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What this page is: Delvantic's full research page for Petrobras S.A. (PBR) — AI-driven forensic equity research: mechanical valuation models (DCF, EPV, anchored-PE, scenario) plus three independent AI lenses (Quality / Value / Sentiment). Everything below is rendered server-side; you are not missing content that requires JavaScript. All scores are predictions and research opinions, not financial advice.
Our current read (analysis of 2026-08-23): Designation Low · Gem Score -16 (−100…+100 Quality+Value blend) · Quality -7 · Value -23 · Sentiment 21 (timing only, not weighted) · Composite fair value $19.49 vs $18.52 at analysis
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Petrobras S.A.
PBR NYSEPetrobras S.A. Sponsored ADR represents interests in Petróleo Brasileiro S.A., a Brazilian integrated energy company headquartered in Rio de Janeiro. The company operates across the oil and gas value chain, with core activities in exploration and production, refining, transportation, and marketing of crude oil and petroleum products. Petrobras S.A. Sponsored ADR provides international investors exposure to Petrobras’ operations, which are heavily focused on large offshore fields in Brazil, including deepwater and ultra-deepwater basins. The company also develops and commercializes natural gas, natural gas liquids, and related energy solutions through segments that encompass gas and low carbon energies. In addition, Petrobras is involved in logistics, trading, and distribution of fuels and other oil derivatives within Brazil and selected international markets. The ADR structure allows investors to access shares of this government-controlled energy major in U.S. dollars, while Petrobras continues to play a central role in Brazil’s domestic fuel supply and broader energy infrastructure.
Price Overview
Price History (1 Year)
Revenue & Net Income Trend
This company does not file structured financial statements with the U.S. SEC, so quarterly figures aren't available from our filings-based data engine. Annual figures shown here come from the sources that do cover it.
| Period | Revenue | Net Income | Net Margin | YoY/QoQ |
|---|
Key Metrics
EPS (Diluted): 0.58
Total Equity: $59.35B
Shares: 12,979,310,345
Total Debt: $23.16B
Cash: $3.27B
EBITDA: $39.36B
Total Debt: $23.16B
Cash: $3.27B
Revenue: $91.42B
Revenue: $91.42B
Revenue: $91.42B
Total Equity: $59.35B
Tax Rate: 31.7%
Equity: $59.35B
Total Debt: $23.16B
Cash: $3.27B
Current Liabilities: $31.46B
Long-Term Debt: $20.60B
Total Debt: $23.16B
Total Equity: $59.35B
Shares: 12,979,310,345
Shares: 12,979,310,345
CapEx: $0.00
Shares: 12,979,310,345
Stock Price: $18.52
Net Income: $7.53B
Industry Benchmarks
Income Statement (Annual)
Last updated: Aug 7, 2026 12:02am (16d ago)| Metric | 2020 | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | $53.7B | $84.0B | $124.5B | $102.4B | $91.4B |
| Cost of Revenue | $29.2B | $43.2B | $59.5B | $48.4B | $45.4B |
| Gross Profit | $24.5B | $40.8B | $65.0B | $54.0B | $46.0B |
| Operating Expenses | $14.4B | $3.2B | $7.9B | $15.9B | $19.1B |
| Operating Income | $10.1B | $37.6B | $57.1B | $38.0B | $26.9B |
| Net Income | $1.1B | $19.9B | $36.6B | $24.9B | $7.5B |
| EBITDA | $21.5B | $49.3B | $70.3B | $51.3B | $39.4B |
| EPS | $0.09 | $1.52 | $2.81 | $1.91 | $0.58 |
| EPS (Diluted) | — | $1.52 | $2.81 | $1.91 | $0.58 |
Balance Sheet (Annual)
Last updated: Aug 7, 2026 12:02am (16d ago)| Metric | 2020 | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cash & Equivalents | $11.7B | $10.5B | $8.0B | $12.7B | $3.3B |
| Total Current Assets | $27.4B | $30.1B | $31.3B | $32.4B | $21.8B |
| Total Assets | $190.0B | $174.3B | $187.2B | $217.1B | $181.6B |
| Current Liabilities | $26.2B | $24.2B | $31.4B | $33.9B | $31.5B |
