Hims & Hers Health, Inc. operates a multi-specialty telehealth platform that connects consumers to licensed healthcare professionals. The company offers a range of health and wellness products and services available to purchase on its websites and mobile application directly by customers. It also provides prescription medication on a recurring basis and ongoing care from healthcare providers; and over-the-counter drug and device products, cosmetics, and supplement products, primarily focusing on wellness, sexual health and wellness, skincare, and hair care. The company's curated non-prescription products include vitamin C, melatonin, biotin, and collagen protein supplements in the wellness category; moisturizer, serums, and face wash in the skincare category; condoms, climax delay spray and wipes, vibrators, and lubricants in the sexual health and wellness category; and shampoos, conditioners, scalp scrubs, and topical treatments, such as minoxidil in the hair care category. In addition, it offers medical consultation services, as well as health and wellness products through wholesale partners. The company is based in San Francisco, California.
Price Overview
Price History (1 Year)
Revenue & Net Income Trend
| Period | Revenue | Net Income | Net Margin | YoY/QoQ |
|---|
Key Metrics
EPS (Diluted): 0.57
Total Equity: $540.93M
Shares: 258,230,547
Total Debt: $1.12B
Cash: $228.62M
EBITDA: $160.12M
Total Debt: $1.12B
Cash: $228.62M
Revenue: $2.35B
Revenue: $2.35B
Revenue: $2.35B
Total Equity: $540.93M
Tax Rate: -3.6%
Equity: $540.93M
Total Debt: $1.12B
Cash: $228.62M
Current Liabilities: $404.43M
Long-Term Debt: $1.12B
Total Debt: $1.12B
Total Equity: $540.93M
Shares: 258,230,547
Shares: 258,230,547
CapEx: -$226.05M
Shares: 258,230,547
Stock Price: $22.99
Net Income: $128.37M
Industry Benchmarks
Deep Analysis
Pre-flight intelligence scans the company first, then routes to the right analytical methods.
Income Statement (Annual)
Last updated: May 21, 2026 10:36am (48d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | $271.9M | $526.9M | $872.0M | $1.5B | $2.3B |
| Cost of Revenue | $67.4M | $118.2M | $157.1M | $303.4M | $614.3M |
| Gross Profit | $204.5M | $408.7M | $714.9M | $1.2B | $1.7B |
| Operating Expenses | $319.5M | $477.4M | $744.4M | $1.1B | $1.6B |
| Operating Income | -$115.0M | -$68.7M | -$29.5M | $61.9M | $105.6M |
| Net Income | -$107.7M | -$65.7M | -$23.5M | $126.0M | $128.4M |
| EBITDA | -$111.0M | -$61.2M | -$19.9M | $79.0M | $160.1M |
| EPS | $-0.58 | $-0.32 | $-0.11 | $0.58 | $0.57 |
| EPS (Diluted) | — | — | — | — | — |
Balance Sheet (Annual)
Last updated: May 21, 2026 10:36am (48d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cash & Equivalents | $71.8M | $46.8M | $96.7M | $220.6M | $228.6M |
| Total Current Assets | $269.9M | $216.6M | $265.1M | $395.8M | $767.6M |
| Total Assets | $420.6M | $366.3M | $441.2M | $707.5M | $2.2B |
| Current Liabilities | $79.2M | $47.9M | $88.5M | $221.4M | $404.4M |
| Long-Term Debt | $0 | $0 | $0 | $0 | $1.1B |
| Total Liabilities | $86.0M | $54.6M | $97.2M | $230.8M | $1.6B |
| Total Equity | $334.6M | $311.7M | $344.0M | $476.7M | $540.9M |
| Retained Earnings | -$279.0M | -$344.6M | -$368.2M | -$242.1M | -$113.8M |
Cash Flow (Annual)
Last updated: May 21, 2026 10:36am (48d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Operating Cash Flow | -$34.4M | -$26.5M | $73.5M | $251.1M | $300.0M |
| Capital Expenditure | -$5.0M | -$7.2M | -$26.5M | -$52.8M | -$226.0M |
| Free Cash Flow | -$39.4M | -$33.8M | $47.0M | $198.3M | $74.0M |
| Acquisitions (net) | -$46.5M | $-459,000 | $0 | -$15.4M | -$145.2M |
| Debt Repayment | — | — | — | — | — |
| Dividends Paid | — | — | — | — | — |
| Stock Buybacks | -$22.0M | $0 | -$2.0M | -$83.0M | -$90.0M |
| Net Change in Cash | $44.3M | -$25.0M | $49.9M | $123.9M | $8.0M |
Analyst Estimates (Annual)
Last updated: May 21, 2026 10:36am (48d ago)| Metric | 2027 | 2028 | 2029 | 2030 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue |
$3.4B $3.1B – $4.3B
|
$4.0B $3.9B – $4.1B
|
$4.8B $4.5B – $5.3B
|
$4.7B $4.4B – $5.2B
|
| EBITDA |
$373.1M $339.8M – $387.6M
|
$468.9M $392.0M – $535.1M
|
$513.9M $456.0M – $601.4M
|
$2.0B $1.9B – $2.2B
|
| Net Income |
$100.7M $86.3M – $192.0M
|
$189.6M $161.6M – $252.0M
|
$344.8M $324.3M – $394.5M
|
$450.6M $423.8M – $515.6M
|
| EPS | — | — | — | — |
Growth Trends (YoY %)
Last updated: May 21, 2026 10:36am (48d ago)| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue Growth | +93.8% | +65.5% | +69.3% | +59.0% |
| Gross Profit Growth | +99.9% | +74.9% | +64.1% | +47.8% |
| Operating Income Growth | +40.3% | +57.1% | +310.2% | +70.6% |
| Net Income Growth | +39.0% | +64.1% | +635.3% | +1.8% |
| EBITDA Growth | +44.8% | +67.4% | +496.2% | +102.7% |
Insider Trading (Recent)
All SEC Form 4 codes
- P Purchase
- Open-market or private purchase of shares.
