Salesforce, Inc. is a leading provider of customer relationship management (CRM) solutions, dedicated to connecting businesses and their clientele on a global scale. At its core, the Customer 360 platform empowers organizations to create seamless, integrated experiences for their customers. The company's extensive suite of services encompasses a wide array of functionalities: Sales: Tools designed to manage sales pipelines, track leads, forecast opportunities, extract data-driven insights through analytics, and streamline the creation of quotes, contracts, and invoices. Service: Capabilities enabling companies to deliver highly personalized, trustworthy, and scalable customer support. Platform: A versatile development environment, featuring intuitive drag-and-drop tools, that allows businesses of diverse sizes, locations, and industries to build tailored applications, thereby strengthening customer relationships. Learning: An online educational platform providing accessible training to acquire sought-after Salesforce skills. Slack: A comprehensive system for team collaboration and engagement. Marketing: Solutions for strategizing, personalizing, and optimizing individual customer marketing journeys. Commerce: Offerings that unify customer interactions across various channels, including mobile, web, social media, and physical retail stores. Tableau: A complete analytics solution addressing a broad spectrum of enterprise data analysis needs. MuleSoft: An integration platform designed to unlock and connect data residing across an organization's various systems. Salesforce's offerings cater to numerous sectors, such as financial services, healthcare, life sciences, and manufacturing, among others. Beyond its core products, the company also provides professional services and conducts both in-person and online courses to certify customers and partners in the architecture, administration, deployment, and development of its services. Its solutions are distributed through direct sales channels, as well as a network of consulting firms, systems integrators, and other strategic partners. Established in 1999, Salesforce, Inc. maintains its headquarters in San Francisco, California.
Price Overview
Price History (1 Year)
Revenue & Net Income Trend
| Period | Revenue | Net Income | Net Margin | YoY/QoQ |
|---|
Key Metrics
EPS (Diluted): 7.85
Total Equity: $59.14B
Shares: 956,000,000
Total Debt: $14.44B
Cash: $7.33B
EBITDA: $13.15B
Total Debt: $14.44B
Cash: $7.33B
Revenue: $41.53B
Revenue: $41.53B
Revenue: $41.53B
Total Equity: $59.14B
Tax Rate: 21.7%
Equity: $59.14B
Total Debt: $14.44B
Cash: $7.33B
Current Liabilities: $37.12B
Long-Term Debt: $10.44B
Total Debt: $14.44B
Total Equity: $59.14B
Shares: 956,000,000
Shares: 956,000,000
CapEx: -$594.00M
Shares: 956,000,000
Stock Price: $156.66
Net Income: $7.46B
Industry Benchmarks
Advanced Analysis Forensic deep-dive · three lenses
The operating story is genuinely impressive: revenue grew from $26.5B (FY22) to $41.5B (FY26), a ~12% CAGR, while operating margin expanded from 2.1% to 21.5% and gross margin lifted from 73.5% to 77.7%. FCF nearly tripled from $5.28B to $14.40B, and net income went from $1.44B to $7.46B. OCF/NI of 8.99x and accruals of -6.3% of assets confirm earnings are cash-backed, not accounting-driven; Beneish M of -2.66 shows no manipulation flags. This is the classic mature-SaaS operating leverage story actually playing out in the numbers. Capital discipline is solid: diluted shares fell from 974M (FY22) to 956M (FY26), a -0.5% CAGR, with buybacks at 206% of SBC, so the company is actually shrinking the share count despite SBC running at 8.5% of revenue. That is a meaningful behavioral shift from the historical Salesforce dilution pattern. The constraint is the balance sheet: net cash is -$4.87B, and cash is only 7.7% of market cap, with Altman Z of 2.22 sitting in the grey zone. With $14.4B of annual FCF, the leverage is trivially serviceable, but it does mean this is a strong operator, not a fortress. Insider 'buying' in the tape is overwhelmingly M-Exempt option exercises by directors at $0, not directional P-code open-market purchases - the summary's 'significant insider buying' framing is misleading.