| Long-Term Debt | $49.7B | $32.1B | $26.4B | $24.5B | $20.6B |
| Total Liabilities | $130.1B | $104.5B | $117.4B | $138.1B | $122.3B |
| Total Equity | $59.9B | $69.8B | $69.8B | $79.0B | $59.4B |
| Retained Earnings | — | — | $1.7B | $2.0B | — |
Cash Flow (Annual)
Last updated: Aug 7, 2026 12:02am (16d ago)| Metric | 2020 | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Operating Cash Flow | $28.9B | $37.8B | $49.7B | $43.2B | $38.0B |
| Capital Expenditure | — | — | — | — | — |
| Free Cash Flow | — | — | — | — | — |
| Acquisitions (net) | — | — | — | — | — |
| Net Debt Issued / (Repaid) | -$8.7B | -$19.5B | -$6.5B | -$2.0B | -$4.4B |
| Dividends Paid | -$930.0M | $12.0B | $36.4B | -$11.9B | -$11.7B |
| Stock Buybacks | — | — | — | — | — |
| Net Change in Cash | $4.3B | -$1.2B | -$2.5B | $4.7B | -$9.5B |
Growth Trends (YoY %)
Last updated: Aug 7, 2026 12:02am (16d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue Growth | +56.4% | +48.2% | -17.7% | -10.7% |
| Gross Profit Growth | +66.6% | +59.3% | -16.9% | -14.8% |
| Operating Income Growth | +273.5% | +52.0% | -33.4% | -29.3% |
| Net Income Growth | +1,641.9% | +84.3% | -32.1% | -69.7% |
| EBITDA Growth | +129.1% | +42.7% | -27.0% | -23.3% |
Dividend History (Last 20)
Last updated: Aug 5, 2026 9:40am (18d ago)| Date | Dividend | Declaration | Record | Payment |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-06-03 | $0.14 | — | — | — |
| 2026-04-24 | $0.12 | — | — | — |
| 2025-08-25 | $0.25 | — | — | — |
| 2025-06-04 | $0.32 | — | — | — |
| 2025-04-22 | $0.13 | — | — | — |
| 2024-12-27 | $0.23 | — | — | — |
| 2024-12-13 | $0.53 | — | — | — |
| 2024-08-23 | $0.15 | — | — | — |
| 2024-06-13 | $0.03 | — | — | — |
| 2024-05-03 | $0.34 | — | — | — |
| 2024-04-26 | $0.21 | — | — | — |
| 2023-11-22 | $0.17 | — | — | — |
| 2023-08-22 | $0.47 | — | — | — |
| 2023-06-13 | $0.38 | — | — | — |
| 2023-04-28 | $0.56 | — | — | — |
| 2022-11-22 | $0.65 | — | — | — |
| 2022-08-12 | $1.29 | — | — | — |
| 2022-05-24 | $0.68 | — | — | — |
| 2022-04-14 | $1.17 | — | — | — |
| 2021-12-02 | $0.77 | — | — | — |
Deep Analysis
Narrative Economics
market-narrative step).
Claude Reading
The raw numbers tell a brutal cyclical story that the models are underweighting. Revenue has collapsed from $124.5B (2022) to $91.4B (2024), a 27% peak-to-trough drop, and net income has cratered from $36.6B to $7.5B — an 80% earnings collapse in two years. That's not a "mature earner" gently compounding; that's a commodity operator whose 2022 print was a Ukraine-war windfall and whose 2024 print reflects normalization plus Lula-era pricing interference (Petrobras abandoned import parity pricing in 2023). The trailing P/E of 31.9x looks expensive, but that's because you're dividing $18.52 by depressed EPS. On 2023 earnings ($24.9B NI = ~$3.87/ADR-equivalent), this trades at ~5x. On 2022, ~3x. Which "E" you believe determines everything, and the synthesis's $19 fair value quietly assumes something in between without saying so.
The balance sheet is genuinely strong for an oil major: $23B debt against $59B equity and $38B operating cash flow — debt/OCF of 0.6x is exceptional. ROIC of 23% on the pre-salt assets is world-class; these are among the lowest-breakeven barrels on the planet (~$35/bbl). But the current ratio of 0.69 and cash of only $3.3B against a payout ratio of 155% tells you the dividend is being funded by drawing down liquidity and/or is about to be cut hard. A 4.5% stated yield with a 155% payout on collapsing earnings is not a "10% dividend fortress" — the bull narrative is stale by roughly one earnings cycle. The market-forces "political football" framing is the correct lens: dividends here are a fiscal instrument for Brasília, not a capital return policy.
