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What this page is: Delvantic's full research page for Rio Tinto Plc (RIO) — AI-driven forensic equity research: mechanical valuation models (DCF, EPV, anchored-PE, scenario) plus three independent AI lenses (Quality / Value / Sentiment). Everything below is rendered server-side; you are not missing content that requires JavaScript. All scores are predictions and research opinions, not financial advice.
Our current read (analysis of 2026-08-23): Designation Low · Gem Score -42 (−100…+100 Quality+Value blend) · Quality -10 · Value -69 · Sentiment 6 (timing only, not weighted) · Composite fair value $78.94 vs $99.01 at analysis
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Rio Tinto Plc
RIO NYSERio Tinto Plc Sponsored ADR represents ownership in Rio Tinto Plc through American Depositary Receipts, providing U.S. investors with access to one of the world’s largest diversified mining and metals companies. The company focuses on the exploration, mining, and processing of mineral resources, with key products including iron ore, aluminum, copper, and other industrial minerals used in construction, infrastructure, automotive, energy, and technology-related industries. Rio Tinto Plc Sponsored ADR is tied economically to the performance of the underlying Rio Tinto Plc shares on its home market, with each ADR typically corresponding to one ordinary share. The company operates large-scale assets and supply chains across multiple continents, serving both industrial customers and commodity markets worldwide. Headquartered in London, United Kingdom, Rio Tinto Plc today plays a significant role in global raw materials supply, particularly in iron ore and aluminum, which are critical inputs for steelmaking, manufacturing, and low-carbon energy technologies.
Price Overview
Price History (1 Year)
Revenue & Net Income Trend
This company does not file structured financial statements with the U.S. SEC, so quarterly figures aren't available from our filings-based data engine. Annual figures shown here come from the sources that do cover it.
| Period | Revenue | Net Income | Net Margin | YoY/QoQ |
|---|
Key Metrics
EPS (Diluted): 6.08
Total Equity: $67.02B
Shares: 1,638,000,000
Total Debt: $21.93B
Cash: $8.87B
EBITDA: $21.51B
Total Debt: $21.93B
Cash: $8.87B
Revenue: $57.64B
Revenue: $57.64B
Revenue: $57.64B
Total Equity: $67.02B
Tax Rate: 29.6%
Equity: $67.02B
Total Debt: $21.93B
Cash: $8.87B
Current Liabilities: $14.93B
Long-Term Debt: $21.20B
Total Debt: $21.93B
Total Equity: $67.02B
Shares: 1,638,000,000
Shares: 1,638,000,000
CapEx: -$12.34B
Shares: 1,638,000,000
Stock Price: $99.01
Net Income: $9.97B
Industry Benchmarks
Income Statement (Annual)
Last updated: Jul 30, 2026 1:33am (24d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | $63.5B | $55.6B | $54.0B | $53.7B | $57.6B |
| Cost of Revenue | — | — | — | — | — |
| Gross Profit | — | — | — | — | — |
| Operating Expenses | $32.7B | $34.8B | $37.1B | $37.7B | $41.8B |
| Operating Income | $29.8B | $19.9B | $14.8B | $15.7B | $14.9B |
| Net Income | $21.1B | $12.4B | $10.1B | $11.6B | $10.0B |
| EBITDA | $34.5B | $24.9B | $20.2B | $21.6B | $21.5B |
| EPS | $13.03 | $7.67 | $6.20 | $7.12 | $6.14 |
| EPS (Diluted) | $12.95 | $7.62 | $6.17 | $7.07 | $6.08 |
Balance Sheet (Annual)
Last updated: Jul 30, 2026 1:33am (24d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cash & Equivalents | $12.8B | $6.8B | $9.7B | $8.5B | $8.9B |
| Total Current Assets | $24.4B | $19.0B | $21.5B | $19.1B | $21.6B |
| Total Assets | $102.9B | $96.7B | $103.5B | $102.8B | $128.1B |
| Current Liabilities | — | — | $12.7B | $11.7B | $14.9B |
| Long-Term Debt | $12.4B | $10.1B | $12.2B | $12.3B | $21.2B |
| Total Liabilities | $46.3B | $44.5B | $47.2B | $44.8B | $61.1B |
