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What this page is: Delvantic's full research page for The Coca-Cola Company (KO) — AI-driven forensic equity research: mechanical valuation models (DCF, EPV, anchored-PE, scenario) plus three independent AI lenses (Quality / Value / Sentiment). Everything below is rendered server-side; you are not missing content that requires JavaScript. All scores are predictions and research opinions, not financial advice.
Our current read (analysis of 2026-08-23): Designation Watch · Gem Score -5 (−100…+100 Quality+Value blend) · Quality 64 · Value -62 · Sentiment 62 (timing only, not weighted) · Composite fair value $39.34 vs $88.49 at analysis
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profile-header/price-overview— company profile, live quote, market capextended-analysis— the core: three AI lens reads with findings, scores, and the analyst memofuture-predictions— our forward price-band predictionsmarket-narrative/ai-findings/gpt-critique— narrative context, cross-model findings, and an adversarial critique of our own analysis (near the end of the document)- Members-only sections (render as login gates for anonymous readers):
price-history,income-trend,key-metrics,financials(statement tables),insider-trading. The analysis above is public; the raw data tables require a free account.
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The Coca-Cola Company
KO NYSEThe Coca-Cola Company is a leading total beverage company that manufactures, markets, and sells a diverse portfolio of nonalcoholic beverages worldwide. Its iconic offerings include Trademark Coca-Cola, Diet Coke, Coca-Cola Zero Sugar, Sprite, Fanta, and other sparkling soft drinks, alongside water, sports drinks, coffee, tea, juices, value-added dairy, plant-based beverages, and emerging categories. The company produces beverage concentrates, syrups, and fountain syrups supplied to bottling partners, distributors, wholesalers, retailers, restaurants, and convenience stores. Operating through key segments such as North America, Europe, Middle East and Africa, Latin America, Asia Pacific, Global Ventures, and Bottling Investments, it reaches consumers in more than 200 countries and territories via a vast network of independent bottlers and distribution operators. Founded in 1886 and headquartered in Atlanta, Georgia, The Coca-Cola Company plays a pivotal role in the global consumer staples sector, providing refreshment through its multibillion-dollar brands.
Price Overview
Revenue & Net Income Trend
| Period | Revenue | Net Income | Net Margin | YoY/QoQ |
|---|
Key Metrics
EPS (Diluted): 3.04
Total Equity: $34.28B
Shares: 4,313,000,000
Total Debt: $0.00
Cash: $10.27B
EBITDA: $14.81B
Total Debt: $0.00
Cash: $10.27B
Revenue: $47.94B
Revenue: $47.94B
Revenue: $47.94B
Total Equity: $34.28B
Tax Rate: 17.9%
Equity: $34.28B
Total Debt: $0.00
Cash: $10.27B
Current Liabilities: $21.28B
Long-Term Debt: $0.00
Total Debt: $0.00
Total Equity: $34.28B
Shares: 4,313,000,000
Shares: 4,313,000,000
CapEx: -$2.11B
Shares: 4,313,000,000
Stock Price: $88.49
Net Income: $13.11B
Industry Benchmarks
Income Statement (Annual)
Last updated: Jul 30, 2026 4:11pm (24d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | $38.7B | $43.0B | $45.8B | $47.1B | $47.9B |
| Cost of Revenue | $15.4B | $18.0B | $18.5B | $18.3B | $18.4B |
| Gross Profit | $23.3B | $25.0B | $27.2B | $28.7B | $29.5B |
| Operating Expenses | $13.0B | $14.1B | $15.9B | $18.7B | $15.8B |
| Operating Income | $10.3B | $10.9B | $11.3B | $10.0B | $13.8B |
| Net Income | $9.8B | $9.5B | $10.7B | $10.6B | $13.1B |
| EBITDA | $11.8B | $12.2B | $12.4B | $11.1B | $14.8B |
| EPS | $2.26 | $2.20 | $2.48 | $2.47 | $3.05 |