Where I disagree with the models: the synthesis calling this "fair value" at $19 with a 4.2% overvaluation is falsely precise given a -54.7% earnings CAGR and no visibility on where the trough is. The narrative engine's claim that "fundamentals explain 95% of price" is circular — fundamentals for a commodity name ARE the narrative about forward oil prices and BRL. Pre-flight nails the sovereign-discount framing but then doesn't act on it: if you truly believe in a permanent state-ownership risk premium, then $18.52 isn't fairly valued, it's *appropriately* discounted, which is different — it means don't expect the discount to close. The mature_earner archetype at 0.63 confidence is the wrong bucket; this is cyclical_commodity_with_political_overlay, and treating it as a compounder will get you run over by the next Lula policy shift or Brent drawdown to $65.
The contrarian long case is real but narrow: at $18.52 with EV/EBITDA of 6.6x, you're paying trough multiples on trough earnings, and if Brent holds $75+ and BRL stabilizes, 2025 earnings normalize toward $15-18B, putting the P/E back near 7-8x with a sustainable ~6-7% dividend. That's a 30-40% total return case over 18 months. The contrarian short case is equally real: another dividend cut, a Lula pricing intervention, or Brent to $60 puts fair value at $13-14, and the ADR has done exactly this multiple times in the past decade. I lean slightly bearish because the payout ratio math is untenable and the earnings trajectory hasn't stabilized — you don't catch this knife until you see one clean quarter of sequential EPS growth, which the "insufficient_data" quarterly flag confirms we can't verify. The models' 4% overvaluation call understates the asymmetry: downside to $13 is larger than upside to $23 without a Brent tailwind.
Net: I partially dissent from the fair-value synthesis. The stock isn't 4% overvalued; it's fairly priced for a bear case and cheap for a bull case, with the payout ratio being the tell that consensus is still too optimistic on the dividend. This is a trading vehicle for oil-cycle timers and BRL bulls, not a portfolio holding. If forced to commit, I'd wait for either (a) a formal dividend reset that clears the 155% payout overhang or (b) Brent breaking above $85 sustainably — until then, $18.52 is a coin flip weighted slightly toward the downside.
GPT Reading
Petrobras screens oddly because the headline multiple set is internally inconsistent with the operating reality. On the raw numbers, this is still a very profitable oil company: 2024 revenue was $91.4B, gross profit $46.0B, operating income $26.9B, and operating cash flow $38.0B. That is not a distressed business. Even after the drop from 2022’s windfall conditions, 2024 gross margin was 50.3% and operating margin 29.4%, which are elite by any industrial standard. Balance sheet risk also looks contained rather than acute: $23.2B of debt against $59.4B of equity is conservative for this asset base, and debt-to-equity of 0.39 is manageable. The problem is not solvency or asset quality; it is that net income collapsed to $7.5B from $24.9B in 2023 and $36.6B in 2022, leaving the stock on a trailing P/E of 31.9 that makes no sense if you view 2024 as representative earnings power.
That mismatch is the key story. Petrobras is being judged simultaneously on depressed trailing earnings and through-the-cycle cash generation, and the two lead to very different answers. If you anchor on 2024 net margin of just 8.2%, then 2.63x sales and 4.05x book are not cheap for a state-controlled commodity producer. But if you anchor on $38.0B of operating cash flow and a 29% operating margin, the equity is not obviously expensive at a $119.4B market cap. In other words, the market is not paying 32x for a normal integrated oil company; it is paying 32x for a year in which below-the-line items, taxes, transfer pricing, policy decisions, and commodity normalization crushed reported earnings much harder than core operations. That is why I am more skeptical of the pure “overvalued on P/E” conclusion than the screen suggests. The earnings collapse is real, but the enterprise still converted more than 40% of revenue into operating cash flow in 2024, which is extraordinarily strong.
My read is that the stock is roughly fairly valued to modestly cheap, but only because the governance discount is deserved and durable. Petrobras does not deserve to trade like a Western supermajor with similar cash generation because minority holders are not the first constituency. The current ratio of 0.69 is a reminder that this is run tightly and not for balance-sheet comfort, and the dividend metrics are a red flag: a 4.5% yield may look fine, but a 154.8% payout ratio says the distribution is not covered by reported earnings. That is the core trap in the name. Investors can point to cash generation, but if the government wants to redirect that cash into lower-return capex, domestic fuel pricing objectives, or simply less minority-friendly capital allocation, then “cheapness” never fully closes. At $18.52, I do not see a large margin of safety because the market cap already assumes these world-class assets will keep throwing off significant cash, and the discount already reflects the political structure. Fair value is closer to the high teens than to a deep-value bargain price.
