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What this page is: Delvantic's full research page for Anheuser-Busch InBev S.A. (BUD) — AI-driven forensic equity research: mechanical valuation models (DCF, EPV, anchored-PE, scenario) plus three independent AI lenses (Quality / Value / Sentiment). Everything below is rendered server-side; you are not missing content that requires JavaScript. All scores are predictions and research opinions, not financial advice.
Our current read (analysis of 2026-08-23): Designation Low · Gem Score -16 (−100…+100 Quality+Value blend) · Quality 41 · Value -62 · Sentiment 19 (timing only, not weighted) · Composite fair value $74.88 vs $84.59 at analysis
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profile-header/price-overview— company profile, live quote, market capextended-analysis— the core: three AI lens reads with findings, scores, and the analyst memofuture-predictions— our forward price-band predictionsmarket-narrative/ai-findings/gpt-critique— narrative context, cross-model findings, and an adversarial critique of our own analysis (near the end of the document)- Members-only sections (render as login gates for anonymous readers):
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Anheuser-Busch InBev S.A.
BUD NYSEAnheuser-Busch InBev S.A. ADR represents shares of Anheuser-Busch InBev SA/NV, a Belgian multinational drink and brewing company headquartered in Leuven, Belgium. The group operates as a global holding and operating company focused on the manufacture, marketing, and distribution of alcoholic and non-alcoholic beverages. Its core business is beer, with a broad portfolio of more than 500 brands spanning global labels such as Budweiser, Corona, and Stella Artois, international brands like Beck’s, Leffe, and Hoegaarden, and numerous strong local brands across key markets. Today, Anheuser-Busch InBev S.A. ADR provides investors exposure to a leading consumer staples company with operations structured across major geographic zones including North America, Middle Americas, South America, EMEA, Asia Pacific, and global export and holding entities. Beyond beer, the company participates in soft drinks through production and bottling agreements, notably via subsidiaries that bottle and distribute brands such as Pepsi, 7UP, and Gatorade in certain regions. Its scale, diversified product mix, and presence in both mature and emerging markets make it a significant player in the global beverages industry and a key constituent within the broader consumer products sector.
Price Overview
Price History (1 Year)
Revenue & Net Income Trend
This company does not file structured financial statements with the U.S. SEC, so quarterly figures aren't available from our filings-based data engine. Annual figures shown here come from the sources that do cover it.
| Period | Revenue | Net Income | Net Margin | YoY/QoQ |
|---|
Key Metrics
EPS (Diluted): 3.39
Total Equity: $97.74B
Shares: 2,016,814,159
Total Debt: $0.00
Cash: $11.64B
EBITDA: $21.06B
Total Debt: $0.00
Cash: $11.64B
Revenue: $59.32B
Revenue: $59.32B
Revenue: $59.32B
Total Equity: $97.74B
Tax Rate: 25.2%
Equity: $97.74B
Total Debt: $0.00
Cash: $11.64B
Current Liabilities: $34.48B
Long-Term Debt: $0.00
Total Debt: $0.00
Total Equity: $97.74B
Shares: 2,016,814,159
Shares: 2,016,814,159
CapEx: -$3.66B
Shares: 2,016,814,159
Stock Price: $84.59
Net Income: $6.84B
Industry Benchmarks
Income Statement (Annual)
Last updated: Jul 30, 2026 3:21am (24d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | $54.3B | $57.8B | $59.4B | $59.8B | $59.3B |
| Cost of Revenue | $23.1B | $26.3B | $27.4B | $26.7B | $26.1B |
| Gross Profit | $31.2B | $31.5B | $32.0B | $33.0B | $33.2B |
| Operating Expenses | $17.4B | $17.0B | $18.0B | $17.5B | $17.8B |
