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What this page is: Delvantic's full research page for ING Groep N.V. (ING) — AI-driven forensic equity research: mechanical valuation models (DCF, EPV, anchored-PE, scenario) plus three independent AI lenses (Quality / Value / Sentiment). Everything below is rendered server-side; you are not missing content that requires JavaScript. All scores are predictions and research opinions, not financial advice.
Our current read (analysis of 2026-08-23): Designation Watch · Gem Score +13 (−100…+100 Quality+Value blend) · Quality 37 · Value -6 · Sentiment 21 (timing only, not weighted) · Composite fair value $88.51 vs $35.68 at analysis
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profile-header/price-overview— company profile, live quote, market capextended-analysis— the core: three AI lens reads with findings, scores, and the analyst memofuture-predictions— our forward price-band predictionsmarket-narrative/ai-findings/gpt-critique— narrative context, cross-model findings, and an adversarial critique of our own analysis (near the end of the document)- Members-only sections (render as login gates for anonymous readers):
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ING Groep N.V.
ING NYSEING Groep N.V. Sponsored ADR represents ownership in ING Groep N.V., a leading multinational banking and financial services corporation headquartered in Amsterdam, Netherlands. The company primarily operates through its retail banking segment, providing a comprehensive suite of products including payment and savings accounts, mortgages, consumer loans, and business credits. This segment serves customers across key markets such as the Netherlands, Belgium, Germany, and other regions in Europe and beyond. Complementing this is the Wholesale Banking division, which offers corporate lending, cash management, real estate financing, and leasing solutions to businesses and institutions globally. ING Groep N.V. emphasizes digital banking platforms, enabling seamless mobile and online access to services for both individual and corporate clients. With a strong focus on the Benelux region and broader European presence, it plays a pivotal role in facilitating everyday financial needs, corporate funding, and international trade finance in the global financial markets.
Price Overview
Price History (1 Year)
Revenue & Net Income Trend
ING Groep N.V. is a foreign private issuer — it reports to the U.S. SEC once a year (on Form 20-F or 40-F) rather than filing the quarterly statements (10-Q) that U.S.-domiciled companies must submit. Our financial statements are read directly from SEC filings, so for this company only annual figures exist at the source.
This is a property of how the company files, not missing or broken data — its filing history shows 9 annual reports, the latest filed 2026-02-26, and no quarterly filings . The company may still publish quarterly results on its own investor-relations site.
| Period | Revenue | Net Income | Net Margin | YoY/QoQ |
|---|
Key Metrics
EPS (Diluted): 2.45
Total Equity: $63.90B
Shares: 2,984,433,962
Total Debt: $0.00
Cash: $62.53B
EBITDA: N/A
Total Debt: $0.00
Cash: $62.53B
Revenue: $29.65B
Revenue: $29.65B
Revenue: $29.65B
Total Equity: $63.90B
Tax Rate: 34.9%
Equity: $63.90B
Total Debt: $0.00
Cash: $62.53B
Current Liabilities: N/A
Long-Term Debt: $0.00
Total Debt: $0.00
Total Equity: $63.90B
Shares: 2,984,433,962
Shares: 2,984,433,962
CapEx: -$405.32M
Shares: 2,984,433,962
Stock Price: $35.62
Net Income: $9.61B
Industry Benchmarks
Income Statement (Annual)
Last updated: Aug 6, 2026 7:32am (17d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | $23.2B | $35.1B | $20.9B | $24.4B | $29.7B |
| Cost of Revenue | — | — | — | — | — |
| Gross Profit | — | — | — | — | — |
| Operating Expenses | $324.5M | $315.2M | $333.7M | $319.9M | $9.3B |