Verify before trusting this (6)
- Whether margin expansion is durable (true operating leverage) or partly one-time cost cuts/restructuring benefit
- Organic vs acquired revenue growth contribution and remaining performance obligations (RPO) trend
- Customer concentration and net revenue retention disclosed in the 10-K
- Detail of the $4.87B net debt position - maturity schedule and refinancing risk
- AI/Agentforce monetization traction - real revenue or pipeline narrative
- Whether buyback pace can be sustained given debt position and any M&A appetite
The composite fair value of $215 and signal-adjusted $246 imply 40-60% upside, and unusually the inputs corroborate each other rather than one method running away - DCF at $263 and anchored P/E at $274 sit in the same neighborhood, with only the EPV floor at $59 acting as a pure no-growth backstop. Market cap of $124B against ~$14.4B FCF puts the stock around 9x FCF, which is a multiple typically reserved for structurally challenged businesses, not a 21% operating margin software franchise still growing double digits with shrinking share count and high earnings quality. What is priced in: that growth stalls toward zero and margins peak here. That looks too pessimistic given the margin trajectory (2% to 21%) and clean accruals. I will not chase the $246 signal-adjusted print - that requires AI/Agentforce monetization that is still unproven - but even a conservative deserved value of $200-220 leaves a real margin of safety against $152. Risks that compress the gap: agentic-AI competition disrupting seat-based pricing, net debt limiting buyback acceleration, and SBC still running hot enough that GAAP-to-cash conversion deserves a haircut. Even with those, the gap is wide enough to call this cheap rather than fair.
Verify before trusting this (5)
- Current-year FCF guidance and SBC as % of revenue in latest 10-Q
- Agentforce/Data Cloud revenue contribution disclosure in next earnings call
- Buyback pace vs SBC issuance - is net share count still declining
- Subscription RPO growth to confirm top-line is not decelerating into the low single digits
- Any one-off items in the operating margin print (restructuring tailwinds rolling off)
The tape itself is only mildly negative - neutral regime, VIX 16.8, S&P 1.4% off highs - so macro is not the dominant force here. With a 1.15 beta CRM is moderately exposed, but the bigger pressure is narrative: large-cap application software is the cohort the market suspects is most exposed to generative-AI seat cannibalization and agentic disruption, and CRM sits squarely in that crosshair. Price at 151.78 against a 265.75 consensus target is a roughly 75% implied upside that the tape is flatly refusing to close - a classic tell that sentiment, not fundamentals, is the binding constraint. Analyst tone (73 Buys, 4 fresh upward revisions averaging 270) is glaringly divergent from price action, which usually means the sell side is lagging a narrative shift rather than leading one. Until Salesforce delivers a clean Agentforce monetization print or the AI-disruption story rotates off legacy SaaS, rallies get sold and good news gets shrugged off. Net: modest but persistent headwind on this specific name, masked by a calm index.
Verify before trusting this (4)
- Agentforce / AI-agent revenue disclosures on the next print - the single catalyst that could flip the disruption narrative
- Whether sell-side targets start getting cut toward price (capitulation) or price closes toward targets (re-rating)
- Rotation signals within software: if other legacy SaaS names (ADBE, WDAY) catch a bid, the cohort headwind is lifting
- Any large activist or buyback escalation that forces a sentiment reset
Deep Analysis
Pre-flight intelligence scans the company first, then routes to the right analytical methods.
Income Statement (Annual)
Last updated: Jun 28, 2026 12:30pm (10d ago)| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 | 2026 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | $26.5B | $31.4B | $34.9B | $37.9B | $41.5B |
