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What this page is: Delvantic's full research page for Honeywell Aerospace Inc. (HONA) — AI-driven forensic equity research: mechanical valuation models (DCF, EPV, anchored-PE, scenario) plus three independent AI lenses (Quality / Value / Sentiment). Everything below is rendered server-side; you are not missing content that requires JavaScript. All scores are predictions and research opinions, not financial advice.
Our current read (analysis of 2026-08-23): Designation Low · Gem Score -46 (−100…+100 Quality+Value blend) · Quality -8 · Value -77 · Sentiment -49 (timing only, not weighted) · Composite fair value $121.26 vs $166.36 at analysis
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profile-header/price-overview— company profile, live quote, market capextended-analysis— the core: three AI lens reads with findings, scores, and the analyst memofuture-predictions— our forward price-band predictionsmarket-narrative/ai-findings/gpt-critique— narrative context, cross-model findings, and an adversarial critique of our own analysis (near the end of the document)- Members-only sections (render as login gates for anonymous readers):
price-history,income-trend,key-metrics,financials(statement tables),insider-trading. The analysis above is public; the raw data tables require a free account.
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Honeywell Aerospace Inc.
HONA NASDAQHoneywell Aerospace Inc. is an independent aerospace and defense technology company that designs, manufactures, and supplies advanced systems and components for aviation and space markets worldwide. The company provides aircraft engines and propulsion solutions, cockpit and cabin electronics, avionics, navigation and control systems, auxiliary power units, connectivity platforms, and a broad range of mechanical and microelectronic components used across commercial air transport, business aviation, military, and space applications. Its technologies are integrated into air, land, sea, and space missions, supporting safer, more efficient, and more reliable operations for airlines, defense organizations, and emerging segments such as advanced air mobility and uncrewed aerial systems. Honeywell Aerospace Inc. also delivers software-enabled services, maintenance, and support solutions that enhance aircraft performance, situational awareness, and operational efficiency. Headquartered in Phoenix, Arizona, the company serves a global customer base as one of the leading pure-play aerospace suppliers in the industry.
Price Overview
Price History (1 Year)
Revenue & Net Income Trend
| Period | Revenue | Net Income | Net Margin | YoY/QoQ |
|---|
Key Metrics
EPS (Diluted): 5.62
Total Equity: $8.40B
Shares: 316,725,979
Total Debt: $271.00M
Cash: $213.00M
EBITDA: $3.59B
Total Debt: $271.00M
Cash: $213.00M
Revenue: $17.40B
Revenue: $17.40B
Revenue: $17.40B
Total Equity: $8.40B
Tax Rate: 23.0%
Equity: $8.40B
Total Debt: $271.00M
Cash: $213.00M
Current Liabilities: $6.58B
Long-Term Debt: $236.00M
Total Debt: $271.00M
Total Equity: $8.40B
Shares: 316,725,979
Shares: 316,725,979
CapEx: -$504.00M
Shares: 316,725,979
Stock Price: $166.36
Net Income: $1.78B
Industry Benchmarks
Income Statement (Annual)
Last updated: Aug 16, 2026 12:24am (7d ago)| Metric | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|
| Revenue | $15.4B | $17.4B |
| Cost of Revenue | $9.9B | $11.3B |
| Gross Profit | $5.5B | $6.1B |
| Operating Expenses | $2.0B | $2.8B |
| Operating Income | $3.5B | $3.3B |
| Net Income | $2.8B | $1.8B |
| EBITDA | $3.9B | $3.6B |
| EPS | $8.89 | $5.62 |
| EPS (Diluted) | $8.89 | $5.62 |
Balance Sheet (Annual)
Last updated: Aug 11, 2026 12:57pm (12d ago)| Metric | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|
| Cash & Equivalents | $244.0M | $213.0M |
| Total Current Assets | $7.7B | $8.4B |
| Total Assets | $16.8B | $17.7B |
| Current Liabilities | $5.8B | $6.6B |
| Long-Term Debt | $203.0M | $236.0M |
| Total Liabilities | $8.0B | $9.2B |
| Total Equity | $8.7B | $8.4B |
| Retained Earnings | — | — |
Cash Flow (Annual)
Last updated: Aug 16, 2026 12:24am (7d ago)| Metric | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|
| Operating Cash Flow | $2.5B | $3.7B |
| Capital Expenditure | -$488.0M | -$504.0M |
| Free Cash Flow | $2.1B | $3.2B |
| Acquisitions (net) | -$2.1B | $0 |
| Net Debt Issued / (Repaid) | — | — |
| Dividends Paid | — | — |
| Stock Buybacks | — | — |
| Net Change in Cash | $103.0M | -$31.0M |
Growth Trends (YoY %)
Last updated: Aug 16, 2026 12:24am (7d ago)| Metric | 2025 |
|---|---|
| Revenue Growth | +12.7% |
| Gross Profit Growth | +10.2% |
| Operating Income Growth | -7.2% |
| Net Income Growth | -36.8% |
| EBITDA Growth | -7.0% |
Deep Analysis
Risk : Reward — if the last quarter repeats
Live · as of 2026-08-23 02:53Even the bull case prices 39% below today — the ratio here measures the model-vs-market gap, not payoff odds. Another quarter like the worst recent one costs 82%.