| Total Equity | $56.6B | $52.3B | $56.3B | $58.0B | $67.0B |
| Retained Earnings | $33.3B | $34.5B | $38.4B | $42.5B | $46.6B |
Cash Flow (Annual)
Last updated: Jul 30, 2026 1:33am (24d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Operating Cash Flow | $25.3B | $16.1B | $15.2B | $15.6B | $16.8B |
| Capital Expenditure | -$7.4B | -$6.8B | -$7.1B | -$9.6B | -$12.3B |
| Free Cash Flow | $18.0B | $9.4B | $8.1B | $6.0B | $4.5B |
| Acquisitions (net) | $0 | -$850.0M | -$834.0M | -$346.0M | -$6.0B |
| Net Debt Issued / (Repaid) | -$219.0M | -$469.0M | $1.5B | -$599.0M | $7.8B |
| Dividends Paid | -$16.5B | -$12.1B | -$6.9B | -$7.6B | -$6.4B |
| Stock Buybacks | — | — | — | — | — |
| Net Change in Cash | $2.4B | -$6.0B | $2.9B | -$1.2B | $381.0M |
Growth Trends (YoY %)
Last updated: Jul 30, 2026 1:33am (24d ago)| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue Growth | -12.5% | -2.7% | -0.7% | +7.4% |
| Gross Profit Growth | — | — | — | — |
| Operating Income Growth | -33.1% | -25.6% | +5.6% | -4.6% |
| Net Income Growth | -41.1% | -19.0% | +14.9% | -13.7% |
| EBITDA Growth | -27.7% | -19.2% | +7.0% | -0.3% |
Dividend History (Last 20)
Last updated: Aug 1, 2026 12:04am (22d ago)| Date | Dividend | Declaration | Record | Payment |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-03-06 | $2.54 | — | — | — |
| 2025-08-15 | $1.48 | — | — | — |
| 2025-03-07 | $2.25 | — | — | — |
| 2024-08-16 | $1.77 | — | — | — |
| 2024-03-07 | $2.58 | — | — | — |
| 2023-08-10 | $1.77 | — | — | — |
| 2023-03-09 | $2.25 | — | — | — |
| 2022-08-11 | $2.67 | — | — | — |
| 2022-03-10 | $4.17 | — | — | — |
| 2021-08-12 | $1.85 | — | — | — |
| 2021-03-04 | $3.09 | — | — | — |
| 2020-08-06 | $1.55 | — | — | — |
| 2020-03-06 | $2.31 | — | — | — |
| 2019-08-08 | $1.51 | — | — | — |
| 2019-03-07 | $1.80 | — | — | — |
| 2018-08-09 | $1.27 | — | — | — |
| 2018-03-01 | $1.81 | — | — | — |
| 2017-08-09 | $1.11 | — | — | — |
| 2017-02-22 | $1.26 | — | — | — |
| 2016-08-10 | $0.45 | — | — | — |
Deep Analysis
Narrative Economics
market-narrative step).
Claude Reading
Looking at the raw trajectory first: revenue has actually decompressed from the 2021 peak of $63.5B to $57.6B in 2025 — a 9% decline over four years — while operating income has collapsed from $29.8B to $14.9B, meaning operating margin has halved from 47% to 26%. Net income tells the same story: $21.1B → $10.0B, a 53% peak-to-current decline. This is not a "mature earner" growing modestly; it's a commodity company that already made its cycle high in 2021, and the market cap of $161B at $99 is only ~10% off where the stock would have traded on 2021 earnings at today's 16x multiple. In other words, the multiple has expanded meaningfully as earnings compressed — the classic late-cycle setup where P/E looks "reasonable" precisely because E is depressed but price hasn't followed.
The FCF picture is the tell the synthesis under-weights. FCF has gone from ~$18B to $4.5B (-25% CAGR), capex is running $12.3B against $16.8B operating cash flow, and the dividend payout ratio is 64% on already-depressed earnings. At $4.5B FCF, the FCF yield on $161B market cap is 2.8% — you're being paid less than Treasuries for cyclical commodity risk, and the dividend (4.06% yield) is being partially funded by balance sheet capacity rather than covered by FCF. Debt-to-equity of 0.33 and $8.9B cash provide cushion, but the "fortress balance sheet" narrative is doing heavy lifting when the actual cash return to shareholders is thin. The Narrative Economics layer nails this: the +21% premium to DCF is entirely a bet that iron ore and copper stay elevated, and I'd add that it's also a bet that Simandou capex (a chunk of that $12B) generates the ROIC bulls assume, which is far from certain on a low-grade Guinean iron ore project competing against Pilbara.
