as a narrative. Analyst tone is not flagged as diverging. Net: a genuinely balanced read - no dominant force in either direction, just quiet drift while risk-on money chases higher-beta names elsewhere.
Verify before trusting this (3)
- Any Buffett succession or capital-deployment headline that could inject a narrative (either direction)
- Whether the risk-on regime persists - a VIX spike would flip BRK.B into a relative safe-haven bid
- Signs of a defensive rotation back in (breadth narrowing, mega-cap growth stalling)
AI reaches Berkshire through four separate channels that must not be blended: (1) insurance underwriting, where cheap intelligence commoditizes analytic skill but cannot commoditize the capital and regulatory license that actually absorbs loss — mildly negative for GEICO's relative edge, neutral-to-positive for Ajit Jain's capacity-scarcity reinsurance; (2) energy, where AI compute demand is a direct, sizable rate-base tailwind and dispatchable capacity becomes scarcer; (3) the operating subsidiaries — BNSF, manufacturing, retail, services — where AI is an ordinary cost-efficiency story that a decentralized, capital-disciplined structure will harvest slowly but keep, since most units are not in seat-priced software competition; (4) capital allocation, which is untouched: the scarce thing is willingness and capacity to write a $10bn check on 48 hours' notice, and abundant intelligence does not create that. Net: low substitution risk, real but modest cost benefit, one genuine competitive erosion in personal auto.
None surfaced.
Verify before trusting this (8)
- Mega-cat and mega-limit deals written
- Statutory surplus and float growth
- Ratings agency commentary
- BHE rate-base and capex plans
- Data-center load contracts signed
- Cash and Treasury balance deployment
- GEICO expense ratio trajectory
- Small-carrier loss-ratio convergence
The macro setup is a two-sided coin for Berkshire uniquely: a 4.63% 10y and elevated front-end rates pay the cash mountain and float handsomely, while simultaneously suppressing housing-linked manufacturing, retail furnishings and freight volumes, and raising utility financing cost. Firm P&C pricing in a steady insurance cycle supports underwriting. Net effect is a business that self-hedges the cycle — the world can neither accelerate it much nor break it, which is exactly why the honest call is flat-to-modestly-growing earnings power rather than a directional inflection.
Prediction unavailable. valuation-synthesis has no result for BRK.B — the prediction needs its fair-value anchors.