- S Sale
- Open-market or private sale of shares.
- A Award / grant
- Grant or award of securities (RSUs, options, etc.) under Rule 16b-3.
- D Return to issuer
- Securities disposed back to the company under Rule 16b-3.
- F In-kind (tax)
- Shares withheld or delivered to pay the option-exercise price or tax — not an open-market sale.
- I Discretionary
- Discretionary transaction under an employee plan — Rule 16b-3(f).
- M Option exercise
- Exercise or conversion of a derivative (option/RSU) into shares — exempt.
- C Conversion
- Conversion of a derivative security into the underlying shares.
- E Short expiration
- Expiration of a short derivative position.
- H Long expiration
- Expiration or cancellation of a long derivative position with value received.
- O OTM exercise
- Exercise of an out-of-the-money derivative.
- X ITM exercise
- Exercise of an in-the-money or at-the-money derivative.
- G Gift
- Bona fide gift of securities.
- L Small acquisition
- Small acquisition under Rule 16a-6.
- W Inheritance
- Acquisition or disposition by will or the laws of descent.
- Z Voting trust
- Deposit into or withdrawal from a voting trust.
- J Other
- Other acquisition or disposition (explained in a Form 4 footnote).
- K Equity swap
- Transaction in an equity swap or similar instrument.
- U Tender / buyout
- Disposition via tender of shares in a change-of-control transaction.
Compensation-plan codes (A, D, F, M) are routine and rarely directional. Open-market P (buy) and S (sale) carry the most signal.
| Date | Insider | Type | Shares | Price | Value |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-07-06 | Okupe Oluyemi | M-Exempt | 7,163.00 | $5.01 | $35,887 |
| 2026-07-06 | Okupe Oluyemi | S-Sale | 7,163.00 | $36.49 | $261,351 |
| 2026-07-06 | Okupe Oluyemi | M-Exempt | 7,163.00 | $5.01 | $35,887 |
| 2026-06-18 | Carroll Patrick Harrison | S-Sale | 23,726.00 | $35.00 | $830,410 |
| 2026-06-22 | Okupe Oluyemi | M-Exempt | 6,376.00 | $5.01 | $31,944 |
| 2026-06-22 | Okupe Oluyemi | S-Sale | 18,197.00 | $34.03 | $619,217 |
| 2026-06-22 | Okupe Oluyemi | M-Exempt | 6,376.00 | $5.01 | $31,944 |
| 2026-06-15 | Carroll Patrick Harrison | M-Exempt | 25,926.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-06-15 | Carroll Patrick Harrison | F-InKind | 8,310.00 | $30.17 | $250,713 |
| 2026-06-15 | Carroll Patrick Harrison | M-Exempt | 9,405.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-06-15 | Carroll Patrick Harrison | M-Exempt | 3,533.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-06-15 | Carroll Patrick Harrison | M-Exempt | 4,840.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-06-15 | Carroll Patrick Harrison | M-Exempt | 8,148.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-06-15 | Okupe Oluyemi | M-Exempt | 71,616.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-06-15 | Okupe Oluyemi | F-InKind | 39,541.00 | $30.17 | $1.2M |
| 2026-06-15 | Okupe Oluyemi | M-Exempt | 18,811.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-06-15 | Okupe Oluyemi | M-Exempt | 22,988.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-06-15 | Okupe Oluyemi | M-Exempt | 11,483.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-06-15 | Okupe Oluyemi | M-Exempt | 18,334.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-06-15 | Autor Deborah M. | M-Exempt | 32,919.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
Narrative Economics
market-narrative step).
Delvantic AI Findings
The Q1 2026 print is the elephant: revenue $608.1M (essentially flat sequentially from $617.8M in Q4'25) and a $92.1M net loss after five consecutive profitable quarters. That's a swing of roughly $113M in net income on flat revenue, which screams either a one-time charge (GLP-1 inventory writedown post-FDA compounding crackdown? legal accrual? stock comp spike?) or a structural margin collapse. The synthesis labels this "Priced for Perfection" but doesn't reckon with the fact that the perfection trade already broke — Q1'26 margins are -15.1% versus +8.4% a year ago on the same revenue base ($608M vs $586M, essentially 3.8% YoY growth, not the 59% the momentum tile cites because that figure is stale and uses mid-2024 comps). Revenue growth has decelerated from triple digits to low single digits in four quarters. That's not deceleration, that's a wall.
