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What this page is: Delvantic's full research page for TIM S.A. (TIMB) — AI-driven forensic equity research: mechanical valuation models (DCF, EPV, anchored-PE, scenario) plus three independent AI lenses (Quality / Value / Sentiment). Everything below is rendered server-side; you are not missing content that requires JavaScript. All scores are predictions and research opinions, not financial advice.
Our current read (analysis of 2026-08-23): Designation Watch · Gem Score -5 (−100…+100 Quality+Value blend) · Quality 60 · Value -59 · Sentiment 6 (timing only, not weighted) · Composite fair value $10.54 vs $19.17 at analysis
Page map (sections in order; each card carries a stable
reference-name attribute you can cite):
profile-header/price-overview— company profile, live quote, market capextended-analysis— the core: three AI lens reads with findings, scores, and the analyst memofuture-predictions— our forward price-band predictionsmarket-narrative/ai-findings/gpt-critique— narrative context, cross-model findings, and an adversarial critique of our own analysis (near the end of the document)- Members-only sections (render as login gates for anonymous readers):
price-history,income-trend,key-metrics,financials(statement tables),insider-trading. The analysis above is public; the raw data tables require a free account.
More for machine readers: site briefing at
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any ticker resolves at delvantic.com/stock/TICKER ·
raw inputs are public-company filings and market data (via licensed data feeds);
every model, score, lens read, and prediction on this page is Delvantic's own analysis.
TIM S.A.
TIMB NYSETIM S.A. Sponsored ADR represents U.S.-traded depositary receipts tied to the Brazilian telecommunications company TIM S.A., with each receipt corresponding to five underlying common shares. Its primary purpose is to provide international investors dollar-denominated access to TIM’s equity, with dividends and trading conducted in U.S. dollars and administered by a global depositary bank. As a major player in wireless telecommunication services, the company focuses on mobile connectivity, data services, and digital solutions across Brazil, serving consumers and enterprises. The ADR structure broadens the shareholder base by aligning disclosure with international reporting standards and facilitating participation by institutions constrained to U.S. securities. By channeling exposure to Brazil’s communications infrastructure and mobile data growth, TIM S.A. Sponsored ADR functions as a bridge between emerging-market telecom operations and global capital pools, supporting liquidity, transparency, and cross-border portfolio diversification.
Price Overview
Price History (1 Year)
Revenue & Net Income Trend
TIM S.A. is a foreign private issuer — it reports to the U.S. SEC once a year (on Form 20-F or 40-F) rather than filing the quarterly statements (10-Q) that U.S.-domiciled companies must submit. Our financial statements are read directly from SEC filings, so for this company only annual figures exist at the source.
This is a property of how the company files, not missing or broken data — its filing history shows 6 annual reports, the latest filed 2026-03-30, and no quarterly filings . The company may still publish quarterly results on its own investor-relations site.
| Period | Revenue | Net Income | Net Margin | YoY/QoQ |
|---|
Key Metrics
EPS (Diluted): 0.35
Total Equity: $4.72B
Shares: 2,414,316,000
Total Debt: $547.35M
Cash: $711.16M
EBITDA: $2.64B
Total Debt: $547.35M
Cash: $711.16M
Revenue: $5.24B
Revenue: $5.24B
Revenue: $5.24B
Total Equity: $4.72B
Tax Rate: 5.4%
Equity: $4.72B
Total Debt: $547.35M
Cash: $711.16M
Current Liabilities: $2.99B
Long-Term Debt: $365.02M
Total Debt: $547.35M
Total Equity: $4.72B
Shares: 2,414,316,000
Shares: 2,414,316,000
