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What this page is: Delvantic's full research page for Marsh & McLennan Companies, Inc. (MMC) — AI-driven forensic equity research: mechanical valuation models (DCF, EPV, anchored-PE, scenario) plus three independent AI lenses (Quality / Value / Sentiment). Everything below is rendered server-side; you are not missing content that requires JavaScript. All scores are predictions and research opinions, not financial advice.
Our current read (analysis of 2026-08-23): Designation Watch · Gem Score -6 (−100…+100 Quality+Value blend) · Quality 71 · Value -69 · Sentiment 0 (timing only, not weighted) · Composite fair value $123.70 vs $192.01 at analysis
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Marsh & McLennan Companies, Inc.
MMC NYSEMarsh & McLennan Companies, Inc. is a leading global professional services firm specializing in risk management, insurance broking, reinsurance, and consulting. The company provides strategic advice and solutions that help organizations manage risk, optimize operations, and enhance workforce effectiveness. Its core operations span two main segments: Risk & Insurance Services, which includes Marsh’s insurance broking and Guy Carpenter’s reinsurance expertise, and Consulting, delivered through Mercer and Oliver Wyman, offering services in health, wealth, and career management, as well as strategic advisory and organizational transformation. Marsh & McLennan is recognized for its significant role in addressing complex business risks and facilitating effective decision-making for clients worldwide. In 2025, it reported robust revenue growth driven by solid performance across all divisions and continued momentum from strategic acquisitions. The firm serves a diverse client base across industries and geographies, underpinning its market significance as a trusted partner in helping organizations navigate evolving risk and regulatory landscapes.
Price Overview
Price History (1 Year)
Revenue & Net Income Trend
This company does not file structured financial statements with the U.S. SEC, so quarterly figures aren't available from our filings-based data engine. Annual figures shown here come from the sources that do cover it.
| Period | Revenue | Net Income | Net Margin | YoY/QoQ |
|---|
Key Metrics
EPS (Diluted): 8.43
Total Equity: $15.10B
Shares: 493,475,682
Total Debt: $21.45B
Cash: $2.69B
EBITDA: $7.38B
Total Debt: $21.45B
Cash: $2.69B
Revenue: $26.98B
Revenue: $26.98B
Revenue: $26.98B
Total Equity: $15.10B
Tax Rate: 23.6%
Equity: $15.10B
Total Debt: $21.45B
Cash: $2.69B
Current Liabilities: $21.06B
Long-Term Debt: $19.85B
Total Debt: $21.45B
Total Equity: $15.10B
Shares: 493,475,682
Shares: 493,475,682
CapEx: $0.00
Shares: 493,475,682
Stock Price: $192.01
Net Income: $4.16B
Industry Benchmarks
Income Statement (Annual)
Last updated: Aug 22, 2026 2:15pm (1d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | $19.8B | $20.7B | $22.7B | $24.5B | $27.0B |
| Cost of Revenue | $11.4B | $12.1B | $13.1B | $14.0B | $15.6B |
| Gross Profit | $8.4B | $8.6B | $9.6B | $10.5B | $11.4B |
| Operating Expenses | $4.1B | $4.4B | $4.4B | $4.6B | $5.2B |
| Operating Income | $4.3B | $4.3B | $5.3B | $5.8B | $6.2B |
| Net Income | $3.1B | $3.1B | $3.8B | $4.1B | $4.2B |
| EBITDA | $5.3B | $5.2B | $6.3B | $6.9B | $7.4B |
| EPS | $6.20 | $6.11 | $7.60 | $8.26 | $8.48 |
| EPS (Diluted) | $6.13 | $6.04 | $7.53 | $8.18 | $8.43 |
Balance Sheet (Annual)
Last updated: Aug 22, 2026 2:15pm (1d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cash & Equivalents | $1.8B | $1.4B | $3.4B | $2.4B | $2.7B |
| Total Current Assets | $8.3B | $19.0B | $21.7B | $22.1B | $23.2B |
| Total Assets | $34.4B | $44.1B | $48.0B | $56.5B | $58.7B |
| Current Liabilities | $6.7B | $17.8B | $19.8B | $19.5B | $21.1B |
| Long-Term Debt | $12.8B | $12.9B | $13.5B | $21.0B | $19.8B |