Where I part ways with the models: the synthesis says "fully priced" at $81.82 fair value, and the pre-flight frames the market as skeptical on China. I think both are too generous. Iron ore at $100+/tonne is not a trough — it's still well above the $60-70 marginal cost, and Chinese steel demand is structurally past peak (property completions rolling over, no infrastructure bazooka replacing it). If iron ore normalizes to $80, Rio's earnings take another 20-30% hit given operating leverage, and the "16x P/E" becomes 22x on normalized numbers. The contrarian bull case — copper optionality via Oyu Tolgoi ramp and energy transition — is real but small relative to iron ore, which still drives ~60% of EBITDA. The market isn't pricing skepticism on China; it's pricing hope that copper offsets iron ore decline, and that hasn't been demonstrated yet. Rule-based classification calling this "mature_earner" with confidence 1 is doing the right thing by hedging — this is really a "late-cycle cyclical" and should be valued on mid-cycle earnings, not trailing.
I dissent modestly with the synthesis direction — agree it's overvalued, disagree the fair value is $82. On mid-cycle earnings of ~$8-9B (splitting difference between 2021 peak and a hypothetical trough of $6B) at 12x — appropriate for a cyclical with declining FCF and headwinds — you get $96-108B market cap, or $59-67/share. The $82 synthesis number embeds too much of the current commodity strip. That said, I'm not table-pounding short: the 4% dividend, real asset base, and copper optionality mean this doesn't crater without a China accident. It just doesn't compound from here. Data gaps worth flagging: no quarterly revenue trajectory provided (can't see if 2025 Q4 is accelerating or decelerating), no gross margin (unusual for a miner where unit economics matter), and the Market Forces module failed entirely — meaning we're missing the geopolitical/tariff read on iron ore trade flows, which for Rio is not a minor input. Anyone underwriting this at $99 should demand to see the H2 2025 iron ore realized price and Simandou capex schedule before adding.
GPT Reading
At $99, Rio Tinto is being valued like a higher-quality cyclical than its current cash economics justify. The business is still excellent in the sense that it earns real money through the cycle: 2025 revenue was $57.6B, operating income $14.9B, net income $10.0B, with a 25.9% operating margin and 17.3% net margin. Balance sheet risk is not the problem either; net debt is only about $13.1B against $67.0B of equity, and leverage at 0.33x debt/equity is conservative for a mining major. What stands out instead is the mismatch between accounting earnings and distributable cash. Operating cash flow of $16.8B sounds robust until you set it against $12.3B of capex, leaving just $4.5B of free cash flow. On a $161B market cap, that is a sub-3% FCF yield. For a large miner with commodity exposure, jurisdictional risk, and no structural growth profile in the reported numbers, that is not cheap.
The earnings history also argues against paying a premium multiple. Revenue has gone nowhere for four years: $63.5B in 2021, then $55.6B, $54.0B, $53.7B, and now $57.6B. More importantly, profit power has reset lower from the cycle peak. Operating income has roughly halved from $29.8B in 2021 to $14.9B in 2025; net income has fallen from $21.1B to $10.0B over the same period. Yet the stock still trades at 16.3x earnings, 8.1x EV/EBITDA, and 2.8x sales. Those are not distressed-cyclical multiples; they imply either confidence that current margins are trough-like or belief that capex-heavy investment will soon convert into materially higher EBITDA. I do not see enough in the raw data to grant that. 2025 revenue rose 7.4% year over year, but net income fell 13.7%, and operating income slipped from $15.7B to $14.9B. That is the signature of a company getting less operating leverage from better top-line conditions, not more.
The market seems to be looking through the current free-cash-flow dip and capitalizing Rio on normalized commodity prices plus future copper optionality. That may eventually be right, but today’s numbers say investors are already paying up for resilience and for projects not yet showing up in returns. ROE of 14.9% and ROIC of 13.1% are good, not exceptional enough to justify ignoring the capital intensity. The dividend yield of 4.1% is respectable, but with a 64% payout ratio and only $4.5B of free cash flow in the latest year, the cash return case is less comfortable than the income headline suggests. If capex stays elevated, either payout flexibility tightens or the equity remains dependent on a favorable commodity tape to feel cheap. For a miner, I want either a clearly depressed multiple, a visibly inflecting cash flow profile, or both. Rio currently offers neither.
