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What this page is: Delvantic's full research page for Lloyds Banking Group Plc (LYG) — AI-driven forensic equity research: mechanical valuation models (DCF, EPV, anchored-PE, scenario) plus three independent AI lenses (Quality / Value / Sentiment). Everything below is rendered server-side; you are not missing content that requires JavaScript. All scores are predictions and research opinions, not financial advice.
Our current read (analysis of 2026-08-23): Designation Low · Gem Score -25 (−100…+100 Quality+Value blend) · Quality 14 · Value -57 · Sentiment -44 (timing only, not weighted) · Composite fair value $2.79 vs $6.28 at analysis
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profile-header/price-overview— company profile, live quote, market capextended-analysis— the core: three AI lens reads with findings, scores, and the analyst memofuture-predictions— our forward price-band predictionsmarket-narrative/ai-findings/gpt-critique— narrative context, cross-model findings, and an adversarial critique of our own analysis (near the end of the document)- Members-only sections (render as login gates for anonymous readers):
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Lloyds Banking Group Plc
LYG NYSELloyds Banking Group Plc ADR is an American Depositary Receipt providing US investors with access to the shares of the UK-based Lloyds Banking Group Plc, a major financial institution focused on retail banking, commercial banking, and insurance services primarily in the UK. It enables trading in US dollars, simplifying exposure to the European financial sector without cross-border complexities. The group offers a comprehensive suite of banking products including current and savings accounts, mortgages, personal loans, credit cards, and investment services for individual and business customers. In commercial banking, it provides lending, transaction banking, and specialized financial solutions to small and medium-sized enterprises as well as large corporations. Its insurance segment delivers life insurance, pensions, and protection products. Lloyds Banking Group Plc ADR plays a key role in the financial markets by representing one of the UK's leading banks, facilitating international investment in established British financial services while supporting diverse customer needs across personal, business, and institutional sectors. Headquartered in London since 2011, it remains integral to the domestic banking landscape.
Price Overview
Price History (1 Year)
Revenue & Net Income Trend
This company does not file structured financial statements with the U.S. SEC, so quarterly figures aren't available from our filings-based data engine. Annual figures shown here come from the sources that do cover it.
| Period | Revenue | Net Income | Net Margin | YoY/QoQ |
|---|
Key Metrics
EPS (Diluted): 0.37
Total Equity: $64.45B
Shares: 16,880,434,783
Total Debt: $0.00
Cash: $81.59B
EBITDA: N/A
Total Debt: $0.00
Cash: $81.59B
Revenue: $26.97B
Revenue: $26.97B
Revenue: $26.97B
Total Equity: $64.45B
Tax Rate: 28.6%
Equity: $64.45B
Total Debt: $0.00
Cash: $81.59B
Current Liabilities: N/A
Long-Term Debt: $0.00
Total Debt: $0.00
Total Equity: $64.45B
Shares: 16,880,434,783
Shares: 16,880,434,783
CapEx: -$6.83B
Shares: 16,880,434,783
Stock Price: $6.28
Net Income: $6.27B
Industry Benchmarks
Income Statement (Annual)
Last updated: Aug 7, 2026 5:34am (16d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | $22.0B | $21.6B | $32.5B | $34.3B | $27.0B |
| Cost of Revenue | — | — | — | — | — |
| Gross Profit | — | — | — | — | — |
| Operating Expenses | $5.7B | $4.6B | $6.0B | $6.6B | $5.2B |
| Operating Income | — | — | — | — | — |
| Net Income | $7.8B | $5.2B | $9.3B | $8.2B | $6.3B |
| EBITDA | — | — | — | — | — |
| EPS | $0.40 | $0.39 | $0.41 | $0.34 | $0.38 |
| EPS (Diluted) | $0.40 | $0.39 | $0.40 | $0.33 | $0.37 |
Balance Sheet (Annual)
