For AI assistants & researchers — machine-readable summary of this page
What this page is: Delvantic's full research page for Trip.com Group Limited (TCOM) — AI-driven forensic equity research: mechanical valuation models (DCF, EPV, anchored-PE, scenario) plus three independent AI lenses (Quality / Value / Sentiment). Everything below is rendered server-side; you are not missing content that requires JavaScript. All scores are predictions and research opinions, not financial advice.
Our current read (analysis of 2026-08-23): Designation Watch · Gem Score +16 (−100…+100 Quality+Value blend) · Quality 51 · Value -12 · Sentiment -17 (timing only, not weighted) · Composite fair value $93.80 vs $47.01 at analysis
Page map (sections in order; each card carries a stable
reference-name attribute you can cite):
profile-header/price-overview— company profile, live quote, market capextended-analysis— the core: three AI lens reads with findings, scores, and the analyst memofuture-predictions— our forward price-band predictionsmarket-narrative/ai-findings/gpt-critique— narrative context, cross-model findings, and an adversarial critique of our own analysis (near the end of the document)- Members-only sections (render as login gates for anonymous readers):
price-history,income-trend,key-metrics,financials(statement tables),insider-trading. The analysis above is public; the raw data tables require a free account.
More for machine readers: site briefing at
/llms.txt ·
any ticker resolves at delvantic.com/stock/TICKER ·
raw inputs are public-company filings and market data (via licensed data feeds);
every model, score, lens read, and prediction on this page is Delvantic's own analysis.
Trip.com Group Limited
TCOM NASDAQTrip.com Group Limited American Depositary Receipt represents the U.S.-traded share exposure of Trip.com Group Limited, a global travel service provider focused on digital booking and trip-management services. Trip.com Group operates a broad online travel platform that serves leisure and business travelers with accommodation reservations, transportation ticketing, packaged tours, corporate travel management, and related travel services. Its ecosystem also includes travel search, destination services, insurance, visa support, and other ancillary offerings that help users plan and manage trips through a single platform. The company operates through well-known brands including Trip.com, Ctrip, Qunar, and Skyscanner, giving it reach across domestic Chinese travel and international markets. Trip.com Group plays an important role in the online travel industry by connecting travelers, airlines, hotels, rail operators, and tour providers through technology-driven booking services.
Price Overview
Price History (1 Year)
Revenue & Net Income Trend
Trip.com Group Limited is a foreign private issuer — it reports to the U.S. SEC once a year (on Form 20-F or 40-F) rather than filing the quarterly statements (10-Q) that U.S.-domiciled companies must submit. Our financial statements are read directly from SEC filings, so for this company only annual figures exist at the source.
This is a property of how the company files, not missing or broken data — its filing history shows 16 annual reports, the latest filed 2026-04-28, and no quarterly filings . The company may still publish quarterly results on its own investor-relations site.
| Period | Revenue | Net Income | Net Margin | YoY/QoQ |
|---|
Key Metrics
EPS (Diluted): N/A
Total Equity: $25.29B
Shares: 698,378,891
Total Debt: $3.10B
Cash: $5.90B
EBITDA: $2.43B
Total Debt: $3.10B
Cash: $5.90B
Revenue: $9.24B
Revenue: $9.24B
Revenue: $9.24B
Total Equity: $25.29B
Tax Rate: 15.0%
Equity: $25.29B
Total Debt: $3.10B
Cash: $5.90B
Current Liabilities: $11.57B
Long-Term Debt: $241.90M
Total Debt: $3.10B
Total Equity: $25.29B
Shares: 698,378,891
Shares: 698,378,891
CapEx: -$117.99M
Shares: 698,378,891
Stock Price: $47.01
Net Income: $4.93B
Industry Benchmarks
Income Statement (Annual)
Last updated: Aug 2, 2026 2:23pm (21d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | $3.0B | $3.0B | $6.6B | $7.9B | $9.2B |
| Cost of Revenue | $680.7M | $668.1M | $1.2B | $1.5B | $1.8B |