CapEx: -$894.58M
Shares: 2,414,316,000
Stock Price: $19.17
Net Income: $849.37M
Industry Benchmarks
Income Statement (Annual)
Last updated: Aug 2, 2026 2:02pm (21d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | $3.6B | $4.2B | $4.7B | $5.0B | $5.2B |
| Cost of Revenue | $1.7B | $2.1B | $2.3B | $2.3B | $2.4B |
| Gross Profit | $1.9B | $2.1B | $2.4B | $2.7B | $2.8B |
| Operating Expenses | $1.2B | $1.5B | $1.5B | $1.6B | $1.6B |
| Operating Income | $739.9M | $622.4M | $929.2M | $1.1B | $1.2B |
| Net Income | $582.5M | $329.1M | $558.9M | $621.3M | $849.4M |
| EBITDA | $1.9B | $2.0B | $2.3B | $2.5B | $2.6B |
| EPS | $0.24 | $0.14 | $0.23 | $0.26 | $0.35 |
| EPS (Diluted) | $0.24 | $0.14 | $0.23 | $0.26 | $0.35 |
Balance Sheet (Annual)
Last updated: Aug 2, 2026 2:02pm (21d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cash & Equivalents | $1.0B | $502.0M | $606.3M | $641.9M | $711.2M |
| Total Current Assets | $3.0B | $2.0B | $2.2B | $2.5B | $2.7B |
| Total Assets | $9.8B | $11.1B | $10.9B | $11.1B | $11.2B |
| Current Liabilities | $2.1B | $2.6B | $2.5B | $2.5B | $3.0B |
| Long-Term Debt | $651.4M | $729.8M | $493.2M | $529.3M | $365.0M |
| Total Liabilities | $4.9B | $6.1B | $5.8B | $5.9B | $6.5B |
| Total Equity | $4.9B | $5.0B | $5.1B | $5.2B | $4.7B |
| Retained Earnings | $2.2B | $2.3B | $2.4B | $2.5B | $2.0B |
Cash Flow (Annual)
Last updated: Aug 2, 2026 2:02pm (21d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Operating Cash Flow | $2.0B | $1.9B | $2.4B | $2.4B | $2.6B |
| Capital Expenditure | -$1.0B | -$931.8M | -$887.3M | -$896.3M | -$894.6M |
| Free Cash Flow | $944.4M | $925.5M | $1.6B | $1.5B | $1.8B |
| Acquisitions (net) | — | — | — | — | — |
| Net Debt Issued / (Repaid) | $603.2M | $308.9M | — | — | — |
| Dividends Paid | -$205.4M | -$236.2M | -$428.4M | -$535.8M | -$1.1B |
| Stock Buybacks | — | — | — | — | — |
| Net Change in Cash | $522.7M | -$527.9M | $104.2M | $35.6M | $69.3M |
Growth Trends (YoY %)
Last updated: Aug 2, 2026 2:02pm (21d ago)| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue Growth | +19.2% | +10.7% | +6.8% | +4.6% |
| Gross Profit Growth | +13.1% | +13.4% | +9.9% | +5.9% |
| Operating Income Growth | -15.9% | +49.3% | +16.7% | +15.2% |
| Net Income Growth | -43.5% | +69.8% | +11.2% | +36.7% |
| EBITDA Growth | +5.7% | +18.5% | +5.9% | +7.1% |
Dividend History (Last 20)
Last updated: Aug 2, 2026 2:02pm (21d ago)| Date | Dividend | Declaration | Record | Payment |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-06-29 | $0.16 | — | — | — |
| 2026-03-30 | $0.16 | — | — | — |
| 2025-08-04 | $0.12 | — | — | — |
| 2025-05-23 | $0.11 | — | — | — |
| 2025-04-04 | $0.18 | — | — | — |
| 2025-02-21 | $0.07 | — | — | — |
| 2024-12-30 | $0.22 | — | — | — |
| 2024-09-30 | $0.11 | — | — | — |
| 2024-06-27 | $0.12 | — | — | — |
| 2024-04-10 | $0.54 | — | — | — |
| 2024-03-28 | $0.08 | — | — | — |
| 2023-12-22 | $0.28 | — | — | — |
| 2023-09-28 | $0.17 | — | — | — |
| 2023-06-23 | $0.12 | — | — | — |
| 2023-04-28 | $0.10 | — | — | — |
| 2023-04-11 | $0.24 | — | — | — |
| 2022-12-22 | $0.18 | — | — | — |
| 2022-09-22 | $0.10 | — | — | — |
| 2022-06-24 | $0.10 | — | — | — |
| 2022-04-01 | $0.08 | — | — | — |
Deep Analysis
Narrative Economics
market-narrative step).
Claude Reading
Looking at the raw numbers first: TIM has grown revenue from $3.56B (2021) to $5.24B (2025) — a 10.2% USD CAGR, better than the 5.7% cited (which likely uses different endpoints). More striking, operating income nearly doubled from $622M (2022) to $1.25B (2025), and net income went from $329M to $849M over the same window. Operating margin expanded from 14.7% to 23.8%. FCF is $1.75B on a $9.16B market cap — that's an 19% FCF yield. EV/EBITDA of 3.4x is genuinely cheap for a telecom throwing off this kind of cash. Debt is trivial ($547M vs $711M cash — net cash position), ROIC is 25.9%. These are not distressed numbers.