| Operating Income | $13.8B | $14.5B | $14.0B | $15.5B | $15.4B |
| Net Income | $4.7B | $6.0B | $5.3B | $5.9B | $6.8B |
| EBITDA | $18.9B | $19.6B | $19.4B | $21.0B | $21.1B |
| EPS | $2.33 | $2.97 | $2.65 | $2.92 | $3.45 |
| EPS (Diluted) | $2.28 | $2.91 | $2.60 | $2.86 | $3.39 |
Balance Sheet (Annual)
Last updated: Jul 30, 2026 3:21am (24d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cash & Equivalents | $12.1B | $10.0B | $10.3B | $11.2B | $11.6B |
| Total Current Assets | $23.9B | $23.2B | $23.4B | $23.0B | $24.8B |
| Total Assets | $217.6B | $212.9B | $219.3B | $206.6B | $218.8B |
| Current Liabilities | $34.2B | $34.4B | $37.2B | $33.1B | $34.5B |
| Long-Term Debt | — | — | — | — | — |
| Total Liabilities | $138.3B | $128.7B | $126.7B | $117.9B | $121.1B |
| Total Equity | $79.3B | $84.3B | $92.7B | $88.7B | $97.7B |
| Retained Earnings | $33.9B | $38.8B | $42.2B | $46.6B | $50.1B |
Cash Flow (Annual)
Last updated: Jul 30, 2026 3:21am (24d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Operating Cash Flow | $14.8B | $13.3B | $13.3B | $15.1B | $14.9B |
| Capital Expenditure | -$5.6B | -$5.2B | -$4.6B | -$3.9B | -$3.7B |
| Free Cash Flow | $9.2B | $8.1B | $8.6B | $11.2B | $11.2B |
| Acquisitions (net) | -$451.0M | — | — | — | — |
| Net Debt Issued / (Repaid) | — | — | — | — | — |
| Dividends Paid | -$2.4B | -$2.4B | -$3.0B | -$2.7B | -$4.5B |
| Stock Buybacks | — | — | — | — | — |
| Net Change in Cash | — | — | — | — | — |
Growth Trends (YoY %)
Last updated: Jul 30, 2026 3:21am (24d ago)| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue Growth | +6.4% | +2.8% | +0.7% | -0.7% |
| Gross Profit Growth | +0.9% | +1.6% | +3.3% | +0.5% |
| Operating Income Growth | +5.0% | -3.8% | +10.9% | -0.5% |
| Net Income Growth | +27.8% | -10.5% | +9.6% | +16.8% |
| EBITDA Growth | +3.8% | -1.1% | +8.5% | +0.1% |
Dividend History (Last 20)
Last updated: Jul 30, 2026 6:52pm (24d ago)| Date | Dividend | Declaration | Record | Payment |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-05-08 | $1.17 | — | — | — |
| 2025-05-07 | $1.05 | — | — | — |
| 2024-05-03 | $0.87 | — | — | — |
| 2023-05-03 | $0.82 | — | — | — |
| 2022-05-03 | $0.53 | — | — | — |
| 2021-05-04 | $0.60 | — | — | — |
| 2020-06-09 | $0.57 | — | — | — |
| 2019-11-19 | $0.89 | — | — | — |
| 2019-05-07 | $1.12 | — | — | — |
| 2018-11-27 | $0.91 | — | — | — |
| 2018-05-01 | $2.39 | — | — | — |
| 2017-11-14 | $1.88 | — | — | — |
| 2017-05-01 | $2.19 | — | — | — |
| 2016-11-14 | $1.70 | — | — | — |
| 2016-04-28 | $2.30 | — | — | — |
| 2015-11-06 | $1.77 | — | — | — |
| 2015-04-29 | $2.24 | — | — | — |
| 2014-11-06 | $1.24 | — | — | — |
| 2014-04-30 | $2.00 | — | — | — |
| 2013-11-07 | $0.81 | — | — | — |
Deep Analysis
Narrative Economics
market-narrative step).
Claude Reading
The raw numbers tell a specific story: BUD is running in place on the top line while quietly compounding earnings and cash. Revenue has crawled from $54.3B (2021) to $59.3B (2025) — a 2.2% four-year CAGR, and actually *down* $450M YoY in 2025. But net income went from $4.67B to $6.84B (+46% cumulative), operating income widened to $15.41B, and FCF hit $11.23B against a $166B market cap — a ~6.7% FCF yield. Gross margin held at 55.9%, operating margin at 26%. This is textbook mature-earner behavior: no volume growth, but pricing/mix and cost discipline extracting more per dollar of revenue. EV/EBITDA of 7.4x is genuinely cheap for a global staples leader — Coca-Cola trades near 20x, Diageo near 15x even after its de-rating. The dividend yield is only 1.4% with a 66% payout ratio, so most of the FCF is going somewhere else — almost certainly debt paydown, which the "total debt: —" blank in the file conveniently obscures (this is the critical missing datum; AB InBev historically carried $70B+ in net debt from the SABMiller deal).