| Gross Profit | $2.3B | $2.3B | $5.4B | $6.4B | $7.4B |
| Operating Expenses | $2.5B | $2.3B | $3.7B | $4.3B | $5.1B |
| Operating Income | -$208.9M | $13.0M | $1.7B | $2.1B | $2.3B |
| Net Income | -$81.4M | $207.7M | $1.5B | $2.5B | $4.9B |
| EBITDA | -$101.9M | $106.6M | $1.8B | $2.2B | $2.4B |
| EPS | — | — | — | — | — |
| EPS (Diluted) | — | — | — | — | — |
Balance Sheet (Annual)
Last updated: Aug 2, 2026 2:23pm (21d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cash & Equivalents | $2.9B | $2.5B | $6.2B | $7.2B | $5.9B |
| Total Current Assets | $9.8B | $9.1B | $13.1B | $16.6B | $17.9B |
| Total Assets | $28.4B | $28.4B | $32.4B | $35.9B | $39.6B |
| Current Liabilities | $9.8B | $9.1B | $10.7B | $11.0B | $11.6B |
| Long-Term Debt | $257.7M | $282.9M | $398.2M | $408.3M | $241.9M |
| Total Liabilities | $12.1B | $11.6B | $14.2B | $14.7B | $14.0B |
| Total Equity | $16.2B | $16.6B | $18.1B | $21.0B | $25.3B |
| Retained Earnings | — | — | — | — | — |
Cash Flow (Annual)
Last updated: Aug 2, 2026 2:23pm (21d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Operating Cash Flow | $366.4M | $391.0M | $3.3B | $2.9B | $2.1B |
| Capital Expenditure | -$84.4M | -$73.6M | -$89.7M | -$87.5M | -$118.0M |
| Free Cash Flow | $282.0M | $317.4M | $3.2B | $2.8B | $2.0B |
| Acquisitions (net) | -$6.2M | $-740,200 | $0 | $180.2M | -$111.5M |
| Net Debt Issued / (Repaid) | $829.3M | -$510.4M | $248.4M | $888,240 | $444,120 |
| Dividends Paid | — | — | — | — | -$30.2M |
| Stock Buybacks | — | — | -$239.4M | -$321.5M | -$650.8M |
| Net Change in Cash | $263.7M | -$401.0M | $3.8B | $1.1B | -$687.2M |
Growth Trends (YoY %)
Last updated: Aug 2, 2026 2:23pm (21d ago)| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue Growth | +0.1% | +122.1% | +19.7% | +17.1% |
| Gross Profit Growth | +0.7% | +134.4% | +19.0% | +16.1% |
| Operating Income Growth | +106.2% | +12,768.2% | +25.2% | +11.3% |
| Net Income Growth | +355.1% | +606.9% | +72.1% | +95.1% |
| EBITDA Growth | +204.7% | +1,559.9% | +24.1% | +10.7% |
Dividend History (Last 20)
Last updated: Aug 2, 2026 2:23pm (21d ago)| Date | Dividend | Declaration | Record | Payment |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2025-03-17 | $0.30 | — | — | — |
| 2008-06-10 | $0.01 | — | — | — |
| 2007-06-27 | $0.00 | — | — | — |
| 2006-06-28 | $0.00 | — | — | — |
Deep Analysis
Narrative Economics
market-narrative step).
Claude Reading
Starting with the raw numbers: TCOM printed $9.24B revenue in 2025 vs $2.97B in 2022 — that's a 3x in three years, but the honest read is that 2021-2022 were COVID-crushed China travel years, so the CAGR is a recovery artifact, not organic. More telling: 2024→2025 revenue growth was 17.1% ($7.89B → $9.24B), which is a defensible steady-state for a mature OTA duopoly. What genuinely raises my eyebrow is the 2025 net income of $4.93B on $9.24B revenue — a 53.3% net margin that exceeds operating margin of 25.3% by 28 points. That gap is almost certainly non-operating: investment gains, equity method income from TravelSky/MakeMyTrip-type stakes, tax benefits, or FX. Op income of $2.34B is the real earnings power; strip the below-the-line noise and normalized net income is closer to $1.8-2.0B, putting real P/E at ~15x, not the headline 6x. The Market Forces model is right to flag this; the Synthesis DCF at $102-124 fair value almost certainly extrapolates the reported 53% net margin, which is unsustainable.
FCF tells a more sobering story than the models emphasize. Operating CF of $2.13B against $4.93B net income is a 43% cash conversion — that's terrible for an asset-light OTA that should convert >100%. Either working capital is bleeding (customer deposits normalizing post-recovery), or a large chunk of "net income" is non-cash mark-to-market gains on investments. FCF CAGR of -20.3% while earnings CAGR is +83% is the smoking gun: the earnings quality is poor. At $2.01B FCF on a $29.6B market cap, that's a 6.8% FCF yield — attractive but not the deep-value 15%+ the P/E of 6 implies. EV/EBITDA of 11x is a fairer lens and suggests the stock is reasonably priced, not screamingly cheap.