Last updated: Aug 6, 2026 7:40am (17d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cash & Equivalents | $102.8B | $129.0B | $119.6B | $95.4B | $81.6B |
| Total Current Assets | — | — | — | — | — |
| Total Assets | $1.2T | $1.2T | $1.2T | $1.2T | $1.3T |
| Current Liabilities | — | — | — | — | — |
| Long-Term Debt | — | — | — | — | — |
| Total Liabilities | $1.1T | $1.1T | $1.1T | $1.2T | $1.2T |
| Total Equity | $71.6B | $64.0B | $63.8B | $61.8B | $64.5B |
| Retained Earnings | $13.8B | $13.7B | $9.1B | $8.0B | $8.5B |
Cash Flow (Annual)
Last updated: Aug 6, 2026 7:40am (17d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Operating Cash Flow | $8.9B | $29.6B | $9.2B | -$5.9B | $7.7B |
| Capital Expenditure | -$4.3B | -$5.2B | -$7.3B | -$5.9B | -$6.8B |
| Free Cash Flow | $4.6B | $24.4B | $1.8B | -$11.8B | $848.3M |
| Acquisitions (net) | -$76.8M | -$550.7M | -$511.7M | — | — |
| Net Debt Issued / (Repaid) | — | — | — | — | — |
| Dividends Paid | -$1.3B | -$2.1B | -$2.4B | -$2.6B | -$2.8B |
| Stock Buybacks | — | — | — | — | — |
| Net Change in Cash | $1.2B | $22.4B | -$9.4B | -$24.3B | -$13.8B |
Growth Trends (YoY %)
Last updated: Aug 7, 2026 5:34am (16d ago)| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue Growth | -1.7% | +50.6% | +5.4% | -21.4% |
| Gross Profit Growth | — | — | — | — |
| Operating Income Growth | — | — | — | — |
| Net Income Growth | -33.8% | +79.8% | -11.7% | -23.3% |
| EBITDA Growth | — | — | — | — |
Dividend History (Last 20)
Last updated: Aug 7, 2026 5:34am (16d ago)| Date | Dividend | Declaration | Record | Payment |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-04-10 | $0.13 | — | — | — |
| 2025-08-04 | $0.07 | — | — | — |
| 2025-04-11 | $0.10 | — | — | — |
| 2024-08-05 | $0.05 | — | — | — |
| 2024-04-11 | $0.09 | — | — | — |
| 2023-08-04 | $0.05 | — | — | — |
| 2023-04-13 | $0.08 | — | — | — |
| 2022-08-05 | $0.04 | — | — | — |
| 2022-04-07 | $0.07 | — | — | — |
| 2021-08-06 | $0.04 | — | — | — |
| 2021-04-15 | $0.03 | — | — | — |
| 2019-08-09 | $0.06 | — | — | — |
| 2019-04-04 | $0.11 | — | — | — |
| 2018-08-16 | $0.06 | — | — | — |
| 2018-04-19 | $0.11 | — | — | — |
| 2017-08-09 | $0.05 | — | — | — |
| 2017-04-05 | $0.03 | — | — | — |
| 2016-08-10 | $0.04 | — | — | — |
| 2016-04-06 | $0.03 | — | — | — |
| 2015-08-12 | $0.05 | — | — | — |
Deep Analysis
Narrative Economics
market-narrative step).
Claude Reading
The synthesis verdict here is nonsense, and I want to say that upfront. A DCF fair value of $2.51 on a UK retail bank trading at 1.64x book with 9.7% ROE and paying a 3.2% yield is a category error — you don't DCF a bank's free cash flow the way you'd DCF an industrial, because "FCF" for a deposit-taking institution is a meaningless artifact of loan book growth, regulatory capital movements, and central bank reserve dynamics. The $848M FCF versus $7.68B operating cash flow versus $6.27B net income tells you the model is choking on capex/loan classifications, not that "cash flow quality is poor." Lloyds' relevant valuation anchors are P/TBV, P/E on normalized earnings, and dividend coverage — on those, 1.64x book with ~10% ROE is roughly fair to slightly rich, not 60% overvalued.
That said, the raw numbers do deserve scrutiny. Revenue fell from $34.29B (2024) to $26.97B (2025), a 21.4% drop, and NI from $8.18B to $6.27B (-23.3%). For a UK bank in a still-elevated rate environment, that's a real deterioration — likely a combination of NIM compression as deposit betas caught up, the motor finance provisioning overhang (the FCA commission scandal, which Lloyds took a ~£1.2B charge on), and FX translation from GBP weakness. ROA at 0.49% is thin even for a retail bank; ROE at 9.7% is below the 12-14% you'd want to justify a premium to book. The 44% payout ratio gives dividend cushion, but the trajectory is wrong direction. Momentum-wise, -9% revenue CAGR and -17.7% earnings CAGR over five years is genuinely poor and undermines the "mature earner" thesis — this is closer to "mature stagnator."