| EPS (Diluted) | $2.25 | $2.19 | $2.47 | $2.46 | $3.04 |
Balance Sheet (Annual)
Last updated: Jul 30, 2026 4:11pm (24d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cash & Equivalents | $9.7B | $9.5B | $9.4B | $10.8B | $10.3B |
| Total Current Assets | $22.5B | $22.6B | $26.7B | $26.0B | $31.0B |
| Total Assets | $94.4B | $92.8B | $97.7B | $100.5B | $104.8B |
| Current Liabilities | $20.0B | $19.7B | $23.6B | $25.2B | $21.3B |
| Long-Term Debt | $38.1B | $36.4B | $35.5B | — | — |
| Total Liabilities | $69.5B | $66.9B | $70.2B | $74.2B | $70.5B |
| Total Equity | $24.9B | $25.8B | $27.5B | $26.4B | $34.3B |
| Retained Earnings | $69.1B | $71.0B | $73.8B | $76.1B | $80.4B |
Cash Flow (Annual)
Last updated: Jul 30, 2026 4:11pm (24d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Operating Cash Flow | $12.6B | $11.0B | $11.6B | $6.8B | $7.4B |
| Capital Expenditure | -$1.4B | -$1.5B | -$1.9B | -$2.1B | -$2.1B |
| Free Cash Flow | $11.3B | $9.5B | $9.7B | $4.7B | $5.3B |
| Acquisitions (net) | — | — | — | — | — |
| Net Debt Issued / (Repaid) | $13.1B | $4.0B | $6.9B | $12.1B | $5.0B |
| Dividends Paid | -$7.3B | -$7.6B | -$8.0B | -$8.4B | -$8.8B |
| Stock Buybacks | -$111.0M | -$1.4B | -$2.3B | -$1.8B | -$746.0M |
| Net Change in Cash | $2.9B | -$200.0M | -$133.0M | $1.8B | -$478.0M |
Growth Trends (YoY %)
Last updated: Jul 30, 2026 4:11pm (24d ago)| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue Growth | +11.3% | +6.4% | +2.9% | +1.9% |
| Gross Profit Growth | +7.3% | +8.9% | +5.5% | +2.8% |
| Operating Income Growth | +5.8% | +3.7% | -11.7% | +37.7% |
| Net Income Growth | -2.3% | +12.3% | -0.8% | +23.3% |
| EBITDA Growth | +3.5% | +2.2% | -11.0% | +33.8% |
Dividend History (Last 20)
Last updated: Jul 31, 2026 12:02am (23d ago)| Date | Dividend | Declaration | Record | Payment |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-06-15 | $0.53 | — | — | — |
| 2026-03-13 | $0.53 | — | — | — |
| 2025-12-01 | $0.51 | — | — | — |
| 2025-09-15 | $0.51 | — | — | — |
| 2025-06-13 | $0.51 | — | — | — |
| 2025-03-14 | $0.51 | — | — | — |
| 2024-11-29 | $0.49 | — | — | — |
| 2024-09-13 | $0.49 | — | — | — |
| 2024-06-14 | $0.49 | — | — | — |
| 2024-03-14 | $0.49 | — | — | — |
| 2023-11-30 | $0.46 | — | — | — |
| 2023-09-14 | $0.46 | — | — | — |
| 2023-06-15 | $0.46 | — | — | — |
| 2023-03-16 | $0.46 | — | — | — |
| 2022-11-30 | $0.44 | — | — | — |
| 2022-09-15 | $0.44 | — | — | — |
| 2022-06-14 | $0.44 | — | — | — |
| 2022-03-14 | $0.44 | — | — | — |
| 2021-11-30 | $0.42 | — | — | — |
| 2021-09-14 | $0.42 | — | — | — |
Deep Analysis
Narrative Economics
market-narrative step).
Claude Reading
Looking at the raw numbers first: KO is running $47.94B TTM revenue with 61.6% gross margins, 28.7% operating margins, and 27.3% net margins — these are exceptional and stable. The quarterly cadence shows Q1'26 at $12.47B rev / $3.92B NI (31.5% margin), up from Q1'25's $11.13B / $3.33B — that's 12% revenue growth and 18% earnings growth YoY in the most recent print, not the 2% trickle the annual CAGR suggests. Something has inflected recently, or Q1 comps flatter the trend. FCF at $5.30B against $13.11B net income is the real tell — a 40% cash conversion ratio for a "capital-light" concentrate business is bad and worth interrogating. The -26.3% FCF CAGR while earnings CAGR is +10.6% signals either aggressive working capital consumption, refranchising distortions, or accrual quality issues. ROIC of 47% and ROE of 38% are pristine, but debt is listed as "—" which is almost certainly a data gap, not zero — KO carries ~$40B+ gross debt historically, so the D/E of 0 is wrong and the EV multiples flowing from it are understated.
