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What this page is: Delvantic's full research page for Sony Group Corporation - (SONY) — AI-driven forensic equity research: mechanical valuation models (DCF, EPV, anchored-PE, scenario) plus three independent AI lenses (Quality / Value / Sentiment). Everything below is rendered server-side; you are not missing content that requires JavaScript. All scores are predictions and research opinions, not financial advice.
Our current read (analysis of 2026-08-23): Designation Low · Gem Score -38 (−100…+100 Quality+Value blend) · Quality -2 · Value -67 · Sentiment 48 (timing only, not weighted) · Composite fair value $17.20 vs $23.10 at analysis
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profile-header/price-overview— company profile, live quote, market capextended-analysis— the core: three AI lens reads with findings, scores, and the analyst memofuture-predictions— our forward price-band predictionsmarket-narrative/ai-findings/gpt-critique— narrative context, cross-model findings, and an adversarial critique of our own analysis (near the end of the document)- Members-only sections (render as login gates for anonymous readers):
price-history,income-trend,key-metrics,financials(statement tables),insider-trading. The analysis above is public; the raw data tables require a free account.
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Sony Group Corporation -
SONY NYSESony Group Corporation - Sponsored American Depositary Receipt represents equity ownership in Sony Group Corporation in a form tailored for U.S. investors. The company is a diversified Japanese conglomerate headquartered in Tokyo, operating across consumer electronics, gaming, entertainment, and imaging technology. Sony today develops, manufactures, and sells products such as game consoles, digital cameras, image sensors, audio devices, and professional broadcasting equipment. It also runs major content businesses, including console and mobile games, recorded music, music publishing, and film and television production and distribution. The company’s technologies and intellectual property are used in consumer, professional, and industrial applications worldwide, supporting sectors from entertainment and media to imaging, communications, and automotive. Through this sponsored American Depositary Receipt, investors gain access to Sony Group Corporation’s global business portfolio and its role as a key player in both hardware and content-driven segments of the modern digital and entertainment economy.
Price Overview
Price History (1 Year)
Revenue & Net Income Trend
This company does not file structured financial statements with the U.S. SEC, so quarterly figures aren't available from our filings-based data engine. Annual figures shown here come from the sources that do cover it.
| Period | Revenue | Net Income | Net Margin | YoY/QoQ |
|---|
Key Metrics
EPS (Diluted): 1.19
Total Equity: $53.72B
Shares: 6,075,064,000
Total Debt: $24.69B
Cash: $18.82B
EBITDA: $16.16B
Total Debt: $24.69B
Cash: $18.82B
Revenue: $81.79B
Revenue: $81.79B
Revenue: $81.79B
Total Equity: $53.72B
Tax Rate: 21.3%
Equity: $53.72B
Total Debt: $24.69B
Cash: $18.82B
Current Liabilities: $67.47B
Long-Term Debt: $13.05B
Total Debt: $24.69B
Total Equity: $53.72B
Shares: 6,075,064,000
Shares: 6,075,064,000
CapEx: -$4.09B
Shares: 6,075,064,000
Stock Price: $23.10
Net Income: $7.21B
Industry Benchmarks
Income Statement (Annual)
Last updated: Aug 7, 2026 12:01am (16d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | $56.8B | $62.6B | $72.8B | $82.2B | $81.8B |
| Cost of Revenue | $32.0B | $36.9B | $45.3B | $51.1B | $53.7B |
| Gross Profit | $24.8B | $25.7B | $27.6B | $31.1B | $28.1B |
