Business Description
Morgan Stanley operates as a prominent financial holding company, delivering a comprehensive suite of financial solutions and services. Its diverse clientele spans major corporations, governmental bodies, financial institutions, and individual clients across various global regions, including the Americas, Europe, the Middle East, Africa, and Asia. The firm's operations are structured into three primary divisions: Institutional Securities, Wealth Management, and Investment Management. Within the Institutional Securities segment, Morgan Stanley provides crucial capital-raising and strategic financial advisory services. This includes underwriting activities for debt, equity, and other financial instruments, alongside expert counsel on mergers and acquisitions, corporate reorganizations, real estate transactions, and project financing. Furthermore, this division is a key player in sales and trading, offering services like sales execution, financing solutions, prime brokerage, and market-making across equity and fixed-income products, encompassing foreign exchange and commodities. It also extends corporate and commercial real estate loans, furnishes secured lending facilities, supports sales and trading clients with financing, and engages in asset-backed and mortgage lending. Investment and research services, along with specific wealth management offerings, are also part of this segment. The Wealth Management segment caters to individual investors, as well as small to medium-sized enterprises and institutions. It offers a broad spectrum of services, from financial advisor-led and self-directed brokerage and investment guidance to comprehensive financial and wealth planning. This segment also delivers workplace solutions, such as stock plan administration, and provides annuity and insurance products. Lending options include securities-backed loans, residential real estate mortgages, and other credit facilities, complemented by banking and retirement plan services. Finally, the Investment Management segment is dedicated to providing specialized investment products, including equity, fixed income, liquidity, and alternative strategies. These offerings are distributed through institutional and intermediary channels to a sophisticated client base that features benefit and defined contribution plans, foundations, endowments, governmental entities, sovereign wealth funds, insurance companies, and corporate and third-party fund sponsors. Morgan Stanley's origins trace back to its founding in 1924, and its global headquarters are situated in New York, New York.
Business History
Generated: Jun 24, 2026 3:02amPrice Overview
Last updated: Jun 24, 2026 3:00am (3d ago)Price History (1 Year)
Revenue & Net Income Trend
| Period | Revenue | Net Income | Net Margin | YoY/QoQ |
|---|
Key Metrics
EPS (Diluted): 10.34
Total Equity: $111.63B
Shares: 1,593,000,000
Total Debt: $471.38B
Cash: $111.70B
EBITDA: $26.61B
Total Debt: $471.38B
Cash: $111.70B
Revenue: $114.98B
Revenue: $114.98B
Revenue: $114.98B
Total Equity: $111.63B
Tax Rate: 22.5%
Equity: $111.63B
Total Debt: $471.38B
Cash: $111.70B
Current Liabilities: $559.57B
Long-Term Debt: $327.33B
Total Debt: $471.38B
Total Equity: $111.63B
Shares: 1,593,000,000
Shares: 1,593,000,000
CapEx: -$2.90B
Shares: 1,593,000,000
Stock Price: $226.03
Net Income: $16.86B
Industry Benchmarks
Advanced Analysis Forensic deep-dive · three lenses
Morgan Stanley is a mature, scaled capital-markets and wealth-management franchise. Revenue has compounded from $57.8B in 2021 to $115.0B in 2025 (roughly 18% CAGR), net income recovered from a $9.1B trough in 2023 to $16.9B in 2025, and operating margin rebounded from 13.4% to 19.1%. The wealth and investment-management businesses provide a fee-based ballast that softens the cyclicality of trading and M&A, and the brand/scale moat in global capital markets is genuine.
Verify before trusting this (7)
- Segment-level results: wealth management vs institutional securities vs investment management revenue and margin trajectory.
- Capital ratios (CET1, SLR) and stress-test results to confirm balance-sheet resilience.
- Composition of the $540B liquid cash figure - how much is firm liquidity vs customer/segregated assets.
- Loan book credit quality, allowance coverage, and any concentration in commercial real estate or leveraged lending.
- Drivers of the gross-margin step-down from 97.6% to ~56% - is this reclassification of interest expense or genuine margin erosion.
- Long-term debt maturity ladder and reliance on wholesale funding.
- Detail on buyback authorization vs SBC issuance going forward.
