Rapid7, Inc. specializes in delivering cutting-edge cybersecurity solutions. Central to its offerings is a sophisticated, cloud-native platform designed to equip organizations with analytics-driven programs for managing and mitigating cyber risks. This integrated platform comprises several critical components: InsightIDR for comprehensive incident detection and response; InsightCloudSec, which provides extensive cloud security across posture management, workload protection, infrastructure entitlements, infrastructure-as-code, and Kubernetes environments; InsightVM for streamlining vulnerability risk management by facilitating data collection, prioritization, and automated remediation; InsightAppSec, a tool for meticulously analyzing web applications to identify security flaws; and InsightConnect, empowering security professionals with orchestration and automation capabilities. Beyond its core platform, Rapid7's product suite includes DivvyCloud for specialized cloud security posture management, Nexpose and AppSpider as on-premises counterparts for vulnerability risk management and application security testing, respectively, and Metasploit, a renowned penetration testing software. The company also offers professional services to its clientele. Rapid7's solutions are accessible through flexible engagement models, including perpetual software licenses, cloud-based subscriptions, and managed services. The company caters to a broad spectrum of industries, such as technology, financial services, healthcare, manufacturing, retail, and government. Its global reach extends across the Americas, Europe, the Middle East, Africa, and Asia Pacific, serving customers directly through its sales teams and via an extensive network of channel partners. Founded in 2000, Rapid7 is headquartered in Boston, Massachusetts.
Price Overview
Last updated: Jul 8, 2026 7:21pm (just now)Price History (1 Year)
Revenue & Net Income Trend
| Period | Revenue | Net Income | Net Margin | YoY/QoQ |
|---|
Key Metrics
EPS (Diluted): 0.36
Total Equity: $154.73M
Shares: 65,002,000
Total Debt: $968.37M
Cash: $246.66M
EBITDA: $86.05M
Total Debt: $968.37M
Cash: $246.66M
Revenue: $859.79M
Revenue: $859.79M
Revenue: $859.79M
Total Equity: $154.73M
Tax Rate: 22.5%
Equity: $154.73M
Total Debt: $968.37M
Cash: $246.66M
Current Liabilities: $575.37M
Long-Term Debt: $952.19M
Total Debt: $968.37M
Total Equity: $154.73M
Shares: 65,002,000
Shares: 65,002,000
CapEx: -$7.60M
Shares: 65,002,000
Stock Price: $11.48
Net Income: $23.38M
Industry Benchmarks
Deep Analysis
Pre-flight intelligence scans the company first, then routes to the right analytical methods.
Income Statement (Annual)
Last updated: Jul 8, 2026 7:21pm (just now)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | $535.4M | $685.1M | $777.7M | $844.0M | $859.8M |
| Cost of Revenue | $168.9M | $214.3M | $231.7M | $251.0M | $255.0M |
| Gross Profit | $366.5M | $470.7M | $546.0M | $593.0M | $604.8M |
| Operating Expenses | $486.5M | $582.3M | $626.7M | $557.9M | $593.2M |
| Operating Income | -$120.1M | -$111.6M | -$80.7M | $35.0M | $11.6M |
| Net Income | -$146.3M | -$124.7M | -$149.3M | $25.5M | $23.4M |
| EBITDA | -$88.1M | -$70.3M | -$39.1M | $97.3M | $86.1M |
| EPS | $-2.65 | $-2.13 | $-2.46 | $0.41 | $0.36 |
| EPS (Diluted) | — | — | — | — | — |
Balance Sheet (Annual)
Last updated: Jul 8, 2026 7:21pm (just now)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cash & Equivalents | $164.6M | $207.3M | $213.6M | $334.7M | $246.7M |