The synthesis verdict of "fair value $72-75 vs $84.59" leans heavily on DCF triangulation, and I partially dissent. On an EV/EBITDA basis BUD looks cheap versus staples peers; on P/E (25x) it looks fair-to-full given -0.1% revenue CAGR. The disagreement between the multiples is itself the story: the market is pricing the equity like a slow-growth staple (25x earnings) while pricing the enterprise like a levered industrial (7.4x EBITDA). Both can be right simultaneously if you believe deleveraging will transfer value from debtholders to equity — which is exactly what's been happening (earnings CAGR 13% on revenue CAGR of -0.1% is the fingerprint of interest-expense reduction, not operational magic). If net debt is still ~$60-65B and they're chipping $4-5B/year off it, equity holders capture that mechanically. The synthesis models don't seem to weight this deleveraging optionality, which is the actual bull case here — not premiumization, not EM growth.
The contrarian argument the models undersell: beer volumes are in secular decline in every developed market, GLP-1 drugs are measurably reducing alcohol consumption (Morgan Stanley surveys show 30%+ reduction in drinking among users), and Gen Z drinks meaningfully less than millennials did at the same age. Bud Light still hasn't recovered US share post-2023 boycott — Modelo took the crown and hasn't given it back. The 55.9% gross margin is impressive but has been flat for four years; there's no evidence premiumization is actually expanding margins, just holding them. If revenue stays flat-to-negative for another 3-5 years and the deleveraging tailwind exhausts (interest expense can only fall so far), you're left with a 25x P/E on a shrinking business. That's the trap. The narrative model's "85-90% fundamentals" read is right but incomplete — the fundamentals themselves are quietly bifurcating between a good balance-sheet story and a mediocre operating story.
I land at partial dissent from the "fair_value $72-75" verdict. The DCF is probably too punitive because it extrapolates flat revenue while ignoring the equity-value transfer from ongoing deleveraging; a fairer anchor is $78-85, which means BUD is roughly fairly valued at $84.59, not 12% overvalued. But I also dissent from any bull case above $95 — there's no growth catalyst, GLP-1 and generational headwinds are real, and the 1.4% yield doesn't pay you to wait. The mature-earner classification is correct, sector-leader tag is correct, but the "macro headwinds" flag is doing important work: consumer defensives underperform when real rates stay elevated and EM currencies (a huge chunk of BUD's revenue mix through Ambev and African ops) weaken versus the dollar. This is a hold-if-you-own-it, don't-chase-it name. Entry closer to $75 would be interesting; at $84.59 the risk/reward is symmetric and boring, which is arguably what a defensive holding should be.
GPT Reading
At $84.59, AB InBev is being valued like a steady grower when the actual top line is barely moving. Revenue was $59.32B in 2025 versus $59.77B in 2024 and $59.38B in 2023; that is not a compounding sales story, it is a pricing/mix and efficiency story laid over flat demand. What does improve materially is profitability below revenue: gross profit rose to $33.18B from $31.98B in 2023, operating income to $15.41B from $13.97B, and net income to $6.84B from $5.34B. That says management is executing well on premiumization, cost control, and mix, but it also means the easy part of the equity story has already happened. With operating margin now 25.97% and gross margin 55.93%, you are no longer buying a depressed-margin recovery; you are paying nearly 25x earnings and 2.88x sales for a brewer with essentially zero revenue CAGR.
The cash generation is undeniably strong. Operating cash flow of $14.88B and free cash flow of $11.23B on $59.32B of revenue implies an FCF margin near 19%, which is elite for a staple business. EV/EBITDA at 7.4x looks less demanding than the P/E, and ROIC at 13.4% is healthy. But that mix of metrics actually highlights the core issue: the enterprise-level valuation says “solid cash cow,” while the equity multiple says “defensive compounder with growth durability.” I don’t think the latter is justified by the data provided. Net margin is only 11.5%, ROE just 7.0%, and the dividend yield is a meager 1.39% with a 66% payout ratio, so shareholders are not even being paid much current income to sit through a low-growth story. If the company is going to trade like a premium staple, I want either visible volume growth, a materially higher shareholder yield, or cleaner evidence that earnings can keep compounding double digits from here. The last five years show earnings improvement, yes, but from 2022 to 2024 operating income was basically stuck around $14.5B-$15.5B before this latest step-up.