The synthesis verdict of $28.46 fair value against $88.49 is directionally right that KO is expensive but the magnitude is absurd and I dissent from it. A DCF that spits out $28 for a business earning $13B in net income with 38% ROE would imply the market cap should be ~$120B — roughly 9x earnings for a dividend aristocrat with 47% ROIC. That's not a fair value, that's a distressed-equity multiple, and no serious analyst would defend it. The synthesis is anchoring on some combination of punitive terminal growth, elevated discount rate, and FCF (not earnings) as the cash proxy — the last of which is defensible but overshoots when the FCF gap is likely working-capital noise. The market-forces "value trap" framing also over-eggs the pudding: KO's Q1'26 margin of 31.5% and 12% revenue growth aren't the fingerprints of a company "losing share in a structurally challenged category." They look like pricing power working.
That said, the bull case has real cracks. At 29x P/E, 25x EV/EBITDA, and 8x sales, KO is priced richer than the S&P 500 despite ~2-3% organic revenue growth. The 2.35% yield with a 67% payout ratio is fine but not compelling versus a 4%+ risk-free rate — the bond-proxy trade is worse now than any time in a decade. FCF of $5.3B against a $381B market cap is a 1.4% FCF yield; even adding buybacks you're not clearing 3% shareholder yield. Insider activity is uniformly sell-side (every exercise is paired with an immediate sale), which is normal for comp-driven executives but there's zero open-market buying to counterweight. A contrarian would argue: if rates stay elevated, the yield-chase premium compresses; if GLP-1s durably reduce sugared-beverage consumption (early data is mixed but non-trivial), volume growth structurally weakens; and the Q1'26 margin spike may reflect refranchising benefits that don't repeat. Reasonable fair value on 22-24x forward earnings of ~$3.10 lands at $68-75.
Net: I'm partial-agree with the synthesis direction (overvalued) but strongly dissent on magnitude. Fair value is $70-75, not $28 — the composite DCF is broken, likely from either the missing debt figure corrupting WACC or an over-weighting of the depressed FCF number. Downside from $88.49 is 15-20%, not 68%. This is a "trim if overweight, don't short, don't buy" name — the narrative durability is real (Buffett premium, dividend aristocrat status, 130-year brand) and can sustain a 15-20% premium to fundamentals indefinitely, but not the current 25-30% premium in a 4% rate world. The Q1'26 acceleration is the swing factor: if Q2/Q3 sustain 10%+ growth and 30%+ margins, the stock grows into the valuation; if margins revert to the 24-29% range and growth returns to 2-3%, the multiple compresses.
GPT Reading
Coca-Cola’s numbers still describe a superb business, but not an $88.49 stock. The operating model is exactly what investors want in a defensive compounder: annual revenue has risen from $38.66B in 2021 to $47.94B in 2025, gross margin sits at 61.6%, operating margin at 28.7%, and net margin reached 27.3% in 2025. Quarterly profitability is especially striking in the non-year-end periods, where net margins ran roughly 30% in 2025 and 31.5% in the latest quarter. That tells you the core franchise retains formidable pricing power and mix advantages. But the top line is not doing enough to justify the multiple. 2025 revenue grew only 1.9% over 2024, and the latest quarter’s $12.47B was only about 12% above the comparable 2025-03-28 quarter of $11.13B. This is not a double-digit secular grower; it is a slow-growing global staple priced like a scarce growth asset.
The valuation is where the story breaks. At 29.1x earnings, 8.0x sales, 25.0x EV/EBITDA, and 11.1x book, KO is being capitalized as though its durability alone can substitute for growth. On 2025 net income of $13.11B against a $380.77B market cap, the equity earnings yield is only about 3.4%; on free cash flow of $5.30B, the FCF yield is just 1.4%. That latter number is the most important one in the file, because it exposes how expensive the “safe dividend” narrative has become. Even if I haircut the weak cash conversion concern and assume 2025 FCF was temporarily depressed, investors are still paying an extraordinary premium for steadiness. A 2.35% dividend yield with a 66.98% payout ratio is respectable, but not enough to bridge the gap between underlying business growth and valuation. This looks less like a mispriced cash machine and more like a bond substitute that has been bid up beyond reasonable income math.