The strongest case against my cautious stance is straightforward: this company earned $36.6B in 2022, $24.9B in 2023, and still produced $38.0B of operating cash flow in 2024 despite lower prices and weaker earnings. On that basis, a $119B equity value and 6.6x EV/EBITDA can look undemanding, especially for a producer with advantaged offshore resources and moderate leverage. If 2024 is unusually depressed by transitory accounting and tax effects, then the trailing P/E is simply the wrong lens, and the stock could be materially undervalued if earnings rebound even partway back toward 2023 levels. A move from $7.5B net income back to, say, $15B-$20B would slash the effective earnings multiple and make today’s price look too low. I weigh that argument less heavily because Petrobras has shown that minority shareholders do not fully own the normalization upside; commodity upcycles can be harvested by the state via dividends, taxes, or policy choices, while downcycles are borne more conventionally by equity holders.
What would change my mind is not another abstract argument about asset quality, which is already obvious, but evidence that 2024 earnings were indeed an aberration and that capital allocation remains shareholder-oriented. If annual net income recovers above roughly $12B-$15B while operating cash flow stays north of $30B, then the current price would look too low and I would shift bullish. Likewise, a cleaner signal on dividends — specifically a payout covered by earnings or clearly supported by recurring free cash flow rather than balance-sheet flexibility — would matter. On the other hand, if revenue falls again from $91.4B, operating margin slips materially below 25%, or the company leans into policy-driven reinvestment at the expense of distributions, then even $18.52 is too high and the “cheap oil major” framing breaks down.
Grok Reading
The raw numbers describe a cash-engine company whose reported profitability has fallen off a cliff. Revenue slid from the 2022 peak of $124.47B to $91.42B in 2024, a 27% drawdown, while net income collapsed from $36.62B to $7.53B—an 79% wipeout that produced a –70% year-over-year earnings drop and a –55% earnings CAGR. Operating margin compressed from roughly 46% at the peak to 29%, and net margin shrank to 8.2%. Yet operating cash flow remains an imposing $37.98B against only $23.16B of total debt and a net-debt position near $20B. That disconnect—still-world-class cash conversion from pre-salt barrels versus cratering GAAP earnings—is the central fact. ROIC holds at a robust 23% and gross margin stays above 50%, confirming the upstream asset quality; the damage is downstream of the wellhead, in pricing, FX, impairments, or fiscal extraction. The quoted 31.9× P/E is expensive relative to Western integrateds at 10–12× and is itself a mechanical artifact of the earnings collapse (simple market-cap-to-NI is closer to 16×); EV/EBITDA of 6.6× looks more reasonable, but the 155% payout ratio against $7.5B of net income and a sub-1.0 current ratio of 0.69 signal that the 4.5% dividend is already eating into the balance sheet. The pre-flight claim of a “steep discount” on P/E versus Exxon is simply false on the supplied data—PBR trades at a premium on earnings, not a discount—so the political-risk story is already fully, if not excessively, compensated by the multiple expansion that accompanied the profit wipeout.
The valuation synthesis placing fair value near $17.75–$19.00 is directionally consistent with a business whose mid-cycle earnings power is higher than the $7.5B print but lower than the $25–37B peak. At $18.52 the shares sit inside that band, yet the trajectory is still negative: revenue CAGR of –14%, FCF CAGR of –13%, and no evidence in the annual series that the decline has stabilized. Debt-to-equity of 0.39 and equity of $59B keep solvency risk remote, but the government-controlled capital-allocation regime means free cash flow is not fully available to minority holders; the 2024 net-income collapse while cash flow held up is precisely the signature of that extraction. On pure asset and cash-flow quality the stock is not expensive; on the combination of deteriorating earnings, unsustainable payout, and permanent governance discount it is fully priced.
The strongest contrary case is the cash-flow yield itself. Nearly $38B of operating cash flow on a $119B equity market cap is a mid-30% OCF yield; even after a heavy maintenance-plus-growth capex program the residual free-cash-flow yield would still clear mid-teens. A bull can argue that 2024 net income is depressed by non-cash or one-time items, that pre-salt breakevens remain among the lowest in the world, and that any normalization in oil prices or refining margins would snap earnings back toward $15–20B and collapse the P/E into single digits. The low net-debt load also gives Petrobras more durability through the cycle than most EM energy names. I weigh this less heavily because the same cash-flow engine has already been shown to be subject to sudden fiscal and pricing interference, the payout ratio above 100% is already unsustainable at current earnings, and the multi-year revenue and earnings CAGRs are unambiguously negative. Cash-flow strength without earnings growth or payout discipline is exactly the classic value-trap profile the market-forces layer correctly flags.