The strongest pushback is that this business may deserve a premium precisely because the top line is so resilient. Beer is not software; flat sales with expanding margins, $11B-plus free cash flow, and global scale can still create attractive equity value over time. Gross profit improved despite flat sales, and net income rose almost $1B year over year from $5.86B to $6.84B. If that continues, then 25x trailing earnings can compress quickly on forward numbers. Also, the valuation stack is not screamingly expensive by staple standards: 1.75x book is reasonable for a branded consumer franchise, and 7.4x EV/EBITDA is not the mark of a euphoric market. If the balance sheet is in fact much cleaner than the missing debt line suggests, then the historical “leveraged brewer” discount may be fading and the market may be right to re-rate the stock upward.
I still weigh the bear side more heavily because the market is paying for persistence of margin gains that are harder to repeat than investors assume. Revenue was higher in 2024 than 2025, so the latest earnings jump did not come from accelerating demand. For a beer company facing mature-market consumption pressure, that matters. You can optimize mix and cost structure for a while, but eventually flat volumes and category headwinds reassert themselves. A 24.95x P/E on 2025 net income of $6.84B implies an equity market value that assumes continued clean execution with little room for disappointment. For a business with recent revenue down 0.8% and five-year revenue CAGR effectively zero, I would want a lower entry point, especially when the dividend is too small to create a meaningful margin of safety.
What would change my mind is simple: either evidence of real top-line reacceleration or a material de-rating. If AB InBev can show two consecutive years of 3-5% organic revenue growth while holding operating margin around 26%, then the current multiple starts to make more sense because the earnings growth would be less dependent on financial engineering through mix and efficiency. Alternatively, if the stock moved down into roughly the low-to-mid $70s without any deterioration in free cash flow, I would be much more constructive; that would better match a mature global consumer franchise with excellent cash conversion but limited volume growth.
Grok Reading
The numbers tell a story of a cash machine running hard on a stalled top line. Revenue has gone nowhere for three years—$59.38B in 2023, $59.77B in 2024, $59.32B in 2025—producing a –0.1% CAGR and a –0.8% recent print. Yet net income climbed from $5.34B to $6.84B over that span, a 16.8% year-over-year jump and 13.1% earnings CAGR, while free cash flow hit $11.23B on only $3.66B of capex. Operating margin expanded from 23.5% to 26.0% and gross margin from 53.9% to 55.9%; the entire growth narrative is mix, premiumization, and cost discipline, not volume. At $84.59 the stock screens at 25× earnings and a 6.7% FCF yield—respectable cash conversion—but a 1.4% dividend yield on a 66% payout is thin compensation for zero top-line growth at a company whose ROE is a mediocre 7%. The valuation synthesis fair value near $75 (11–12% below spot) aligns with what flat revenue and mid-teens earnings growth on cost cuts alone should command; EV/EBITDA of 7.4 looks optically cheap only if one ignores that the balance-sheet debt figures are clearly incomplete and historically this name carries heavy leverage.
I am therefore reading the stock as modestly overvalued: the market is capitalizing an earnings expansion that has already been largely harvested and is paying a consumer-staples multiple for a business whose volumes are structurally challenged in developed markets. The “steady compounder” narrative is doing just enough work to keep the multiple inflated, but fundamentals are 85–90% of the price and those fundamentals are not compounding the top line.
The strongest counter-argument is the quality and trajectory of the cash flows themselves. FCF has compounded at 14%, cash conversion is excellent, ROIC sits at a solid 13.4%, and the company remains the global scale leader with pricing power across 500-plus brands and genuine emerging-market leverage, particularly in Latin America. A smart opponent would note that 25× is not extreme if earnings can keep growing low-double-digits on flat sales for another cycle, that the 6.7% FCF yield still beats most defensives after leverage costs, and that any further de-leveraging (the missing debt data notwithstanding) would mechanically lift equity value. I weigh this less heavily because the earnings growth is increasingly margin-driven rather than volume- or price-driven at scale; once the easy cost saves and premium mix shifts are exhausted, the multiple has nowhere to hide if revenue stays stuck near $59B.