| Operating Income | $23.2B | $35.1B | $20.9B | $24.4B | $29.7B |
| Net Income | $6.9B | $14.0B | $4.8B | $6.2B | $9.6B |
| EBITDA | — | — | — | — | — |
| EPS | $1.42 | $1.18 | $2.37 | $2.29 | $2.45 |
| EPS (Diluted) | $1.42 | $1.17 | $2.36 | $2.29 | $2.45 |
Balance Sheet (Annual)
Last updated: Aug 6, 2026 7:32am (17d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cash & Equivalents | $124.3B | $110.2B | $107.4B | $79.8B | $62.5B |
| Total Current Assets | — | — | — | — | — |
| Total Assets | $1.1T | $1.1T | $1.1T | $1.2T | $1.2T |
| Current Liabilities | — | — | — | — | — |
| Long-Term Debt | — | — | — | — | — |
| Total Liabilities | $1.0T | $1.1T | $1.1T | $1.1T | $1.2T |
| Total Equity | $61.0B | $65.8B | $64.2B | $62.0B | $63.9B |
| Retained Earnings | $41.0B | $48.0B | $46.5B | $41.9B | $46.2B |
Cash Flow (Annual)
Last updated: Aug 6, 2026 7:32am (17d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Operating Cash Flow | -$17.3B | -$12.8B | -$13.1B | -$26.0B | -$7.4B |
| Capital Expenditure | -$212.5M | -$266.7M | -$284.1M | -$383.4M | -$405.3M |
| Free Cash Flow | -$17.5B | -$13.1B | -$13.4B | -$26.4B | -$7.8B |
| Acquisitions (net) | — | — | — | — | — |
| Net Debt Issued / (Repaid) | $-46,190 | — | — | — | — |
| Dividends Paid | -$2.8B | -$3.6B | -$3.4B | -$4.5B | — |
| Stock Buybacks | — | — | — | — | — |
| Net Change in Cash | -$3.9B | -$13.6B | -$1.7B | -$26.8B | -$16.0B |
Growth Trends (YoY %)
Last updated: Aug 6, 2026 7:32am (17d ago)| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue Growth | +51.4% | -40.4% | +16.4% | +21.8% |
| Gross Profit Growth | — | — | — | — |
| Operating Income Growth | +51.4% | -40.4% | +16.4% | +21.8% |
| Net Income Growth | +103.8% | -65.9% | +28.8% | +56.1% |
| EBITDA Growth | — | — | — | — |
Dividend History (Last 20)
Last updated: Aug 6, 2026 7:32am (17d ago)| Date | Dividend | Declaration | Record | Payment |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-04-17 | $0.88 | — | — | — |
| 2025-04-25 | $0.77 | — | — | — |
| 2025-01-13 | $0.17 | — | — | — |
| 2024-08-08 | $0.38 | — | — | — |
| 2024-04-24 | $0.82 | — | — | — |
| 2023-08-11 | $0.38 | — | — | — |
| 2023-04-26 | $0.41 | — | — | — |
| 2023-01-13 | $0.09 | — | — | — |
| 2022-08-12 | $0.17 | — | — | — |
| 2022-05-13 | $0.24 | — | — | — |
| 2022-04-27 | $0.43 | — | — | — |
| 2021-10-04 | $0.55 | — | — | — |
| 2021-02-23 | $0.15 | — | — | — |
| 2019-08-09 | $0.27 | — | — | — |
| 2019-04-25 | $0.49 | — | — | — |
| 2018-08-10 | $0.27 | — | — | — |
| 2018-04-25 | $0.51 | — | — | — |
| 2017-08-10 | $0.23 | — | — | — |
| 2017-05-09 | $0.38 | — | — | — |
| 2016-08-11 | $0.22 | — | — | — |
Deep Analysis
Narrative Economics
market-narrative step).
AI Lens 4th lens · how AI reaches this business · 5-yr
2026-08-12ING carries a very large financial-crime compliance, onboarding and servicing workforce built up after its 2018 AML settlement; document-reading, transaction-triage and alert-adjudication are exactly the tasks LLM systems compress, and any sustained cost/income improvement drops straight into ROE because pricing on deposits and mortgages is set by market rates, not by ING's cost of production.
ING's funding advantage rests on retail deposits that are slow to move; AI assistants and PSD2-enabled agents that continuously shop savings rates and switch mortgages at zero effort raise deposit beta and shorten the repricing lag that generates net interest income.
Whether agent-mediated switching materially lifts deposit beta in NL/BE/Germany before AI-driven opex reduction shows up. Watch quarterly cost/income ratio and FTE count against the disclosed deposit beta and savings-rate pass-through in retail Netherlands and Germany.
Banking licences, ~€700bn-scale insured deposit base, capital and liquidity buffers, direct-bank brand across four core European markets, and payment-rail membership — none of which get cheaper because software does.
