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What this page is: Delvantic's full research page for TotalEnergies SE (TTE) — AI-driven forensic equity research: mechanical valuation models (DCF, EPV, anchored-PE, scenario) plus three independent AI lenses (Quality / Value / Sentiment). Everything below is rendered server-side; you are not missing content that requires JavaScript. All scores are predictions and research opinions, not financial advice.
Our current read (analysis of 2026-08-23): Designation Watch · Gem Score +24 (−100…+100 Quality+Value blend) · Quality 33 · Value 16 · Sentiment -6 (timing only, not weighted) · Composite fair value $11.93 vs $87.20 at analysis
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profile-header/price-overview— company profile, live quote, market capextended-analysis— the core: three AI lens reads with findings, scores, and the analyst memofuture-predictions— our forward price-band predictionsmarket-narrative/ai-findings/gpt-critique— narrative context, cross-model findings, and an adversarial critique of our own analysis (near the end of the document)- Members-only sections (render as login gates for anonymous readers):
price-history,income-trend,key-metrics,financials(statement tables),insider-trading. The analysis above is public; the raw data tables require a free account.
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raw inputs are public-company filings and market data (via licensed data feeds);
every model, score, lens read, and prediction on this page is Delvantic's own analysis.
TotalEnergies SE
TTE NYSETotalEnergies SE is a global integrated multi-energy company headquartered in Courbevoie, France. It operates across key segments including Exploration & Production, where it explores and produces oil and natural gas in over 50 countries; Integrated LNG, focusing on liquefied natural gas activities; Integrated Power, encompassing renewables and electricity generation; Refining & Chemicals, involving the refining of crude oil and production of petrochemicals; and Marketing & Services, which handles the distribution of fuels, lubricants, and related services worldwide. The company refines raw materials into usable products, distributes refined fuels through a network in numerous countries, and manufactures commodity and specialty chemicals. TotalEnergies SE also maintains significant renewable power generation capacity and engages in biofuel and green gas production. This diversified structure positions it as a major player in the global energy sector, serving markets from upstream resource extraction to downstream consumer services.
Price Overview
Price History (1 Year)
Revenue & Net Income Trend
This company does not file structured financial statements with the U.S. SEC, so quarterly figures aren't available from our filings-based data engine. Annual figures shown here come from the sources that do cover it.
| Period | Revenue | Net Income | Net Margin | YoY/QoQ |
|---|
Key Metrics
EPS (Diluted): 5.78
Total Equity: $117.52B
Shares: 2,271,107,266
Total Debt: $61.03B
Cash: $26.20B
EBITDA: N/A
Total Debt: $61.03B
Cash: $26.20B
Revenue: $201.20B
Revenue: $201.20B
Revenue: $201.20B
Total Equity: $117.52B
Tax Rate: 40.5%
Equity: $117.52B
Total Debt: $61.03B
Cash: $26.20B
Current Liabilities: $92.56B
Long-Term Debt: $49.00B
Total Debt: $61.03B
Total Equity: $117.52B
Shares: 2,271,107,266
Shares: 2,271,107,266
CapEx: $0.00
Shares: 2,271,107,266
Stock Price: $87.20
Net Income: $13.13B
Industry Benchmarks
Income Statement (Annual)
Last updated: Jul 31, 2026 9:19am (23d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | $205.9B | $281.0B | $237.1B | $214.6B | $201.2B |
| Cost of Revenue | — | — | — | — | — |
| Gross Profit | — | — | — | — | — |
| Operating Expenses | $146.3B | $200.5B | $174.0B | $158.5B | $148.1B |
| Operating Income | $24.8B | $50.6B | — | — | — |
| Net Income | $16.0B | $20.5B | $21.4B | $15.8B | $13.1B |
| EBITDA | — | — | — | — | — |
| EPS | $5.95 | $7.91 | $8.72 | $6.74 | $5.84 |
| EPS (Diluted) | $5.92 | $7.85 | $8.67 | $6.69 | $5.78 |
Balance Sheet (Annual)
