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What this page is: Delvantic's full research page for Pool Corporation (POOL) — AI-driven forensic equity research: mechanical valuation models (DCF, EPV, anchored-PE, scenario) plus three independent AI lenses (Quality / Value / Sentiment). Everything below is rendered server-side; you are not missing content that requires JavaScript. All scores are predictions and research opinions, not financial advice.
Our current read (analysis of 2026-08-23): Designation Low · Gem Score -19 (−100…+100 Quality+Value blend) · Quality 23 · Value -53 · Sentiment -57 (timing only, not weighted) · Composite fair value $202.52 vs $191.17 at analysis
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profile-header/price-overview— company profile, live quote, market capextended-analysis— the core: three AI lens reads with findings, scores, and the analyst memofuture-predictions— our forward price-band predictionsmarket-narrative/ai-findings/gpt-critique— narrative context, cross-model findings, and an adversarial critique of our own analysis (near the end of the document)- Members-only sections (render as login gates for anonymous readers):
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Pool Corporation
POOL NASDAQPool Corporation is a wholesale distributor specializing in swimming pool supplies, equipment, and related outdoor living products. The company provides non-discretionary pool maintenance essentials such as chemicals, replacement parts, and cleaning systems, alongside a wide range of equipment including pumps, filters, heaters, lights, and packaged pool kits for new construction and renovation. Pool Corporation also supplies complementary irrigation and landscape products, outdoor lighting, grills, and outdoor kitchen components, serving the broader backyard and outdoor living market. Its customer base consists primarily of professional pool builders, remodelers, independent retailers, and service companies, making it a key intermediary between manufacturers and the fragmented end-market. Headquartered in Covington, Louisiana and founded in 1980, Pool Corporation operates hundreds of sales centers across North America, Europe, and Australia, giving it a significant footprint in residential and commercial pool and outdoor environments. Through its scale, product breadth, and distribution network, the company plays a central role in supporting ongoing maintenance and refurbishment activity in the pool and outdoor living industry.
Price Overview
Price History (1 Year)
Revenue & Net Income Trend
| Period | Revenue | Net Income | Net Margin | YoY/QoQ |
|---|
Key Metrics
EPS (Diluted): 10.85
Total Equity: $1.19B
Shares: 37,288,000
Total Debt: $1.20B
Cash: $104.96M
EBITDA: $622.88M
Total Debt: $1.20B
Cash: $104.96M
Revenue: $5.29B
Revenue: $5.29B
Revenue: $5.29B
Total Equity: $1.19B
Tax Rate: 23.8%
Equity: $1.19B
Total Debt: $1.20B
Cash: $104.96M
Current Liabilities: $880.29M
Long-Term Debt: $1.19B
Total Debt: $1.20B
Total Equity: $1.19B
Shares: 37,288,000
Shares: 37,288,000
CapEx: -$56.33M
Shares: 37,288,000
Stock Price: $191.70
Net Income: $406.40M
Industry Benchmarks
Income Statement (Annual)
Last updated: Aug 3, 2026 12:09pm (20d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | $5.3B | $6.2B | $5.5B | $5.3B | $5.3B |
| Cost of Revenue | $3.7B | $4.2B | $3.9B | $3.7B | $3.7B |
| Gross Profit | $1.6B | $1.9B | $1.7B | $1.6B | $1.6B |
| Operating Expenses | $784.3M | $907.6M | $913.5M | $958.1M | $992.3M |
| Operating Income | $832.8M | $1.0B | $746.6M | $617.2M | $580.2M |
| Net Income | $650.6M | $748.5M | $523.2M | $434.3M | $406.4M |
| EBITDA | $861.1M | $1.1B | $778.2M | $654.0M | $622.9M |
| EPS | $16.21 | $18.89 | $13.45 | $11.37 | $10.89 |
| EPS (Diluted) | $15.97 | $18.70 | $13.35 | $11.30 | $10.85 |
Balance Sheet (Annual)
Last updated: Aug 3, 2026 11:33am (20d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cash & Equivalents | $24.3M | $45.6M | $66.5M | $77.9M | $105.0M |