| Total Current Assets | $432.7M | $510.3M | $634.5M | $786.1M | $688.9M |
| Total Assets | $1.3B | $1.4B | $1.5B | $1.7B | $1.7B |
| Current Liabilities | $468.7M | $531.3M | $569.8M | $630.2M | $575.4M |
| Long-Term Debt | $812.1M | $815.9M | $930.0M | $888.4M | $952.2M |
| Total Liabilities | $1.4B | $1.5B | $1.6B | $1.6B | $1.6B |
| Total Equity | -$126.0M | -$120.1M | -$118.2M | $17.7M | $154.7M |
| Retained Earnings | -$736.0M | -$860.7M | -$1.0B | -$988.0M | -$964.7M |
Cash Flow (Annual)
Last updated: Jul 8, 2026 7:21pm (just now)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Operating Cash Flow | $53.9M | $78.2M | $104.3M | $171.7M | $152.1M |
| Capital Expenditure | -$9.0M | -$20.4M | -$4.4M | -$3.4M | -$7.6M |
| Free Cash Flow | $44.9M | $57.8M | $99.9M | $168.2M | $144.5M |
| Acquisitions (net) | -$358.4M | $-300,000 | -$34.8M | -$37.3M | $0 |
| Debt Repayment | — | — | — | — | — |
| Dividends Paid | — | — | — | — | — |
| Stock Buybacks | $0 | $0 | $0 | $0 | $0 |
| Net Change in Cash | -$9.0M | $42.7M | $6.3M | $128.5M | -$95.4M |
Analyst Estimates (Annual)
Last updated: Jul 8, 2026 7:21pm (just now)| Metric | 2026 | 2027 | 2028 | 2029 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue |
$838.7M $838.1M – $839.4M
|
$837.2M $808.1M – $858.1M
|
$852.0M $847.3M – $856.6M
|
$904.0M $887.4M – $919.5M
|
| EBITDA |
$316.3M $316.1M – $316.5M
|
$315.7M $304.7M – $323.6M
|
$321.3M $319.5M – $323.0M
|
$340.9M $334.6M – $346.7M
|
| Net Income |
$100.8M $99.2M – $102.4M
|
$101.0M $89.9M – $112.0M
|
$108.4M $96.8M – $120.0M
|
$128.1M $125.0M – $130.9M
|
| EPS | — | — | — | — |
Growth Trends (YoY %)
Last updated: Jul 8, 2026 7:21pm (just now)| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue Growth | +28.0% | +13.5% | +8.5% | +1.9% |
| Gross Profit Growth | +28.5% | +16.0% | +8.6% | +2.0% |
| Operating Income Growth | +7.0% | +27.7% | +143.4% | -67.0% |
| Net Income Growth | +14.8% | -19.7% | +117.1% | -8.4% |
| EBITDA Growth | +20.2% | +44.3% | +348.6% | -11.6% |
Insider Trading (Recent)
All SEC Form 4 codes
- P Purchase
- Open-market or private purchase of shares.
- S Sale
- Open-market or private sale of shares.
- A Award / grant
- Grant or award of securities (RSUs, options, etc.) under Rule 16b-3.
- D Return to issuer
- Securities disposed back to the company under Rule 16b-3.
- F In-kind (tax)
- Shares withheld or delivered to pay the option-exercise price or tax — not an open-market sale.
- I Discretionary
- Discretionary transaction under an employee plan — Rule 16b-3(f).
- M Option exercise
- Exercise or conversion of a derivative (option/RSU) into shares — exempt.
- C Conversion
- Conversion of a derivative security into the underlying shares.
- E Short expiration
- Expiration of a short derivative position.
- H Long expiration
- Expiration or cancellation of a long derivative position with value received.
- O OTM exercise
- Exercise of an out-of-the-money derivative.
- X ITM exercise
- Exercise of an in-the-money or at-the-money derivative.
- G Gift
- Bona fide gift of securities.
- L Small acquisition
- Small acquisition under Rule 16a-6.
- W Inheritance
- Acquisition or disposition by will or the laws of descent.
- Z Voting trust
- Deposit into or withdrawal from a voting trust.
- J Other
- Other acquisition or disposition (explained in a Form 4 footnote).