What flips the verdict is straightforward: two consecutive quarters of positive organic revenue growth above 3% (proving premiumization and EM can actually move the top line), or a sustained net-margin push through 13% that would justify re-rating the earnings power closer to $8B+. Conversely, a full-year revenue decline worse than –2% or FCF falling below $9B would confirm the overvaluation and push fair value into the mid-60s.
Big-3 Panel — where each AI stands
Advanced Analysis Forensic deep-dive · separate lenses
AB InBev is a textbook mature earner: revenue drifted from $54.3B (2021) to $59.3B (2025), gross margin held in a tight 54-57% band, and operating margin expanded modestly to 26.0% in 2025 from 23.5% in 2023. Net income improved to $6.84B and FCF stepped up to $11.23B, with OCF/NI of 2.53x and negative accruals (-4% of assets) confirming earnings are backed by cash, not accounting. Beneish M of -2.48 shows no manipulation signature.
Verify before trusting this (5)
- Gross debt stack, maturity ladder, and covenant headroom given Altman Z 1.6
- Whether 'net cash = liquid cash' in the module reflects a specific definition or ignores long-term debt
- Volume vs price/mix decomposition of flat revenue - is core beer volume declining
- Beyond Beer / Michelob Ultra share gains post-Bud Light boycott
- Emerging markets (Brazil, Mexico, South Africa) FX exposure and organic growth
The three valuation methods cluster tightly and tell a consistent story: DCF $76.07, EPV floor $68.42, anchored P/E $68.46, composite $72.26, signal-adjusted $74.77. Against a $84.59 price, that is a -12% to -17% gap - the stock is modestly rich, not egregiously so. The tight clustering across methods raises confidence that deserved value really does sit in the low-70s; there is no runaway method to discount here. Earnings quality is good, so no additional haircut is warranted, and the Solid quality grade already supports the deserved value the models produced. What is priced in at $84.59: continued premiumization, stable margin expansion, and successful deleveraging without EM FX shocks. The bear case (secular beer decline, health/spirits/cannabis substitution, dividend-trap dynamics) is essentially ignored at this multiple. Given the Altman Z of 1.6 and lingering SABMiller-era leverage, I would want a discount to deserved value, not a premium. This is a decent business at a full-to-rich price - the classic 'quality you pay up for, zero edge' setup.
Verify before trusting this (5)
- Organic volume trends by region, especially US and China
- Net debt/EBITDA trajectory and pace of deleveraging
- FX exposure and EM currency headwinds in reported EPS
- Premium brand mix growth vs core beer volumes
- Any guidance revision on margin expansion or capex
The non-fundamental pressure on BUD is modestly positive. The narrative is a low-intensity, durable steady-compounder story - not exciting, but the recent Q2 print (revenue beat, volume growth, market share gains, dividend hike, reaffirmed EBITDA guidance) is being framed favorably in the press, with multiple 'still undervalued after the rally' pieces circulating. That is exactly the kind of coverage that quietly attracts defensive capital without inviting momentum crowds. The macro tape is mildly risk-on (VIX 16.5, S&P at highs), which is neutral-to-slightly-negative for a 0.79-beta defensive brewer that tends to lag in euphoric tapes - but the muted beta also means the higher-rates / stretched-multiple macro headwind barely touches this name. The one real overhang is the 731 million euro family placement, which signals insider supply after the YTD surge and can cap near-term upside. Net: gentle tailwind from earnings-driven narrative reinforcement, partially offset by the placement and a tape that favors higher-beta stories over defensives.
Verify before trusting this (4)
- Whether the family placement triggers follow-on selling or was a one-off clearing event
- Sell-side target revisions in the two weeks post-Q2 - upgrades would confirm the tailwind
- Any rotation from growth back to defensives if the risk-on tape wobbles
- Latin America volume commentary in follow-up notes - the one place a real narrative premium could build
This lens hasn't been run for this ticker yet.
When we made this prediction on Aug 5, 2026, BUD was $84.59. We expect it to be $77.00 by Feb 2027, and we consider it great value under $65.00. This is an early model (v0.6.0) — the direction is more reliable than the exact price. Made Aug 5, 2026.
Blue is our prediction, starting the day we made it. Grey is a slower route to the same place — the same destination, taking longer. Black is the actual price, so you can see how we are doing.