| Total Current Assets | $1.8B | $2.0B | $1.8B | $1.7B | $2.0B |
| Total Assets | $3.2B | $3.6B | $3.4B | $3.4B | $3.6B |
| Current Liabilities | $744.4M | $675.7M | $770.8M | $844.2M | $880.3M |
| Long-Term Debt | $1.2B | $1.4B | $1.0B | $900.9M | $1.2B |
| Total Liabilities | $2.2B | $2.3B | $2.1B | $2.1B | $2.4B |
| Total Equity | $1.1B | $1.2B | $1.3B | $1.3B | $1.2B |
| Retained Earnings | $526.9M | $653.5M | $700.0M | $648.5M | $520.7M |
Cash Flow (Annual)
Last updated: Aug 3, 2026 12:09pm (20d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Operating Cash Flow | $313.5M | $484.9M | $888.2M | $659.2M | $365.9M |
| Capital Expenditure | -$37.7M | -$43.6M | -$60.1M | -$59.5M | -$56.3M |
| Free Cash Flow | $275.8M | $441.2M | $828.1M | $599.7M | $309.5M |
| Acquisitions (net) | -$812.0M | -$9.3M | -$11.5M | -$4.7M | -$10.8M |
| Net Debt Issued / (Repaid) | — | — | — | — | — |
| Dividends Paid | -$119.6M | -$150.6M | -$167.5M | -$179.6M | -$184.9M |
| Stock Buybacks | -$138.0M | -$471.2M | -$306.4M | -$306.3M | -$346.3M |
| Net Change in Cash | -$9.8M | $21.3M | $20.9M | $11.3M | $27.1M |
Growth Trends (YoY %)
Last updated: Aug 3, 2026 12:09pm (20d ago)| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue Growth | +16.7% | -10.3% | -4.2% | -0.4% |
| Gross Profit Growth | +19.6% | -14.1% | -5.1% | -0.2% |
| Operating Income Growth | +23.2% | -27.2% | -17.3% | -6.0% |
| Net Income Growth | +15.0% | -30.1% | -17.0% | -6.4% |
| EBITDA Growth | +22.7% | -26.3% | -16.0% | -4.8% |
Dividend History (Last 20)
Last updated: Aug 3, 2026 11:34am (20d ago)| Date | Dividend | Declaration | Record | Payment |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-08-13 | $1.30 | — | — | — |
| 2026-05-14 | $1.30 | — | — | — |
| 2026-03-12 | $1.25 | — | — | — |
| 2025-11-12 | $1.25 | — | — | — |
| 2025-08-14 | $1.25 | — | — | — |
| 2025-05-15 | $1.25 | — | — | — |
| 2025-03-12 | $1.20 | — | — | — |
| 2024-11-13 | $1.20 | — | — | — |
| 2024-08-15 | $1.20 | — | — | — |
| 2024-05-15 | $1.20 | — | — | — |
| 2024-03-13 | $1.10 | — | — | — |
| 2023-11-07 | $1.10 | — | — | — |
| 2023-08-09 | $1.10 | — | — | — |
| 2023-05-16 | $1.10 | — | — | — |
| 2023-03-14 | $1.00 | — | — | — |
| 2022-11-09 | $1.00 | — | — | — |
| 2022-08-10 | $1.00 | — | — | — |
| 2022-05-13 | $1.00 | — | — | — |
| 2022-03-09 | $0.80 | — | — | — |
| 2021-11-09 | $0.80 | — | — | — |
Deep Analysis
Risk : Reward — if the last quarter repeats
Live · as of 2026-08-19 10:57Even the bull case prices 34% below today — the ratio here measures the model-vs-market gap, not payoff odds. Another quarter like the worst recent one costs 58%.
| Case | Growth | Margin | Fair value | vs price ($191.17) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Bull — recovery | +4% | 9.2% | $125.97 | -34% |
| Base — stabilizes | +3% | 8.0% | $106.43 | -44% |
| Bear — keeps slipping | +1% | 6.8% | $88.41 | -54% |
| Stress — last quarter repeats | -1% | 6.5% | $80.31 | -58% |
Narrative Economics
market-narrative step).
Claude Reading
Looking at the raw numbers first: POOL's quarterly cadence is remarkably stable year-over-year — Q2'25 rev $1.78B vs Q2'24 $1.77B, Q3'25 $1.45B vs $1.43B, Q1'26 $1.14B vs Q1'25 $1.07B (+6.5%). That's not "deteriorating" — that's stabilization with a tentative Q1'26 uptick after two years of grinding down from the 2022 sugar-high ($6.18B rev, $748M NI). Net income at $406M in 2025 vs $434M in 2024 is a 6.4% decline, not a collapse. Gross margin held at 29.7%, operating margin 11%, ROE 34%, ROIC 19%. This is a franchise absorbing a cyclical trough while still earning bank-crushing returns on capital. FCF of $309M against a $6.77B cap = 4.6% FCF yield, and capex is only $56M — this is a capital-light distributor, not a cash incinerator. The "FCF CAGR -38.9%" figure is misleading because it's anchored to a 2021-2022 stimulus peak; normalized FCF here is fine.