Last updated: Jul 31, 2026 9:19am (23d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cash & Equivalents | $21.3B | $33.0B | $27.3B | $25.8B | $26.2B |
| Total Current Assets | $111.1B | $125.7B | $99.5B | $96.6B | $89.5B |
| Total Assets | $293.5B | $303.9B | $283.7B | $285.5B | $291.1B |
| Current Liabilities | $95.1B | $109.8B | $88.8B | $88.0B | $92.6B |
| Long-Term Debt | $49.5B | $45.3B | $40.5B | $43.5B | $49.0B |
| Total Liabilities | $178.5B | $189.3B | $164.2B | $165.2B | $173.5B |
| Total Equity | $115.0B | $114.6B | $119.5B | $120.3B | $117.5B |
| Retained Earnings | — | — | — | — | — |
Cash Flow (Annual)
Last updated: Jul 31, 2026 9:19am (23d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Operating Cash Flow | $30.4B | $47.4B | $40.7B | $30.9B | $27.3B |
| Capital Expenditure | — | — | — | — | — |
| Free Cash Flow | — | — | — | — | — |
| Acquisitions (net) | -$321.0M | -$94.0M | -$1.8B | -$2.4B | -$2.0B |
| Net Debt Issued / (Repaid) | — | — | — | — | — |
| Dividends Paid | -$8.3B | -$10.5B | -$7.9B | -$8.2B | -$8.5B |
| Stock Buybacks | — | — | — | — | — |
| Net Change in Cash | -$8.7B | $13.0B | -$5.5B | -$903.0M | -$722.0M |
Growth Trends (YoY %)
Last updated: Jul 31, 2026 9:19am (23d ago)| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue Growth | +36.5% | -15.6% | -9.5% | -6.2% |
| Gross Profit Growth | — | — | — | — |
| Operating Income Growth | +103.7% | — | — | — |
| Net Income Growth | +28.0% | +4.2% | -26.3% | -16.7% |
| EBITDA Growth | — | — | — | — |
Dividend History (Last 20)
Last updated: Jul 31, 2026 9:19am (23d ago)| Date | Dividend | Declaration | Record | Payment |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-03-31 | $0.97 | — | — | — |
| 2025-12-31 | $1.00 | — | — | — |
| 2025-09-30 | $0.99 | — | — | — |
| 2025-06-18 | $1.00 | — | — | — |
| 2025-03-25 | $0.83 | — | — | — |
| 2024-12-31 | $0.83 | — | — | — |
| 2024-09-24 | $0.87 | — | — | — |
| 2024-06-18 | $0.86 | — | — | — |
| 2024-03-18 | $0.81 | — | — | — |
| 2023-12-28 | $0.81 | — | — | — |
| 2023-09-15 | $0.81 | — | — | — |
| 2023-06-16 | $0.79 | — | — | — |
| 2023-03-20 | $0.74 | — | — | — |
| 2022-12-29 | $0.72 | — | — | — |
| 2022-12-02 | $1.04 | — | — | — |
| 2022-09-19 | $0.69 | — | — | — |
| 2022-06-16 | $0.69 | — | — | — |
| 2022-03-18 | $0.73 | — | — | — |
| 2021-12-30 | $0.76 | — | — | — |
| 2021-09-17 | $0.76 | — | — | — |
Deep Analysis
Narrative Economics
market-narrative step).
Claude Reading
Looking at the raw file first: TTE generated $201B revenue in 2025, $13.1B net income, on $117.5B equity — that's an 11% ROE in what should be a mid-cycle year, down from a peak-cycle 18%+ in 2022. Revenue has fallen from $281B (2022) to $201B (2025), a 28% top-line contraction, and earnings are down from $20.5B to $13.1B. That's cyclical normalization, not collapse — Brent averaged ~$100 in 2022 and ~$80 in 2024-25. Net debt is ~$35B against $117B equity (D/E 0.52) — investment-grade solid, not stressed. Operating cash flow of $27B against a $193B market cap is a 14% OCF yield; even after ~$16-18B typical capex, FCF supports the ~$8.8B dividend (4.5% yield, 65% payout) with room. This is a normally-functioning supermajor at a mid-cycle multiple.
The synthesis verdict — fair value $10.95 vs price $87.20, i.e., 87% overvalued — is not a serious number and I dissent completely. A $10.95 fair value implies TTE should trade at 0.8x earnings and ~5% of book value; that's a bankruptcy scenario for a company generating $13B in net income and returning ~$16B annually to shareholders via dividends and buybacks. The DCF is almost certainly using a punitive terminal decline assumption or mis-scaled cash flows. The Market Forces claim of "core business collapses faster than peers" and "likely dividend cut within 12-24 months" is contradicted by the payout ratio (65%, comfortably covered by OCF), balance sheet (net debt/equity 0.30), and peer comparison — Shell, BP, Chevron, XOM all trade 12-16x earnings on similar cyclical dynamics. TTE at 15x P/E, 1.68x book, 4.5% yield is squarely in-line with the integrated major cohort, not at a premium requiring narrative justification. The "696% premium to intrinsic value" framing in the narrative layer inherits the broken DCF and should be discarded.