AI Lens thesis
AI reaches ING through three channels of very different size: (1) a genuine cost channel — its opex is dominated by human-intensive compliance, onboarding, servicing and IT change, all high-yield targets for automation, and because a bank's output price is set exogenously by rates and competition, retained savings convert almost directly to earnings; (2) a funding channel, the real risk — ING is a direct bank whose economics depend on the gap between policy rates and what it pays savers, and frictionless AI rate-shopping plus European instant-payment rails compress that gap in a way no amount of internal automation offsets; (3) a competitive channel that is weaker than it looks — AI lowers the cost of building banking software but not of holding capital, obtaining licences, or funding a mortgage book, so neobank pressure remains a distribution and cost-of-funds fight ING can contest with 40m-scale digital customer relationships. Credit underwriting and fraud detection improve modestly on both sides and largely cancel.
What the market may be underestimating
Upside Financial-crime compliance is currently an unpriced tax on European banks; if AI cuts ING's per-account KYC/monitoring cost sharply, it also removes the marginal-cost objection to serving small business and cross-border retail clients ING has been shrinking away from.
Downside Wholesale Banking's advisory, structuring and cash-management fee pool is where AI most directly substitutes for billable human judgement, and corporate treasurers running their own agents may internalise the analytical layer while keeping only the balance-sheet commitment — fee income erodes while capital consumption stays.
Outcome range spread 41
Claude Reading
The raw numbers tell a straightforward story that the models are overcomplicating. ING earned $9.61B on $29.65B revenue in 2025, up from $6.16B on $24.35B in 2024 — 21.8% revenue growth, 56% earnings growth, and a 32.4% net margin driven by the ECB's rate cycle. At $35.62, market cap of $101B, that's 10.5x trailing earnings and roughly 1.58x book on $63.9B of equity, with a 4.7% dividend yield. The stated 14.5x P/E from FMP appears to lag; on 2025 actuals this is a high-single-digit-to-low-double-digit multiple bank yielding nearly 5%. That is not a demanding price for a G-SIB earning ~15% ROE.
The Valuation Synthesis output — $88.51 fair value, +155% upside — is nonsense and should be discarded. DCFs on banks are structurally broken because operating cash flow reflects loan book expansion (hence the -$7.37B OCF, which is a balance sheet growth artifact, not distress), and the "poor cash flow quality" flag is a category error for a deposit-taking institution. Meanwhile, Market Forces screams "unsustainable cyclical peak" and the Thesis Evaluation lands at -17 on NIM compression fears. These two are directionally right about the risk (2022 NI of $14B was clearly a rate-hike peak, and 2025's $9.6B is already below it) but they're double-counting a concern already visible in the 10x multiple and 4.7% yield. If the market were ignoring ECB cuts, ING would trade at 13-15x, not 10x.
The contrarian case against my own read: 2022 net income was $14B and 2023 collapsed to $4.78B — this book has enormous rate sensitivity, and ECB deposit rates have already fallen from 4% to ~2.5%. If 2026-2027 earnings mean-revert toward the $5-7B range (2021/2023 levels), then "10x trailing" becomes 15-18x forward on trough earnings, and the dividend gets trimmed. Credit costs are also suspiciously benign given eurozone commercial real estate stress and German industrial weakness; the 0.79% ROA masks that loan-loss provisions have been running light. The Narrative layer's "post-bubble cynicism / durable pessimism" framing is honest: European banks have traded at these multiples for 15 years because ROEs structurally don't sustain above cost of equity through a cycle. Betting on multiple re-rating is betting against a very long base rate.
Net: I dissent from the synthesis's "fair value with $88 composite" — that number is unreliable — but I also dissent from Market Forces' bearish framing. My read is modestly undervalued on a through-cycle basis. Normalize earnings to ~$7B (midpoint of 2021's $6.87B and 2024's $6.16B, haircutting the 2025 peak by ~25%), apply a 10-11x multiple appropriate for a mature eurozone bank with 12-13% mid-cycle ROE, and you get $70-77B equity value versus $101B market cap — so on normalized earnings, ING is actually slightly *rich*, not cheap. But the 4.7% yield covered ~3x by earnings, the CET1 buffer, and the ongoing buyback program (implied by the OCF/capex gap) mean total shareholder yield is likely 8-10%. That's an acceptable return without needing multiple expansion. Fair value $36-42; I'd be a buyer under $33 and a trimmer above $42. Conviction is low because the trough earnings scenario genuinely bites and the models can't agree on which direction to be wrong.