Now the models. The synthesis verdict of $10.54 fair value (-45%) is where I part ways sharply. A DCF that spits out $10.54 on a business generating $1.75B FCF, growing earnings 36.7% YoY, with net cash and 25.9% ROIC, is almost certainly loading catastrophic BRL depreciation and terminal-value haircuts into the assumptions. The 54x P/E headline is misleading — that's the canonical annual figure, but on trailing $849M NI and $9.16B cap, P/E is actually ~10.8x. EV/EBITDA of 3.4x confirms the cheap read. Someone's P/E denominator is stale or in the wrong currency. The pre-flight thesis that the market is "demanding double-digit USD dividend yields" contradicts a 2.85% stated yield — another data inconsistency. The narrative layer calling this a "fallen angel" with an 82% premium to DCF is downstream of the same broken DCF.
The contrarian case against my bullishness: this is Brazil, and BRL has structurally weakened against USD for two decades. USD-reported growth requires either real operational gains or FX tailwinds; if the recent margin expansion reflects Brazilian rate cycle benefits or one-time tower monetization/spectrum accounting, it won't repeat. The payout ratio of 124% is a genuine yellow flag — dividends exceeding earnings means either the accounting NI understates cash earnings (plausible given $2.65B OCF vs $849M NI, likely non-cash D&A on infrastructure) or the dividend is being funded from the balance sheet. Insider activity shows sales in mid-2026 against awards — modestly negative but not damning. The "Sector Leader" tag is right (TIM is #2/3 in Brazilian wireless behind Vivo), but Brazilian telecom is a three-player oligopoly that occasionally reprices competitively. Market Forces flagging "inevitable competitive response" is fair — Vivo and Claro won't cede share indefinitely.
Where I land: the synthesis is wrong, and the models are contradicting each other in ways that should have been reconciled. Rule-based says mature_earner (correct). Momentum shows 23% earnings CAGR and 36.7% recent YoY (that's not mature — that's re-rating). FCF quality is strong, ROIC is 26%, EV/EBITDA is 3.4x. Against that, the DCF says worth $10.54. The DCF is the outlier and it's driving the verdict. On any reasonable telecom comp basis — even applying a 40% EM haircut — 6x EV/EBITDA gets you to ~$32-34, and 8x FCF gets you to ~$29. Fair value is meaningfully above $19.17, not below it. The real risks are BRL translation (genuine, ongoing) and the possibility that 2025's earnings jump reflects a Brazilian macro cyclical peak rather than sustainable run-rate. I'd want to see 2026 half-year data before pounding the table, but at 3.4x EV/EBITDA with net cash and $1.75B FCF, this is not overvalued by 45%. It's undervalued or fairly valued with EM discount already priced in.
GPT Reading
What jumps out first is how internally inconsistent the quoted valuation metrics are with the operating and balance-sheet data. A business doing $5.24B of revenue, $1.25B of operating income, $849M of net income, and $1.75B of free cash flow on a $9.16B market cap is not trading on a real 54.7x earnings multiple or 8.8x sales multiple in any economic sense; those figures look contaminated by ADR/share-count or currency-mapping issues. On the raw numbers, the market is paying about 1.7x revenue, roughly 7.3x operating income, about 10.8x net income, and only about 5.2x free cash flow. Enterprise value should actually be below market cap given $711M of cash against $547M of debt, so the 3.4x EV/EBITDA reading is directionally much more believable than the headline P/E and P/S. That matters because the bearish model output leans heavily on ratios that do not reconcile with the financial statements.
The operating story is stronger than a “mature utility, no upside” caricature. Revenue has grown from $3.56B in 2021 to $5.24B in 2025, a 10%+ annualized climb, while operating income rose from $740M to $1.25B and net income from $583M to $849M, with some 2022 noise. Gross margin improved from 53.1% in 2021 to 53.9% in 2025, operating margin from 20.8% to 23.8%, and net margin to 16.2%. That combination—mid-single-digit top-line growth with margin expansion—is exactly what you want from a telecom consolidating spectrum, pricing, and network utilization advantages. More important, cash conversion is exceptional: $2.65B of operating cash flow against $849M of net income is not a small difference, and after nearly $895M of capex the company still produced $1.75B of free cash flow. For a telecom, that is unusually strong self-funding capacity.