The best pushback is straightforward: this is exactly how you misread a top-tier miner near an investment hump. The company remains highly profitable, the balance sheet is strong, and depressed free cash flow is partly self-inflicted by growth capex rather than operational weakness. If $12.3B of capex moderates even by a few billion while operating cash flow stays around $16-17B, free cash flow can rerate sharply without heroic commodity assumptions. On that view, 8.1x EV/EBITDA is not demanding for a scarce, diversified mining franchise with iron ore dominance, copper exposure, and a demonstrated ability to earn double-digit returns on capital. I take that seriously. But I weigh it differently because the reported trend does not yet show that this spending is translating into higher earnings power; 2025 delivered better revenue but worse profits. Until that changes, “normalize the FCF” is more a thesis than an observed fact.
What would change my mind is tangible evidence that Rio is exiting the heavy-investment phase into a stronger cash-conversion phase. Specifically, I would want to see free cash flow move sustainably above $8-10B without balance-sheet strain, either through capex falling meaningfully below $10B or operating cash flow rising above $19B. I would also want proof that earnings power is expanding, not just revenue: operating income back above $17-18B and net income comfortably above $12B would support the argument that 2025 was a transition year rather than a new normal. Absent that, a stock near $99 looks priced for a better cycle and better project outcomes than the current data supports; I would get more constructive closer to the low $80s, where the cash flow risk is better compensated.
Grok Reading
Rio Tinto’s numbers tell a story of a mature miner grinding through the back half of a commodity cycle while the market still prices it like the front half. Revenue rebounded to $57.64B in 2025 from $53.66B, a 7.4% lift, yet operating income slipped to $14.94B from $15.65B and net income fell 13.7% to $9.97B—still less than half the $21.09B earned in the 2021 peak. The real stress shows in cash conversion: operating cash flow of $16.83B is respectable, but $12.34B of capex left free cash flow at only $4.50B, a collapse that produces a –25.4% FCF CAGR against a meager 3.3% revenue CAGR and negative earnings CAGR. At $99 the stock trades 16.3× earnings and 8.1× EV/EBITDA with a 4.1% dividend yield supported by a 64% payout—fine metrics if FCF were $12–15B, stretched when it is $4.5B and ROIC has settled at 13%. The balance sheet is clean (net debt roughly $13B, D/E 0.33, current ratio 1.45), so solvency is not the issue; valuation versus normalized cash generation is.
The quantitative models flag the stock as fully priced at a composite fair value near $82, a 17% downside from spot, and the underlying data supports that more than it contradicts it. Elevated capex is being framed as trough investment for copper and iron-ore growth, yet the earnings power has not expanded with the spend: operating margin has compressed from nearly 47% in 2021 to 26% now, and absolute NI is drifting lower even as revenue ticks up. That combination—rising reinvestment, falling free cash, and a mid-teens multiple—looks like the market is capitalizing peak-cycle commodity assumptions into a trough-cycle cash-flow base. Narrative economics correctly tags the +21% premium to DCF as fragile and contingent on iron ore and copper staying elevated; nothing in the five-year income progression suggests structural margin expansion that would justify paying up.
The strongest counter-case is straightforward: the company remains a low-leverage, high-ROIC franchise that can still throw off mid-teens billions of operating cash in a normal price environment, and the current $12B+ capex wave could eventually reverse into higher FCF once Simandou and copper projects mature. Bulls will correctly note that EV/EBITDA of 8× is not extreme for a diversified major, the 4% yield is covered even on depressed FCF, and any sustained Chinese stimulus or energy-transition copper tightness would re-rate the equity before the DCF catch-up. I weigh that less heavily because the earnings and FCF trajectories are already moving the wrong way while the multiple has not compressed; paying $99 today requires the cycle to stay hot long enough for the capex to pay off, which is a forecast, not a margin of safety.
A decisive re-acceleration in free cash flow above $10B on the next full-year print, or a clear multi-quarter lift in copper/iron-ore realizations that restores operating margins toward 30%+, would force a reassessment toward fair value. Conversely, another year of sub-$6B FCF with flat-to-down NI would confirm the overvaluation.