Where I diverge from the prior models: the Market Forces call of "deteriorating…hemorrhaging cash…losing market share" is factually wrong on this data. POOL generated $366M in operating cash flow last year, grew Q1'26 revenue +6.5% YoY, and there is zero evidence of share loss in the file — that's an assertion, not a datapoint. The Synthesis "fully priced" verdict at $163 fair value implies a ~15% downside, but that DCF is presumably capitalizing trough earnings; if you normalize NI to a midcycle $500-550M (below 2023's $523M and well below 2022), you get $9-10 midcycle EPS against $191 = 19-21x normalized, which is reasonable for a 30%+ ROE consolidator with a 2.7% dividend. The Pre-Flight read that this is a "traditional mature cyclical at trough earnings with modest recovery priced in" is the most honest of the bunch. The insider buying is the tell that models are underweighting: multiple open-market purchases in May 2026 (10,000 + 10,000 + 1,000 + 525 + 464 shares) is not routine — insiders don't buy 20k+ shares into a "deteriorating" business at $191 unless they see the trough.
The contrarian bear case that deserves airtime: POOL is 2.5x levered debt-to-equity ($1.20B debt / $1.19B equity, though D/E of 1.01 on canonical), and if rates stay elevated with housing turnover suppressed for another 2-3 years, the "trough" earnings could persist longer than a normal cycle. The 2022 peak sucked forward years of demand — installed-base refresh doesn't fully offset the new-construction air pocket. At 17.7x trailing and 12.6x EV/EBITDA on already-depressed EBITDA, you're not getting a screaming bargain. Also worth noting: revenue has printed essentially flat YoY for six straight quarters — "stabilization" and "no recovery" look identical until they don't, and there's no catalyst in this data suggesting the inflection is imminent. The Q4 2025 print ($982M rev, 3.2% margin) was the weakest seasonal quarter in the series.
GPT Reading
What stands out is that the business has likely moved through the sharpest part of the post-2022 reset, but the equity is not obviously cheap even after that pain. Revenue peaked at $6.18B in 2022, fell to $5.54B in 2023, then $5.31B in 2024 and $5.29B in 2025. That looks ugly in a growth chart, yet the more important read is that the decline has largely stabilized: 2025 revenue was down just 0.4% versus 2024, and Q1 2026 actually grew to $1.14B from $1.07B, about 6.5% year over year. The issue is that earnings have not stabilized nearly as well as sales. Net income fell from $748.5M in 2022 to $523.2M, then $434.3M, then $406.4M in 2025, and Q1 2026 was still slightly down at $53.2M versus $53.5M despite the revenue uptick. That says recovery is currently more volume-led than profit-led, with margin pressure still lingering.
The margin structure tells the real story. Gross profit was $1.93B in 2022, but only $1.57B in 2025, and annual operating margin compressed from 16.7% in 2022 to 13.5% in 2023, 11.6% in 2024, and 11.0% in 2025. Net margin similarly slid from 12.1% to 7.7% over that span. For a distributor, that is a meaningful reset, not a rounding error. The quarterly pattern shows a business that still has strong seasonality and decent discipline—Q2 and Q3 margins remain healthy at 10.9% and 8.8% in both 2024 and 2025—but there is no evidence yet of a rebound in profitability. This matters because at $6.77B market cap, investors are paying about 16.7x 2025 earnings and roughly 21.9x 2025 free cash flow of $309.5M. That is not distressed pricing for a company with three straight years of earnings contraction and negative multi-year FCF CAGR. The market is giving POOL credit for durability, and durability is deserved; it is not giving it away.
Still, I think some of the more bearish framing overstates the damage. Calling this a business “hemorrhaging cash” is simply wrong on the numbers. It produced $365.9M of operating cash flow and $309.5M of free cash flow in 2025, with only $56.3M of capex. The balance sheet is not pristine but is manageable: $1.20B of debt against $105M of cash and $1.19B of equity, with a current ratio above 2.2. Returns remain very good even after the downturn, with ROIC near 19% and ROE above 34%, though the latter is helped by leverage and a relatively thin equity base. This is still a high-quality distributor with an installed-base tailwind from existing pools that require maintenance regardless of new construction cycles. The fact that Q1 2026 revenue turned positive while margins merely held suggests the next leg, if it comes, is operational leverage rather than heroic assumptions about demand. The insider purchases in May 2026 are also hard to ignore: multiple open-market buys including two 10,000-share transactions are a more meaningful signal than routine awards.