| Cost of Revenue | $7.0B | $8.4B | $8.5B | $8.6B | $9.3B |
| Gross Profit | $19.5B | $23.0B | $26.3B | $29.3B | $32.3B |
| Operating Expenses | $18.9B | $22.0B | $21.3B | $22.0B | $23.3B |
| Operating Income | $548.0M | $1.0B | $5.0B | $7.2B | $8.9B |
| Net Income | $1.4B | $208.0M | $4.1B | $6.2B | $7.5B |
| EBITDA | $5.1B | $5.6B | $9.2B | $11.1B | $13.2B |
| EPS | $1.51 | $0.21 | $4.25 | $6.44 | $7.85 |
| EPS (Diluted) | — | — | — | — | — |
Balance Sheet (Annual)
Last updated: Jul 1, 2026 7:44pm (6d ago)| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 | 2026 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cash & Equivalents | $5.5B | $7.0B | $8.5B | $8.8B | $7.3B |
| Total Current Assets | $22.9B | $26.4B | $29.1B | $29.7B | $28.2B |
| Total Assets | $95.2B | $98.8B | $99.8B | $102.9B | $112.3B |
| Current Liabilities | $21.8B | $25.9B | $26.6B | $28.0B | $37.1B |
| Long-Term Debt | $10.6B | $9.4B | $8.4B | $8.4B | $10.4B |
| Total Liabilities | $37.1B | $40.5B | $40.2B | $41.8B | $53.2B |
| Total Equity | $58.1B | $58.4B | $59.6B | $61.2B | $59.1B |
| Retained Earnings | $7.4B | $7.6B | $11.7B | $16.4B | $22.2B |
Cash Flow (Annual)
Last updated: Jun 28, 2026 12:30pm (10d ago)| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 | 2026 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Operating Cash Flow | $6.0B | $7.1B | $10.2B | $13.1B | $15.0B |
| Capital Expenditure | -$717.0M | -$798.0M | -$736.0M | -$658.0M | -$594.0M |
| Free Cash Flow | $5.3B | $6.3B | $9.5B | $12.4B | $14.4B |
| Acquisitions (net) | -$14.9B | -$439.0M | -$82.0M | -$2.7B | -$9.3B |
| Debt Repayment | — | — | — | — | — |
| Dividends Paid | — | — | — | — | — |
| Stock Buybacks | $0 | -$4.0B | -$7.6B | -$7.8B | -$12.6B |
| Net Change in Cash | -$731.0M | $1.6B | $1.5B | $376.0M | -$1.5B |
Analyst Estimates (Annual)
Last updated: Jul 1, 2026 7:44pm (6d ago)| Metric | 2027 | 2028 | 2029 | 2030 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue |
$46.1B $46.0B – $46.2B
|
$50.5B $49.4B – $51.5B
|
$55.3B $55.3B – $55.3B
|
$59.4B $58.6B – $60.9B
|
| EBITDA |
$21.4B $21.4B – $21.5B
|
$23.5B $23.0B – $23.9B
|
$25.7B $25.7B – $25.7B
|
$27.6B $27.2B – $28.3B
|
| Net Income |
$13.6B $12.6B – $14.6B
|
$15.0B $13.8B – $16.2B
|
$16.2B $13.3B – $19.2B
|
$17.4B $17.1B – $17.9B
|
| EPS | — | — | — | — |
Growth Trends (YoY %)
Last updated: Jun 28, 2026 12:30pm (10d ago)| Metric | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 | 2026 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue Growth | +18.3% | +11.2% | +8.7% | +9.6% |
| Gross Profit Growth | +18.1% | +14.5% | +11.2% | +10.3% |
| Operating Income Growth | +88.0% | +386.5% | +43.8% | +23.8% |
| Net Income Growth | -85.6% | +1,888.5% | +49.8% | +20.3% |
| EBITDA Growth | +11.8% | +63.4% | +20.8% | +18.0% |
Dividend History (Last 20)
Last updated: Jul 1, 2026 7:05pm (7d ago)| Date | Dividend | Declaration | Record | Payment |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-06-11 | $0.44 | 2026-05-28 | 2026-06-11 | 2026-07-02 |
| 2026-04-09 | $0.44 | 2026-02-23 | 2026-04-09 | 2026-04-23 |
| 2025-12-18 | $0.42 | 2025-12-04 | 2025-12-18 | 2026-01-08 |
| 2025-09-17 | $0.42 | 2025-09-04 | 2025-09-17 | 2025-10-09 |
| 2025-06-18 | $0.42 | 2025-06-05 | 2025-06-18 | 2025-07-10 |
| 2025-04-10 | $0.42 | 2025-03-27 | 2025-04-10 | 2025-04-24 |
| 2024-12-18 | $0.40 | 2024-12-05 | 2024-12-18 | 2025-01-09 |
| 2024-09-18 | $0.40 | 2024-09-05 | 2024-09-18 | 2024-10-08 |
| 2024-07-09 | $0.40 | 2024-06-27 | 2024-07-09 | 2024-07-25 |
| 2024-03-13 | $0.40 | 2024-02-28 | 2024-03-14 | 2024-04-11 |
Insider Trading (Recent)
Last updated: Jul 1, 2026 6:12pm (7d ago)All SEC Form 4 codes
- P Purchase
- Open-market or private purchase of shares.
- S Sale
- Open-market or private sale of shares.
- A Award / grant
- Grant or award of securities (RSUs, options, etc.) under Rule 16b-3.
