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What this page is: Delvantic's full research page for Commvault Systems Inc. (CVLT) — AI-driven forensic equity research: mechanical valuation models (DCF, EPV, anchored-PE, scenario) plus three independent AI lenses (Quality / Value / Sentiment). Everything below is rendered server-side; you are not missing content that requires JavaScript. All scores are predictions and research opinions, not financial advice.
Our current read (analysis of 2026-08-23): Designation Watch · Gem Score -7 (−100…+100 Quality+Value blend) · Quality 68 · Value -69 · Sentiment -43 (timing only, not weighted) · Composite fair value $86.97 vs $116.42 at analysis
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Commvault Systems Inc.
CVLT NASDAQCommvault Systems Inc. is a technology company that provides enterprise data protection and information management software and services. Its core purpose is to help organizations securely back up, recover, manage, and govern data across on-premises, cloud, and hybrid IT environments. Commvault delivers a unified platform that supports use cases such as backup and recovery, disaster recovery, ransomware and cyber resilience, compliance, and cloud data mobility. Key offerings include solutions like Cleanroom Recovery, HyperScale X, Air Gap Protect, Compliance, Cloud Rewind, and Clumio BackUp as a Service, which address complex workloads and multi-cloud architectures for large enterprises, mid-sized businesses, and government entities. The company distributes its software and services through a direct salesforce and an ecosystem of channel and reseller partners, serving customers in the United States and many international markets. Founded in 1996 and headquartered in Tinton Falls, New Jersey, Commvault Systems Inc. plays an important role in the data protection and cyber resilience segment of the enterprise software market.
Price Overview
Price History (1 Year)
Revenue & Net Income Trend
| Period | Revenue | Net Income | Net Margin | YoY/QoQ |
|---|
Key Metrics
EPS (Diluted): 1.58
Total Equity: $7.49M
Shares: 44,654,000
Total Debt: $0.00
Cash: $899.99M
EBITDA: $84.34M
Total Debt: $0.00
Cash: $899.99M
Revenue: $1.18B
Revenue: $1.18B
Revenue: $1.18B
Total Equity: $7.49M
Tax Rate: 23.3%
Equity: $7.49M
Total Debt: $0.00
Cash: $899.99M
Current Liabilities: $658.17M
Long-Term Debt: $0.00
Total Debt: $0.00
Total Equity: $7.49M
Shares: 44,654,000
Shares: 44,654,000
CapEx: -$7.53M
Shares: 44,654,000
Stock Price: $116.42
Net Income: $70.66M
Industry Benchmarks
Income Statement (Annual)
Last updated: Jul 30, 2026 9:04pm (23d ago)| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 | 2026 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | $769.6M | $784.6M | $839.2M | $995.6M | $1.2B |
| Cost of Revenue | $113.9M | $135.4M | $151.6M | $179.0M | $223.1M |
| Gross Profit | $655.7M | $649.2M | $687.6M | $816.6M | $960.6M |
| Operating Expenses | $614.2M | $665.1M | $612.3M | $742.8M | $886.6M |
| Operating Income | $41.6M | -$15.9M | $75.4M | $73.7M | $74.0M |
| Net Income | $33.6M | -$35.8M | $168.9M | $76.1M | $70.7M |
| EBITDA | $52.5M | -$5.6M | $81.9M | $82.9M | $84.3M |
| EPS | $0.74 | $-0.80 | $3.85 | $1.74 | $1.61 |
| EPS (Diluted) | $0.71 | $-0.80 | $3.75 | $1.68 | $1.58 |
Balance Sheet (Annual)
Last updated: Jul 30, 2026 7:35pm (24d ago)| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 | 2026 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cash & Equivalents | $267.5M | $287.8M | $312.8M | $302.1M | $900.0M |
| Total Current Assets | $484.1M | $550.9M | $595.1M | $635.1M | $1.3B |
| Total Assets | $816.1M | $782.6M | $943.9M | $1.1B | $1.9B |