Morgan Stanley at $226 carries a ~$357B market cap and trades around 15-16x forward earnings and roughly 2.3-2.4x tangible book - well above its historical 11-13x P/E and ~1.7x TBV range. The e2e synthesis flags the price as 'disconnected from fundamentals,' and while I would discount any model output that prints a wildly higher fair value (DCFs on banks routinely run away), the direction is clear: this is not a cheap stock. The wealth-management re-rating thesis is well known and largely in the price; the bull case requires sustained mid-teens ROTCE, benign credit, and a healthy capital-markets cycle to justify today's multiple.
Verify before trusting this (4)
- Forward ROTCE guidance and wealth-management net new asset growth
- Basel III endgame capital impact on buyback capacity
- Investment banking backlog commentary and NII trajectory
- Any one-off legal/regulatory charges distorting reported EPS
The macro tape is neutral with VIX at 19.5 and the S&P only 3.2% off highs, so there is no risk-off mauling to amplify through MS's 1.22 beta. As a diversified capital-markets and wealth franchise, MS is moderately tape-sensitive but not a high-beta story stock - the regime is a mild drag at best, not a directional force. Higher 10y at 4.5% is a generic headwind for financials' valuations but the curve is positively sloped, which is constructive for the business mix the market actually cares about here.
Verify before trusting this (4)
- Whether sell-side targets get revised up toward the $226 print or the gap widens
- VIX behavior and any move from neutral toward risk-off, which would hit beta-1.22 financials harder
- Any narrative shift around capital-markets activity (deal flow, IPO window) that could inject intensity
- Crypto-ETF launch reception as a possible narrative add
Deep Analysis
Pre-flight intelligence scans the company first, then routes to the right analytical methods.
Income Statement (Annual)
Last updated: Jun 24, 2026 3:03am (3d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | $57.8B | $62.5B | $88.3B | $103.1B | $115.0B |
| Cost of Revenue | $1.4B | $12.5B | $38.2B | $45.8B | $49.4B |
| Gross Profit | $56.4B | $49.9B | $50.1B | $57.4B | $65.6B |
| Operating Expenses | $36.7B | $35.8B | $38.3B | $39.8B | $43.7B |
| Operating Income | $19.7B | $14.1B | $11.8B | $17.6B | $22.0B |
| Net Income | $15.0B | $11.0B | $9.1B | $13.4B | $16.9B |
| EBITDA | $23.9B | $18.1B | $16.1B | $22.8B | $26.6B |
| EPS | $8.16 | $6.23 | $5.24 | $8.04 | $10.34 |
| EPS (Diluted) | — | — | — | — | — |
Balance Sheet (Annual)
Last updated: Jun 24, 2026 3:02am (3d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cash & Equivalents | $86.8B | $92.7B | $58.7B | $75.7B | $111.7B |
| Total Current Assets | $596.4B | $546.4B | $542.0B | $487.7B | $654.7B |
| Total Assets | $1.2T | $1.2T | $1.2T | $1.2T | $1.4T |
| Current Liabilities | $772.5B | $756.8B | $747.8B | $739.5B | $559.6B |
| Long-Term Debt | $232.8B | $241.1B | $267.5B | $288.8B | $327.3B |
| Total Liabilities | $1.1T | $1.1T | $1.1T | $1.1T | $1.3T |
| Total Equity | $105.4B | $100.1B | $99.0B | $104.5B | $111.6B |
| Retained Earnings | $89.4B | $94.9B | $98.0B | $105.0B | $115.1B |
Cash Flow (Annual)
Last updated: Jun 24, 2026 3:02am (3d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Operating Cash Flow | $34.0B | -$6.4B | -$33.5B | $1.4B | $49.0B |
| Capital Expenditure | -$2.3B | -$3.1B | -$3.4B | -$3.5B | -$2.9B |
| Free Cash Flow | $31.7B | -$9.5B | -$36.9B | -$2.1B | $46.1B |
| Acquisitions (net) | -$2.6B | $0 | $0 | $0 | $0 |
| Debt Repayment | — | — | — | — | — |
| Dividends Paid | — | — | — | — | — |
| Stock Buybacks | -$12.1B | -$10.9B | -$6.2B | -$4.2B | -$5.8B |
| Net Change in Cash | $22.1B | $402.0M | -$38.9B | $16.2B | $6.3B |