| Case | Growth | Margin | Fair value | vs price ($166.36) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Bull — recovery | +15% | 15.9% | $101.02 | -39% |
| Base — stabilizes | +10% | 13.8% | $75.82 | -54% |
| Bear — keeps slipping | +5% | 11.8% | $55.62 | -67% |
| Stress — last quarter repeats | +5% | 5.9% | $30.76 | -82% |
Narrative Economics
market-narrative step).
AI Lens 4th lens · how AI reaches this business · 5-yr
2026-08-16The dominant internal cost is certified engineering labor — design, verification, DO-178/DO-254 artifacts, qualification test documentation — and AI can compress those hours materially while price on certified parts and avionics is set by airframer contracts and aftermarket position, not by the vendor's cost. Cost falls, willingness-to-pay does not.
The aftermarket annuity on APUs, wheels/brakes, and legacy avionics is the profit engine, and AI attacks it from two sides: prognostics reduce unscheduled removals and spares consumption, while AI-assisted reverse engineering shortens the path to PMA parts and DER repairs that price against OEM spares.
Whether Honeywell captures prognostics itself — selling outcome-based availability and connected-aircraft services — or lets airlines and independent MROs use AI to consume fewer of its parts. Watch aftermarket revenue per installed shipset and the mix of long-term service agreements versus transactional spares.
Type certificates, FAA/EASA design-organization approval, decades of in-service reliability evidence, spec-position on shipping airframes, and the global field-service/repair-station network. None of these are code, and none get cheaper because inference does.
AI Lens thesis
The need — safe, certified propulsion, power and flight-deck systems, and the parts to keep them flying for 30 years — is essentially AI-proof, and the transaction is physical hardware under a regulator's signature, so exposure is bounded. AI reaches the economics through three channels: it cuts the cost of the certified engineering and test-documentation work that makes new programs expensive; it makes the fleet's operating data monetizable, letting Honeywell sell availability rather than boxes; and it lowers the analytical cost for third parties to attack the spares monopoly via PMA parts and DER repairs, and for airframers to run more of the systems-integration work in-house. Direction is favorable because the cost relief is near-certain and near-term while the aftermarket erosion is gradual and partly defensible, but the magnitude of both is modest against a hardware P&L where materials, supply chain and program execution dominate the margin story more than intelligence does.
What the market may be underestimating
Upside AI-compressed verification and certification artifact generation is a program-cost lever unique to regulated aerospace: it can turn marginal engine and avionics bids into economic ones, widening spec-position wins whose annuity shows up a decade later.
Downside AI lowers the cost of the reliability-data analysis and engineering substantiation behind PMA approvals and DER repair designs, letting independents attack the exact SKUs that carry the fattest OEM spares margin — an erosion that appears as mix, not as lost customers.
Outcome range spread 32
Growth Outlook
Analyzed 2026-08-17 16:38The question every valuation on this page silently assumes: is this company likely to grow? Judged forward — the business, its category, the world — against what's already printed.