The classification model calling this "high_growth_profitable" at 0.82 confidence is wrong as of the latest quarter — it's pattern-matching on annual 2025 numbers ($2.35B rev, $128M NI) and missing that the most recent data point inverted the thesis. Pre-flight's "pre-profit-platform" framing is closer but still too generous; a platform with 73% gross margins that can't hold operating profitability at $600M quarterly revenue isn't a platform, it's a marketing-arbitrage DTC business where CAC is eating the P&L. FCF of $74M on $300M operating cash flow with $226M capex is also suspicious for an "asset-light" telehealth company — that capex line suggests they're building physical compounding/fulfillment infrastructure, which is exactly the wrong direction if the GLP-1 compounding loophole is closing. The synthesis flagging "weak cash flow quality" is the most honest secondary signal in the stack.
The contrarian case: at $5.2B market cap on $2.4B+ run-rate revenue (2.2x sales), if Q1'26's loss is a one-time GLP-1 transition charge and the underlying subscription business (sexual health, derm, mental health — the boring stuff) is still growing 20-30% with 5-10% margins, you're paying ~15x normalized earnings for a brand with 2M+ subscribers and real recurring revenue. Insider selling is all M-Exempt option exercises followed by sales, which is mechanical, not necessarily a signal — though the volume and clustering on April 16-20 right before/after a brutal print deserves scrutiny. The bull case requires you to believe Q1 was noise; the bear case requires you to believe revenue stalling at $600M with margin collapse is the new regime. Both are defensible from this data; neither is "priced for perfection" — it's priced for ambiguity.
I dissent partially from the synthesis. "Priced for perfection" was the right call at $70; at $23.68 with the stock already down 66%, the framing should be "priced for a binary outcome." If GLP-1 revenue (~50% of the business per prior disclosures) survives the compounding ban via branded partnerships at reasonable economics, fair value is $30-35 (3x sales, 20x normalized earnings on $250M+ NI). If GLP-1 collapses and the core business reverts to $1.2-1.5B at 5% margins, fair value is $12-15 (10x earnings, 1.5x sales). The Q1'26 loss tilts probability toward the bear scenario but doesn't confirm it — we need Q2 to see if the loss recurs or normalizes. The thin spot in the data is that we have no debt figure, no equity figure, and no segment breakdown of GLP-1 vs core, which makes any precise valuation guesswork. Wait for Q2'26 print and management commentary on the loss; do not commit capital based on an annual-2025 narrative that the latest quarter just contradicted.
GPT Critique
From my perspective, the most striking aspect of Hims & Hers Health, Inc.'s financial data is the stark contrast in net income between Q1 2026 and the previous quarters. The abrupt return to a net loss of $92.1 million after several profitable quarters raises immediate red flags. This 15.1% negative margin, compared to prior positive results, suggests a significant financial disturbance — possibly a one-time expense or a structural issue that needs to be addressed. Furthermore, revenue growth has decelerated precipitously from a healthy 59% year-over-year increase to a mere 3.8% in recent quarters. This deceleration is concerning, as it indicates potential saturation in their market or operational challenges. The recent insider selling activity, particularly the volume and timing, could suggest a lack of confidence from those most familiar with the company's operations.
I agree with Claude Opus’s assessment that the Q1 2026 results are pivotal and create ambiguity regarding the company’s financial health. Opus correctly identifies the $92.1 million net loss as a critical issue. However, I disagree with the notion that the classification as "high_growth_profitable" is entirely misplaced. While the recent quarter was poor, the annual figures still reflect substantial growth from 2021 to 2025, with revenue increasing almost ninefold. The "pre-profit-platform" descriptor remains relevant, especially given the high gross margins typical of a scalable platform. I am aligned with Opus's skepticism toward the company’s capex direction, which seems incongruent with the asset-light telehealth model they claim to follow.
Opus's argument that the market has mispriced Hims & Hers as "priced for perfection" at the current level of $23.68 merits consideration. While I agree that at $70, such a label would be accurate, the significant decline in stock price reflects a market adjustment for inherent risks, not an unrealistic perfection scenario. Thus, Opus's framing of this as a "binary outcome" situation, contingent on the Q2 2026 results, is more precise. The potential outcomes (GLP-1 revenue continuation or collapse) indeed suggest a wide valuation range, from $12 to $35, depending on future developments.
A careful skeptic might argue that both Opus and I are potentially overemphasizing the importance of one quarterly result without sufficient context on the long-term strategic direction or resilience of the core business segments outside GLP-1. They might suggest that the insider sales, while concerning, could be routine profit-taking rather than a reaction to business fundamentals, given their mechanistic nature. Additionally, the absence of total debt and equity figures limits a full assessment of financial stability, which could alter the perceived risk profile.