Where I disagree with the models: the Synthesis verdict of $102-124 fair value (+165%) is fantasy anchored on unsustainable margins and ignores that TCOM's "6x P/E" is a data illusion. I side with Market Forces — fair, not compelling. However, the Narrative layer correctly identifies a real China-discount overhang, and the balance sheet is genuinely fortress-grade: $5.90B cash vs $3.10B debt (net cash $2.8B, ~9.5% of market cap), 1.55 current ratio, D/E of 0.12. ROE of 19.5% and ROIC of 8.8% (the ROE-ROIC gap again suggests financial income is inflating returns on book equity vs. operating capital). The contrarian case a skeptic would push: TCOM's Chinese outbound travel recovery is largely done; domestic travel is being commoditized by Meituan/Douyin verticals; the VIE structure remains an existential tail risk that no DCF captures; and the single 1M-share insider J-Other transaction in September (direction unclear from the data) deserves clarification — a 1M share sale at ~$50 would be a meaningful ~$50M signal.
Committing: I dissent from the synthesis's "undervalued at $124" verdict but agree with its direction (undervalued), just far less aggressively. Normalize net income to $2.5-3.0B (haircut the investment gains), apply a 12-14x multiple appropriate for a duopoly OTA carrying a legitimate 20-25% China-risk discount, and fair value lands at $50-60 — call it $55. That's 15-20% upside from $47, not 165%. This is a "hold with modest upside" name, not a table-pounder. The 40% drawdown from highs reflects real risks (margin normalization, geopolitics, VIE) that are only partially discounted, not fully. Starter position defensible for value investors comfortable with China exposure; anyone buying based on the headline 6x P/E is buying a mirage. The right catalysts to watch: Q1 2026 operating margin (does 25% hold?), FCF conversion normalizing back toward net income, and any clarity on the September insider transaction.
GPT Reading
Trip.com looks cheap on the surface, but the raw numbers tell me the market is not being irrational so much as refusing to capitalize a peak-margin year at face value. Revenue has rebounded from $2.96B in 2021 and $2.97B in 2022 to $6.59B in 2023, $7.89B in 2024, and $9.24B in 2025, which is an excellent recovery and still a healthy 17% growth rate in the latest year. Gross margin is an eye-catching 80.6% and operating margin 25.3%, both strong for an OTA platform. The issue is below operating profit: net income jumped to $4.93B on $9.24B of revenue, a 53.4% net margin, while operating income was only $2.34B. That gap is too large to simply treat as normalized earnings power. At a $29.6B market cap, the stock screens at 6.0x earnings, but on operating income it is closer to 12.6x EBIT, and EV/EBITDA at 11.0x already points to a much less absurd valuation than the P/E suggests.
Cash flow reinforces that caution. Free cash flow of $2.01B is real and healthy, but it is nowhere near the $4.93B of net income. Operating cash flow was $2.13B, so more than half of reported earnings did not show up in cash in the latest year. That does not make the business weak; it makes the earnings multiple misleading. If I capitalize something closer to $2.0B-$2.5B of sustainable annual cash generation, this is not a screaming bargain at $29.6B equity value. It is more like a decent business trading at roughly 12x-15x FCF, which is attractive only if you believe growth remains solid and China risk deserves little discount. The balance sheet is unquestionably strong, with $5.90B cash against $3.10B debt, so there is no financial stress here; that cash-rich profile helps justify a constructive floor under the stock, but not the triple-digit fair values some models spit out.
What stands out most is that the stock is being valued like a China-discounted cyclical platform just as the company is reporting numbers that look structurally superior to that label. ROE of 19.5%, ROA of 12.5%, and a 25% operating margin are all very good. Price-to-book at 1.30x is low for a platform asset with this profitability. Price-to-sales at 3.55x is also not demanding for a travel intermediary with 80% gross margins. So I do think the market is under-crediting the franchise quality and over-penalizing the China/VIE/regulatory overhang. But I would not underwrite the story off the 6x P/E because the 2025 income statement is clearly inflated by non-operating items or mark-to-market-type gains relative to the operating and cash profile. My read is that fair value is above $47, but nowhere near the mechanistic $100-plus output; a more honest range is probably in the low-to-mid $60s if revenue can keep compounding at mid-teens and operating margins hold above 20%.