- K Equity swap
- Transaction in an equity swap or similar instrument.
- U Tender / buyout
- Disposition via tender of shares in a change-of-control transaction.
Compensation-plan codes (A, D, F, M) are routine and rarely directional. Open-market P (buy) and S (sale) carry the most signal.
| Date | Insider | Type | Shares | Price | Value |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-06-15 | MOHAMED WAEL | A-Award | 2,125,000.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-06-15 | MOHAMED WAEL | A-Award | 841,515.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-06-09 | JANA Partners Management, LP | J-Other | 15,208.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-06-09 | Galligan Kevin G. | A-Award | 15,208.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-06-09 | Brown Marc Evan | A-Award | 15,208.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-06-09 | BRUNER JUDY | A-Award | 15,208.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-06-09 | BURNS MIKE | A-Award | 15,208.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-06-09 | Holzman Benjamin | A-Award | 15,208.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-06-09 | Nye Benjamin | A-Award | 15,208.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-06-09 | Schodorf Thomas E | A-Award | 15,208.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-06-09 | Sondhi Reeny | A-Award | 15,208.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-06-09 | MOHAMED WAEL | F-InKind | 397.00 | $7.10 | $2,819 |
| 2026-06-09 | BERRY MICHAEL J | G-Gift | 8,420.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-06-09 | BERRY MICHAEL J | G-Gift | 8,420.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-06-09 | Kalowski Jeffrey | A-Award | 57,390.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-06-09 | Kalowski Jeffrey | 0.00 | $0.00 | $0 | |
| 2026-05-15 | Murphy Scott M | F-InKind | 1,059.00 | $6.50 | $6,884 |
| 2026-05-15 | Thomas Corey E. | F-InKind | 5,357.00 | $6.50 | $34,821 |
| 2026-02-17 | Murphy Scott M | A-Award | 20,000.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-04-22 | Murphy Scott M | S-Sale | 827.00 | $6.35 | $5,251 |
Narrative Economics
market-narrative step).
Delvantic AI Findings
Looking at the raw numbers first: Rapid7 is doing $859.8M in 2025 revenue, up from $844.0M — that's 1.9% YoY, effectively stall speed. The quarterly sequence ($205M → $208M → $215M → $216M → $210M → $214M → $218M → $217M) shows revenue has flatlined around $215M for four quarters running. This isn't a growth company anymore; it's a utility. But the cash generation is real and improving: $144.5M FCF on $152.1M OCF with trivial capex, and net income turned positive across all four 2025 quarters ($23.4M full year). Gross margin is 70%, which is respectable but light for enterprise SaaS (best-in-class is 75-80%). Operating margin of 1.35% GAAP is thin — the profitability story is FCF, not GAAP earnings, because of heavy SBC add-backs (visible in the award grants of 1.1M + 275K + 467K shares — material dilution on a 65M share count).
Now the models. The Valuation Synthesis is working from numbers that don't match what I'm seeing. It cites "$878M debt with 1.1x interest coverage," "0.4x P/S," and "$19M insider buying" — but the tile shows P/S of 1.14x (not 0.4x), debt as "—" (not disclosed, so the $878M figure is unsourced in this file), and cash of $246.7M. Market cap is $380M; even if debt really is ~$878M, EV/revenue would be ~1.5x, not the 2.05x shown either. Something is inconsistent. The ev_to_ebitda of 13.5x and P/E of 16.4x TTM do NOT suggest a company priced for liquidation — they suggest a company priced roughly in line with a no-growth mature software business. The Synthesis narrative of "distressed asset pricing" appears to be overdramatic or based on a different data snapshot (possibly when the stock was lower). At $5.84 and 1.1x sales, RPD is cheap but not priced for death.