- D Return to issuer
- Securities disposed back to the company under Rule 16b-3.
- F In-kind (tax)
- Shares withheld or delivered to pay the option-exercise price or tax — not an open-market sale.
- I Discretionary
- Discretionary transaction under an employee plan — Rule 16b-3(f).
- M Option exercise
- Exercise or conversion of a derivative (option/RSU) into shares — exempt.
- C Conversion
- Conversion of a derivative security into the underlying shares.
- E Short expiration
- Expiration of a short derivative position.
- H Long expiration
- Expiration or cancellation of a long derivative position with value received.
- O OTM exercise
- Exercise of an out-of-the-money derivative.
- X ITM exercise
- Exercise of an in-the-money or at-the-money derivative.
- G Gift
- Bona fide gift of securities.
- L Small acquisition
- Small acquisition under Rule 16a-6.
- W Inheritance
- Acquisition or disposition by will or the laws of descent.
- Z Voting trust
- Deposit into or withdrawal from a voting trust.
- J Other
- Other acquisition or disposition (explained in a Form 4 footnote).
- K Equity swap
- Transaction in an equity swap or similar instrument.
- U Tender / buyout
- Disposition via tender of shares in a change-of-control transaction.
Compensation-plan codes (A, D, F, M) are routine and rarely directional. Open-market P (buy) and S (sale) carry the most signal.
| Date | Insider | Type | Shares | Price | Value |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-06-22 | Tallapragada Srinivas | M-Exempt | 1,831.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-06-22 | Tallapragada Srinivas | F-InKind | 908.00 | $150.12 | $136,309 |
| 2026-06-22 | Tallapragada Srinivas | M-Exempt | 1,523.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-06-22 | Tallapragada Srinivas | F-InKind | 756.00 | $150.12 | $113,491 |
| 2026-06-22 | Tallapragada Srinivas | M-Exempt | 1,831.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-06-22 | Tallapragada Srinivas | M-Exempt | 1,523.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-06-22 | Niles Sabastian | M-Exempt | 1,017.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-06-22 | Niles Sabastian | M-Exempt | 1,016.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-06-22 | Niles Sabastian | F-InKind | 563.00 | $150.12 | $84,518 |
| 2026-06-22 | Niles Sabastian | F-InKind | 562.00 | $150.12 | $84,367 |
| 2026-06-22 | Niles Sabastian | M-Exempt | 1,017.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-06-22 | Niles Sabastian | M-Exempt | 1,016.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-06-22 | Washington Robin L | M-Exempt | 1,831.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-06-22 | Washington Robin L | F-InKind | 908.00 | $150.12 | $136,309 |
| 2026-06-22 | Washington Robin L | M-Exempt | 1,831.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-06-22 | Harris Parker | M-Exempt | 1,271.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-06-22 | Harris Parker | F-InKind | 631.00 | $150.12 | $94,726 |
| 2026-06-22 | Harris Parker | M-Exempt | 1,269.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-06-22 | Harris Parker | F-InKind | 630.00 | $150.12 | $94,576 |
| 2026-06-22 | Harris Parker | M-Exempt | 1,271.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
Narrative Economics
market-narrative step).
Delvantic AI Findings
Starting with the raw tape: revenue went $9.33B → $9.44B → $9.99B → $9.83B → $10.24B → $10.26B → $11.20B → $11.13B over eight quarters. That's roughly 19% cumulative over two years, or ~9% annualized — decelerating, not reaccelerating. The latest quarter (Apr 2026) actually ticked *down* sequentially from $11.20B to $11.13B, which is the first sequential decline in the series and is not what you want to see if "Agentforce inflection" is the thesis. Net income trajectory is genuinely better: margins moved from 15.3% to a 17-20% band, and FY26 net income hit $7.46B on $41.53B revenue (18.0% net margin) versus $208M four years ago. FCF of $14.4B against a $152B market cap is ~9.5% FCF yield — that's the real anchor here, not the DCF the synthesis is waving around.