There is also an internal tension in the data that makes me less willing to pay up. Earnings have compounded much faster than revenue over the last five years, with net income up from $9.77B in 2021 to $13.11B in 2025 while revenue grew at a modest pace. That is great if it reflects durable mix, refranchising, and pricing; it is less comforting when operating cash flow is only $7.41B and free cash flow only $5.30B in 2025. A company reporting $13.11B of net income but converting less than half of that to free cash flow in the latest year does not deserve to be valued solely on EPS optics. The year-end quarter margins dropping to about 19% in both 2024 and 2025 also remind you that some of the eye-popping quarterly profitability is not evenly distributed. This is still a high-quality franchise, but the market is pricing perfection in both resilience and cash generation.
The best counterargument is straightforward and serious: KO may deserve to stay expensive for a very long time. ROE of 38.2% and ROIC of 47.1% are elite, the balance sheet appears conservative with $10.27B of cash and no reported debt in this data set, and the brand/distribution moat is one of the rare truly global consumer franchises. A bull would also note that annual operating income rebounded sharply to $13.76B in 2025 from $9.99B in 2024, and recent quarterly earnings are clearly strong, with latest-quarter net income of $3.92B up materially from $3.33B a year earlier. If inflation or macro volatility persists, investors may continue to pay a premium for predictable volumes, pricing power, and dividend continuity. I weigh that differently because paying 25x EBITDA and nearly 8x revenue for a business growing low single digits leaves very little room for any stumble in volume, FX, cash conversion, or category mix.
What would change my mind is not another quarter of 30% net margin; the market already assumes that. I would need to see evidence that cash flow catches up to accounting earnings and that growth is reaccelerating enough to support the premium. Specifically, if operating cash flow moves sustainably above $11B and free cash flow toward $9B-$10B while revenue growth returns to at least 5%-6% without margin erosion, then today’s multiple would look less stretched. Alternatively, a major rerating into the low $60s would put KO closer to a justifiable 20x-22x earnings range for a defensive franchise of this quality. At $88.49, the business is excellent and the stock is not.
Grok Reading
The numbers tell a story of a fortress franchise whose economics remain excellent on the income statement but whose cash conversion and growth trajectory no longer support the multiple the market is assigning. Revenue has crawled from $43.0B in 2022 to $47.9B in 2025 — a 2.4% CAGR — while net income jumped to $13.11B in 2025 from $10.63B the prior year on operating-margin expansion to 28.7%. Gross margin holds at a remarkable 61.6%. That is real pricing power and mix discipline. Yet operating cash flow printed only $7.41B and free cash flow $5.30B against that $13.11B of reported earnings; the FCF CAGR of –26.3% is the single most important contradiction in the briefing. A business that converts barely 40 cents of net income into free cash is not the bond-proxy machine the 29.1x P/E, 8.0x sales, and 25x EV/EBITDA imply. At $88.49 the market is capitalizing roughly $381B of equity on $5.3B of FCF — a mid-70s multiple of cash generation for low-single-digit top-line growth.
Quarterly progression reinforces the deceleration narrative rather than a re-acceleration. The four most recent quarters show revenue oscillating between $11.1B and $12.5B with no sustained breakout; year-over-year revenue growth is 1.9%. Earnings growth of 23% looks impressive until you notice it is almost entirely margin and one-time optics, not volume or structural mix shift. ROE of 38% and ROIC of 47% confirm the capital-light concentrate model still compounds invested capital brilliantly, which is why the franchise deserves a quality premium — just not a triple-digit premium to any reasonable cash-flow anchor. Insider activity is a string of option exercises immediately followed by sales; that is liquidity, not conviction. The dividend (2.35% yield, 67% payout) remains safe on the earnings base, but the payout already consumes more than the entire free-cash-flow line, leaving little organic reinvestment or balance-sheet flexibility if volumes soften further.
The strongest counter-argument is that Coca-Cola’s brand and distribution moat have justified premium multiples for decades, Berkshire’s stake validates the cultural permanence, and 2025’s operating-income leap from $10.0B to $13.8B shows management can still expand margins even in a slow-growth world. A skeptic of the overvalued call would also note that the $28–30 DCF spit out by the quantitative layer looks mechanically harsh — it may underweight terminal brand value and emerging-market pricing power — and that in a lower-rate or risk-off regime the stock can remain a scarcity asset for yield seekers indefinitely. I weigh those points seriously; the moat is not imaginary and narrative durability is high. I simply refuse to pay 29x earnings and ~70x FCF for 2% revenue growth and deteriorating cash conversion when history shows these premiums compress once the “safety” bid fades or rates reprice defensive duration.
I would reverse to neutral or constructive if free-cash-flow recovers above $10B on a trailing basis while revenue growth sustains above 4–5% for two consecutive years, or if the shares pulled back into the low-to-mid $60s where a mid-20s earnings multiple and a more tolerable FCF yield would restore margin of safety.