The best case against my caution is straightforward: even if you haircut the $4.93B net income heavily, the business is still very cheap for its quality. Revenue has more than tripled from the 2021-2022 trough, EBIT has gone from negative in 2021 and breakeven in 2022 to $1.68B, then $2.10B, then $2.34B, which shows the recovery is not a one-quarter mirage but a three-year normalization. Net cash of roughly $2.8B lowers real enterprise value, and EV/revenue of 2.9x for a category leader with international optionality is hardly aggressive. If outbound Chinese travel keeps normalizing and international units like Skyscanner continue to diversify the story, then today’s multiple could prove too low even on conservative cash earnings. That is the strongest bull argument, and it is credible; I weigh it less because the latest year’s bottom line is too detached from both operating profit and cash flow for me to give full credit yet.
What would change my mind is simple. If the next year shows revenue growth still above 12%-15%, operating income rising toward $2.7B-$3.0B, and operating cash flow tracking much closer to net income, then I would become materially more bullish and likely view anything under $60 as clearly cheap. Conversely, if revenue growth slips to single digits while operating margin retreats below 20% and free cash flow stalls around $2.0B or less, then the current price is not a bargain at all and the market’s discount is justified. The key question is not whether Trip.com is a good business; it is whether 2025 earnings represent durable economics or a temporarily flattering mix of recovery, non-operating gains, and unusually benign travel conditions.
Grok Reading
Trip.com’s reported numbers paint a business that has fully exited the COVID trough and is now compounding at scale: revenue climbed from $2.97B in 2022 to $9.24B in 2025, a path that still delivered 17% year-over-year growth in the latest period and an 18.4% multi-year CAGR. Operating income reached $2.34B on an 80.6% gross margin and 25.3% operating margin—classic asset-light OTA economics—while free cash flow printed $2.01B against only $118M of capex and a fortress balance sheet ($5.9B cash, $3.1B debt, debt-to-equity 0.12). At a $29.6B market cap and roughly $26.8B enterprise value, the stock screens at 6.0x trailing earnings, 2.9x EV/sales, 11.0x EV/EBITDA and a 6.8% FCF yield. Those multiples sit well below Western OTA peers even after granting a persistent China discount, and the ROE of 19.5% shows the equity base is already earning acceptably.
The contradiction that matters is the 53.4% net margin versus the 25.3% operating margin. Net income of $4.93B is more than double operating profit, which means roughly half the bottom line is non-operating—investment gains, associate income or other items that cannot be underwritten as recurring. Strip that away and normalized earnings power sits closer to $2.0–2.4B; on that base the trailing P/E compresses from 6x toward the mid-teens and the valuation looks less like a gift. The negative 20% FCF CAGR further warns that the current $2B cash generation benefited from working-capital tailwinds that may reverse. Still, even on cleaned-up numbers the stock is not expensive: 13–14x EV/FCF for a mid-teens revenue grower with 80% incremental gross margins and net cash is a discount that over-weights regulatory and geopolitical risk relative to the cash-flow durability already on display.
The strongest opposing case is straightforward. First, the 95% earnings jump and 53% net margin are optically unsustainable; any normalization toward a 20–25% net margin would erase the cheap-looking P/E overnight and leave the shares trading at a full multiple of true earnings. Second, China travel demand is maturing after the post-reopening surge, competition from Alibaba and ByteDance is intensifying on the domestic side, and the VIE structure plus data-governance overhang justify a structural discount that may never fully close. Third, the valuation models flashing $103–$125 fair value are almost certainly capitalizing the inflated net income figure; once that is adjusted, upside shrinks dramatically and the Market Forces “fair value, not compelling” read becomes the more honest one. I weigh these points seriously—the earnings-quality gap is real—but I still land undervalued because even a fully taxed, fully normalized $2.2B of earnings power plus $2B of FCF supports a mid-$60s to low-$70s price on 15–18x, leaving 40%+ upside from $47 before any multiple re-rating.
What would flip the verdict is concrete evidence that operating margins are rolling over below 20%, that quarterly revenue growth slows into the single digits for two consecutive prints, or that FCF drops below $1.5B as working-capital benefits reverse. Conversely, two clean quarters of 15%+ revenue growth with stable 24%+ operating margins and continued outbound-travel recovery data would raise conviction and push my fair-value range higher.