Now the model outputs. The synthesis verdict of $283 fair value (+52%) is, frankly, aggressive and I'd dissent from the magnitude even while agreeing on direction. A $283 target implies the market is mispricing CRM by half — that's the kind of gap you see in genuinely broken names, not in a $152B mega-cap covered by 40 analysts. The pre-flight and narrative layers are more honest: this is a fallen angel where the debate is whether 9% revenue growth deserves a software multiple or a "boomer SaaS" multiple. At 20x TTM P/E and 14.9x EV/EBITDA, CRM is already trading at a discount to the software cohort (ORCL ~30x, MSFT ~33x, ADBE ~22x) — so the re-rating case requires Agentforce to actually move the revenue line, which the most recent quarter does not confirm. The "Significant Insider Buying" signal deserves scrutiny: the transaction list shows ten identical 442-share M-Exempt (option exercise) entries on the same day — that is *not* open-market buying, that's routine 10b5-1/option mechanics. The secondary signal is misreading the tape.
The contrarian case the models underweight: Salesforce's margin expansion from 15% to 18% net came substantially from Elliott-driven cost discipline (2023 layoffs, real estate consolidation, opex restraint) — these are one-time levers, not recurring operating leverage. Once you've fired the bottom 10% and renegotiated the leases, the next 300bps is much harder. Meanwhile RPO and cRPO growth have been decelerating per recent prints, Informatica is a $8B acquisition that adds integration risk, and Microsoft Copilot + Dynamics is genuinely taking seats at the low end. The 9.2% revenue CAGR is flattered by the Slack/MuleSoft base; organic core CRM growth is closer to mid-single-digits. If you put CRM on a GARP-appropriate 18x forward earnings on ~$11 EPS, you get $200 — basically here. The "undervalued by 52%" synthesis assumes both that growth reaccelerates *and* margins keep expanding; pick one.
My verdict: I partially agree with the synthesis direction but reject the magnitude. At 9.5% FCF yield, 18% net margins, and a fortress balance sheet ($7.3B cash, manageable debt), CRM is a reasonable mature-compounder buy in the $180s — but fair value is closer to $215-230, not $283. The Q1 FY27 sequential revenue dip is a yellow flag that needs to resolve before sizing up. The market isn't being irrational; it's correctly pricing the tension between durable cash generation and the absence of a credible reacceleration catalyst. Starter position justified, full position needs the next two prints to show Agentforce-driven cRPO acceleration above 12%. The insider-buying signal is a data artifact and should be ignored.
GPT Critique
Salesforce's financial trajectory over the past two years reveals a complex picture of growth and profitability. The company has witnessed a revenue increase from $9.33 billion to $11.13 billion over eight quarters, translating to a cumulative growth of about 19% or roughly 9% annualized, aligning with the status of a mature platform rather than a hyper-growth entity. However, the sequential revenue decline from $11.20 billion to $11.13 billion in the latest quarter is a concern, potentially indicating challenges in maintaining momentum. Notably, net income has improved, with margins rising from 15.3% to an 18-20% range, reflecting strong cost management and operational efficiency. The free cash flow of $14.4 billion, yielding approximately 9.5% relative to the market cap, is a significant strength, underscoring the company's robust cash-generating capabilities.
Opus highlights the aggressive nature of the valuation synthesis, which suggests a fair value of $283 per share, implying a 52% undervaluation. I concur with Opus's skepticism regarding this target as overly optimistic, given Salesforce's current growth trajectory and market positioning. The comparison with other software giants like Oracle, Microsoft, and Adobe trading at higher multiples supports the notion that Salesforce is already priced at a discount due to its perceived transition from a growth leader to a mature cash flow generator. Additionally, I agree with Opus's interpretation of insider transactions as routine and not indicative of bullish insider sentiment, which diminishes their relevance to valuation discussions.
Where I diverge from Opus is in the assessment of Salesforce's growth potential. Opus suggests that the market is correctly pricing Salesforce, given the lack of a credible reacceleration catalyst. However, I believe that Salesforce's ongoing transformation efforts, including efficiency improvements and strategic acquisitions like Informatica, could eventually bolster growth. The market may be underestimating the potential for a turnaround in revenue trajectory, particularly if the company effectively leverages its AI-driven initiatives like Agentforce. While the sequential revenue decline is concerning, it may be a temporary blip rather than a sustained trend.
A careful skeptic might argue that both Opus and I are underplaying the risks associated with Salesforce's integration of large acquisitions and the competitive pressures from other SaaS providers. They might contend that the market's cautious pricing reflects justified concerns over Salesforce's ability to maintain even its current growth rates amidst these challenges. Additionally, skeptics might point to the broader macroeconomic environment, which could impact enterprise spending on software solutions, further complicating Salesforce's growth prospects.