Where the models have a point: the momentum data is genuinely negative — revenue CAGR -7.9%, earnings CAGR -21.7%, FCF CAGR -18%. But this is measuring peak-to-trough of a commodity cycle, which is what always happens to oil majors post-spike. The pre-flight intelligence's read — "European discount, energy transition skepticism, 15x P/E with 4.5% yield" — is the honest characterization. The bear case worth taking seriously isn't imminent dividend cut; it's (a) capital misallocation into sub-cost-of-capital renewables (Integrated Power segment ROACE reportedly ~10% vs 15%+ hurdle for E&P), (b) European regulatory/windfall tax risk, and (c) reserve replacement costs rising as easy barrels deplete. A contrarian could argue the entire supermajor cohort deserves to de-rate to 8-10x as terminal value shrinks — but that's a sector call, not a TTE-specific short.
My independent read: TTE is fairly valued to modestly undervalued at $87. On $13-15B normalized earnings and 12-14x fair multiple, that's $156-210B market cap vs current $193B — right in the range. The 4.5% dividend covered 1.5x by OCF, buybacks running ~$2B/quarter, and LNG portfolio (arguably best-in-class among Europeans) provide downside support. I'd put fair value at $85-100, with total return of ~8-10% annually (4.5% yield + 3-5% buyback + modest growth) being the realistic base case. Not a table-pounder, but the synthesis verdict claiming $11 fair value is quantitatively indefensible and the "avoid" from Market Forces is not supported by the balance sheet or cash flow data in this same file. The models are anchored to a broken DCF and are extrapolating cyclical decline into secular collapse.
GPT Reading
The data say this is a normal integrated oil major being judged by a badly broken valuation overlay. A $193.6B market cap against $13.1B of 2025 net income is about 15x earnings; that is not a distressed hydrocarbon multiple, but it is also nowhere near absurd for a company with diversified upstream, LNG, refining, marketing, and a 4.5% dividend yield. The first thing that stands out is how implausible the prior “fair value” of roughly $11 is on the raw numbers alone: at that level, the equity would trade at barely 0.1x book versus reported equity of $117.5B, despite still generating $27.3B of operating cash flow in 2025. Even allowing for cyclicality, reserve depletion, and transition risk, that output is not consistent with a near-wipeout valuation. The more credible reading is simpler: earnings and revenue have rolled over from the 2022 energy spike, but the business remains strongly profitable and balance-sheet sound enough to keep paying shareholders.
What the trend really shows is normalization, not collapse. Revenue peaked at $281.0B in 2022, then fell to $237.1B in 2023, $214.6B in 2024, and $201.2B in 2025. Net income moved from $20.5B in 2022 and $21.4B in 2023 down to $15.8B in 2024 and $13.1B in 2025. If you anchor on the 2022 windfall, the business looks like a deteriorating asset. If you anchor on 2021, when revenue was $205.9B and net income was $16.0B, 2025 looks like a pretty decent through-cycle year: similar revenue, somewhat lower earnings, still robust cash generation. Net margin at 6.5% is not exceptional, but perfectly serviceable for a supermajor outside peak conditions. Debt is $61.0B against $26.2B cash, so net debt is roughly $34.8B; against $117.5B equity, leverage is manageable, and the reported debt/equity of 0.52 does not signal a stressed capital structure. This looks like a cyclical cash machine that has already come down from boom earnings, not one staring at a dividend cut in the immediate future.
At $87.2, the stock looks roughly fair to modestly cheap if you believe 2025 earnings are a reasonable mid-cycle floor rather than a prelude to another down-leg. The market is paying about 1.7x book, about 1.0x sales, and receiving a 4.5% yield with a 64.6% payout ratio. That payout is not screamingly conservative, but with $27.3B of operating cash flow versus $13.1B of net income, the cash earnings cushion appears materially better than the income statement alone suggests. For an integrated major, the key question is not whether revenue is shrinking from 2022’s extraordinary level; of course it is. The key question is whether today’s price already discounts lower oil and gas realizations, European political drag, and energy-transition capex. I think mostly yes. A 15x multiple is not a fire-sale price, but for a company still earning double-digit billions and carrying a real asset base, it is defensible enough that I lean undervalued rather than overvalued, especially versus the laughable bear case implied by the synthetic DCF.