| Total Liabilities | $23.2B | $33.4B | $35.7B | $42.9B | $43.4B |
| Total Equity | $11.0B | $10.5B | $12.2B | $13.3B | $15.1B |
| Retained Earnings | $18.4B | $20.3B | $22.8B | $25.3B | $27.8B |
Cash Flow (Annual)
Last updated: Aug 22, 2026 2:15pm (1d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Operating Cash Flow | $3.5B | $3.4B | $4.1B | $4.3B | $5.1B |
| Capital Expenditure | — | — | — | — | — |
| Free Cash Flow | $3.1B | $3.0B | $3.8B | $4.0B | $5.0B |
| Acquisitions (net) | -$775.0M | -$453.0M | -$993.0M | -$8.5B | -$630.0M |
| Net Debt Issued / (Repaid) | -$273.0M | $619.0M | $1.8B | $6.6B | -$519.0M |
| Dividends Paid | -$1.0B | -$1.1B | -$1.3B | -$1.5B | -$1.7B |
| Stock Buybacks | -$1.2B | -$2.0B | -$1.2B | -$900.0M | -$2.0B |
| Net Change in Cash | $700.0M | $728.0M | $2.1B | -$478.0M | $486.0M |
Growth Trends (YoY %)
Last updated: Aug 22, 2026 2:15pm (1d ago)| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue Growth | +4.5% | +9.7% | +7.6% | +10.3% |
| Gross Profit Growth | +3.0% | +11.4% | +8.6% | +9.0% |
| Operating Income Growth | -0.7% | +23.4% | +10.1% | +7.0% |
| Net Income Growth | -3.0% | +23.1% | +8.1% | +2.5% |
| EBITDA Growth | -1.7% | +20.3% | +9.5% | +6.7% |
Dividend History (Last 20)
Last updated: Aug 22, 2026 2:15pm (1d ago)| Date | Dividend | Declaration | Record | Payment |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-01-29 | $0.90 | — | — | — |
| 2025-10-02 | $0.90 | — | — | — |
| 2025-07-24 | $0.90 | — | — | — |
| 2025-04-03 | $0.82 | — | — | — |
| 2025-01-30 | $0.82 | — | — | — |
| 2024-10-04 | $0.82 | — | — | — |
| 2024-07-25 | $0.82 | — | — | — |
| 2024-04-03 | $0.71 | — | — | — |
| 2024-01-24 | $0.71 | — | — | — |
| 2023-10-05 | $0.71 | — | — | — |
| 2023-07-26 | $0.71 | — | — | — |
| 2023-04-04 | $0.59 | — | — | — |
| 2023-01-25 | $0.59 | — | — | — |
| 2022-10-06 | $0.59 | — | — | — |
| 2022-07-27 | $0.59 | — | — | — |
| 2022-04-05 | $0.54 | — | — | — |
| 2022-01-26 | $0.54 | — | — | — |
| 2021-10-07 | $0.54 | — | — | — |
| 2021-07-28 | $0.54 | — | — | — |
| 2021-04-06 | $0.47 | — | — | — |
Deep Analysis
Narrative Economics
market-narrative step).
Growth Outlook
Analyzed 2026-08-22 14:39The question every valuation on this page silently assumes: is this company likely to grow? Judged forward — the business, its category, the world — against what's already printed.
Claude Reading
Looking at MMC's raw numbers first: revenue has compounded from $19.82B (2021) to $26.98B (2025), a 4-year CAGR of ~8.0% — respectable but not extraordinary for a firm trading at 22.8x earnings. More telling: 2025 net income of $4.16B grew just 2.5% YoY against 10.3% revenue growth, meaning net margin compressed from 16.6% to 15.4%. Operating margin held at ~23%, so the earnings deceleration is below-the-line (interest expense on that $21.45B debt load, likely). ROE of 27.5% looks impressive but is levered — debt/equity of 1.42 and ROA of just 7.1% tell the truer story. FCF of $5.00B against a $93.5B market cap is a 5.3% FCF yield, which is fine but not cheap for a business growing earnings mid-single-digits.
The synthesis verdict of $125 fair value (-34.7%) strikes me as too aggressive on the downside. A DCF that spits out $125 for MMC is almost certainly using a discount rate that doesn't credit the quality of the cash flows — insurance broking is genuinely sticky (retention rates in the 90s), commissions scale with premium inflation which is running hot, and the Mercer/Oliver Wyman mix does provide real cross-sell. That said, the pre-flight and narrative layers correctly identify the crux: the market is paying 22.8x for a business whose earnings grew 2.5% last year. Even generous assumptions — say 8% earnings CAGR forward and a 20x exit multiple — don't get you to $192 with any margin of safety. Fair value is probably $145-165, not $125 and not $192.