| Operating Expenses | $18.8B | $18.1B | $19.9B | $23.5B | $19.2B |
| Operating Income | $6.0B | $7.6B | $7.6B | $7.6B | $8.9B |
| Net Income | $6.5B | $5.6B | $5.9B | $6.1B | $7.2B |
| EBITDA | $10.7B | $13.3B | $14.5B | $14.9B | $16.2B |
| EPS | $1.06 | $0.90 | $0.96 | $1.00 | $1.19 |
| EPS (Diluted) | $1.04 | $0.89 | $0.95 | $0.99 | $1.19 |
Balance Sheet (Annual)
Last updated: Aug 7, 2026 12:01am (16d ago)| Metric | 2022 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cash & Equivalents | $12.9B | $12.9B | $9.3B | $12.0B | $18.8B |
| Total Current Assets | $34.9B | $34.9B | $36.5B | $42.8B | $47.1B |
| Total Assets | $192.4B | $192.4B | $202.2B | $215.3B | $222.8B |
| Current Liabilities | $55.3B | $55.3B | $58.8B | $64.3B | $67.5B |
| Long-Term Debt | $7.6B | $7.6B | $11.2B | $13.0B | $13.0B |
| Total Liabilities | $147.0B | $147.0B | $156.2B | $166.3B | $169.1B |
| Total Equity | $45.4B | $45.4B | $46.0B | $49.0B | $53.7B |
| Retained Earnings | $23.7B | $23.7B | $29.1B | $37.9B | $42.2B |
Cash Flow (Annual)
Last updated: Aug 7, 2026 12:01am (16d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Operating Cash Flow | $7.2B | $7.8B | $2.0B | $8.7B | $14.7B |
| Capital Expenditure | -$3.0B | -$2.8B | -$3.9B | -$3.9B | -$4.1B |
| Free Cash Flow | $4.2B | $5.0B | -$1.9B | $4.7B | $10.6B |
| Acquisitions (net) | -$96.3M | -$1.8B | -$1.8B | -$1.3B | -$1.9B |
| Net Debt Issued / (Repaid) | -$619.4M | — | — | — | — |
| Dividends Paid | -$386.9M | -$469.3M | -$546.4M | -$622.5M | -$727.5M |
| Stock Buybacks | -$2.3M | — | — | — | — |
| Net Change in Cash | $1.7B | $1.7B | -$3.6B | $2.7B | $6.8B |
Growth Trends (YoY %)
Last updated: Aug 7, 2026 12:01am (16d ago)| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue Growth | +10.3% | +16.3% | +12.8% | -0.5% |
| Gross Profit Growth | +3.6% | +7.1% | +13.0% | -9.7% |
| Operating Income Growth | +25.9% | +0.5% | +0.1% | +16.4% |
| Net Income Growth | -14.3% | +6.2% | +3.6% | +17.6% |
| EBITDA Growth | +24.9% | +9.0% | +2.5% | +8.8% |
Dividend History (Last 20)
Last updated: Aug 5, 2026 9:36am (18d ago)| Date | Dividend | Declaration | Record | Payment |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2025-03-31 | $0.07 | — | — | — |
| 2024-09-30 | $0.01 | — | — | — |
| 2024-03-27 | $0.01 | — | — | — |
| 2023-09-28 | $0.01 | — | — | — |
| 2023-03-30 | $0.01 | — | — | — |
| 2022-09-29 | $0.05 | — | — | — |
| 2022-03-29 | $0.05 | — | — | — |
| 2021-09-28 | $0.05 | — | — | — |
| 2021-03-29 | $0.05 | — | — | — |
| 2020-09-28 | $0.05 | — | — | — |
| 2020-03-27 | $0.05 | — | — | — |
| 2019-09-27 | $0.04 | — | — | — |
| 2019-03-28 | $0.04 | — | — | — |
| 2018-09-27 | $0.03 | — | — | — |
| 2018-03-28 | $0.03 | — | — | — |
| 2017-09-28 | $0.02 | — | — | — |
| 2017-03-28 | $0.02 | — | — | — |
| 2016-09-27 | $0.02 | — | — | — |
| 2016-03-28 | $0.02 | — | — | — |
| 2015-09-25 | $0.02 | — | — | — |
Deep Analysis
Narrative Economics
market-narrative step).
Claude Reading
Starting from the raw numbers: Sony did $81.79B revenue in FY25 vs $56.80B in FY21 — that's a 9.5% five-year revenue CAGR, but the last two years were flat ($82.19B → $81.79B, -0.5% YoY). Operating income actually expanded meaningfully ($6.03B → $8.88B, ~10% CAGR) and net income grew to $7.21B. FCF of $10.57B on a $135.65B market cap is a 7.8% FCF yield — that is not an overvalued signal on its face for a business with platform economics in gaming. ROE 13.4%, ROIC 11.7%, net margin 8.8%, EV/EBITDA 9.0x. These are pedestrian conglomerate numbers, not premium ones, but they're also not stretched. A current ratio of 0.70 looks scary but is normal for Japanese conglomerates with financial-services subsidiaries embedded in the consolidated balance sheet.