Claude Reading
The most alarming number in this file isn't in any model output — it's the Q2 2026 print. Revenue grew a respectable 5.4% YoY ($4.52B vs $4.29B), but net income collapsed from $844M to $246M, a 71% drop, with net margin compressing from 19.7% to 5.4%. That is not "peak cycle plateau" — that is a step-function break in unit economics. Yet none of the prior models seem to have digested this single quarter properly: the Market Forces layer mentions "distressed spin-off" and "negative guidance," Narrative treats the premium as reasonable optionality, and Synthesis anchors on trailing FCF of $3.2B. Either the Q2 print reflects a one-time charge (restructuring, spin-off costs — consistent with the Market Forces hint), in which case normalized earnings are intact, or aerospace supply-chain margins are structurally cracking. The models don't reconcile these.
Reconciling the annuals confirms the tension. FY2025 revenue of $17.4B grew 12.6% over FY2024's $15.45B — healthy — but net income fell from $2.82B to $1.78B, a 37% decline, with operating income also slipping ($3.51B → $3.26B). So the earnings deterioration predates the Q2 2026 print. On $17.4B revenue and $1.78B NI, trailing net margin is 10.2%, less than half the 19.7% Q2 2025 quarterly peak — the business is normalizing lower, not consolidating higher. Meanwhile FCF held at $3.2B (18.4% of revenue) with only $271M debt against $8.4B equity — the balance sheet is pristine, ROIC of 29.7% is genuinely elite, and this is not a distressed situation despite the Market Forces label. The insider data is uninformative: it's all award grants dated 2026-08-03 (post-spin vesting, presumably), zero open-market buys or sells.
Where I break with the synthesis: the $127.55 fair value looks too pessimistic if you believe FCF is the right anchor. At $3.2B FCF and $52.7B market cap, the FCF yield is 6.1% — for a business with 30% ROIC, near-zero net debt, and structural aerospace aftermarket lock-in, that's not egregious. A 20x FCF multiple (fair for this quality) gets you $64B / ~$200 per share. The DCF-derived $127 implicitly assumes either FCF mean-reverts sharply toward the depressed earnings number, or growth decelerates to low-single-digits permanently. Given aftermarket parts/service revenues in aerospace are contractually sticky and the installed base is expanding, that seems harsh. Where I break with the bulls: paying 29.6x earnings when trailing earnings just fell 37% is paying up on the wrong denominator. If Q2 2026 margin compression persists for even two more quarters, the PE optically explodes toward 50x on run-rate earnings.
The contrarian read is that this is a post-spin-off orphan with messy comparability, real quality, and a market that hasn't decided what to make of it. The models are talking past each other because they're each anchored on different windows: Narrative sees the durable installed base, Synthesis sees the fair-value DCF, Market Forces sees the transition pain. All three are partially right. The right move is to underwrite this on FCF, not earnings, until 2-3 more quarters clarify whether the Q2 collapse was one-time (spin costs, inventory adjustment) or structural (margin compression from OEM rate cuts and pricing pressure). At $166, you're paying 16.5x FCF for a 30% ROIC franchise with a fortress balance sheet — that's not cheap, but it's not the 30% overvaluation the synthesis claims either. I'd anchor fair value at $150-175 (17-20x FCF) rather than $127, making this closer to fairly valued than overvalued. I dissent from the "fully_priced -23% overvalued" verdict; the earnings-based valuation is misleading here.
The honest answer: the data is too fresh and too noisy — one full post-spin quarter with a massive margin anomaly — to commit either way. If Q3 2026 shows margins recovering to 15%+, the stock is fairly valued to slightly cheap. If Q3 confirms 5-8% net margins as the new normal, the synthesis is right and fair value is closer to $110-125. That's a binary I don't have information to resolve today.
GPT Reading
The numbers say this is a high-quality aerospace asset with a balance sheet most industrials would envy, but the equity is being valued off a cleaner earnings story than the recent data supports. Revenue growth is real: 2025 sales rose to $17.40B from $15.45B, up 12.6%, and the latest quarter kept that pace with $4.52B versus $4.29B, up 5.4%. Free cash flow of $3.20B on $17.40B of revenue is exceptional, an 18.4% FCF margin, and operating cash flow of $3.71B comfortably exceeds net income of $1.78B. Debt is almost irrelevant at $271M against $8.40B of equity. On capital efficiency, 21.2% ROE and 29.7% ROIC are elite. If I stopped there, I could justify a premium multiple.