The contrarian case for the bulls: the hard insurance market (P&C premium rates up double digits in 2023-24) directly boosts Marsh's commission-based revenue with almost no incremental cost — this is why revenue accelerated to 10.3% while the underlying business hasn't changed. If premium rates normalize (which cycle history suggests they will within 12-24 months), that 10% top-line collapses back to 5-6% and the multiple compresses. Conversely, cyber and climate risk intermediation is a genuine secular tailwind that could sustain elevated growth longer than skeptics think. The bear case that consulting is cyclical is real but overstated — Mercer's retirement/health advisory is annuity-like. Where I disagree with the narrative layer calling this "platform-monopoly": it's not. It's a Big Three oligopoly (MMC, Aon, WTW) with pricing discipline, but there's no network effect and switching costs are moderate, not extreme.
The data gaps that matter: no quarterly trajectory was provided, which is a significant blind spot given that the 2.5% earnings growth in 2025 could be a one-quarter anomaly (say, a legal charge or integration cost) or a genuine deceleration. The "insufficient_data" flag on quarterly trend is doing real work here. Also, capex is listed as "—" which prevents proper FCF quality assessment — though the $5.00B OCF/$5.11B FCF spread tells me capex is minimal (~$100M), consistent with an asset-light broker. No insider activity data was provided at all, which for a mature-earner thesis is a meaningful omission. I side with the synthesis direction (overvalued) but dissent on magnitude — the -34.7% call requires the hard market to fully unwind AND consulting to compress AND the multiple to re-rate to 15x simultaneously. More likely: MMC drifts sideways or corrects 15-20% as growth normalizes, making fair value ~$155-165. This isn't a short; it's a "trim, don't buy here" name where the next 3 years likely deliver 3-5% annualized returns including the 1.8% dividend — below equity cost of capital.
GPT Reading
At $192, MMC is being priced more like a premium defensive compounder than a mature broker/consultant, and the recent numbers do not quite support that premium. The business is undeniably strong: revenue has grown from $19.82B in 2021 to $26.98B in 2025, an 8.9% CAGR, while free cash flow reached $5.00B and operating cash flow $5.11B. Margins are healthy and durable, with gross margin at 42.3%, operating margin at 23.1%, and net margin at 15.4%. That is exactly the sort of profile investors pay up for. But the key issue is what has to happen from here to justify 22.8x earnings, 15.3x EV/EBITDA, 4.2x EV/revenue, and 6.3x book for a company whose earnings growth has lagged revenue. Net income went from $3.14B in 2021 to $4.16B in 2025, only a 5.2% CAGR, and from 2024 to 2025 it rose just 2.5% despite revenue increasing 10.3%. That spread tells you the incremental revenue is not dropping through at a rate consistent with a stock trading at a substantial quality premium.
The raw progression is actually a little less impressive than the headline growth suggests. Operating income rose from $4.31B in 2021 to $6.22B in 2025, but there was a dip in 2022 to $4.28B before the recovery, so this is not a pristine straight-line margin story. Operating margin improved from about 21.7% in 2021 to 23.1% in 2025, which is good, but not enough to explain why the market should pay a multiple more typical of a stronger secular grower. Meanwhile, the balance sheet is fine but not especially conservative: $21.45B of debt against $2.69B of cash leaves net debt near $18.8B, and debt-to-equity is 1.42x. For a business with stable cash generation that is manageable, but it also means the 27.6% ROE is flattered by leverage and should not be mistaken for extraordinary underlying economics. The cleaner figure is 14.1% ROIC, which is solid, yet again not so exceptional that I want to pay nearly 23x earnings for a company with mid-single-digit earnings growth.
What stands out most is that this looks like a business enjoying strong pricing and acquisition tailwinds in insurance broking while consulting and advisory likely provide diversification, but the market is capitalizing that as though 2024-2025 growth is the new baseline. I doubt it. Insurance broking is a very good business, but it is still tied to pricing cycles, exposure growth, and retention rather than unlimited volume expansion. Consulting is useful ballast, but it is not a reason to award a scarcity multiple in a softer macro backdrop. On $4.16B of net income and a $93.5B market cap, investors are accepting an earnings yield of about 4.5%; on $5.0B of free cash flow, the FCF yield is only about 5.3%. Those are defensible for an elite, faster-growing franchise, but stretched for a company where earnings growth has already decelerated to low single digits even while revenues remain robust. My read is simple: this is a high-quality company, but the stock embeds too much confidence that double-digit top-line growth can persist without margin friction.