What would flip the view is a clear bottoming and re-acceleration in quarterly net income back above a $15B annualized run-rate while the dividend is reset to a sub-80% payout, or an explicit, credible reduction in government interference on fuel pricing and capital returns. Conversely, another year of sub-$10B net income or a further cut in the ordinary dividend would confirm the overvaluation.
Big-3 Panel — where each AI stands
Advanced Analysis Forensic deep-dive · separate lenses
Petrobras is a mature integrated oil major throwing off enormous cash: FCF of $37.98B in 2024 on $91.42B revenue, following $43.21B and $49.72B in the two prior years. Gross margin has held above 50% and share count has been essentially flat (0.6% CAGR), so per-share value is not being eroded by dilution. Earnings quality flags are benign: OCF/NI of 7.07x, accruals -11.4% of assets, Beneish M -3.77 - reported numbers appear real, not manufactured. The concerns are structural. Net debt of ~$19.9B against only $3.27B liquid cash means the balance sheet is a constraint, and Altman Z of 1.51 sits in the distress zone. More importantly, the operating trajectory is deteriorating fast: operating margin has collapsed from 45.9% (2022) to 37.1% (2023) to 29.4% (2024), and net income has cratered from $36.6B to $7.53B in two years - a >75% drop - while revenue fell only ~27%. That gap (NI down far more than revenue) implies rising costs, taxes/royalties, or non-operating hits that the OpM trend alone understates. This is a state-influenced commodity producer whose earnings power is heavily levered to Brent and to political dividend/investment policy, neither of which the data can adjudicate.
Verify before trusting this (6)
- Debt maturity ladder and refinancing needs against the $3.27B cash position
- Cause of the 2023-2024 net income collapse: was it lower Brent, fuel-price parity policy, tax/royalty changes, or one-time impairments?
- Mandatory dividend/payout policy and any government-imposed capex reallocation (e.g., refining, renewables) that could crowd out shareholder returns
- Reserve replacement ratio and pre-salt production trajectory - is the underlying earnings engine still growing?
- FX and Real-denominated debt exposure given the USD reporting
- Any pending legal/regulatory liabilities (Lava Jato residuals, environmental) not visible in the derived data
The e2e composite fair value of $19.00 sits within 3% of the $18.52 price, and the signal-adjusted FV of $17.75 actually implies mild overvaluation (-4%). The EPV floor of $27.15 looks generous given Brazil political risk and a rolling-over margin profile, while the anchored-PE of $10.85 reflects a bearish cyclical/political discount; splitting the difference lands you almost exactly at the current tape. There is no obvious mispricing to exploit here.
Verify before trusting this (4)
- Q4 opex and lifting cost trend to see if margin roll is stabilizing
- Any change to dividend policy or capex framework from Lula government
- Refining segment margins and decarbonization capex plans
- FX assumptions in guidance and hedging book
The non-fundamental pressure on PBR right now leans positive. The tape is risk-on (+46), VIX is a sleepy 15, and into that calm the newswire just delivered a near-doubling of Q2 profit driven by a US-Iran conflict crude rally plus record production - exactly the kind of headline that reinforces the fortress cash-flow / 10% yield story the market already tells about this name. A new Colombia gas discovery and a Brazil megaproject piece add incremental bullish color.
Verify before trusting this (4)
- Whether crude holds the Iran-conflict premium or the rally fades - the single biggest sentiment swing factor
- Any Brazilian government interference in dividend policy or fuel pricing (the political-football risk)
- Sell-side target revisions post the Q2 beat - do estimates and PTs actually get marked up
- BRL stability vs USD as it directly gates ADR sentiment
This lens hasn't been run for this ticker yet.
When we made this prediction on Aug 7, 2026, PBR was $18.52. We expect it to be $17.80 by Feb 2027, and we consider it great value under $15.00. This is an early model (v0.6.0) — the direction is more reliable than the exact price. Made Aug 7, 2026.
Blue is our prediction, starting the day we made it. Grey is a slower route to the same place — the same destination, taking longer. Black is the actual price, so you can see how we are doing.