T1 Energy Inc specializes in the creation and distribution of battery cells, catering to diverse sectors including stationary power storage, electric vehicles, and maritime applications. The company operates globally, with a strong presence across Europe. Furthermore, it undertakes the development and construction of manufacturing plants for lithium-ion batteries. T1 Energy Inc was established in 2018 and is headquartered in Luxembourg.
Price Overview
Last updated: Jul 8, 2026 7:24pm (just now)Price History (1 Year)
Revenue & Net Income Trend
| Period | Revenue | Net Income | Net Margin | YoY/QoQ |
|---|
Key Metrics
EPS (Diluted): -2.19
Total Equity: $321.89M
Shares: 173,640,000
Total Debt: $327.19M
Cash: $182.45M
EBITDA: -$210.34M
Total Debt: $327.19M
Cash: $182.45M
Revenue: $755.30M
Shares: 173,640,000
Revenue: $755.30M
Revenue: $755.30M
Revenue: $755.30M
Total Equity: $321.89M
Tax Rate: 5.7%
Equity: $321.89M
Total Debt: $327.19M
Cash: $182.45M
Current Liabilities: $463.59M
Long-Term Debt: $280.84M
Total Debt: $327.19M
Total Equity: $321.89M
Shares: 173,640,000
Shares: 173,640,000
CapEx: -$78.80M
Shares: 173,640,000
Stock Price: $7.35
Net Income: -$367.83M
Industry Benchmarks
Deep Analysis
Pre-flight intelligence scans the company first, then routes to the right analytical methods.
Income Statement (Annual)
Last updated: Jul 4, 2026 9:16am (4d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | $0 | $0 | $0 | $2.9M | $755.3M |
| Cost of Revenue | $120,000 | $478,000 | $0 | $1.7M | $699.7M |
| Gross Profit | $-120,000 | $-478,000 | $0 | $1.2M | $55.6M |
| Operating Expenses | $75.5M | $120.5M | $65.5M | $75.5M | $235.3M |
| Operating Income | -$75.6M | -$120.9M | -$65.5M | -$74.3M | -$179.7M |
| Net Income | -$93.4M | -$98.8M | -$71.9M | -$450.2M | -$367.8M |
| EBITDA | -$93.3M | -$98.6M | -$14.9M | -$69.9M | -$210.3M |
| EPS | $-0.85 | $-0.83 | $-0.51 | $-3.20 | $-2.19 |
| EPS (Diluted) | — | — | — | — | — |
Balance Sheet (Annual)
Last updated: Jul 4, 2026 9:16am (4d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cash & Equivalents | $564.0M | $563.0M | $254.3M | $72.6M | $182.5M |
| Total Current Assets | $582.8M | $579.5M | $312.0M | $583.2M | $663.5M |
| Total Assets | $627.0M | $828.4M | $732.9M | $1.3B | $1.4B |
| Current Liabilities | $25.8M | $62.6M | $49.2M | $414.0M | $463.6M |
| Long-Term Debt | $0 | $0 | $0 | $507.9M | $280.8M |
| Total Liabilities | $81.5M | $108.3M | $98.2M | $1.1B | $1.1B |
| Total Equity | $545.5M | $717.5M | $633.2M | $237.1M | $321.9M |
| Retained Earnings | -$104.3M | -$203.1M | -$275.0M | -$725.2M | -$1.1B |
Cash Flow (Annual)
Last updated: Jul 4, 2026 9:16am (4d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Operating Cash Flow | -$63.1M | -$90.0M | -$87.9M | -$102.8M | $95.5M |
| Capital Expenditure | -$13.8M | -$180.8M | -$187.8M | -$50.8M | -$78.8M |
| Free Cash Flow | -$76.9M | -$270.8M | -$275.8M | -$153.6M | $16.7M |
| Acquisitions (net) | $0 | -$3.0M | $0 | -$109.6M | $0 |
| Debt Repayment | — | — | — | — | — |
| Dividends Paid | — | — | — | — | — |
| Stock Buybacks | $0 | -$1.1M | $0 | $0 | $0 |
| Net Change in Cash | $550.7M | -$2.6M | -$287.3M | -$199.1M | $194.1M |
Analyst Estimates (Annual)
Last updated: Jul 8, 2026 7:24pm (just now)| Metric | 2026 | 2027 | 2028 | 2029 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue |
$934.9M $881.8M – $1.0B
|
$1.4B $1.3B – $1.4B
|
$1.7B $1.6B – $1.9B
|
$1.9B $1.8B – $2.1B
|
| EBITDA |
$321.9M $303.6M – $347.0M
|
$472.6M $461.0M – $484.3M
|
$591.7M $558.1M – $637.9M
|
$661.1M $623.5M – $712.7M
|
| Net Income |
-$38.7M -$42.6M – -$35.8M
|
$33.1M $30.6M – $36.5M
|
$98.9M $91.6M – $108.9M
|
$159.7M $148.0M – $176.0M
|
| EPS | — | — | — | — |
Growth Trends (YoY %)
Last updated: Jul 4, 2026 9:16am (4d ago)| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue Growth | — | — | — | +25,572.8% |
| Gross Profit Growth | -298.3% | +100.0% | — | +4,426.1% |
| Operating Income Growth | -60.0% | +45.8% | -13.3% | -142.0% |
| Net Income Growth | -5.8% | +27.2% | -525.7% | +18.3% |
| EBITDA Growth | -5.8% | +84.9% | -370.7% | -200.7% |
Insider Trading (Recent)
All SEC Form 4 codes
- P Purchase
- Open-market or private purchase of shares.