The best case against my caution is straightforward: the stock may already be sitting near trough earnings, and trough multiples on a still-excellent franchise can look deceptively full right before profits inflect upward. If revenue has bottomed around $5.3B and operating margin only recovers from 11.0% to, say, 12.5%, operating income would rise materially without requiring a return to 2022 demand conditions. On $5.5B of revenue, a 12.5% operating margin would imply roughly $688M of operating income versus $580M in 2025, which could push earnings power well above $11 per share equivalent and make a $191 stock look more reasonable. The bull would also point out that gross margin has held close to 29.7% despite the downturn, which suggests the core competitive position is intact and the real pressure is in SG&A deleverage rather than price erosion or structural share loss. If housing and backyard discretionary spending merely stop getting worse, POOL can snap back faster than the trailing numbers imply.
What would change my mind is evidence that earnings have truly turned, not just sales. I would want to see at least two consecutive quarters of year-over-year revenue growth paired with net margin improvement, especially in the important Q2 and Q3 periods. If Q2 2026 can exceed the prior year’s $1.78B revenue and lift net income above $194M, that would be a genuine signal that the cycle is turning and the current multiple is fair-to-cheap. Conversely, if revenue growth in 2026 is positive but net income stays flat or down—repeating Q1’s pattern—then the market is still overpaying for a “recovery” that is not reaching the bottom line. At $191.7, I see a solid business, but not a bargain; I’d get interested closer to the mid-$160s unless margin recovery becomes visible in the next two quarters.
Grok Reading
The numbers describe a classic post-boom cyclical reset that has largely completed its top-line compression but has not yet found an earnings floor with conviction. Revenue has stabilized near $5.3B after the multi-year slide from the $6.18B 2022 peak—2025 finished essentially flat at $5.29B versus $5.31B, and the first quarter of 2026 actually printed a modest year-over-year lift to $1.14B from $1.07B. That is not growth; it is the absence of further decline. Net income, however, continues to grind lower: $406M in 2025 versus $434M the prior year and $748M at the peak, with operating margin compressed to 11.0% from the mid-teens. Gross margin has held remarkably steady near 29.7%, which tells you the core distribution economics and pricing power on chemicals and parts remain intact even as volume and mix deteriorated. Free cash flow of $310M on only $56M of capex is still solid, supporting the 2.7% dividend at a 46% payout, and ROIC of 19.4% plus ROE of 34% confirm this remains a high-return capital allocator rather than a broken business. At 17.7× trailing earnings and 12.6× EV/EBITDA with the stock already 43% off its highs, the market is applying a cyclical discount but not a distress multiple.
What stands out most is the divergence between the still-negative momentum statistics (earnings CAGR –12%, FCF CAGR –39%) and the early signs of stabilization plus aggressive insider buying. Multiple open-market purchases in May 2026 totaling well over 20,000 shares are not routine option exercises; they are real capital at risk near current levels. Net debt of roughly $1.1B against $310M of FCF is manageable (mid-3×), and the current ratio above 2.2 leaves liquidity comfortable. The quantitative models’ signal-adjusted fair value of $163 therefore looks overly punitive: it appears to extrapolate continued deterioration that the most recent quarterly print and the balance-sheet durability do not yet support. Composite fair value near $190 sits almost exactly on the $191.70 tape, which is consistent with a business that has stopped getting worse but has not started getting better.
The strongest counter-argument is straightforward and data-rich. Revenue and earnings have now declined for three consecutive years, summer peak quarters in 2025 were only flat versus 2024, and FCF has collapsed from prior-cycle levels. A PE of 17.7× on what may still be mid-trough rather than true-trough earnings is not obviously cheap for an industrial distributor facing housing and discretionary-spending headwinds; if the installed-base maintenance story proves less non-discretionary than management claims, or if another down-leg in new-pool construction hits the 2026 peak season, both the multiple and the earnings base can compress further. Price-to-book of 6.0× leaves little margin of safety if ROE mean-reverts, and the debt load, while serviceable, limits strategic flexibility if cash generation worsens. Those points justify the models’ “fully priced” and “market headwinds” labels; I simply weigh the gross-margin resilience, insider accumulation, and Q1 stabilization more heavily than pure backward-looking CAGRs.