The contrarian case against the bullish "disconnected from fundamentals" read: revenue growth of 1.9% in a cybersecurity market growing 12-15% means Rapid7 is LOSING share every quarter. That's not a stable melting ice cube — that's accelerating relative decline in a category where scale and platform breadth are winning (CrowdStrike, Palo Alto, Wiz, SentinelOne all growing 20%+). The 70% gross margin is 5-10 points below peers, suggesting pricing pressure or unfavorable mix. The SBC-heavy compensation (millions of shares being awarded) means FCF overstates owner earnings by probably $60-80M annually — real owner FCF is closer to $70-90M, and on $380M market cap + whatever net debt exists, that's not screamingly cheap if growth is zero-to-negative. The insider purchases (50K, 150K, 41K, 6K shares in late November 2025) are real but modest in dollar terms at these prices — maybe $1-2M total, not the "$19M" the Synthesis cites.
Where the data is thin: total debt and total equity are both blank in the balance sheet section, which is the single most important variable for this thesis. If RPD carries the convertible notes I vaguely recall (~$600M range), interest coverage and refinancing risk matter enormously. The Synthesis treats debt as central but the file doesn't actually show it. The insider list also has unnamed filers ("?") which makes it impossible to distinguish CEO conviction buying from director box-checking. The TTM metrics are from a different window than the annual tile, flagged appropriately.
My read: the prior models are directionally right that RPD is cheap for a profitable SaaS business, but the Synthesis's "disconnected from fundamentals / acquisition at premium likely" framing is too aggressive. This is a no-growth, share-losing, SBC-diluting cybersecurity vendor with a possibly stressed balance sheet, generating real but overstated cash. At 1.1x sales and ~16x earnings, it's priced as a dying-but-not-dead business — which is approximately what the numbers say it is. M&A optionality exists but isn't a layup; strategic acquirers have been buying faster-growing assets (Wiz at $32B by Google, etc.) not decelerating legacy vendors. I dissent from the "compelling risk-adjusted returns" framing and land closer to "cheap but deservedly so, with binary M&A optionality." Fair value in a standalone case is maybe $7-9 (1.3-1.6x sales, ~20x owner FCF); in an acquisition case $10-12. Current $5.84 offers modest upside with real downside if debt refinancing sours.
GPT Critique
Upon reviewing Rapid7's financial data, what stands out most to me is the stark contrast between its modest revenue growth and its relatively strong free cash flow generation. The revenue growth is indeed anemic at 1.9% YoY for 2025, stagnating around $215M per quarter. However, the company has managed to turn a profit with net income of $23.4M for the year and a free cash flow of $144.5M, which is impressive given its past losses. The gross margin of 70% is decent, though not exceptional for the industry, indicating some pricing or competitive pressures. Despite these pressures, the operating cash flow of $152.1M and minimal capex suggest that Rapid7 is generating substantial cash, which could be a lifeline in a consolidating market.
I disagree with Opus's assertion that the company's valuation metrics imply pricing for liquidation. The P/E ratio of 16.4x and ev_to_ebitda of 13.5x do not suggest a distressed valuation. These metrics indicate a mature software company with no growth rather than a company on the brink of failure. Opus's claim that Rapid7 is priced for death is overly pessimistic. The discrepancy in the P/S ratio (1.14x shown in the data vs. 0.4x claimed by Opus) further undermines the notion that the market has given up entirely on Rapid7's potential.
However, I concur with Opus's assessment that Rapid7 is losing market share, as evidenced by its growth lagging behind the broader cybersecurity market, which is expanding at 12-15%. This relative decline poses a significant challenge, especially given the high competitive pressures from larger platforms like CrowdStrike and Palo Alto. Opus rightly points out that the company's heavy reliance on stock-based compensation dilutes actual owner earnings, making the FCF appear more robust than it truly is.
A careful skeptic might argue that both my view and Opus's overlook the potential for strategic restructuring or divestitures that could unlock value. They might also highlight that the absence of specific debt figures in the data introduces significant uncertainty regarding Rapid7's financial health and the potential impact of refinancing risks. Furthermore, the insider buying, while modest, could indicate insider confidence in the company's strategic direction, suggesting that management may have a plan to address these challenges.