Analyst Estimates (Annual)
Last updated: Jun 24, 2026 3:00am (3d ago)| Metric | 2026 | 2027 | 2028 | 2029 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue |
$77.5B $75.7B – $79.0B
|
$81.7B $78.7B – $84.6B
|
$86.5B $85.2B – $87.8B
|
$93.9B $91.0B – $96.2B
|
| EBITDA |
$20.7B $20.2B – $21.1B
|
$21.8B $21.0B – $22.6B
|
$23.1B $22.8B – $23.5B
|
$25.1B $24.3B – $25.7B
|
| Net Income |
$18.6B $18.1B – $19.9B
|
$20.4B $19.8B – $20.9B
|
$20.3B $18.9B – $24.6B
|
$24.5B $23.5B – $25.3B
|
| EPS | — | — | — | — |
Growth Trends (YoY %)
Last updated: Jun 24, 2026 3:03am (3d ago)| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue Growth | +8.1% | +41.3% | +16.8% | +11.5% |
| Gross Profit Growth | -11.5% | +0.4% | +14.4% | +14.4% |
| Operating Income Growth | -28.4% | -16.2% | +49.0% | +24.8% |
| Net Income Growth | -26.6% | -17.6% | +47.4% | +25.9% |
| EBITDA Growth | -24.3% | -11.2% | +41.6% | +16.9% |
Insider Trading (Recent)
Last updated: Jun 24, 2026 3:03am (3d ago)All SEC Form 4 codes
- P Purchase
- Open-market or private purchase of shares.
- S Sale
- Open-market or private sale of shares.
- A Award / grant
- Grant or award of securities (RSUs, options, etc.) under Rule 16b-3.
- D Return to issuer
- Securities disposed back to the company under Rule 16b-3.
- F In-kind (tax)
- Shares withheld or delivered to pay the option-exercise price or tax — not an open-market sale.
- I Discretionary
- Discretionary transaction under an employee plan — Rule 16b-3(f).
- M Option exercise
- Exercise or conversion of a derivative (option/RSU) into shares — exempt.
- C Conversion
- Conversion of a derivative security into the underlying shares.
- E Short expiration
- Expiration of a short derivative position.
- H Long expiration
- Expiration or cancellation of a long derivative position with value received.
- O OTM exercise
- Exercise of an out-of-the-money derivative.
- X ITM exercise
- Exercise of an in-the-money or at-the-money derivative.
- G Gift
- Bona fide gift of securities.
- L Small acquisition
- Small acquisition under Rule 16a-6.
- W Inheritance
- Acquisition or disposition by will or the laws of descent.
- Z Voting trust
- Deposit into or withdrawal from a voting trust.
- J Other
- Other acquisition or disposition (explained in a Form 4 footnote).
- K Equity swap
- Transaction in an equity swap or similar instrument.
- U Tender / buyout
- Disposition via tender of shares in a change-of-control transaction.
Compensation-plan codes (A, D, F, M) are routine and rarely directional. Open-market P (buy) and S (sale) carry the most signal.
| Date | Insider | Type | Shares | Price | Value |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-06-01 | NALLY DENNIS M | A-Award | 345.30 | $209.96 | $72,500 |
| 2026-06-01 | NALLY DENNIS M | A-Award | 1,309.78 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-06-01 | WILKINS RAYFORD JR | A-Award | 1,309.78 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-06-01 | BUTLER MEGAN | A-Award | 1,309.78 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-06-01 | BUTLER MEGAN | F-InKind | 190.00 | $209.96 | $39,892 |
| 2026-06-01 | James Erika H | A-Award | 1,309.78 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-06-01 | GOOD LYNN J | A-Award | 273.86 | $209.96 | $57,500 |
| 2026-06-01 | GOOD LYNN J | A-Award | 1,309.78 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-06-01 | TRAQUINA PERRY M | A-Award | 369.12 | $209.96 | $77,500 |
| 2026-06-01 | TRAQUINA PERRY M | A-Award | 1,309.78 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-06-01 | Peterson Douglas L. | A-Award | 273.86 | $209.96 | $57,500 |
