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What this page is: Delvantic's full research page for The Carlyle Group Inc. (CG) — AI-driven forensic equity research: mechanical valuation models (DCF, EPV, anchored-PE, scenario) plus three independent AI lenses (Quality / Value / Sentiment). Everything below is rendered server-side; you are not missing content that requires JavaScript. All scores are predictions and research opinions, not financial advice.
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profile-header/price-overview— company profile, live quote, market capextended-analysis— the core: three AI lens reads with findings, scores, and the analyst memofuture-predictions— our forward price-band predictionsmarket-narrative/ai-findings/gpt-critique— narrative context, cross-model findings, and an adversarial critique of our own analysis (near the end of the document)- Members-only sections (render as login gates for anonymous readers):
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The Carlyle Group Inc.
CG NASDAQThe Carlyle Group Inc. is a global alternative asset management firm that provides investment solutions across private equity, global credit, and investment solutions. The company manages a broad range of private market strategies, including buyouts, growth capital, real assets, direct lending, opportunistic credit, asset-backed finance, secondaries, co-investments, and tailored portfolio programs. It serves institutional investors, insurers, and private wealth clients through a diversified platform designed to deploy capital across multiple sectors and geographies. The Carlyle Group Inc. also supports portfolio companies and investment vehicles with active ownership, capital structuring, and long-term asset management capabilities. As one of the largest publicly listed firms in the alternative investment industry, The Carlyle Group Inc. plays a significant role in connecting global capital with private market opportunities.
Price Overview
Price History (1 Year)
Revenue & Net Income Trend
| Period | Revenue | Net Income | Net Margin | YoY/QoQ |
|---|
Key Metrics TTM · through Jun 30, 2026
EPS (Diluted): 0.99
Total Equity: $7.21B
Shares: 367,660,657
Total Debt: $0.00
Cash: $1.26B
EBITDA: N/A
Total Debt: $0.00
Cash: $1.26B
Revenue: $3.61B
Revenue: $3.61B
Revenue: $3.61B
Total Equity: $7.21B
Tax Rate: 15.8%
Equity: $7.21B
Total Debt: $0.00
Cash: $1.26B
Current Liabilities: N/A
Long-Term Debt: $0.00
Total Debt: $0.00
Total Equity: $7.21B
Shares: 367,660,657
Shares: 367,660,657
CapEx: -$125.30M
Shares: 367,660,657
Stock Price: $46.97
Net Income: $363.90M
Industry Benchmarks
Income Statement (Annual)
Last updated: Sep 7, 2026 9:58am (48d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | $5.5B | $3.4B | $1.3B | $3.4B | $3.2B |
| Cost of Revenue | — | — | — | — | — |
| Gross Profit | — | — | — | — | — |
| Operating Expenses | $433.2M | $576.8M | $652.3M | $665.3M | $784.1M |
| Operating Income | — | — | — | — | — |
| Net Income | $3.0B | $1.2B | -$608.4M | $1.0B | $808.7M |
| EBITDA | — | — | — | — | — |
| EPS | $8.37 | $3.39 | $-1.68 | $2.85 | $2.25 |
| EPS (Diluted) | $8.20 | $3.35 | $-1.68 | $2.77 | $2.18 |
Balance Sheet (Annual)
Last updated: Sep 7, 2026 9:58am (48d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cash & Equivalents | $2.5B | $1.4B | $1.4B | $1.3B | $2.0B |
| Total Current Assets | — | — | — | — | — |
| Total Assets | $21.3B | $21.4B | $21.2B | $23.1B | $29.1B |
| Current Liabilities | — | — | — | — | — |
| Long-Term Debt | — | — | — | — | — |
| Total Liabilities | $15.5B | $14.6B | $15.4B | $16.8B | $22.1B |
| Total Equity | $5.7B | $6.8B | $5.8B | $6.3B | $7.1B |
| Retained Earnings | $2.8B | $3.4B | $2.1B | $2.0B | $1.6B |
Cash Flow (Annual)
Last updated: Sep 7, 2026 9:58am (48d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Operating Cash Flow | $1.8B | -$379.3M | $204.9M | -$759.5M | -$3.3B |
| Capital Expenditure | -$41.4M | -$40.6M | -$66.6M | -$77.7M | -$99.4M |
| Free Cash Flow | $1.7B | -$419.9M | $138.3M | -$837.2M | -$3.4B |
| Acquisitions (net) | $0 | -$150.2M | $0 | $0 | — |
| Net Debt Issued / (Repaid) | $111.7M | $73.2M | $12.0M | $700,000 | $90.0M |