GPT Reading
The first thing I would push back on is any valuation framework that treats ING like an ordinary industrial cash-flow machine. A bank’s reported free cash flow of -$7.8B and operating cash flow of -$7.4B are not, by themselves, evidence of weak economics; for lenders, balance-sheet movements swamp cash-flow statements. The cleaner anchors here are earnings power, return on equity, and book value. On those, ING looks solid rather than distressed: 2025 net income was $9.61B on $63.9B of equity, roughly a 15% ROE, after $6.16B in 2024 and $4.78B in 2023. At a $101.0B market cap, investors are paying about 1.58x equity and about 10.5x 2025 earnings by my math, not some heroic multiple. For a large diversified bank producing mid-teens ROE and paying a 4.7% dividend yield, that is not expensive. If anything, the raw numbers say the market is capitalizing a decent bank at a level that already assumes earnings come off their cyclical highs.
The more important question is whether 2025 is a peak or a new base. Revenue rose from $20.93B in 2023 to $24.35B in 2024 and $29.65B in 2025, while net income climbed from $4.78B to $6.16B to $9.61B. That acceleration is too strong to treat as normal compounding for a mature European bank. The 2022 result of $14.0B on $35.1B of revenue also shows how noisy bank accounting and rate-cycle effects can be; this is not a smooth annuity. So I do not buy the exuberant fair-value output implying something like $90 per share, because to justify that cleanly you would need confidence that current profitability is durable and that 1.6x book should re-rate materially higher. European banks almost never sustain that kind of multiple expansion without either structurally higher growth or an exceptional capital return story. ING may be good, but the numbers here read more like “well-run cyclical beneficiary” than “mispriced compounder.”
Still, I come out modestly constructive because even under a normalization lens the current price does not look demanding. If earnings fall back from $9.6B toward, say, $7-8B as ECB cuts pressure deposit spreads, the stock is still around 12.5x-14.5x that more conservative range, while earning around 11%-13% on current equity and paying nearly 5% in cash dividends. That is close to fair for a quality bank, maybe a bit cheap if credit stays benign. The balance sheet also does not suggest obvious strain: cash and equivalents of $62.5B against $63.9B of equity is not a full solvency analysis, but it is at least consistent with a large, liquid institution rather than a bank reaching for survival. What stands out to me is not hidden fragility but the absence of a valuation discount large enough to call it a screaming bargain and the absence of a premium large enough to call it dangerous.
The best bear case is straightforward and serious: ING’s recent profit expansion is rate-cycle rent, not franchise improvement. If 2023-2025 earnings were driven primarily by unusually favorable net interest margins, then 15% ROE could slide back toward high single digits just as quickly as it rose. In that world, 1.66x book is too rich for a European bank, and the reported earnings progression from $4.78B to $9.61B becomes exactly the kind of peak-profit trap that screens as “cheap” before de-rating. A smart skeptic would also argue that the 2022-2025 swings in revenue and net income are themselves the warning sign: this is a bank with highly variable earnings, not a stable utility. I weigh that differently because the current valuation is not pricing perfection; it is already a middling multiple on current earnings and only a moderate premium to book for a bank earning materially above its cost of equity.
What would change my mind is evidence that normalization is sharper than I expect. If net income drops below $7B while ROE slips under 11% and management cannot offset margin pressure with fees, cost control, or buybacks, then today’s price would look full and I would move bearish. Conversely, if ING can hold annual earnings around $8.5B-$9.5B through the ECB easing cycle while maintaining a dividend near the current yield and keeping book value compounding, then the market should tolerate at least the current multiple and likely somewhat more. The next few reporting periods need to show whether 2025 was the crest of the wave or proof that the franchise can earn through lower rates.
Grok Reading
The raw numbers describe a European universal bank that rode the 2022 rate spike to a $35.1B revenue and $14.0B net income peak, collapsed to $20.9B and $4.8B in 2023 as that windfall normalized, and has since rebuilt to $29.7B revenue and $9.61B net income in 2025. That recovery is the story that matters: trailing net margin sits at 32%, ROE at 15.0%, and the bank is again earning at a level that supports a mid-teens return on a $63.9B equity base. At $35.62 the stock screens at 14.5x earnings, 1.66x book, and a 4.7% dividend yield—multiples that are neither distressed nor exuberant for a diversified lender posting those returns. The 19% revenue CAGR and 42% earnings CAGR over the recent window are inflated by the 2022 base effect and the subsequent rebound; strip the cycle and you still have a franchise expanding earnings at a double-digit clip into 2025 while carrying $62.5B of cash against a reported debt-to-equity of zero. Negative operating cash flow of –$7.4B and FCF of –$7.8B look alarming until you remember that loan-book growth registers as a cash outflow for banks; the “poor cash-flow quality” flag is mostly an accounting artifact of balance-sheet expansion, not evidence that the $9.6B of reported profit is fictitious.