The market-forces read of "strategic deleveraging with excessive provisioning creating upside optionality" is the most honest framing here. The motor finance provisions are likely over-reserved (UK banks routinely kitchen-sink these), and if the Supreme Court ruling lands better than feared or FCA remediation caps lower than reserved, there's a reserve release tailwind into 2026. The narrative model's "fallen angel" framing with moderate durability is right — this is a stock where the story is "boring, adequate ROE, 3%+ yield, tangible book floor" and that's a defensible holding but not a compelling buy at 1.64x book. A contrarian bull would note: UK banks structurally re-rated post-2023 as rates normalized, HSBC and NatWest are trading at similar or higher multiples, and Lloyds' £15B+ structural hedge repricing tailwind through 2026-2027 is a knowable earnings uplift that consensus is likely underweighting. A contrarian bear would counter: UK mortgage market share is genuinely eroding to challengers, digital deposit competition is real, and the 2025 earnings decline isn't a one-off but a normalization to a lower run-rate.
I dissent from the synthesis "overvalued at 60% premium" verdict — that's a broken model applied to the wrong asset class. But I don't endorse "undervalued" either. Fair value for LYG on a bank-appropriate framework: at ~$6.28 with tangible book roughly $3.80-4.00/ADR equivalent and normalized EPS of ~$0.40-0.45, you're paying ~1.6x TBV and ~14-15x normalized earnings for a 10% ROE bank with a 3.2% yield. That's fair, maybe 5-10% rich. Fair value I'd anchor at $5.75-6.25, with upside to $7.00-7.50 if motor finance reserves release and structural hedge tailwinds flow through cleanly in 2026. This is a hold-for-yield, not a value opportunity — the re-rating from £0.40 to £0.75 that UK bank bulls got over 2023-2024 has largely happened. New money here is buying the 3.2% dividend plus modest earnings recovery, not a mispriced asset.
GPT Reading
The first thing that jumps out is that the stock is being framed like a plain-vanilla cheap bank, but the supplied numbers do not actually show a cheap bank. At $91.2B of market cap against $64.5B of equity, Lloyds is on roughly 1.4x book by the raw balance-sheet figures, close to the cited 1.64x P/B, while earning just $6.27B in 2025 for a 9.7% ROE. That is not a distressed multiple; it is a premium multiple for a bank producing only around a high-single-digit to 10% return on equity. If I take those numbers at face value, investors are paying above book for a business whose earnings have moved the wrong way: net income fell from $9.26B in 2023 to $8.18B in 2024 to $6.27B in 2025, a two-year decline of about 32%. Revenue also rolled over from $34.29B to $26.97B in 2025, down 21%. A premium-to-book bank with shrinking revenue and shrinking earnings needs a clear case for temporary cyclicality; I do not see that proven in this dataset.
The cash-flow line strengthens the skepticism rather than weakening it. Operating cash flow of $7.68B looks acceptable against $6.27B of net income, but free cash flow is only $848M after $6.83B of capex, which is a very thin conversion for a company valued at $91B. For banks, conventional FCF is often a noisy and imperfect metric, so I would not hang the whole thesis on that one line. But when poor FCF sits alongside falling earnings, a 16.9x P/E, and a 3.2% dividend yield, it matters because it tells you this is not obviously a “paid to wait” setup. The payout ratio is 44%, so the dividend is not reckless, yet 3.2% is not enough compensation for owning a no-growth, UK-concentrated bank at above-book valuation. If the business were compounding book at a strong rate, the multiple could be defended; instead ROA is 0.49% and ROE is under 10%, both consistent with a solid but unexceptional franchise.