| Current Liabilities | $394.1M | $410.1M | $484.9M | $555.1M | $658.2M |
| Long-Term Debt | — | — | — | — | — |
| Total Liabilities | $560.3M | $596.5M | $665.8M | $793.1M | $1.9B |
| Total Equity | $255.8M | $186.1M | $278.1M | $325.1M | $7.5M |
| Retained Earnings | -$898.7M | -$1.1B | -$1.1B | -$1.1B | -$1.5B |
Cash Flow (Annual)
Last updated: Jul 30, 2026 9:04pm (23d ago)| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 | 2026 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Operating Cash Flow | $177.2M | $170.3M | $203.8M | $207.4M | $244.7M |
| Capital Expenditure | -$3.9M | -$3.2M | -$4.1M | -$3.8M | -$7.5M |
| Free Cash Flow | $173.3M | $167.0M | $199.7M | $203.6M | $237.2M |
| Acquisitions (net) | -$16.9M | $0 | $0 | -$65.3M | -$25.8M |
| Net Debt Issued / (Repaid) | — | — | — | — | — |
| Dividends Paid | — | — | — | — | — |
| Stock Buybacks | -$305.2M | -$150.9M | -$184.0M | -$165.0M | -$446.1M |
| Net Change in Cash | -$129.7M | $20.3M | $25.0M | -$10.7M | $597.9M |
Growth Trends (YoY %)
Last updated: Jul 30, 2026 9:04pm (23d ago)| Metric | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 | 2026 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue Growth | +1.9% | +7.0% | +18.6% | +18.9% |
| Gross Profit Growth | -1.0% | +5.9% | +18.8% | +17.6% |
| Operating Income Growth | -138.2% | +574.4% | -2.1% | +0.3% |
| Net Income Growth | -206.4% | +572.1% | -54.9% | -7.2% |
| EBITDA Growth | -110.6% | +1,572.2% | +1.3% | +1.7% |
Deep Analysis
Risk : Reward — if the last quarter repeats
Live · as of 2026-08-19 08:47Even the bull case prices 57% below today — the ratio here measures the model-vs-market gap, not payoff odds. Another quarter like the worst recent one costs 88%.
| Case | Growth | Margin | Fair value | vs price ($116.42) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Bull — recovery | +22% | 9.2% | $49.63 | -57% |
| Base — stabilizes | +14% | 8.0% | $34.99 | -70% |
| Bear — keeps slipping | +7% | 6.8% | $24.01 | -79% |
| Stress — last quarter repeats | +13% | 3.1% | $14.50 | -88% |
Narrative Economics
market-narrative step).
Claude Reading
Looking at the raw quarterly tape first: revenue grew from $224.7M (Jun-24) to $311.7M (Mar-26) — roughly 39% over seven quarters, healthy. But sequential Q4 revenue actually ticked *down* from $313.8M to $311.7M, and net margins have compressed hard: 11.3% → 8.3% → 5.3% → 5.7% → 4.7% over the last five quarters. That's not "burning profitability to chase growth" as market-forces claims — it's more subtle. Annual operating income has been flat at $74M for three straight years ($75.4M, $73.7M, $74.0M) despite revenue climbing from $839M to $1.18B. Every incremental dollar of revenue is dropping ~0% to operating income. That's the story: 82% gross margins but zero operating leverage. FY24 NI of $168.9M vs FY26 of $70.7M is largely tax/one-time noise (op income was steady), so the "earnings CAGR -35%" is misleading.
On valuation: $4.82B market cap on $237M FCF = 20.3x FCF, which for an 18% grower with 82% gross margins is *not* expensive — it's cheap-ish if growth persists. The 73x PE is a red herring driven by tax normalization; EV/FCF around 16.5x (netting the $900M cash, no debt) is the number that matters. The synthesis fair value of $103 vs $116 (-11%) feels roughly right on a DCF basis but underweights the cash cushion and the FCF yield. The pre-flight's "traditional mature software" framing is more accurate than the rule-based "high_growth_profitable" tag — Commvault is a subscription-transition story where reported revenue growth flatters the underlying business (deferred revenue mechanics).