Where the quantitative models overreach is the $88–$91 composite fair-value print implying 155% upside. That figure treats a mature eurozone bank as if mid-cycle NII and 15% ROE are permanent and frictionless, ignoring regulatory capital drag, the ECB cutting cycle already underway, and the simple fact that European bank equities have spent fifteen years refusing to re-rate to U.S.-style multiples. The market is not “giving growth away for free”; it is correctly embedding a haircut for net-interest-margin compression through 2025–26 and for the possibility that credit costs rise off today’s benign levels. A 1.66x price-to-book multiple on 15% ROE is roughly what a 9–10% cost of equity would justify—fair, not deeply cheap. The 2025 earnings rebound is real, but it still leaves absolute profit 31% below the 2022 peak, and the trajectory from here is flatter once rate tailwinds fully reverse.
The strongest counter-argument is straightforward: if the negative FCF and –2.6x accruals signal genuinely unsustainable loan growth rather than ordinary bank accounting, then the 2025 earnings base is overstated and the 14.5x multiple is a trap. A smart opponent would also note that ROA of only 0.8% leaves little cushion once funding costs stop falling and that sector-wide European bank valuations have repeatedly failed to close “value gaps” that look identical to today’s. I weigh those points seriously—the thesis score of –17 and the market-headwinds signal are not noise—but I still put more weight on the demonstrated ability to deliver $9.6B of net income and a covered 4.7% yield while ROE holds in the mid-teens. That combination has historically been worth at least the current multiple once the worst of the rate-cut fear is absorbed.
I would flip to a clear overvalued stance if 2026 net interest income falls more than 10–12% year-over-year or if the common equity tier-1 ratio is forced materially higher by regulation, crushing the ROE back toward single digits. Conversely, two consecutive quarters of stable or rising NII alongside flat-to-down cost of risk would confirm the market has over-discounted the margin cliff and would justify moving from modest undervaluation to a higher-conviction bid.
Big-3 Panel — where each AI stands
Advanced Analysis Forensic deep-dive · separate lenses
ING is a mature diversified bank generating EUR 20-35B in revenue and net income of USD 4.8-14.0B across 2021-2025, with 2025 net income of USD 9.61B on USD 29.65B revenue - a solid mid-teens return profile for a universal bank. Diluted shares fell from 3.88B in 2021 to 2.98B in 2025 (roughly -6.4% CAGR), meaning management is aggressively returning capital and concentrating per-share ownership rather than diluting. That is a strong signal of capital discipline and confidence in the underlying franchise. The reported operating margin of 100% and gross margin of 0% are artifacts of bank accounting (interest expense treated as cost of revenue), not real operating characteristics. Similarly, 'FCF' of -USD 7.77B and Altman Z of 0.21 are meaningless here: banks intermediate deposits and loans, so operating cash flow swings with balance-sheet growth and Altman Z is not calibrated for depository institutions. The USD 62.5B 'cash' is largely central bank reserves and interbank balances, not discretionary liquidity. So the true quality read has to come from earnings level and trend plus buyback discipline, both of which look healthy. What is missing from the evidence supplied is any read on CET1 ratio, NPL trends, loan-loss provisions, net interest margin, or exposure to commercial real estate and Dutch mortgages - the actual drivers of a bank's quality. Without those, I can only grade this as solid-and-improving based on earnings recovery from the 2023 trough (USD 4.78B) to USD 9.61B in 2025 and disciplined share reduction.