The best case against my view is also obvious and respectable. MMC has exactly the traits institutions crowd into when macro conditions deteriorate: recurring client relationships, low capital intensity, strong cash conversion, a modest 40.8% payout ratio, and pricing support from rising insured values and increasing risk complexity. Revenue growth has accelerated versus the 2021-2023 base, and 2025 revenue of $26.98B versus $24.46B in 2024 is a real step-up, not financial engineering. If that revenue can keep compounding high single digits while operating margin expands another 100-150 basis points, then 22.8x earnings will not look crazy in hindsight. A bull would also note that 15.3x EV/EBITDA is not absurd for a durable oligopolistic intermediary with 5%+ FCF yield, especially if bolt-on M&A and buybacks continue to support EPS. I weigh those points less heavily because the 2025 numbers already test the thesis: strong sales growth only produced 2.5% earnings growth. When a premium multiple meets slowing earnings conversion, downside usually comes from de-rating rather than operational collapse.
What would change my mind is not another year of revenue growth alone; I would need to see much better profit translation. If MMC can grow revenue another high-single-digit rate while lifting net income by at least 8-10% and sustaining FCF above $5.5B, that would indicate the 2025 earnings slowdown was temporary rather than structural. I would also get more constructive if leverage trends down materially, with net debt/earnings capacity improving enough to make the ROE quality cleaner. Absent that, I think the stock needs either a pullback into roughly the $150-$165 range or a meaningfully stronger earnings trajectory to offer an attractive risk/reward.
Grok Reading
The numbers describe a high-quality compounding franchise that is still being asked to stretch. Revenue has climbed from $19.82B in 2021 to $26.98B in 2025, an 8.9% CAGR that accelerated to 10.3% in the latest year, while free cash flow reached $5.00B on only $5.11B of operating cash flow—essentially all earnings convert. Operating margin expanded from roughly 20.7% in 2022 to 23.1% in 2025 and net margin sits at 15.4%, supporting a 27.6% ROE. That is the clean story of an insurance-brokerage oligopolist plus consulting (Mercer/Oliver Wyman) riding a hard pricing cycle and cross-sell. What stands out against the growth narrative is the earnings lag: net income only rose 2.5% year-over-year to $4.16B despite the double-digit top line, and the five-year earnings CAGR is just 5.2%. Leverage is material—$21.45B of debt against $2.69B cash and $15.10B equity (D/E 1.42)—so the 14.1% ROIC is respectable but not spectacular once the balance sheet is counted. At $192 and a 22.8x P/E, 15.3x EV/EBITDA and 3.5x sales, the market is capitalizing mid-teens-plus growth and further margin lift that the recent earnings print does not yet confirm.
The valuation synthesis fair value near $125 implies the stock is roughly 35% rich, and that gap is the right directional signal even if the absolute DCF looks conservative. FCF yield is about 5.3% and the dividend is a modest 1.8% at a 41% payout; those cash returns are fine for a defensive compounder but do not justify a multiple that historically sat closer to the mid-teens. Momentum is real—recent revenue growth is the strongest in the five-year window—yet the disconnect between 10% revenue growth and 2.5% earnings growth is the contradiction the quantitative models correctly flag. Macro headwinds and a mature-earner archetype reinforce that this is not a re-rating story still in early innings; it is a quality name already priced as a secular growth compounder.
The strongest case against an overvalued read is simply the durability of the franchise and the cash engine. Insurance broking remains an oligopoly with high switching costs when catastrophe and cyber risk are on the line; Mercer and Oliver Wyman embed MMC inside Fortune 500 C-suites, producing recurring, high-margin advisory revenue that is hard to dislodge. Gross margin holds above 42%, FCF has compounded at 12.3%, and ROE above 27% shows the model still throws off economic profit after leverage. A bull can argue that 8–10% revenue growth is the new baseline in a structurally harder risk environment, that operating leverage will reappear once integration costs normalize, and that 22–23x is a fair multiple for a 14%+ ROIC compounder with defensive characteristics when the alternative is lower-quality financials. That argument has merit on quality grounds; I weigh it less because the multiple already capitalizes the best version of that story while trailing earnings growth and net leverage leave little cushion if consulting demand softens or the hard market rolls over.