| 2026-06-01 | Peterson Douglas L. | A-Award | 1,309.78 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-06-01 | Miscik Judith A | A-Award | 1,309.78 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-06-01 | Herz Robert H | A-Award | 1,309.78 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-06-01 | Leibowitz Shelley B | A-Award | 1,309.78 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-06-01 | GLOCER THOMAS H | A-Award | 512.00 | $209.96 | $107,500 |
| 2026-06-01 | GLOCER THOMAS H | A-Award | 1,309.78 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-06-01 | SCHAPIRO MARY L | A-Award | 1,309.78 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-05-14 | Itagaki Yasushi | 0.00 | $0.00 | $0 | |
| 2026-04-20 | GROSSMAN ERIC F | S-Sale | 5,559.00 | $190.00 | $1.1M |
Dividend History (Last 20)
Last updated: Jun 21, 2026 6:37pm (5d ago)| Date | Dividend | Declaration | Record | Payment |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-04-30 | $1.00 | 2026-04-15 | 2026-04-30 | 2026-05-15 |
| 2026-01-30 | $1.00 | 2026-01-15 | 2026-01-30 | 2026-02-13 |
| 2025-10-31 | $1.00 | 2025-10-15 | 2025-10-31 | 2025-11-14 |
| 2025-07-31 | $1.00 | 2025-07-16 | 2025-07-31 | 2025-08-15 |
| 2025-04-30 | $0.93 | 2025-04-11 | 2025-04-30 | 2025-05-15 |
| 2025-01-31 | $0.93 | 2025-01-16 | 2025-01-31 | 2025-02-14 |
| 2024-10-31 | $0.93 | 2024-10-16 | 2024-10-31 | 2024-11-15 |
| 2024-07-31 | $0.93 | 2024-07-16 | 2024-07-31 | 2024-08-15 |
| 2024-04-29 | $0.85 | 2024-04-16 | 2024-04-30 | 2024-05-15 |
| 2024-01-30 | $0.85 | 2024-01-16 | 2024-01-31 | 2024-02-15 |
| 2023-10-30 | $0.85 | 2023-10-18 | 2023-10-31 | 2023-11-15 |
| 2023-07-28 | $0.85 | 2023-07-18 | 2023-07-31 | 2023-08-15 |
| 2023-04-28 | $0.78 | 2023-04-19 | 2023-05-01 | 2023-05-15 |
| 2023-01-30 | $0.78 | 2023-01-17 | 2023-01-31 | 2023-02-15 |
| 2022-10-28 | $0.78 | 2022-10-14 | 2022-10-31 | 2022-11-15 |
| 2022-07-28 | $0.78 | 2022-07-14 | 2022-07-29 | 2022-08-15 |
| 2022-04-28 | $0.70 | 2022-04-14 | 2022-04-29 | 2022-05-13 |
| 2022-01-28 | $0.70 | 2022-01-19 | 2022-01-31 | 2022-02-15 |
| 2021-10-28 | $0.70 | 2021-10-14 | 2021-10-29 | 2021-11-15 |
| 2021-07-29 | $0.70 | 2021-07-15 | 2021-07-30 | 2021-08-13 |
Narrative Economics
market-narrative step).
Delvantic AI Findings
Looking at the raw trajectory first: Morgan Stanley printed $33.15B in Q1'26 revenue with a 17% net margin — that's the best quarter in the dataset and shows real acceleration, not deceleration as one of the secondary signals claims. Sequential quarterlies went $25.5B → $26.3B → $26.0B → $27.9B → $28.2B → $30.1B → $28.9B → $33.2B. That's roughly 30% revenue growth from mid-2024 to early 2026, with margins expanding from ~12% to ~17%. Full-year 2025 came in at $115B rev / $16.9B NI vs. 2023's $88B / $9.1B — earnings essentially doubled in two years. The 36% earnings CAGR and 14% revenue CAGR are real, driven by wealth management AUM growth on the back of a strong equity market plus an IB/trading recovery off the 2022-23 trough.
Now the prior models. The Valuation Synthesis verdict — "Disconnected from Fundamentals" predicated on a "60% implied FCF growth rate" — is, frankly, nonsense for a bank. You cannot run a reverse-DCF on a capital-markets firm and treat the output as meaningful; banks aren't valued on FCF because operating cash flow is dominated by changes in trading assets/liabilities and deposit flows. The $46B "FCF" figure is a balance-sheet artifact, not distributable cash. MS trades at 19.5x TTM earnings, 2.5x book, with a 16.4% ROE and a 2.4% dividend yield — those are the right anchors, and on those anchors the stock is fully-priced but not absurd. The synthesis model applied the wrong framework and arrived at a wrong-headed verdict; the Market Narrative section actually gets it right ("anchored to fundamentals... rational assessment"). These two prior outputs directly contradict each other and the narrative read is the credible one.