The best argument against my read is that the decline is not merely cyclical mean reversion but evidence of structural earnings erosion. The five-year revenue CAGR of -7.9% and earnings CAGR of -21.7% are ugly, recent earnings fell another 16.7% year over year, and return on equity at 11.2% is not high enough to dismiss the possibility that capital is being pushed into lower-return uses. The current ratio under 1.0 is also a reminder that this is a capital-intensive business, not a fortress software model. If management is indeed allocating more capital toward lower-return transition assets while legacy upstream volumes and margins fade, then 15x trailing earnings could prove expensive for a no-growth, depleting franchise. A smart bear would also point out that the payout ratio near 65% leaves less room for error if commodity prices soften further, and that European integrateds often deserve a discount to U.S. peers because of governance, taxation, and policy exposure.
What would change my mind is straightforward. If the next annual cycle shows operating cash flow falling materially below $20B while net income drops into single-digit billions, then today’s dividend and multiple would look too rich and I would move bearish fast. Likewise, if equity starts shrinking meaningfully while debt rises from the current $61.0B, that would suggest the business is funding shareholder returns and transition spending from the balance sheet rather than the asset base. On the other hand, if earnings stabilize around $13B-$16B and operating cash flow stays in the mid-$20B range despite softer commodity conditions, then the current price is at least supportable and likely modestly cheap for an income-oriented holder.
Grok Reading
The raw numbers describe a classic post-peak hydrocarbon cycle, not a franchise in freefall. Revenue has rolled off from the 2022 spike of $281B to $201B in 2025, with net income compressing from $21.4B (2023) to $13.1B—exactly the shape you expect when Brent normalized off the Ukraine-war spike and refining margins tightened. Yet operating cash flow still printed $27.3B against a market cap of $194B, and the balance sheet is serviceable: $61B gross debt, $26B cash, net debt roughly $35B, debt-to-equity 0.52. At 15.1x trailing earnings, 0.98x sales, 1.69x book and a 4.5% dividend covered 1.5x by earnings and more than 3x by OCF, the stock is priced like a mature, modestly levered European major—not like a terminal-value zero. The -7.9% revenue CAGR and -21.7% earnings CAGR are real, but they are the arithmetic of commodity mean-reversion from an extraordinary high, not evidence that the LNG portfolio, downstream system or upstream base has suddenly stopped generating cash.
The valuation synthesis claiming a $10.95–$11.93 fair value (an 87% downside) is simply broken. That figure implies the equity is worth roughly one-fifth of tangible book and less than half a year of operating cash flow—an outcome only coherent if you assume permanent oil demand collapse and zero terminal value for every barrel and molecule TotalEnergies owns. No integrated major with $13B of current net income, positive ROE of 11%, and a still-intact 4.5% payout has ever traded at those levels outside of genuine distress. The “strong market headwinds” and “dividend cut within 12–24 months” language overweights narrative terminal-value risk and underweights the actual cash-generation engine still visible in the 2025 statements. A 65% payout ratio is elevated and will tighten if earnings keep sliding, but $8.8B of annual dividends against $27B of OCF leaves substantial headroom before a cut becomes arithmetic necessity.
The strongest counter-case is straightforward: the decline has not yet bottomed, European political and windfall-tax risk is permanent, and the renewables pivot is diluting returns while the core hydrocarbon base shrinks faster than replacement. Current ratio under 1.0, ROA of only 4.5%, and a multi-year negative FCF CAGR of -18% are legitimate yellow flags; if oil settles into a sustained $50–60 world and LNG spot weakens, the 15x multiple and the dividend both become vulnerable. US peers with cleaner balance sheets and less political overhang deserve a structural premium, and the “European discount” is not pure irrationality. I weigh these factors as real but already largely embedded in the 15x earnings and 4.5% yield; they justify caution, not an 87% haircut to cash flows that are still printing.
A decisive break in the dividend, a further 20%+ drop in annual NI below $10B, or a sustained sub-$55 Brent that forces reserve write-downs would flip me decisively bearish. Conversely, stabilization of earnings around $15B+ with oil holding $70–80 and continued LNG backlog conversion would make the current price look cheap rather than fair.