Big-3 Panel — where each AI stands
Advanced Analysis Forensic deep-dive · separate lenses
Rio Tinto is a mature, self-funding commodity producer generating $4.5B FCF on $57.6B revenue in 2025, with operating margins of 25.9% - still healthy in absolute terms but down materially from 47% in 2021. Net income of $10.0B and OCF/NI of 1.41x with -4.4% accruals point to clean, cash-backed earnings; Altman Z of 2.99 sits at the top of the grey zone, consistent with an investment-grade miner. Diluted share count has been essentially flat at ~1.63B for five years, so per-share value is not being eroded by issuance. The main quality concern is trajectory: revenue has drifted from $63.5B (2021) to $53-57B, operating margin has nearly halved, and FCF has fallen four straight years from $17.96B to $4.50B - a 75% decline. Net debt of ~$13B is manageable against $4.5B FCF but constrains flexibility if commodity prices weaken further. This is a durable, well-run cyclical operator past its last cycle peak, not a compounding machine.
Verify before trusting this (5)
- Capex intensity and whether the FCF decline reflects growth capex (Simandou, lithium) versus maintenance cost inflation
- Iron ore price sensitivity and 2025 realized pricing vs prior years to isolate cost from price effects
- Debt maturity ladder and covenant headroom given rising net debt
- Segment mix shift (iron ore vs aluminium vs copper vs lithium) and unit cost trends
- Dividend policy sustainability at current FCF run-rate
Composite fair value lands at $79.56 (DCF $75.12, EPV floor $88.44) with a signal-adjusted FV of $81.82 versus a $99.01 price - roughly a 17-21% overpayment. The EPV floor at $88 is the friendliest read and even that is below spot, meaning today's price requires either sustained peak iron ore and copper realizations or the Simandou capex converting into high-return volumes faster than base rates suggest. Earnings quality is clean so no haircut is warranted, but that only defends the FV, it does not lift it to $99. The Company-Quality lens tags this as Solid, not compounder-grade, and flags multi-year FCF and margin compression - facts that argue the deserved value sits at the DCF end, not above the EPV floor. What is priced in is a continuation of cyclical-peak cash flows into a heavy capex phase; the bear case that normalization is coming is not obviously wrong. There is no margin of safety here - this is a hold-if-you-own-it, not a buy.
Verify before trusting this (4)
- Simandou capex schedule and first-production ramp assumptions in the next results
- iron ore and copper realized price sensitivity disclosed in guidance
- unit cost inflation trend vs prior year
- capital return policy (buyback pace, dividend cover) at current commodity strip
The macro tape is mildly risk-on (VIX 16.5, S&P at highs) and RIO's low 0.65 beta means it neither benefits much from euphoria nor gets mauled in stress - the market backdrop is a soft positive here. More importantly, the active narrative just got a genuine push: the August 2 Barron's-style framing that Rio's H1 results (EBITDA +28%, FCF +75%, copper EBITDA nearly doubling) make the case for 'AI trade beyond tech' is exactly the kind of story that pulls generalist money into a cyclical-late-stage miner. That is the dominant sentiment force on this name right now. Offsetting it: the narrative is explicitly tagged fragile with low cult coefficient, durability is thin, and the stock trades at a 21% premium to DCF that is almost entirely narrative-driven - meaning any crack in the copper/energy-transition story de-rates fast. Analyst tone is not screaming upgrades, momentum is neutral with cash generation flagged as weakening, and the Glencore merger optionality was just deflated ('unlikely to revisit soon'). Higher-for-longer rates (10y 4.7%) and a stretched market PE are a background drag on all commodity names via demand expectations. Net: a genuine but not decisive tailwind - the AI-adjacent copper narrative is doing real work, but it is a borrowed story on a fragile base.
Verify before trusting this (4)
- Copper spot price action and China stimulus flow - the AI-copper narrative lives or dies here
- Any analyst target revisions in the next 2-4 weeks following the H1 print
- Iron ore price stability - the bear case's key crack point
- Whether the 'AI trade beyond tech' framing gets repeated by other sell-side desks or fades as a one-off
This lens hasn't been run for this ticker yet.
When we made this prediction on Aug 5, 2026, RIO was $99.01. We expect it to be $86.50 by Feb 2027, and we consider it great value under $78.00. This is an early model (v0.6.0) — the direction is more reliable than the exact price. Made Aug 5, 2026.
Blue is our prediction, starting the day we made it. Grey is a slower route to the same place — the same destination, taking longer. Black is the actual price, so you can see how we are doing.