What the numbers suggest to me is a market still paying for franchise quality and rate leverage after the best part of the margin cycle has already passed. The 2022 to 2024 revenue surge from $21.60B to $34.29B likely reflected a favorable rate environment, but 2025 shows how quickly that benefit can reverse or normalize. If 2024 was closer to peak earnings power than trough, then the current valuation is too generous. On 2025 earnings, the stock is not remotely a bargain; on 2025 book value, it is asking investors to believe Lloyds can sustainably earn more than the current 9.7% ROE, ideally back into the low teens, to justify a 1.4x-1.6x book multiple. That may happen, but the burden of proof is on the bull when recent earnings are deteriorating, not improving. My read is that the stock is overvalued not because the franchise is bad, but because the market is still capitalizing it like a sturdier compounder than the recent numbers warrant.
The best counterargument is straightforward and serious: Lloyds is a dominant domestic retail and mortgage franchise, its balance sheet shows $81.6B of cash and a large $64.5B equity base, and even after the decline it still generated $6.27B of profit with a 23.3% net margin. Banks should not be judged on industrial-style EV/revenue or even conventional FCF, and if 2025 reflects one-off provisioning, margin normalization, or investment spend, then the right earnings base is closer to the $8B-$9B delivered in 2023-2024. On that view, the stock is closer to 10x-12x normalized earnings, the dividend has room to grow, and the franchise deserves a premium to book because Lloyds has scale, deposit stickiness, and substantial optionality if UK credit remains benign. I take that seriously. But even if I grant a normalized earnings figure of $8B, the current market cap is still about 11x-12x earnings for a bank with modest structural growth and concentrated macro exposure. That is fair at best, not obviously cheap.
What would change my mind is evidence that 2025 was a trough rather than a new run-rate. Specifically, I would want to see revenue stabilize back above $30B, net income recover toward at least $7.5B-$8.0B, and ROE move back above 11%-12% without a deterioration in capital or a stretched payout. If those metrics rebound while book value continues to grow, paying above book becomes defensible. Conversely, if revenue stays in the high-$20Bs and earnings remain around $6B, then the stock should not trade around $6.28; I would expect a meaningful de-rating, likely toward a valuation closer to book or below.
Grok Reading
Lloyds is printing a clear contraction story that the $6.28 price refuses to acknowledge. Revenue fell from $34.29B in 2024 to $26.97B in 2025, a 21.4% collapse, while net income slid from a 2023 peak of $9.26B through $8.18B to $6.27B—leaving earnings CAGR at –17.7% and free-cash-flow CAGR at a brutal –31.8%. The $848M of free cash flow against $6.27B of reported net income and $6.83B of capex is the red flag the models correctly surface: cash conversion is poor and the earnings quality is suspect. At a 16.9x trailing P/E and 1.65x book on a 9.7% ROE that is itself declining, the multiple embeds permanence that the income statement is actively dismantling. Net margin remains a healthy 23%, but a high margin on a shrinking revenue base is not a franchise premium; it is a lagging indicator. With market cap at $91B against $64.5B of equity, investors are paying a 41% premium to book for a bank whose return on equity is already below a reasonable cost of capital and heading lower.
The momentum data reinforce the same picture. Three-year revenue CAGR of –9% and recent earnings down 23% year-on-year are not noise around a rate cycle; they are the operating reality of a UK retail bank losing net-interest-margin ground and facing structural pressure on mortgage volumes. Operating cash flow of $7.68B still covers the dividend (3.2% yield, 44% payout), so the income vehicle narrative is not dead, but the payout is being defended by a balance sheet that is no longer growing earnings power. EV-to-revenue of 0.46 looks optically cheap only because bank leverage and deposit funding make that ratio almost meaningless; the P/B and P/E are the binding constraints, and both are elevated relative to the deteriorating fundamentals.
The strongest counter-argument is that bank DCFs are notoriously brittle and the $2.51 composite fair value is almost certainly too punitive. Lloyds still holds an unmatched UK deposit franchise, $81.6B of cash, zero reported debt-to-equity on the supplied sheet, and a statutory role in the domestic payments system that value investors have correctly defended through prior cycles. A 9.7% ROE with a 3%+ dividend can justify something closer to 1.0–1.2x book if rates stabilize and credit costs remain benign; the fallen-angel re-rating story is therefore not pure fantasy. The valuation gap the models flag may partly reflect temporary NIM compression rather than permanent franchise decay, and UK pension money has historically been willing to own this name through multi-year troughs precisely because tangible book and the dividend provide a floor the pure DCF ignores.