Here's where I push back hard on the synthesis: the composite fair value of $16.23 (a 30% haircut) implies Sony deserves an EV/EBITDA of ~6x and a P/E of ~13x — that's a melting-ice-cube multiple, not a mature platform owner with PlayStation, Bungie/FromSoftware IP, the music catalog (which is genuinely compounding — publishing royalties from streaming are one of the best businesses in media), and ~50% share of premium smartphone CMOS sensors. The thesis-evaluation claim that "the market embeds 23% FCF growth for five years" is arithmetically wrong for a company trading at 12.8x FCF and 19.5x earnings. At 12.8x FCF you need mid-single-digit growth plus stable margins to justify the price, not 23%. The bear model is anchoring on a DCF output without sanity-checking the implied multiple against what actually clears the market for diversified platform-media businesses (Nintendo trades ~18x, Disney ~20x, Warner Music ~25x).
The contrarian counter — and it's real — is (1) the console cycle: PS5 launched November 2020, so we're 5 years in and hardware unit growth is decelerating; PS6 capex ramp in FY26-27 will pressure margins; (2) image sensors are exposed to smartphone unit stagnation and Chinese competition (OmniVision, Samsung ISOCELL are closing the gap); (3) Sony Pictures had a soft slate and streaming economics are punishing everyone below Netflix scale; (4) yen strength from BoJ normalization is a direct earnings headwind since Sony reports in JPY and derives majority of revenue in USD/EUR. FCF quality flagged as "weak" is worth investigating — $14.65B OCF vs $7.21B NI is a 2x ratio, which is actually strong, so I disagree with that secondary signal outright. The insider "A-Award" transactions dated 2026-07-24 look like stale/future-dated RSU grants, not conviction signals — ignore.
I dissent from the synthesis. $23.10 for a business generating $10.57B in FCF, growing operating income ~10% annually, with a genuine platform asset in PlayStation and a compounding music-publishing tail, is not overvalued — it's roughly fair to modestly cheap. The narrative-premium framing (42% above DCF) is model-anchoring; the DCF is the thing that's wrong, not the price. Fair value in the $25-30 range on 14-16x FCF is defensible. I'd disagree with the "market prices in 23% FCF growth" claim as mathematically unsupported. Where I partially agree with the bears: this is not a table-pounding long — the console-cycle transition into PS6 is a real 2026-27 margin risk, and if the yen strengthens another 10% against the dollar, reported earnings compress. But calling it 30% overvalued requires you to believe PlayStation is worth almost nothing, and that's not a defensible base case. Direction: modestly undervalued, conviction 3. The right trade is a starter position with room to add on any PS6 capex-driven drawdown.
GPT Reading
Sony looks misread if you treat it as a plain consumer electronics name, but it also doesn’t look like an obvious bargain at $23.1. What stands out in the raw numbers is the combination of flat top line and improving profit extraction. Revenue was basically unchanged in FY2025 at $81.79B versus $82.19B in FY2024, yet operating income rose to $8.88B from $7.63B and net income to $7.21B from $6.13B. That is a meaningful step-up: operating margin expanded to 10.9% from 9.3%, and net margin to 8.8% from 7.5%. Over five years, revenue grew from $56.8B to $81.8B, a roughly 7.5% annualized climb, while operating income went from $6.03B to $8.88B and free cash flow reached $10.57B on $14.65B of operating cash flow. This is not a melting legacy conglomerate. It is a diversified platform-and-content company that has shown it can hold earnings power even when revenue stalls.
The valuation does not scream expensive on those earnings and cash numbers. At a $135.65B market cap, the stock trades at about 19.5x earnings and roughly 12.8x free cash flow. For a business producing ROE of 13.4% and ROIC of 11.7%, with net debt of only about $5.9B, that is closer to fair-to-modestly-cheap than to clearly overvalued. EV/EBITDA of 9.0x is especially hard to square with a deeply bearish view, given the business mix includes gaming ecosystem economics, music royalties, and entertainment IP rather than just low-return hardware. The biggest contradiction in the bearish model outputs is the implied need for extraordinary growth. The actual market multiple does not suggest investors are pricing Sony like a high-growth software name; 1.7x sales and sub-20x earnings for a company generating $10.6B of FCF says the market is already applying a conglomerate discount.