But the income statement is the problem, and it is not a small one. Despite the 12.6% revenue increase in 2025, operating income fell to $3.26B from $3.51B, so operating margin dropped from 22.7% to 18.7%. Net income fell much harder, to $1.78B from $2.82B, a 36.9% decline, taking net margin from 18.3% to 10.2%. The latest quarter is more concerning: revenue rose 5.4% year over year, yet net income collapsed from $844M to $246M and margin cratered from 19.7% to 5.4%. That is not normal cyclicality around a “mature earner” profile; it suggests either separation-related dis-synergies, one-time charges, or underlying cost pressure severe enough that the market should not be capitalizing trailing earnings at nearly 30x as if they are stable. A company can be cash-rich and still be overpriced if the market is anchoring to normalized earnings that have not yet reappeared.
At $52.7B, investors are paying about 3.0x sales, 14.7x EBITDA, 6.3x book, and 29.6x earnings for a business whose annual operating profit declined 7.1% and whose most recent quarterly profit fell 70.9%. That valuation is demanding even for a pristine aerospace franchise unless you underwrite a sharp rebound in margins. The contradiction I see in the prior models is that they correctly land on “fully priced,” but some of the narrative language still treats this as a conventional aerospace upcycle beneficiary. The reported numbers do not show an upcycle converting into earnings. They show revenue growth with major margin leakage. Until management proves that 2026’s quarterly collapse was an accounting/separation air pocket rather than a new base, I think the right lens is not “great business at fair price” but “great franchise with temporarily unreliable earnings being priced as if the earnings are reliable.”
The best counterargument is straightforward: free cash flow is so much stronger than net income that the P/E may be the wrong anchor. On 2025 figures, the stock trades at roughly 16.5x FCF, which is much more reasonable for a high-return aerospace business with almost no net debt and an installed base that likely throws off durable aftermarket cash. Gross profit also improved to $6.06B from $5.50B, implying gross margin held around 34.8%-35.6%, so a good skeptic would argue the pressure sits below gross profit and may be temporary corporate cost noise, transaction costs, or non-cash charges. If that is right, the 5.4% quarterly net margin is not the earnings power of the franchise; it is a distorted print. I weigh that argument seriously, but I still discount it because a stock at $166 does not just need “eventual normalization” — it needs a fairly prompt restoration of operating leverage. Otherwise investors are paying a premium multiple on faith while reported profitability is moving the wrong way.
What changes my mind is simple. If the next couple of quarters show revenue still growing mid- to high-single digits and net margin recovering back above 15% with operating margin back above 20%, then the ugly 2026 quarter becomes a passing separation charge story and the current multiple can be defended, especially with $3B+ annual FCF. Conversely, if quarterly revenue stays around $4.5B but net income remains stuck near the $250M-$400M range, then the stock is not just fully priced; it is materially overvalued because the market is capitalizing obsolete earnings power. I would also want to see whether annual FCF can hold near $3.0B without working-capital tailwinds. If FCF slips toward $2.2B-$2.5B while margins stay compressed, fair value falls well below where the stock trades now.
Grok Reading
The numbers tell a spin-off story that is still half-digested. Revenue is doing what a mid-cycle aerospace franchise should do—$15.45B to $17.40B annually (+12.6%), with the latest June quarter at $4.52B versus $4.29B a year earlier—yet reported profitability is collapsing in the opposite direction. Full-year 2025 net income fell from $2.82B to $1.78B; the most recent quarter printed only $246M of NI on $4.52B of sales, a 5.4% margin against 19.7% the prior-year period. Operating income itself slipped from $3.51B to $3.26B despite the top-line gain, so this is not purely a below-the-line accounting artifact. Gross margin eased from roughly 35.6% to 34.8%. Against that, free cash flow of $3.20B on only $504M of capex is excellent—an 18.4% FCF margin and a ~6.1% FCF yield at the $52.73B enterprise—while the balance sheet is essentially unlevered ($271M debt, $213M cash, debt-to-equity 0.03). ROIC at 29.7% and ROE at 21% say the underlying installed-base economics remain elite. The clean read is therefore a high-quality cash compounder whose P&L is being mauled by separation costs, mix, or program timing, and whose 29.6x trailing P/E is being applied to a trough (or at least heavily distorted) earnings year.