Big-3 Panel — where each AI stands
Advanced Analysis Forensic deep-dive · separate lenses
Revenue compounded from $38.7B (2021) to $47.9B (2025) with gross margin expanding to 61.6% and operating margin recovering to 28.7% in 2025 after a 2024 dip to 21.2% (likely one-time charges). Net income hit a record $13.1B in 2025. Earnings quality checks are clean: accruals 0.7% of assets, Beneish M -2.35, Altman Z 5.31 (safe zone), and OCF/NI 0.95x indicates reported earnings are largely cash-backed at the operating level. Diluted share count edged down from 4.34B to 4.31B, with buybacks running 4.2x SBC and SBC only 0.6% of revenue - per-share value is being protected. Net cash of $10.3B is thin at 2.7% of market cap, but for a business of this cash-generative reliability, that is a capital-allocation choice, not a survival issue. The soft spot is free cash flow: FCF fell from $11.3B (2021) to $4.7B (2024) and only partially recovered to $5.3B (2025), while net income kept climbing. That divergence - net income up ~34% since 2021 while FCF is down ~53% - is the one thing that doesn't fit the otherwise pristine picture and warrants scrutiny (working capital, litigation payments, tax matters, or capex intensity). Insider tape is all option-exercise-and-sell by operating executives (Pietracci, Mann, Quincey), zero open-market buys - typical mature-large-cap comp behavior, not a red flag but no conviction signal either.
Verify before trusting this (5)
- Reconcile the 2022-2025 FCF decline vs rising net income - is it fairlife/BodyArmor contingent consideration, IRS tax dispute payments, bottler refranchising working capital, or a genuine capex step-up?
- Confirm the 2024 operating-margin dip to 21.2% was driven by a specific one-time charge (impairment, litigation, restructuring) and not underlying deterioration.
- IRS tax case exposure and potential cash outflow timing.
- Bottler concentration and refranchising trajectory - how much of margin expansion is mix shift vs organic pricing power.
- Volume vs price/mix split within the ~4% revenue growth - is unit demand actually growing.
The e2e composite fair value of $30.12 and signal-adjusted $28.46 imply -68% downside, but those numbers fail the sanity check - a DCF at $20.79 and EPV floor at $24.67 would price KO at roughly 8x earnings, which no defensive megacap franchise with 61%+ gross margins and rising operating leverage trades at. The anchored-PE output of $54.24 is more credible but still assumes multiple compression from ~24x to something closer to 15x. My skeptical deserved value, adjusting upward for the Strong quality grade (moat, margin expansion, no dilution) but downward for softening FCF conversion and mid-single-digit growth, lands around $70-78 - roughly 19-22x forward earnings, in line with peers like PEP and defensive staples premium.
Verify before trusting this (4)
- FCF conversion trajectory in next 2 quarters - is the gap to net income closing
- Organic volume growth in developed markets vs pricing-led revenue
- Guidance on currency-neutral EPS and any buyback pace change
- Any one-time working capital or bottler-refranchising drags in reported FCF
The macro tape is neutral with VIX at 17 and the S&P a shade off highs, but the specific way that lands on KO is favorable: it is a low-beta consumer defensive with a bond-proxy dividend identity, exactly the profile that gets bid when rates are elevated but risk appetite is wobbly. News flow in the last 72 hours is unusually clean and positive - Q2 beat, guidance raised, FIFA/World Cup activation, an all-time high headline, and Buffett-portfolio-anchor framing - which reinforces the platform-monopoly narrative rather than testing it.
Verify before trusting this (4)
- Whether the 10y yield keeps rising - a sharp move higher would compress bond-proxy premiums including KO's
- Any sign the Q3 print or volume trends undercut the 'volume scale beats stagflation' framing
- Rotation out of defensives if VIX collapses and risk-on resumes - KO underperforms in that tape
- Follow-through on Fairlife recovery and any lingering supply/margin drag
This lens hasn't been run for this ticker yet.
When we made this prediction on Jul 31, 2026, KO was $88.49. We expect it to be $85.20 by Jan 2027, and we consider it great value under $68.00. This is an early model (v0.6.0) — the direction is more reliable than the exact price. Made Jul 31, 2026.
Blue is our prediction, starting the day we made it. Grey is a slower route to the same place — the same destination, taking longer. Black is the actual price, so you can see how we are doing.