The Market Forces "cyclical peak amplified by leverage" critique deserves more weight, though. MS earnings are genuinely cyclical: 2021 NI was $15.0B at the SPAC/IPO peak, collapsed to $9.1B in 2023, and has now surged to $16.9B in 2025 with TTM tracking higher. At 19.5x peak-ish earnings and 2.5x book, you're paying a premium multiple for what may be peak earnings power. A normalized mid-cycle ROE for MS is probably 13-14%, not 16.4%; on normalized earnings of ~$14B, the multiple stretches to ~25x. The contrarian case writes itself: wealth management fees are tied to AUM which is tied to the S&P; a 20% equity drawdown takes fee revenue down meaningfully while comp ratios stay sticky; IB pipelines evaporate when volatility spikes. The 67% rally off the lows is the warning, not the validation. Insider activity is all awards/in-kind, not informative either direction — the "heavy insider selling" claim in Market Forces isn't supported by the rows shown.
My read: this is a high-quality franchise printing genuinely strong numbers, but the price reflects it. The "Disconnected from Fundamentals" verdict is methodologically wrong — MS is not 60% FCF-growth-priced, it's priced at a reasonable 19.5x earnings for a 16% ROE bank with a real wealth franchise. The honest concern is cyclical: you're buying at peak margins and a peak multiple simultaneously. Fair value on through-cycle earnings of ~$14B at 15x is ~$210, roughly 7% below current; on current run-rate earnings of ~$18-19B at 17x, fair value is ~$260, 15% upside. So the stock is approximately fairly valued in a base case, expensive in a normalization case, cheap only if you believe the new margin profile is structural (plausible for wealth, not for ISG). I dissent from the synthesis verdict's reasoning but partially agree with its directional caution; I agree with the Market Narrative framing. Not a short, not a buy here — a hold for owners, wait-for-pullback for non-owners.
GPT Critique
Upon analyzing Morgan Stanley's recent financials, several points stand out to me. Notably, there's a clear trajectory of revenue and net income growth over the past few years, with revenue increasing from $57.78 billion in 2021 to $114.98 billion in 2025 and a corresponding rise in net income from $15.03 billion to $16.86 billion. This growth is corroborated by their quarterly performance, showing a steady increase in both revenue and net income, particularly in the latest quarter, which saw $33.15 billion in revenue with a 17% margin. Such figures suggest a strong operational foundation, especially in the wealth management sector, which likely benefited from robust market conditions.
I find myself agreeing with Claude Opus's assertion that the "Disconnected from Fundamentals" verdict in the Valuation Synthesis is misguided when applied to Morgan Stanley. As Opus points out, the valuation metrics of a bank cannot be equated to those of non-financial firms due to the nature of their cash flows and balance sheet dynamics. I concur that the bank's price-to-earnings ratio of 19.5x, combined with a return on equity of 16.4%, does not suggest an overvaluation based on typical banking metrics. Opus's critique of the synthesis's reliance on a "60% implied FCF growth rate" as a valuation anchor is valid; this approach misinterprets the financial structure of banks, where free cash flow isn't a primary valuation measure.
However, I diverge slightly on Opus's optimism regarding the recent rally. While I agree that Morgan Stanley is a high-quality franchise, I am more cautious about the sustainability of its margins and earnings at these levels. The earnings surge aligns with a cyclical peak, amplified by favorable market conditions, as Opus acknowledges. The stock's current valuation seems to factor in peak earnings, and with historical earnings volatility — such as the drop from $15.0 billion in 2021 to $9.1 billion in 2023 — there's a risk that a market downturn could significantly impact profitability. Therefore, I am inclined to weigh the cyclical peak critique more heavily, considering potential downside risks if market conditions shift unfavorably.
A careful skeptic might argue that both my analysis and Opus's underestimate the potential for structural changes in Morgan Stanley's business model, particularly in wealth management, to sustain higher margins and returns. They might point out that the bank's diversification across segments could offer resilience against cyclical downturns, suggesting that current valuations could be justified if these changes prove durable.