That distortion is exactly where the quantitative stack both helps and misleads. The valuation synthesis fair value near $127–128 correctly refuses to pay 30x for a mature earner whose earnings CAGR is −37% and whose operating leverage has gone the wrong way; EV/EBITDA of 14.7x and P/S of 3.0x are full for mid-teens growth that may be cresting with the commercial OEM cycle. Momentum confirms the split personality—revenue CAGR +12.7%, FCF CAGR +56%, earnings CAGR −36.8%. The market-forces note about a distressed spin-off with unclear normalized earnings power is the right framing: until two or three clean post-separation quarters exist, any multiple on GAAP NI is noise. I weigh the margin compression at the operating line more heavily than the bull narrative of irreplaceable chokepoints and two-decade fleet replacement; those stories are durable but already in the price, and they do not explain why operating profit fell while revenue rose.
The strongest case against calling this overvalued is the cash. If $3.2B of FCF is closer to economic earnings than the $1.78B of NI, the stock is closer to 16.5x FCF with fortress leverage, 30% ROIC, and genuine dual-use defense/commercial optionality—hardly a disaster for an aerospace supplier, and cheap if NI mean-reverts toward the $2.5B–$2.8B zone (which would put a normalized P/E in the high teens at today’s price). A smart opponent would also note that the entire de-rating from richer multiples earlier in the year may have already discounted OEM rate cuts and business-jet softness, and that insider activity is routine award/withholding noise rather than distribution. I discount that defense because operating margin erosion is real, the latest quarter’s 5.4% NI margin is too ugly to hand-wave as pure one-time items without evidence, and paying a 30% premium to DCF for a “widely accepted” secular narrative (moderate intensity, low cult coefficient) is exactly how mature earners deliver mid-single-digit forward returns from here. Cash quality keeps me from a hard short; earnings trajectory and starting multiple keep me from averaging in.
I would flip constructive if the next two print quarters show NI margins recovering above ~12–14% with operating margin stabilizing near 18%+, or if management guides normalized annual earnings power above ~$2.5B with FCF still clearing $3B. I would get more decisively negative on a sub-$4.2B revenue quarter, further operating-margin compression below 16%, or FCF falling under $2.5B as separation “temporary” costs prove structural.
Big-3 Panel — where each AI stands
Advanced Analysis Forensic deep-dive · separate lenses
On the two years visible, revenue grew from 15.45B to 17.40B (about 12.6 percent), a healthy top-line move for an aerospace and defense franchise of this size. Gross margin held roughly flat at 34.8 percent versus 35.6 percent, but operating margin compressed materially from 22.7 percent to 18.7 percent, and net income fell from 2.82B to 1.78B despite the revenue gain. That is a 400 basis point operating margin give-back that outweighs the gross line, pointing to opex, restructuring, or one-time charges below the gross line that need to be identified in filings.
Verify before trusting this (7)
- Cause of 2025 operating margin compression: restructuring, spin-related costs, pension mark-to-market, or program charges
- Standalone balance sheet: total debt, cash, pension and OPEB obligations transferred from Honeywell parent
- Working capital movements driving 3.2B FCF vs 1.78B net income in 2025
- Segment mix within Aerospace (commercial OE vs aftermarket vs defense) and customer concentration
- Any share issuance or buyback authorization post carve-out and capital return policy
- Backlog size, book-to-bill, and long-cycle program commitments
- Contingent liabilities, litigation, and environmental reserves inherited in the separation
The e2e synthesis lands at a composite FV of $123.05 and a signal-adjusted FV of $127.55 against a $166.36 price, implying roughly -23% downside. The three methods bracket the answer tightly enough to trust the direction: DCF at $143.55 (most generous, embedding continued growth), anchored P/E at $118.25 (peer-multiple sanity check), and EPV floor at $86.86 (what today's earnings alone justify). Even the most optimistic method sits ~14% below the current price, and the earnings-power floor is roughly half of it. That is the signature of a stock where the market is paying for the platform-monopoly narrative in full. The Company-Quality lens grades this Strong, which rightly lifts the deserved multiple - but 'Strong' does not stretch to a 30% premium over a composite that already reflects franchise economics. The 2024-2025 margin anomaly (operating margin down 400bps, net income down a third on double-digit revenue growth) adds a small haircut to deserved value until the one-timers are confirmed. To justify $166, you need durable mid-teens EPS growth plus multiple persistence - the bull case, priced in. Margin of safety is negative; this is a hold-and-watch, not a buy.