I would reverse course if the next two reported years show net income growth re-accelerating into the high single digits or better while holding operating margins at or above 23%, or if organic revenue sustains above 8% through a softer macro tape without further debt-funded M&A. A clear de-leveraging path that brings net debt down materially while FCF stays near $5B-plus would also justify a higher multiple. Conversely, any quarter where revenue growth slips back to mid-single digits with flat-to-down earnings would confirm the premium is unsustainable.
Big-3 Panel — where each AI stands
Advanced Analysis Forensic deep-dive · separate lenses
The business shows textbook mature-earner quality: revenue grew from 19.82B in 2021 to 26.98B in 2025 (about 8% CAGR), operating margin expanded from 21.8% to a 23-24% band, and net income rose from 3.14B to 4.16B while FCF climbed from 3.11B to 5.00B. OCF/NI of 1.12x, negative accruals (-0.9% of assets), and Beneish M of -2.49 all point to earnings that are backed by cash rather than manufactured. Diluted share count shrank every year (512.7M to 493.5M, -1% CAGR) with buybacks running nearly 4x SBC (1.5% of revenue), so per-share value is being concentrated rather than leaked. The one real constraint is the balance sheet: net cash is -18.76B against only 2.69B liquid, and Altman Z of 2.81 sits in the grey zone. For an insurance broker with recurring commission/fee revenue and 5B of annual FCF this leverage is serviceable, but it means the cushion is earnings power, not the balance sheet. Nothing in the mechanical checks flags aggressive accounting, and the multi-year margin and FCF trajectory is a quiet up-and-to-the-right pattern consistent with a well-run franchise.
Verify before trusting this (5)
- Composition and maturity ladder of the ~18.8B net debt position and any floating-rate exposure
- Organic vs acquired revenue growth split — how much of the 8% CAGR is M&A driven
- Goodwill/intangibles as share of assets and any impairment risk from prior acquisitions
- Segment mix between Marsh, Guy Carpenter, Mercer, Oliver Wyman and whether margins are broad-based
- Pension and off-balance-sheet obligations that could tighten the leverage picture
At $192.01 the stock sits roughly 53-55% above the composite fair value of $123.70 and the signal-adjusted $125.31, and even the most generous input (anchored-PE at $142.05) leaves the price ~35% rich. The EPV floor of $105.35 says the current earnings stream, capitalized without heroic growth, supports barely half the quote. That is a market pricing in continued mid-to-high single digit revenue growth, further margin expansion, and clean synergy capture on recent M&A — essentially the bull case executed cleanly for years. Earnings quality is high (score 2), so no haircut is warranted, but that just means the deserved-value numbers are trustworthy, not that they are too low. Business quality (score 71) legitimately lifts the deserved multiple above a generic broker, but even generously flexing the anchored-PE case to the top of the range you still get $142-150, well below $192. The gap is the market paying full freight for a proven compounder — a reasonable stance, but not a mispricing in the buyer's favor. Net debt of $18.8B also argues against stretching the multiple further.
Verify before trusting this (4)
- Organic revenue growth trajectory in Marsh and consulting segments vs the mid-single-digit assumption baked into FV
- Realized margin expansion and synergy capture from recent acquisitions
- Net debt trajectory and interest expense post-M&A
- Any forward guidance on capital return pace given elevated leverage
None surfaced.
None surfaced.
The world is turning from a hard insurance market to a softening one: abundant capacity and lower cat-reinsurance pricing shrink the premium pool brokers clip, so the industry's revenue engine slows even as risk complexity (cyber, climate, litigation) grows. Simultaneously, rate cuts remove the fiduciary-income kicker while the 4.69% long end keeps acquisition debt expensive. Offsetting this, employer health cost inflation and retirement complexity keep advisory demand firm. Net: a decelerating tailwind, not a reversal.
When we made this prediction on Aug 23, 2026, MMC was $192.01. We expect it to be $183.00 by Feb 2027, and we consider it great value under $150.00. This is an early model (v0.6.0) — the direction is more reliable than the exact price. Made Aug 23, 2026.
Blue is our prediction, starting the day we made it. Grey is a slower route to the same place — the same destination, taking longer. Black is the actual price, so you can see how we are doing.