Where I diverge from the models: the market-forces "value trap" call is too harsh — a company with $900M net cash, $237M FCF, 19% revenue growth, and sector-leader status in a ransomware-tailwind category is not a value trap at 20x FCF. But the synthesis "fair value" verdict undersells the risk that operating margins have structurally topped out. If op income stays pinned at $74M while revenue scales, the model is not "SaaS with expanding margins" — it's "reseller with growing COGS/S&M drag," which deserves a lower multiple. The 42% drawdown from 52-week high the pre-flight cites tells you the market already caught this. Insider activity is meaningfully skewed to sales (five sales in May 2026 alone, plus a 40,734-share gift which is often a tax-efficient disposal) with only award-based receipts — that's a soft negative, not a smoking gun.
The contrarian argument nobody made: what if the margin compression is deliberate SaaS investment that inflects in FY27? Subscription transitions famously depress GAAP margins for 8-12 quarters before the annuity kicks in. Rubrik and Veeam are cited as competitive threats, but Commvault has the balance sheet ($900M cash, zero debt) to outlast a price war neither private competitor can sustain indefinitely. That said, I want to see one quarter of *reaccelerating* net margin before paying up — Q1 FY27 at 4.7% margin is the wrong direction. My read: fairly valued to modestly rich here at $116; fair value $95-$105 based on 18x forward FCF with modest growth deceleration priced in. Not a short (cash cushion + FCF + sector position), not a buy (margin trajectory + insider selling + no catalyst). I'd want the stock at $90-95 or evidence of margin inflection before committing. Partial agreement with the synthesis $103 anchor, dissenting slightly on the market-forces alarmism.
GPT Reading
Commvault’s numbers read much better as a cash-rich, steadily improving infrastructure software company than as a true high-growth story. Revenue has clearly inflected upward: from $839.2M in FY24 to $995.6M in FY25 and then $1.18B in FY26, a two-year increase of about 41%. The quarterly pattern shows the same step-up, with revenue running from $224.7M and $233.3M in mid/late 2024 to $311.7M and $313.8M in the last two reported quarters. That is real growth, not accounting noise. But the part that stands out most to me is the disconnect between revenue momentum and earnings leverage. FY26 operating income was $74.0M on $1.18B of sales, almost unchanged from $73.7M on $995.6M the year before. Operating margin fell from 7.4% to 6.3% even as revenue grew 18%. Net income actually declined from $76.1M to $70.7M. So the company is selling much more, but not converting that into better annual profitability. That makes the 73.7x P/E hard to defend on simple operating economics.
The best part of the story is cash generation and balance sheet strength. With no debt and $900M of cash against a $4.82B market cap, nearly 19% of the equity value is cash. Free cash flow of $237.2M on $1.18B of revenue is a 20.1% FCF margin, which is dramatically stronger than the 6.0% net margin and 6.3% operating margin. That tells you two things: first, this is a high-quality software model with low capital intensity, since capex is only $7.5M; second, GAAP earnings understate business value more than usual. On an enterprise basis, EV/revenue of 3.3x is not demanding for a sticky data protection vendor with low churn characteristics and 81% gross margin. If I look at the business through EV/FCF rather than P/E, the valuation is much less stretched: roughly $3.9B EV against $237M FCF is about 16-17x EV/FCF. For a durable software franchise still growing high teens, that is reasonable.
What keeps me from being outright bullish is that the latest quarterly trend hints the growth burst may already be maturing. Revenue grew from $275.0M in the March 2025 quarter to $311.7M in March 2026, solid 13% growth, but sequentially the business flattened from $313.8M in December 2025 to $311.7M in March 2026. Net margin in the latest quarter was only 4.7%, down from 11.3% in the year-ago March quarter. Across FY26, quarterly net margins stepped down from 8.3% in June to 5.3%, 5.7%, and 4.7% thereafter. That pattern does not support the idea that Commvault is on the verge of a clean SaaS-style margin expansion cycle. The market seems caught between two valuation frameworks: too expensive on earnings if this remains a mid-single-digit margin business, but not obviously expensive on cash flow if FCF can hold above $230M and growth stays double digit. My read is that the stock at $116 is mostly discounting the cash flow case already, while still giving management credit for future margin improvement that the annual numbers have not yet delivered.