The balance sheet also weakens the overvaluation case. Debt of $547M against $4.72B of equity and cash of $711M means net cash, not leverage stress. ROIC of 25.9% and ROE of 18.0% are far too good for a business supposedly trapped in a low-quality, over-earning moment. Yes, the current ratio is sub-1 at 0.89, but that is common in telecoms with predictable billing and supplier finance, and it is hard to call liquidity tight when annual free cash flow is nearly twice total debt. At $19.17, the equity is not obviously cheap in an absolute sense, but if I trust the income statement and cash flow statement more than the broken-looking headline multiples, the shares look closer to fairly valued-to-modestly undervalued than massively overvalued. A business with double-digit earnings growth, net cash, and an implied ~9%-10% FCF yield does not deserve a “fair value $10.54” conclusion unless one assumes a major collapse in normalized cash generation.
The best bear case is that the cash flow is flattered by telecom accounting and working-capital timing, and that investors are over-extrapolating a post-consolidation sweet spot. Revenue growth has slowed to 4.6% recently, so the step-up from 2021 to 2025 may already be largely harvested. Net income growth from $621M to $849M in the latest year was much faster than revenue growth, which raises the risk that margins are peaking. The payout ratio of 124% is a real yellow flag if measured against accounting earnings, because it says management may be stretching distributions beyond steady-state profitability. The ADR also carries Brazil-specific currency and regulatory risk: even if local earnings rise, USD investors can still lose through FX. And if the market is really paying up for dividend optics while insiders are modest net sellers, then a de-rating could happen without any operational collapse. Those are all legitimate concerns; I just think they argue against paying a premium multiple, not for halving the stock from here.
What would change my mind is evidence that 2025 free cash flow is not repeatable. If operating cash flow falls back toward $1.5B while capex stays near $900M, the equity would look much less attractive. Likewise, if revenue growth slips below 3% and operating margin retreats from 23.8% back toward 20%-21%, then the current valuation would start to look full. On the other hand, if the company sustains even $1.2B-$1.4B of annual free cash flow and keeps net cash on the balance sheet, then the stock should hold at least the high teens and arguably support a value in the low-to-mid $20s despite Brazil risk.
Grok Reading
The raw financials describe a business that has quietly compounded its way into a high-quality cash machine while the market still prices it like a distressed EM utility. Revenue has climbed steadily from $3.56B in 2021 to $5.24B in 2025 (5.7% CAGR), but the real story is operating leverage: operating income nearly doubled from $622M to $1.25B over three years as margins expanded from the mid-teens to 23.8% operating and 16.2% net. Net income hit $849M last year, up 37% year-over-year, and free cash flow of $1.75B on a $9.16B market cap produces a roughly 19% FCF yield. The balance sheet is fortress-like—$711M cash against only $547M total debt, net cash positive, debt-to-equity of 0.12—while ROIC of 26% and ROE of 18% confirm capital is being deployed productively. The EV/EBITDA of 3.4x and EV/revenue of 1.7x are the cleanest lenses; the reported 54x P/E and 9.8x P/B are arithmetic artifacts that do not reconcile with market cap over $849M of earnings (~10.8x) or $4.72B of equity (~1.9x) and should be discarded.
That cash-flow reality collides with the valuation synthesis calling the stock 45% overvalued at a $10.54 fair value. A mature telecom generating nearly $2B of annual free cash after only $895M of capex, sitting on net cash, and still growing earnings at a mid-teens-to-20s clip does not belong at 5x FCF. The market thesis correctly flags Brazilian real depreciation risk and political overhang, yet the ADR is already embedding a punitive country discount that leaves little room for the operational trajectory actually delivered. Insider activity is noise—mostly awards with modest subsequent sales—and the 2.85% dividend yield understates the cash-return capacity given FCF coverage well above the elevated 124% earnings payout.