The weak spots are real, but I read them as reasons for restraint, not a short thesis. Gross profit fell from $31.13B to $28.10B in FY2025 even as operating income improved, which suggests mix, cost classification, or volatility across segments rather than broad-based pricing power. The current ratio of 0.70 is low, though less alarming in a large, cash-generative Japanese conglomerate than it would be in a strained industrial. Revenue growth has clearly slowed: the five-year build is solid, but the latest year was down 0.5%, so the investment case today is about durability and margin quality, not acceleration. That matters because if Sony is entering the softer part of the console cycle, flat-to-down revenue could persist for a while. Even so, a company earning $7.2B and converting that into $10.6B of free cash flow does not deserve to be valued as though a cliff is imminent.
The best argument against my read is that FY2025 may be close to a margin peak while the revenue engine is already flattening. If gaming hardware and software normalize, if image sensors face a smartphone lull, and if entertainment growth slows, then the market could be paying 19.5x for earnings that do not compound. A skeptic would also point to the decline in gross profit dollars, the “weak cash flow quality” flag, and the fact that dividend yield is only 0.6%, meaning shareholders rely almost entirely on continued execution and rerating rather than direct cash return. On that framing, the composite fair value in the mid-to-high teens is not crazy: if normalized net income is nearer $6B than $7.2B and free cash flow is cyclically elevated at $10.6B, then today’s price embeds more confidence than the recent top-line trend warrants. I weigh that differently because the balance sheet is not stretched, profitability is improving rather than eroding, and the market multiple is not rich enough to demand perfection.
What would change my mind is straightforward. If the next annual result shows another year of flat or declining revenue and operating income falls back toward the $7.5B level, then FY2025 will look like a one-off margin spike and I would move bearish quickly, especially if free cash flow drops below about $8.5B. Conversely, if Sony can grow revenue back into even a mid-single-digit range while sustaining operating margin around 10.5%-11% and free cash flow above $10B, then the current price is too low and a valuation in the high $20s becomes easy to defend.
Grok Reading
Sony’s latest fiscal year tells a story of a mature earner whose top line has stalled while the profit mix is quietly deteriorating underneath the surface. Revenue slipped from $82.19B to $81.79B, a –0.5% print that ends a multi-year climb from $56.8B; the 6% five-year CAGR is now clearly decelerating. More telling is the $3B collapse in gross profit—from $31.13B to $28.10B—pushing gross margin from roughly 38% down to 34.4%. Operating income still rose to $8.88B and net income to $7.21B (+17.6% YoY), so management is extracting leverage below the gross line, but that is cost discipline, not pricing power. Free cash flow of $10.57B on $14.65B of operating cash remains the cleanest number on the sheet and equates to a 7.8% FCF yield at the $135.65B market cap; net debt is a modest $5.9B. Yet a current ratio of 0.70 and ROA of only 3.2% underscore that this is a capital-heavy, low-turnover conglomerate, not a high-ROIC platform. At 19.5× trailing earnings and 9.0× EV/EBITDA the market is still paying a growth multiple for what the income statement now shows is a low-single-digit revenue story with visible margin compression.
The quantitative models flag a 30% overvaluation versus a $16–17 composite, and the thesis score of –16 correctly identifies the console-cycle cliff and the improbability of 23% FCF compounding as the core risks. Those warnings align with the raw data: PlayStation and music may be high-quality, but they have not prevented a flat revenue year or a three-point gross-margin hit. The 42% narrative premium the market is embedding for “software-platform economics” is therefore resting on assets whose contribution is already fully visible in the current run-rate and is not expanding the top line.
The strongest counter-argument is the cash-generation profile itself. A business that converts $7.21B of net income into $10.57B of free cash flow, carries only 0.46× debt-to-equity, and still grows earnings at a 10% CAGR can justify a mid-teens multiple even if revenue is stagnant; Japanese conglomerate recovery and image-sensor scarcity narratives have historically supported similar premiums. If gross-margin pressure proves temporary—driven by mix or one-time inventory rather than structural commoditization—and if PlayStation Plus and music streaming continue to lift recurring-revenue mix, the $23.10 price could simply be the market correctly refusing to apply a pure mature-earner discount. That case is coherent, but it requires believing the gross-profit drop is noise rather than signal, which the five-year trend does not support.
I would reverse to neutral or undervalued on two concrete prints: a return to positive mid-single-digit organic revenue growth accompanied by gross margin re-expanding above 36%, or fiscal 2026 free cash flow clearing $12B while the console cycle is still intact. Either would invalidate the deceleration thesis that currently anchors the overvaluation call.