The strongest pushback to my skepticism is straightforward: the accounting optics may be lagging the business reality. A company growing revenue from $784.6M in FY23 to $1.18B in FY26 while generating $244.7M of operating cash flow and carrying $900M of cash deserves more than a mature-software multiple. Gross profit rose to $960.6M, and 81% gross margins provide ample room for future operating leverage if sales and marketing intensity normalizes. The bizarre 694x P/B is meaningless given the $7.5M equity base, and the P/E is distorted by low GAAP net income relative to cash flow. On that view, EV/revenue at 3.3x is actually cheap versus software peers with comparable retention and cyber-resilience exposure, especially if ransomware and recovery demand remain secular tailwinds. I weigh that argument less heavily because the company has already had two years of strong top-line acceleration without any real annual operating margin expansion to show for it.
What would change my mind is simple. I would turn more constructive if Commvault can sustain quarterly revenue above $315M while lifting quarterly net margin back toward 8-10%, showing that FY26’s annual profit stagnation was temporary rather than structural. A full-year print above $1.30B of revenue with operating income above $100M and FCF above $260M would support a stock meaningfully above $120. I would turn negative if growth drops into high single digits while FCF slips below $200M or if quarterly revenue falls back under $300M, because then the current valuation would be too generous for what is essentially a low-margin backup software vendor.
Grok Reading
Commvault’s numbers tell a clear and uncomfortable story: the top line is growing while economic profit is not. Revenue scaled from $839M in FY2024 to $1.18B in FY2026—roughly 41% cumulative growth and a clean ~18.5% year-over-year print—yet operating income sat dead flat at $74–75M across all three years. Net income actually fell from $76.1M to $70.7M, and quarterly net margins have compressed from 11.3% a year ago to 4.7% in the March 2026 quarter. The most recent quarter also showed the first sequential revenue dip ($313.8M to $311.7M) and year-over-year growth decelerating to ~13% from the mid-20s earlier in the year. Gross margin remains an elite 81%, and free cash flow of $237M (20% FCF margin) on only $7.5M of capex is genuine quality; the problem is that none of that cash generation is dropping through to operating leverage. At $116.42 the stock still trades at 74× earnings, 46× EBITDA and ~20× FCF—multiples that price in the very margin recovery the last twelve quarters have systematically refused to deliver.
The balance sheet reinforces the asset-light software profile but also explains the absurd 694× P/B: $900M of cash, zero debt, and only $7.5M of book equity after what must have been aggressive buybacks or equity accounting noise. That net-cash cushion (~$22 per share) is real support, yet ROIC is negative and ROA is a meager 3.8%, so the capital is not being deployed at high returns. Insider activity is a steady drip of sales mixed with routine awards—no accumulation signal. The rule-based “high-growth profitable” tag and the market’s implied thesis (high-teens growth plus a march back to 15–20% net margins) both look increasingly detached from the operating-income line that has gone nowhere for three years.
The strongest counter-argument is valuation on cash rather than GAAP earnings. A 4.9% FCF yield on a business with 81% gross margins, zero leverage, ransomware/data-protection secular tailwinds, and an already 42% drawdown from the highs is not obviously egregious; if management ever converts even half the gross-margin advantage into operating leverage, 20× FCF becomes cheap quickly. Secondary models still flag strong cash-flow quality, and the FY2024 net-income spike to $169M shows the P&L can produce outsized profits under the right cost structure. A bull can also note that EV/revenue of 3.3× is only moderate for application software and that the $900M cash pile funds either aggressive buybacks or M&A without balance-sheet stress. Those points keep me from a table-pounding short; they do not erase three straight years of zero operating-profit growth while revenue compounded at double digits.
I would flip constructive if the next two quarters show year-over-year revenue re-accelerating above 18% and operating margin expanding back through 10%, or if FCF runs above $280M annualized while the multiple compresses under 15×. Conversely, another quarter of sub-15% growth with margins stuck in the mid-single digits would confirm the multiple is simply too high for a mature, no-leverage story.