The strongest counter-argument is straightforward and quantitative: revenue growth is only mid-single-digit, the business is a saturated Brazilian wireless operator facing inevitable competitive response, and every formal model in the briefing (DCF, composite fair value, narrative layer) lands at roughly half the current $19.17 price. An 82% premium to the $10.54 intrinsic estimate is extreme if the Real weakens further or if regulators compress returns; the current ratio below 1.0 and payout above earnings also leave less cushion than the net-cash headline implies. Macro headwinds are real, and treating TIMB as a pure Brazil proxy has burned dollar investors before. I weigh this less heavily because the earnings and FCF CAGRs (23% and 6%) plus margin expansion demonstrate the company is converting the competitive vacuum into durable cash rather than fleeting volume, and because EV multiples already price in severe distress that the income statement no longer supports.
A sustained break of BRL that drives USD-denominated FCF below $1.2B, or two consecutive quarters of operating margin compression back toward 18%, would flip the thesis; so would a regulatory or spectrum surprise that forces capex materially above $1.2B while stalling the subscriber economics.
Big-3 Panel — where each AI stands
Advanced Analysis Forensic deep-dive · separate lenses
TIM S.A. is a mature earner showing a clean multi-year improvement: revenue grew from $3.56B (2021) to $5.24B (2025), gross margin expanded from 53.2% to 53.9%, and operating margin from 20.8% to 23.8%. Net income nearly tripled from a 2022 trough of $329M to $849M in 2025, and FCF scaled from ~$925M to $1.75B — an FCF margin of ~33%, elite for a telco. OCF/NI of 4.09x and accruals of -15.5% of assets confirm the earnings are cash-backed, not accrual-inflated (Beneish -3.22 supports this).
Verify before trusting this (6)
- Confirm the 2022-to-2023 share count jump (2.4M to 2.42B) is an ADR ratio/restatement rather than a real issuance
- Debt maturity ladder and BRL vs USD debt mix
- Capex intensity and 5G rollout obligations going forward
- Post-Oi mobile integration synergy realization and any remaining earn-out or contingent liabilities
- Dividend and interest-on-capital policy - payout ratio vs FCF
- Customer/segment concentration (mobile prepaid vs postpaid vs FTTH)
The e2e synthesis pins composite and signal-adjusted fair value at $10.54, with a DCF at $13.12 and an EPV floor at $5.39 - implying -45% downside from today's $19.17. Even taking the more generous DCF as the anchor and adding a quality premium for a solid, cash-generative mature telco (quality score 60), deserved value lands in the low-to-mid teens, not near $19. The market appears to be paying a hard-currency ADR premium and pricing in FX stabilization plus continued margin expansion; that is a real bull case but it is already in the price. Earnings quality is high, so no haircut is warranted, but high quality on already-priced earnings does not create a gap. Margin of safety here is negative: buyers today are underwriting perfect Brazil macro and BRL stability. The honest read is Rich - not a short thesis, but not a value setup either. I would need a materially lower entry before the risk/reward on a single-country EM telco tilts my way.
Verify before trusting this (4)
- Guided FCF and capex trajectory post-Oi integration
- BRL sensitivity and hedging disclosures in the 20-F
- Dividend/JCP payout sustainability vs reported FCF
- Any one-time regulatory or tax items inflating trailing earnings
The macro tape is mildly constructive (regime +22, VIX 16) but TIMB's 0.11 beta means the market's mood barely lands on the stock either way. What actually drives this ADR is the fallen-angel narrative: a foundational Brazilian telecom, income-oriented, dollar-denominated - moderate intensity, moderate durability, low cult. That story is neither breaking nor accelerating right now, so there is no dominant force in the tape. Positive momentum (5.7% CAGR, +4.3pp over 3 years, low vol) has quietly rehabilitated the name from its fallen-angel lows without generating euphoria. Yield-and-stability buyers are the marginal holders, and in a neutral tape with the 10y at 4.68% and market PE 26.9, an income telecom ADR is a defensible but not exciting perch - some rotation into defensives helps, but stretched market multiples and elevated US rates cap dividend-proxy appeal. Net: a real but ordinary crosswind, leaning very slightly positive from momentum and defensive-bid, offset by the ever-present BRL/regulatory overhang embedded in the bear story.
Verify before trusting this (4)
- BRL/USD trajectory and any Brazilian central bank pivot that would revive EM-telecom bid
- Any regulatory or spectrum-cost headline out of Anatel that would reawaken the bear narrative
- Dividend declaration cadence - a cut would break the entire ADR thesis and flip sentiment hard
- Rotation flows into EM defensives if US rates roll over
This lens hasn't been run for this ticker yet.