Big-3 Panel — where each AI stands
Claude — Second Response · undervalued revised
VERDICT: Modestly undervalued at $23.10; fair value $24-27 contingent on FY26 gross margin stabilizing above 35% and FCF holding near $10B
Both colleagues converged in the fair-to-modestly-cheap zone, and Grok's bear case deserves specific engagement rather than dismissal. The argument that moved me most is Grok's gross-margin observation: $31.13B → $28.10B gross profit, with margin compressing from ~38% to 34.4%, while operating income *rose*. I underweighted this in my first read. That is a real signal — it means the FY25 operating-income beat came from SG&A discipline or segment mix, not pricing power, and it's harder to repeat. Combined with flat revenue (-0.5%), this weakens my "10% operating income CAGR" extrapolation. If normalized OI is closer to $7.5-8B than $8.88B, my $25-30 range compresses toward $22-26.
What did *not* move me: Grok's $17-19 fair value still requires the market to apply ~11-12x earnings and ~7x EV/EBITDA to a business with $10.57B FCF, a music-publishing tail, and PlayStation platform economics. Nintendo at ~18x and Warner Music at ~25x remain the relevant comps, and Grok never addresses why Sony deserves a discount to *both*. The "23% implied FCF growth" claim is still arithmetically unsupported at 12.8x FCF — GPT implicitly agrees, noting the market is already applying a conglomerate discount rather than a growth multiple. GPT's framing is closer to mine but with better discipline around the margin-peak risk, and I'll adopt that restraint.
Net: I hold direction (modestly undervalued) but tighten the range and lower conviction. Grok's gross-margin point is the specific data I underweighted; it shifts my fair value from $25-30 to $24-27 and makes this less of a "starter position with room to add" and more of a "wait for the FY26 gross margin print." If gross margin doesn't recover above 36% and FCF drops below $9B next year, I flip to neutral quickly.
GPT — Second Response · fairly valued changed direction
VERDICT: Fair-to-modestly attractive at $23.10; reasonable value is still about $25–28, while a drop toward $19–20 would make it clearly cheap.
Claude’s pushback on the bearish DCF moved me, but only at the margin because it reinforces rather than changes my original view. The most persuasive point is arithmetic: a stock at 12.8x FCF and 19.5x earnings does not obviously require heroic 20%+ growth to justify itself, so I agree the “market embeds 23% FCF growth” framing is overstated. I also think he is right that a 6x EV/EBITDA or ~13x P/E framing would implicitly treat Sony like a deteriorating hardware-only asset, which does not fit a mix that includes PlayStation ecosystem revenues, music publishing, and image sensors. That makes the hard-bear mid-teens valuation feel too punitive unless one assumes a real earnings reset.
What did not move me is Grok’s attempt to turn the gross-profit decline into the central signal while downplaying the offsetting fact that operating and net income materially improved. A $3B gross-profit drop matters, but if the company simultaneously expands operating margin from 9.3% to 10.9% and produces $10.6B of FCF, I need stronger evidence that this is structural erosion rather than mix/accounting/noise across segments. Where Grok is useful is as a check on complacency: flat revenue, a maturing console cycle, and possible yen strength make it hard to underwrite multiple expansion with confidence. So after hearing both sides, I land where I started but with slightly lower conviction in upside magnitude: Sony is not cheap enough for a strong bullish call, yet the bear case still leans too heavily on model outputs that undercredit the quality of the asset mix and overstate the growth needed to support today’s price.
Grok — Second Response · fairly valued changed direction
VERDICT: Fairly valued at $23.10; central fair-value band $22–26 on 13–15× FCF once platform durability is properly weighted
The FCF-yield arithmetic from both colleagues is the point that lands cleanly and forces a revision. At 12.8× trailing FCF and a clean 7.8% yield, the market is simply not embedding the 23% compounding my first-read models assumed; mid-single-digit durability plus the observed operating leverage is enough to clear $23. That error, plus the sanity check against Nintendo/Disney/Warner Music multiples, shows the $16–17 composite was an over-penalized melting-ice-cube output rather than a realistic base case for a platform-plus-catalog owner. Claude’s and GPT’s shared emphasis on the 10% operating-income CAGR despite flat revenue further undercuts my earlier dismissal of below-gross cost discipline as mere temporary housekeeping.