Big-3 Panel — where each AI stands
Advanced Analysis Forensic deep-dive · separate lenses
The business has scaled decisively out of the COVID trough: revenue went from $2.96B (2021) to $9.24B (2025), gross margin sits in the 80-82% band, and operating margin has stabilized around 25-27% across 2023-2025. Net income compounded from a $81M loss to $4.93B, and FCF has been positive every year, running $2.0-3.2B for three straight years. The balance sheet is a fortress: $10.64B liquid cash, $7.53B net cash (36% of market cap), and self-funding operations - survival risk is effectively nil and reinvestment capacity is large. Earnings quality is adequate but not pristine: accruals are benign (-0.3% of assets) and Beneish M (-1.88) shows no manipulation flags, but reported OCF/NI at 0.24x in the latest period is notably soft - the $4.93B net income in 2025 outran $2.01B FCF materially, suggesting either large non-cash gains (possibly equity-method or fair-value marks on investees like MakeMyTrip/Tongcheng) or working-capital drag. Altman Z of 1.89 is 'grey' but that metric misreads asset-light platforms with big cash piles. Dilution is the clearest per-share concern: diluted shares grew from 634M to 698M (2.4% CAGR), SBC is 3.6% of revenue, and buybacks only offset 91% of SBC - modest but real per-share erosion despite the cash pile that could easily fund heavier repurchases.
Verify before trusting this (6)
- Composition of 2025 net income - specifically fair-value gains on equity investees (MakeMyTrip, Tongcheng) vs core operating income
- Working capital movements in 2025 that drove OCF/NI to 0.24x
- Buyback authorization size and pace vs SBC issuance to gauge management's per-share discipline
- Customer/geographic concentration - domestic China vs Trip.com international vs Skyscanner
- VIE structure and any regulatory or capital-repatriation constraints on the $10.6B cash pile
- Nature of the Sept 2025 'J-Other' transaction by chairman Liang
Price is $47.01 vs a composite FV of $102.90 and signal-adjusted FV of $124.87 — a 2.2-2.7x gap that fails the sanity check. The DCF at $135.70 is doing all the work while the EPV floor sits at $37.30, below spot. The truth is between them, not at the top. Strip out net cash (~1/3 of market cap per the quality lens, call it ~$10B, or ~$16/share) and the operating business trades near ~$31/share on ~$2-2.5B of FCF, a mid-teens FCF multiple for a dominant Asian OTA with 80%+ gross and 25%+ operating margins. That is reasonable-to-cheap, not a screaming discount. What is priced in: continued China travel normalization but skepticism on international scaling, VIE/regulatory overhang, and the earnings-quality haircut (soft OCF/NI, non-cash marks flattering 2025 P&L, ongoing dilution burning the cash edge). Deserved value on skeptical, quality-adjusted numbers is probably $55-65 — a modest but real margin of safety, not a fallen-angel bonanza.
Verify before trusting this (5)
- OCF/NI reconciliation and size of non-cash gains in 2025 results
- Skyscanner and outbound international take-rate and contribution margin disclosure
- SBC as % of revenue and net buyback vs issuance
- Any updated capital return (buyback/dividend) that would monetize the cash pile
- Domestic hotel/air booking growth trajectory vs Meituan/Alibaba
The macro tape is mildly constructive (regime score +22, VIX 16, S&P only 1.6% off highs) but TCOM's beta of -0.03 means the market's mood essentially does not transmit to this name. What actually presses on the stock is idiosyncratic: a fallen-angel narrative where a 62% discount to intrinsic value is being enforced by China VIE distrust, data-governance risk, and skepticism that Chinese travel growth can re-accelerate. That is a moderate, durable headwind on sentiment even though the operating story is quietly good. On the other side, momentum is strong-positive (18% CAGR, +31pp over three years, leverage falling) and the tape is not hostile, so the story is not actively breaking - it is just not being rewarded. Analyst tone and news flow are quiet (a routine +1% session), which fits a name the market has neither embraced nor is actively dumping. Net: two moderate forces roughly cancel - a persistent China-discount headwind vs a slow-grind momentum/tape tailwind - leaving pressure balanced with a faint negative lean from the unresolved regulatory narrative.
Verify before trusting this (4)
- Any US-China regulatory or delisting headline that would sharply widen or narrow the China-ADR discount
- Next earnings print and outbound-travel data - a beat that reignites the reopening/international narrative could flip sentiment
- Sell-side target revisions or a broker upgrade cycle, which has been notably absent
- Rotation into or out of China ADRs as a cohort (KWEB flows) as the real sentiment tell for this name
This lens hasn't been run for this ticker yet.