- S Sale
- Open-market or private sale of shares.
- A Award / grant
- Grant or award of securities (RSUs, options, etc.) under Rule 16b-3.
- D Return to issuer
- Securities disposed back to the company under Rule 16b-3.
- F In-kind (tax)
- Shares withheld or delivered to pay the option-exercise price or tax — not an open-market sale.
- I Discretionary
- Discretionary transaction under an employee plan — Rule 16b-3(f).
- M Option exercise
- Exercise or conversion of a derivative (option/RSU) into shares — exempt.
- C Conversion
- Conversion of a derivative security into the underlying shares.
- E Short expiration
- Expiration of a short derivative position.
- H Long expiration
- Expiration or cancellation of a long derivative position with value received.
- O OTM exercise
- Exercise of an out-of-the-money derivative.
- X ITM exercise
- Exercise of an in-the-money or at-the-money derivative.
- G Gift
- Bona fide gift of securities.
- L Small acquisition
- Small acquisition under Rule 16a-6.
- W Inheritance
- Acquisition or disposition by will or the laws of descent.
- Z Voting trust
- Deposit into or withdrawal from a voting trust.
- J Other
- Other acquisition or disposition (explained in a Form 4 footnote).
- K Equity swap
- Transaction in an equity swap or similar instrument.
- U Tender / buyout
- Disposition via tender of shares in a change-of-control transaction.
Compensation-plan codes (A, D, F, M) are routine and rarely directional. Open-market P (buy) and S (sale) carry the most signal.
| Date | Insider | Type | Shares | Price | Value |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-07-02 | Hammond Robert O. | A-Award | 33,375.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-07-02 | Strine Jessica Wirth | A-Award | 22,695.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-07-02 | Matrai Balazs Peter | A-Award | 22,695.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-07-02 | Manners David J. | A-Award | 22,695.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-07-02 | Steingart Daniel | A-Award | 22,695.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-07-02 | ANDERSON W RICHARD | A-Award | 22,695.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-06-23 | Calio Joseph Evan | M-Exempt | 125,000.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-06-23 | Calio Joseph Evan | F-InKind | 57,925.00 | $9.24 | $535,227 |
| 2026-06-23 | Calio Joseph Evan | M-Exempt | 125,000.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-06-23 | Bentzen Andreas | M-Exempt | 25,000.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-06-23 | Bentzen Andreas | M-Exempt | 25,000.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-06-23 | Bentzen Andreas | F-InKind | 11,850.00 | $9.24 | $109,494 |
| 2026-06-12 | Calio Joseph Evan | M-Exempt | 422,476.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-06-12 | Calio Joseph Evan | F-InKind | 195,776.00 | $8.50 | $1.7M |
| 2026-06-12 | Calio Joseph Evan | M-Exempt | 422,476.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-05-21 | TRINA SOLAR (SCHWEIZ) AG | S-Sale | 8,849,024.00 | $8.62 | $76.3M |
| 2026-05-21 | TRINA SOLAR (SCHWEIZ) AG | S-Sale | 1,150,976.00 | $9.20 | $10.6M |
| 2026-05-21 | TRINA SOLAR (SCHWEIZ) AG | S-Sale | 3,000,000.00 | $8.71 | $26.1M |
| 2026-05-22 | TRINA SOLAR (SCHWEIZ) AG | S-Sale | 9,479,904.00 | $8.13 | $77.1M |
| 2026-05-22 | TRINA SOLAR (SCHWEIZ) AG | S-Sale | 20,096.00 | $8.80 | $176,845 |
Narrative Economics
market-narrative step).
Delvantic AI Findings
The raw numbers tell a more interesting story than the "high conviction required / strong headwinds" framing suggests. Revenue went from $0 in 2024 Q3 to $358.6M in 2025 Q4 — that's not a scale-up, that's a commercial inflection. Then Q1 2026 prints $177.6M, roughly half of Q4. The synthesis models all treat this as continued progress; I read it as a potential one-time pull-forward or lumpy project revenue typical of utility-scale solar/storage shipments. Trailing four quarters now sit at ~$879M, but the quarterly volatility ($53M → $133M → $211M → $359M → $178M) makes "growing" a generous descriptor. The next print is the entire thesis.