Verify before trusting this (8)
- CET1 ratio and leverage ratio versus regulatory minimums and peer average
- Non-performing loan ratio and stage 3 loan trends, especially in Dutch mortgages and commercial real estate
- Loan loss provision run-rate and coverage ratios versus 2020-2021 baseline
- Net interest margin trajectory as ECB rates plateau and potentially fall
- Composition of the USD 62.5B 'cash' - how much is central bank reserves vs discretionary liquidity
- Driver of the 2022 to 2023 net income drop from USD 14.0B to USD 4.78B - one-offs, hedge accounting, or genuine underlying weakness
- Insider transactions and management tenure/incentive alignment
- Buyback authorization size relative to distributable capital and regulator approval
The e2e composite fair value of $88.51 (signal-adjusted $90.99) implies 155% upside from $35.61, but that number leans on an EPV/DCF framework that mis-fits a bank balance sheet and almost certainly extrapolates the recent net-income doubling (USD 4.8B to 9.6B) as a durable run-rate. I discount it heavily. On skeptical math, ING earns roughly USD 9-10B on a ~$101B market cap, which is ~10-11x earnings with a mid-single-digit dividend yield and ongoing buybacks that have retired ~25% of shares - that is genuinely cheaper than a US large-cap bank comp set trading 11-13x, and cheap versus the company's own capital-return pace.
Verify before trusting this (5)
- Normalized NIM guidance and rate sensitivity in latest earnings deck
- Fee vs NII mix - how much of the 2y earnings jump is rate-driven vs franchise growth
- Remaining buyback authorization and CET1 headroom
- Loan-loss provisioning trend and stage-3 exposure
- Dividend policy sustainability at through-cycle earnings
The pressure on ING right now is modestly positive but nothing dramatic. The tape is risk-on (+47), VIX at 15.3, S&P near highs - a friendly backdrop for a cyclical European lender, though ING's 0.9 beta means the market lift lands with only ordinary force. Recent newsflow is quietly constructive: an active 1.0B buyback progressing weekly, a fresh 0.46/share dividend, and a momentum piece flagging a 2.15% one-week gain. That is the kind of drip-drip capital-return story that supports a floor without igniting a rally. The dominant narrative pressure is a durable but low-intensity post-bubble-cynicism on European banks - the sector is structurally unloved, which is a persistent light headwind on multiple, not an acute one. It is not de-rating the name today; it is simply preventing the tape's risk-on juice from translating into any real multiple expansion. Macro cross-currents are mixed for a bank: 10y at 4.72% and a positively-sloped curve (+0.47) are supportive of NIM narrative, but stretched market PE 26 and the eurozone-lender stigma mute the benefit. Net: gentle tailwind from tape and buyback flow, gentle headwind from sector apathy - the tailwind wins by a nose.
Verify before trusting this (4)
- Weekly buyback execution pace - any pause would remove a visible bid
- Any shift in ECB rate path commentary that could revive or bury the NIM story
- Sector rotation signals - if EU banks catch a bid as a group, the cynicism narrative cracks
- Analyst target revisions post next earnings - divergence from the flat consensus would be the tell
AI reaches ING through three channels of very different size: (1) a genuine cost channel — its opex is dominated by human-intensive compliance, onboarding, servicing and IT change, all high-yield targets for automation, and because a bank's output price is set exogenously by rates and competition, retained savings convert almost directly to earnings; (2) a funding channel, the real risk — ING is a direct bank whose economics depend on the gap between policy rates and what it pays savers, and frictionless AI rate-shopping plus European instant-payment rails compress that gap in a way no amount of internal automation offsets; (3) a competitive channel that is weaker than it looks — AI lowers the cost of building banking software but not of holding capital, obtaining licences, or funding a mortgage book, so neobank pressure remains a distribution and cost-of-funds fight ING can contest with 40m-scale digital customer relationships. Credit underwriting and fraud detection improve modestly on both sides and largely cancel.
None surfaced.
Verify before trusting this (8)
- Cost/income ratio trajectory
- FTE count in ops and compliance
- IT change spend as share of opex
- PSD3/FIDA rulemaking scope
- Aggregator and assistant switching volumes
- Mortgage broker/comparison channel share
- Net interest margin by segment
- Share of non-maturity deposits
This lens hasn't been run for this ticker yet.
When we made this prediction on Aug 14, 2026, ING was $35.60. We expect it to be $42.30 by Feb 2027, and we consider it great value under $30.00. This is an early model (v0.6.0) — the direction is more reliable than the exact price. Made Aug 14, 2026.
Blue is our prediction, starting the day we made it. Grey is a slower route to the same place — the same destination, taking longer. Black is the actual price, so you can see how we are doing.