Verify before trusting this (5)
- Breakdown of 2025 operating margin compression - one-time spin/restructuring charges vs structural
- Forward organic growth guidance for aftermarket vs OE mix
- Free cash flow conversion post-separation and any stranded corporate costs
- Backlog growth and book-to-bill in engines and avionics
- Capital return plan (buyback pace, leverage target) post-spin
The macro backdrop is mildly supportive - VIX 14.3, S&P near highs, risk-on regime - which normally helps an industrial compounder like HONA. But this name is carrying a specific, recent wound: an August 6 guidance cut that triggered a 23% single-day plunge on supply-chain constraints and unfavorable mix. That is exactly the kind of event that damages a 'platform-monopoly / mission-critical chokepoint' narrative, because the whole premium (stock trades ~30% above intrinsic) is paid for narrative durability and execution confidence. Once that story cracks, sentiment de-rates faster than fundamentals. Narrative intensity is only moderate and cult is low, so there is no fanatical buyer base to defend the tape. Analyst tone is not screamingly negative here, but a Cramer 'what went wrong' segment days after a guide-down is textbook post-mortem sentiment - it hardens the bear framing and slows dip-buyers. Momentum is neutral with a clear 2-year deceleration (-8pp), consistent with a name whose story is fading rather than accelerating. Beta is moderate and the sector (A&D) is structurally in favor, which cushions but does not neutralize the stock-specific overhang. Net: the pressure on THIS name leans negative in the near term despite a friendly tape. Not a collapse - the secular A&D backdrop and calm VIX keep this from being a rout - but a real headwind until the guide is re-based and execution stabilizes.
Verify before trusting this (5)
- Whether sell-side targets are cut materially in the next 2-4 weeks (magnitude of the estimate reset)
- Any follow-through commentary from management on supply-chain resolution timeline
- Whether the stock can reclaim its pre-Aug-6 range on volume (sentiment repair signal)
- A&D peer tape - if peers hold up and HONA lags, the overhang is idiosyncratic and persistent
- Further high-visibility media pieces (Cramer, Barrons) that either extend or close the post-mortem cycle
The need — safe, certified propulsion, power and flight-deck systems, and the parts to keep them flying for 30 years — is essentially AI-proof, and the transaction is physical hardware under a regulator's signature, so exposure is bounded. AI reaches the economics through three channels: it cuts the cost of the certified engineering and test-documentation work that makes new programs expensive; it makes the fleet's operating data monetizable, letting Honeywell sell availability rather than boxes; and it lowers the analytical cost for third parties to attack the spares monopoly via PMA parts and DER repairs, and for airframers to run more of the systems-integration work in-house. Direction is favorable because the cost relief is near-certain and near-term while the aftermarket erosion is gradual and partly defensible, but the magnitude of both is modest against a hardware P&L where materials, supply chain and program execution dominate the margin story more than intelligence does.
None surfaced.
Verify before trusting this (8)
- Global fleet count and flight hours
- Business jet and rotorcraft build rates
- Defense platform procurement cadence
- Long-term service agreement penetration
- Availability/power-by-hour contract growth
- Warranty and recall provisions
- Aftermarket revenue per flight hour
- Spares volume versus fleet growth
Global aviation is in the post-recovery phase where flight hours and fleet age, not new deliveries, drive supplier revenue — a structurally favorable setup for an aftermarket-weighted content supplier. Airframer output remains supply-constrained, which delays OEM-linked revenue but extends the life (and spares consumption) of the existing fleet. Simultaneously, defense electronics budgets are rising across NATO and Asia, adding an appropriations-backed demand leg. The offsetting force is company-specific rather than worldly: a newly independent aerospace entity must prove it can carry its own overhead, R&D and supply chain without parent scale. So the world is pushing revenue up while the corporate transition is pushing margins down.
When we made this prediction on Aug 16, 2026, HONA was $166.36. We expect it to be $132.00 by Feb 2027, and we consider it great value under $115.00. This is an early model (v0.6.0) — the direction is more reliable than the exact price. Made Aug 16, 2026.
Blue is our prediction, starting the day we made it. Grey is a slower route to the same place — the same destination, taking longer. Black is the actual price, so you can see how we are doing.