Margins, however, are doing something the models underweight. Q1 2026 net margin is -11.5% versus -52.7% in Q4 2025 and -62% in Q3 2025. That's a 50-point improvement in two quarters. Combined with $95.5M operating cash flow and $16.7M FCF for 2025 — actually positive — this is not a company "losing money at commercial scale" in the way the synthesis claims. The synthesis cites a -48.7% net margin from the full-year 2025 figure, but that average is dominated by the early-ramp quarters and a likely Q4 impairment ($189M net loss on $359M revenue is too large to be operational). The Market Forces verdict of "near-certain bankruptcy within 12 months" is flatly inconsistent with $182M cash, positive OCF, and a sharply improving margin trajectory. Those two models contradict each other and Market Forces is wrong on the arithmetic.
That said, the bear case the narrative engine articulates is real and the contrarian read is uncomfortable. T1 (formerly FREYR Battery, repositioned as a US solar module assembler via the G2_Austin Texas facility — context the file omits) is competing in a commoditized industry where Chinese modules set price and the entire US thin-film/crystalline module thesis depends on IRA Section 45X credits surviving political risk. The $55.6M gross profit on $755M revenue (7.4% gross margin) is structurally thin; without 45X credits flowing through, this business doesn't work. The insider activity is also misread as "unusual selling" — every transaction listed is an A-Award (grant) or M-Exempt/F-InKind (option exercise with tax withholding), not open-market selling. That's neutral-to-mildly-positive, not a warning sign. The synthesis layer flagged this incorrectly.
My verdict: I dissent from both the "bankruptcy imminent" Market Forces call and the "high conviction required" hand-wave. At $1.53B market cap, 1.5x trailing sales, $182M cash, positive FCF, and a margin trajectory bending hard toward breakeven, this is a binary bet on (a) Q2 2026 revenue holding above $175M and (b) gross margin expanding from 7% toward 15%+ as the Texas facility ramps. If both happen, fair value is $14-18 on a 2.5-3x sales multiple consistent with profitable US energy infrastructure names. If Q2 revenue collapses below $100M or gross margin compresses, fair value is $3-4 as the market re-rates to distressed. The expected value at $8.83 is positive but the variance is enormous, and you're paid to wait one quarter for clarity rather than anchor here. Starter position only for risk-tolerant capital; the next print resolves the thesis.
GPT Critique
Analyzing T1 Energy's recent financial performance, there is a dramatic shift in revenue, jumping from $0 in early 2024 to a substantial $755.3 million by the end of 2025. This surge suggests a significant operational ramp-up, likely from the completion and activation of their manufacturing facilities. However, the volatility in quarterly revenues — peaking at $358.6 million in Q4 2025 and then dropping to $177.6 million in Q1 2026 — hints at potential instability or lumpy revenue recognition common in large capital projects. Despite this growth, the persistent negative net income and razor-thin gross margins (7.4% in 2025) raise concerns about their ability to achieve sustainable profitability. The cash flow situation, with positive operating cash flow of $95.5 million and free cash flow of $16.7 million, provides a glimmer of financial stability, but the high capital expenditures underscore ongoing operational scaling needs.
Opus argues that the company's margin improvement from -52.7% in Q4 2025 to -11.5% in Q1 2026 is a positive indicator that contradicts the synthesis model's assertion of inevitable bankruptcy. I concur with Opus that this margin improvement, alongside the robust cash position of $182 million, suggests a less dire financial outlook than the synthesis posits. However, I disagree with Opus's optimistic view that the market has mispriced this as terminal. The inconsistency in revenue and the competitive pressures from established players like CATL and LG suggest that the path to consistent profitability is fraught with challenges.
The Delvantic AI Findings also highlight insider activity as "unusual selling," which Opus rebuts by clarifying these are primarily grants and tax-related exercises, not indicative of insider pessimism. I agree with Opus's interpretation here, as these transactions do not inherently signal negative sentiment from within the company. However, the broader market narrative, as outlined in the findings, portrays T1 Energy as a turnaround bet heavily reliant on geopolitical and market timing factors, which adds a layer of risk not fully addressed by Opus's analysis.
A careful skeptic might argue that both my views and Opus's underestimate the severity of the competitive landscape and overestimate the significance of short-term financial improvements. They might point out that the current revenue growth could be unsustainable without clear evidence of long-term contracts or competitive advantages in manufacturing efficiencies. Furthermore, the geopolitical reliance on European battery localization initiatives may not materialize as quickly or as substantially as required to support the company's valuation.