Big-3 Panel — where each AI stands
Advanced Analysis Forensic deep-dive · separate lenses
TotalEnergies generated $27.3B of FCF in 2025 on $201.2B of revenue, with OCF/NI at 2.03x and accruals at -6.1% of assets — earnings are backed by cash, not accounting. Diluted share count has fallen from 2.71B (2021) to 2.27B (2025), a -4.3% CAGR, so per-share value is being concentrated rather than diluted. Liquid cash of $26.2B is real but net debt is $34.8B, so the balance sheet is a working constraint rather than a cushion. The Altman Z of 1.35 flags 'distress' but is largely an artifact of applying a manufacturing-calibrated model to a capital-intensive integrated oil major with large fixed assets and structural leverage; it should be read as noise here, not a bankruptcy signal. Trajectory is clearly cyclical: revenue peaked at $281B in 2022, net income at $21.4B in 2023, and both have rolled over to $201B rev / $13.1B NI in 2025 as commodity prices normalized. FCF has compressed from $47.4B to $27.3B across the same window — still very large, but the direction is down. Reported operating margin flips to 0 in 2023-2025 in this dataset which looks like a data artifact given net income remains double-digit billions; underlying operating profitability is intact. Overall this is a high-integrity, self-funding, per-share-friendly business whose ceiling is capped by commodity exposure and leverage, not by accounting or capital-allocation concerns.
Verify before trusting this (5)
- Debt maturity schedule and average cost of debt versus $26.2B cash position
- Whether the 0% reported operating margin for 2023-2025 is a data artifact or reflects impairments/write-downs
- Dividend coverage sensitivity at lower oil/gas price decks
- Capex commitments for energy transition (renewables/LNG) versus core upstream reinvestment
- Any pending asset writedowns tied to Russia/Novatek exposure or stranded-asset risk
The composite fair value of $11.93 versus a $87.20 price implying -87% downside is almost certainly a runaway DDM (likely mis-modeled payout or discount rate) and should be discarded as the anchor. For an integrated supermajor with elite cash conversion, persistent buybacks, and Strong quality, deserved value is better triangulated off through-cycle multiples: European majors typically trade 6-8x mid-cycle EPS and 4-5x EV/EBITDA, with a 5-6% dividend yield floor. At $87 and roughly $193B market cap, TTE sits inside that band, not below it.
Verify before trusting this (4)
- Forward capex guidance and LNG project cash-flow timing
- Normalized Brent assumption behind consensus EPS and any updated buyback pace
- Segment breakdown of downstream margins vs 2022-23 peak
- Any change to distribution policy or debt reduction targets
TotalEnergies sits in a genuinely mixed sentiment setup. The broad tape is mildly risk-on (VIX 15.9, S&P near highs, US-Iran truce hopes lifting futures), which is a light tailwind but muted here because TTE's beta is essentially zero - macro moves barely translate. The active narrative is cyclical-late-stage with strong intensity but only moderate durability and low cult following, meaning the story can push the stock but has no fanatical base to defend it if energy scarcity themes fade. Recent news is a genuine narrative positive: the Shell onshore renewables acquisition and KKR partnership feed the 'integrated energy major managing the transition' bull thesis, and one sell-side piece explicitly framed the stock as leaning cheap. Against that, energy stocks sold off 1.2% Monday afternoon, momentum is negative (-7.9% CAGR), and rising leverage adds a quiet negative undertone. Net: the narrative pressure is roughly balanced - transition-credibility tailwind from the Shell deal offsets a soft sector tape and weak price momentum. Nothing here is decisive; this is an ordinary crosswind name, not a stock being marked up or down by force.
Verify before trusting this (4)
- Whether the energy sector selloff extends beyond one session or reverses with oil prices
- Follow-through analyst notes on the Shell/KKR deal - upgrades or target hikes would confirm narrative traction
- Any escalation or breakdown in US-Iran truce talks that would swing oil sentiment
- LNG spot pricing and European gas curves - the core pillar of the bull narrative
This lens hasn't been run for this ticker yet.
When we made this prediction on Aug 4, 2026, TTE was $87.20. We expect it to be $76.00 by Feb 2027, and we consider it great value under $72.00. This is an early model (v0.6.0) — the direction is more reliable than the exact price. Made Aug 4, 2026.
Blue is our prediction, starting the day we made it. Grey is a slower route to the same place — the same destination, taking longer. Black is the actual price, so you can see how we are doing.