Big-3 Panel — where each AI stands
Advanced Analysis Forensic deep-dive · separate lenses
Commvault runs a high-gross-margin (81-82%) software model that has reaccelerated to double-digit top-line growth, with revenue climbing from $769.6M (2022) to $1.18B (2026), roughly 11% CAGR and accelerating (18% in the latest year). FCF has grown every year from $173.3M to $237.2M with OCF/NI of 1.58x and accruals of -13.7% of assets, indicating reported earnings are backed (and exceeded) by cash. Balance sheet is a fortress: $900M cash, no net debt, and cash equals ~19% of market cap. The Altman Z of 1.6 flagging distress is a false positive - the model penalizes asset-light software firms with negative working capital from deferred revenue and is not meaningful here.
Verify before trusting this (6)
- Non-GAAP vs GAAP operating margin reconciliation and true underlying operating leverage as ARR/SaaS mix grows
- SaaS/subscription ARR growth rate and mix within the $1.18B revenue base
- Customer concentration and net revenue retention in cyber-resilience offerings
- Whether the $900M cash includes any restricted or deferred-rev-linked balances
- Nature of the 40.7K share gift by CEO Mirchandani (charitable vs family planning)
- Any convertible/debt instruments not visible in net-cash figure
The e2e synthesis pins composite fair value at $103.55 and signal-adjusted at $103.27 against a $116.42 print — roughly 11-13% overvalued. The method spread is wide and telling: DCF says $138.65 (extrapolates the current ~18% growth reacceleration), anchored-PE says $65.34, and EPV floor is $44.25. Averaging these, the market is already paying for the DCF-style outcome — i.e. the bull case that the growth pivot sticks and cloud/SaaS mix keeps compounding. There is essentially no cushion if growth normalizes back toward the anchored-PE view. A strong business (quality 68) justifies trading above the EPV/anchored-PE floors, but not above the composite that already blends in the optimistic DCF. Earnings quality is clean, so no haircut is warranted — the deserved value stays near $103. The gap to price is small enough to call Rich rather than Overvalued, but it is clearly not cheap; the market already understands this story.
Verify before trusting this (4)
- Whether ~18% ARR/subscription growth is durable or a one-off cohort effect
- Net revenue retention and SaaS mix trajectory in next 10-Q
- Any FY guide raise/cut that would recalibrate the DCF growth input
- Competitive share commentary vs Rubrik/Veeam in enterprise renewals
The dominant force on CVLT right now is the July 28 post-print reaction: a clean beat with 71% FCF growth and strong SaaS metrics was met with a 20% drawdown because forward guidance disappointed. That is a classic narrative crack for a steady-compounder archetype - the whole point of owning this cohort is predictable acceleration, and soft guidance breaks the story investors were paying a modest premium for. Analyst tone is trying to catch the falling knife (Zacks upgrade to Buy, ABR-driven 'buy this dip' notes, growth-investor puff pieces), but that broker chorus is a lagging tailwind against a fresh price wound and is often faded by the tape. The macro backdrop is neutral-to-slightly-hostile (VIX 17, 10y 4.61%, mkt PE 26) but CVLT's 0.79 beta and profitable SaaS profile mute the market-wide pressure - this is not a high-beta story-stock getting mauled by the tape. The pressure here is idiosyncratic and narrative-driven: the bear frame (legacy vendor vs Veeam/Rubrik, hyperscaler commoditization, SaaS cannibalization) just got fresh ammunition from the guide-down, and the moderate-durability/low-cult narrative gives the name no fanbase to defend it. Net: a real but not decisive headwind, leaning down over the next few weeks until guidance is re-based or a catalyst resets tone.
Verify before trusting this (4)
- Whether Q2 print re-bases guidance credibly or extends the disappointment
- Sell-side estimate revisions over the next 2-3 weeks - do targets follow the upgrades down?
- Competitive commentary from Veeam/Rubrik/Rubrik-adjacent names that could harden or soften the commoditization narrative
- Any Microsoft partnership follow-through news that reinvigorates the cloud-native story
This lens hasn't been run for this ticker yet.
When we made this prediction on Jul 31, 2026, CVLT was $116.42. We expect it to be $124.00 by Jan 2027, and we consider it great value under $92.00. This is an early model (v0.6.0) — the direction is more reliable than the exact price. Made Jul 31, 2026.
Blue is our prediction, starting the day we made it. Grey is a slower route to the same place — the same destination, taking longer. Black is the actual price, so you can see how we are doing.