I would reverse to neutral or better only on two concrete prints: a return to positive revenue growth (or at least stabilization above $30B) accompanied by ROE re-expanding through 12%, and free-cash-flow conversion that closes the gap between the $6.27B net income and the sub-$1B FCF. Absent those, the stock remains a yield vehicle priced as if the contraction has already ended.
Big-3 Panel — where each AI stands
Advanced Analysis Forensic deep-dive · separate lenses
Lloyds is a classic mature earner: net income has run between 5.15B and 9.26B across 2021-2025, with 2025 delivering 6.27B on 26.97B of revenue. Diluted share count has been reduced at a -3.3% CAGR, indicating active capital return rather than dilution - a mark of a shareholder-aligned mature bank. Reported liquidity is enormous (81.59B liquid), consistent with a deposit-taking institution, and accruals are clean (-0.2% of assets, OCF/NI 1.68x).
Verify before trusting this (6)
- Whether the 2025 revenue drop (34.29B to 26.97B) reflects NIM compression, business mix, or accounting reclassification
- Loan-book credit quality trend: NPL ratio, coverage, and stage-3 loan trajectory
- CET1 ratio and regulatory capital headroom vs. Bank of England requirements
- Nature of share count volatility - convertibles, AT1s, or share consolidation events
- Motor finance / commissions litigation exposure and provisioning adequacy
- Composition of the 848M FCF for 2025 vs. prior years (working capital vs. underlying)
The e2e composite pegs deserved value at $2.79 (signal-adjusted $2.51) versus a $6.28 price, implying roughly -60% downside. Even acknowledging that a single anchored-PE method can under-shoot for a mature bank generating steady multi-billion profits with a fortress UK deposit franchise, the gap is too wide to shrug off. The bull case leans on re-rating toward tangible book and dividend yield, but at ~$91B market cap the market already appears to be pricing that recovery in, not discounting it.
Verify before trusting this (4)
- Motor-finance provisioning update and any FCA remediation quantification
- 2025 NIM trajectory and revenue guidance vs the noted revenue slump
- Buyback pace and dividend guidance vs consensus payout expectations
- Tangible book value per share to sanity-check the $2.79 anchored-PE FV against a P/TBV read
The macro tape is mildly supportive - VIX at 14.9, S&P near highs, risk-on regime building - but LYG's beta of 0.91 and defensive UK-bank profile mean it barely participates in the reflation. What actually presses on this name is the narrative decay: a moderate-intensity, moderate-durability fallen-angel story with low cult coefficient, meaning there's no true-believer base to defend it when the tape wobbles. The bear framing (structural NIM compression, no growth story, 2008 legacy) is winning on the margin, and recent momentum confirms it - down 21.4% recently versus a already-negative 9% long-term CAGR. That is a stock the market is actively marking down, not neutral drift. News flow is genuinely mixed and slightly constructive on the margin: dividend raised, H1 net income solid, but analyst chatter is split ('fully valued after 217% run' versus 'sizeable discount'), and a CRO exit adds a small governance overhang into 2026. Layer in UK fiscal-noise headlines (Burnham gilts concern) and you have a name that carries UK-sovereign narrative risk on top of sector fatigue. Net: the tape is friendly, but nothing is actively pulling LYG higher, and the price action plus narrative fade are doing real damage.
Verify before trusting this (4)
- Whether UK gilt spreads widen further on fiscal-rule debate - would amplify the sector pressure
- Any sell-side downgrade following the 'fully valued' framing gaining traction
- Sterling and BoE rate path - a hawkish surprise would rescue the NIM narrative
- Whether recent -21% drawdown finds a bid or extends, telling you if capitulation is done
This lens hasn't been run for this ticker yet.
When we made this prediction on Aug 10, 2026, LYG was $6.28. We expect it to be $5.65 by Feb 2027, and we consider it great value under $4.50. This is an early model (v0.6.0) — the direction is more reliable than the exact price. Made Aug 10, 2026.
Blue is our prediction, starting the day we made it. Grey is a slower route to the same place — the same destination, taking longer. Black is the actual price, so you can see how we are doing.