I still do not fully buy the $25–30 upside case. The three-point gross-margin collapse and stalled top line remain real signals of mix pressure and console-cycle maturation; those are not noise, and PS6 capex plus yen risk keep the forward path from being linear. But those risks now look like reasons for a modest conglomerate discount, not a 30% haircut. The balance-sheet and cash-conversion profile (net debt 0.46×, OCF-to-NI >2×) give the stock enough ballast that $23.10 sits inside a fair-value band rather than above it.
Advanced Analysis Forensic deep-dive · separate lenses
Sony is a mature, diversified conglomerate (gaming, music, pictures, imaging sensors, financial services) generating $81.8B revenue with $7.21B net income and a strong $10.57B FCF in the latest year. Over five years, revenue grew from $56.8B to $81.8B (roughly 9.5% CAGR), while net income drifted from $6.5B to $7.2B - top-line growth has outpaced earnings growth because gross margin has compressed from 43.7% to 34.4% and operating margin has hovered in a 9-12% band. Earnings quality is respectable: OCF/NI at 1.26x and accruals at -0.8% of assets suggest reported profits are backed by cash, and FCF in the trailing year notably exceeds net income.
Verify before trusting this (4)
- Segment-level margin bridge: is gross margin compression driven by gaming hardware mix, financial services consolidation, or genuine pricing pressure?
- Adjusted leverage excluding the Sony Financial Group consolidation to assess the true industrial net-debt position.
- Capex intensity and content/game investment cadence to explain FCF volatility (notably the -$1.89B 2023 print).
- Detail on the 2025 buyback authorization and pace versus SBC issuance to confirm the -0.7% share-count trend is durable.
The e2e synthesis pegs composite fair value at $17.65 and signal-adjusted at $16.23 against a $23.10 price - a 24-30% overshoot. The DCF ($12.27) and EPV floor ($13.24) both sit well below price, and only the anchored-PE method ($32.80) supports the current quote, which itself relies on a generous multiple applied to peak-cycle earnings. Averaging the cash-flow-based methods puts deserved value in the mid-teens; even weighting the PE anchor heavily gets you to the high-teens, not $23.
Verify before trusting this (5)
- Gaming segment operating margin trajectory post-Bungie
- Imaging sensor share and ASPs in the smartphone downcycle
- Music/pictures streaming economics and content amortization policy
- Financial-services segment separation impact on consolidated leverage
- Buyback pace and share-count trajectory
The non-fundamental pressure on SONY is currently net positive. The narrative has visibly shifted in the last week: a raised profit outlook, a 10.9% one-week rally, articles framing it as a buy, a TSMC sensor JV storyline, and a sell-side consensus flagging ~30% upside. Nintendo's blowout print reinforces the console/gaming sentiment backdrop and pulls SONY along by association. The archetype is 'platform-monopoly' with moderate intensity and durability - not a mania, but a coherent, strengthening story the tape is choosing to reward. With beta 0.76 and a diversified, profitable mix, SONY is not a high-octane momentum name, so the push is steady rather than explosive. The macro backdrop is mixed but leans supportive: a risk-on regime (score +46, VIX 15.2, S&P near highs) is a mild tailwind for a low-beta consumer-tech conglomerate, while 10y at 4.63% and market PE 27.7 are generic headwinds that barely bite a cash-generative name like this. Momentum score prints slightly negative on the model's lookback, but the freshest week is clearly up, and news flow and analyst tone are aligned bullish. Net: a moderate tailwind, not a euphoric one - the story is being upgraded, not re-rated to cult status.
Verify before trusting this (5)
- Whether the post-guidance rally holds or fades into a 'sell the news' unwind over the next 2-3 weeks
- Any downgrade or target cut that would break the constructive analyst chorus
- Yen/USD moves that could flip the FX narrative from neutral to headwind
- Follow-through in PS5 software attach and any Bungie/FromSoftware release cadence news
- Progress or setbacks on the TSMC sensor JV that would validate or puncture the new story angle
This lens hasn't been run for this ticker yet.
When we made this prediction on Aug 7, 2026, SONY was $23.10. We expect it to be $20.10 by Feb 2027, and we consider it great value under $17.50. This is an early model (v0.6.0) — the direction is more reliable than the exact price. Made Aug 7, 2026.
Blue is our prediction, starting the day we made it. Grey is a slower route to the same place — the same destination, taking longer. Black is the actual price, so you can see how we are doing.