I would flip to a clear undervalued stance on two consecutive quarters of positive revenue growth accompanied by operating-margin expansion back above 12%, or to overvalued if the 2026 peak season (June and September quarters) prints year-over-year revenue declines greater than 3% with further NI compression. Until then the stock screens as roughly fairly valued with a mild positive skew from insider behavior and trough-like fundamentals.
Big-3 Panel — where each AI stands
Advanced Analysis Forensic deep-dive · separate lenses
POOL is a mature, cash-generative distributor showing textbook post-COVID normalization: revenue peaked at $6.18B in 2022 and has drifted to $5.29B in 2025, with operating margin compressing from 16.6% to 11.0% and net income falling from $748M to $406M. Gross margin has held remarkably steady in the 29.7-30% band across the downturn, suggesting pricing discipline and channel position are intact even as volume/mix pressure hits opex leverage. FCF remains solidly positive across every year ($309M-$828M range) and OCF/NI of 1.05x plus accruals of just 0.3% of assets confirm the earnings are real cash. Capital allocation is a clear strength: diluted shares fell from 40.5M to 37.3M (roughly -2% CAGR), SBC is a trivial 0.4% of revenue, and buybacks run at ~17x SBC — per-share value is being concentrated, not leaked. Beneish M of -2.34 and Altman Z of 4.21 corroborate a clean, safe accounting profile. The one real caveat is the balance sheet: net cash is -$1.09B against only $105M liquid, so the company is levered and FCF of ~$309M in 2025 is doing double duty funding buybacks and servicing debt. Insider behavior is a genuine positive - five open-market P-purchases totaling ~$4M in recent weeks, including sizable buys by Perez de la Mesa ($3.7M across two tranches), with zero sales - insiders are stepping in during the earnings drawdown.
Verify before trusting this (5)
- Debt maturity ladder and covenants on the ~$1.1B net debt position
- Whether the operating margin compression is mix/opex investment or structural (freight, wages, competitive)
- Customer concentration and exposure to new-pool construction vs recurring maintenance demand
- Segment/geographic detail on the revenue decline - is Horizon (irrigation) offsetting or dragging
- Terms and remaining authorization on the buyback program given lower FCF run-rate
The price sits essentially on top of the composite fair value ($190.02) but ~17% above the signal-adjusted FV of $163.43 and ~45% above the EPV floor of $131.78. The DCF ($182) says modest overvaluation; only the anchored-PE ($264) argues for cheapness, and that method is almost certainly extrapolating peak-cycle multiples onto trough earnings - I discount it. Net-net, deserved value clusters in the $160-185 range, and $191 pays full retail for a quality distributor mid-downcycle.
Verify before trusting this (4)
- Management commentary on new-pool build activity and 2025 unit volumes
- Discretionary vs non-discretionary revenue mix disclosure
- Net debt trajectory and buyback pace at current price
- Whether gross margin holds if volume declines another leg
The macro tape is nominally neutral-to-slightly-positive, but the composition matters for POOL: 10y at 4.68% and a market PE of 26.9 press directly on housing-adjacent distributors, and POOL's beta of 1.05 gives it no defensive buffer. The narrative here is a moderate-intensity, moderate-durability steady-compounder story with low cult coefficient - meaning there is no fervent buyer base to defend the stock when the story wobbles, and the story IS wobbling as new-pool construction slows and the bear case (mature cycle, DIY erosion, priced for perfection) gains airtime. Momentum is decisively negative: -2.3% CAGR, rising leverage (D/E 0.80 to 1.01), and softening cash generation. That combination tends to invite analyst target trims and de-rating pressure even without a fresh catalyst, because the compounder narrative depends on visible, uninterrupted execution - and the tape currently shows the opposite. There is no euphoric flow or thematic bid (no AI, no reopening, no rate-cut trade specifically pulling this name up), so sentiment is left leaning on a story that is quietly fading rather than breaking. Net: a real crosswind, not a rout - the kind of persistent drip that keeps a name capped rather than crashed.
Verify before trusting this (5)
- Any sell-side target cuts or downgrades citing housing/new-pool weakness
- Housing starts and existing-home sales prints - the direct read-through to the narrative
- Whether commentary shifts from 'consolidator compounder' to 'cyclical distributor' in analyst notes
- 10y yield direction - a break lower would materially ease pressure on housing-adjacent names
- Peer distributor tape (SITE, FERG, WSO) for confirmation this is name-specific vs sector-wide
This lens hasn't been run for this ticker yet.