| Dividends Paid | -$355.8M | -$443.6M | -$497.7M | -$503.0M | -$505.1M |
| Stock Buybacks | -$161.8M | -$185.6M | -$203.5M | -$554.6M | -$686.5M |
| Net Change in Cash | $1.5B | -$1.1B | $80.6M | -$175.6M | $707.1M |
Growth Trends (YoY %)
Last updated: Sep 7, 2026 9:58am (48d ago)| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue Growth | -39.3% | -60.5% | +156.9% | -5.6% |
| Gross Profit Growth | — | — | — | — |
| Operating Income Growth | — | — | — | — |
| Net Income Growth | -58.8% | -149.7% | +267.7% | -20.7% |
| EBITDA Growth | — | — | — | — |
Dividend History (Last 20)
Last updated: Sep 7, 2026 9:58am (48d ago)| Date | Dividend | Declaration | Record | Payment |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-08-17 | $0.35 | — | — | — |
| 2026-05-18 | $0.35 | — | — | — |
| 2026-02-13 | $0.35 | — | — | — |
| 2025-11-10 | $0.35 | — | — | — |
| 2025-08-18 | $0.35 | — | — | — |
| 2025-05-19 | $0.35 | — | — | — |
| 2025-02-21 | $0.35 | — | — | — |
| 2024-11-18 | $0.35 | — | — | — |
| 2024-08-16 | $0.35 | — | — | — |
| 2024-05-13 | $0.35 | — | — | — |
| 2024-02-22 | $0.35 | — | — | — |
| 2023-11-20 | $0.35 | — | — | — |
| 2023-08-14 | $0.35 | — | — | — |
| 2023-05-15 | $0.35 | — | — | — |
| 2023-02-21 | $0.33 | — | — | — |
| 2022-11-17 | $0.33 | — | — | — |
| 2022-08-08 | $0.33 | — | — | — |
| 2022-05-09 | $0.33 | — | — | — |
| 2022-02-14 | $0.25 | — | — | — |
| 2021-11-08 | $0.25 | — | — | — |
Deep Analysis
Risk : Reward — upside vs downside from this company's own quarters
Not computed yetNarrative Economics
market-narrative step).
Claude Reading
The first thing that jumps out is that every standard valuation metric in this file is distorted by the single most important structural feature of Carlyle's business: carried interest. The TTM revenue of $3.61B (summing $332.7M, $1.90B, $254.0M, $1.12B across the four quarters ending June 2026) is not a run-rate — it is a snapshot of a lumpy, event-driven fee stream. The $1.90B December 2025 quarter and the $2.64B September 2024 quarter are carry events; the $254M March 2026 quarter is essentially the management-fee floor. The -41.9% YoY revenue decline and -71% earnings decline flagged in the momentum module are carry-timing artifacts, not a structural revenue collapse. The 5-year annual revenue path — $5.53B, $3.36B, $1.32B, $3.40B, $3.21B — shows a firm that peaked in 2021 and has been in a carry drought since, not a company in secular decline. The 3.1% revenue CAGR is a meaningless number computed across a window that straddles a carry peak and a carry trough.
Given that, the valuation synthesis verdict of "overvalued" with a composite fair value of $9.51 is not a judgment I can accept. A DCF that produces a $9.51 value for a company with $7.06B in equity, $1.97B in cash, zero reported debt, and roughly $1.0B in 5-year average net income is not modeling Carlyle — it is modeling a broken spreadsheet. The model is treating lumpy, non-recurring carry as if it were a decaying annuity, which produces a floor value no rational investor would anchor to. The "methods disagree" caveat is doing the work of a full disclaimer. Similarly, the "platform-monopoly" narrative archetype is wrong: Carlyle competes head-to-head with Blackstone, KKR, Apollo, and Ares for the same institutional LP dollars. It is a competitive oligopoly, not a monopoly, and the "cult coefficient: medium" and "narrative intensity: strong" tags overstate the moat. The "high_growth_profitable" classification at 0.27 confidence is the most misleading label in the file — this is a mature, cyclical fee-collector, not a growth stock.
Where I do agree with the prior models is on the cash-flow quality flag, but for a different reason than stated. The -$3.37B FCF in 2025 is not "poor quality" in the sense of earnings that fail to convert to cash; it reflects capital deployment into private fund investments, which is the business model. The real cash-flow question is whether the management-fee base (roughly $3-4B annually on an estimated $200B+ AUM at 1.5-2% fees) covers operating costs and dividends, and the answer is yes — the $1.97B cash balance and zero debt confirm it. The payout ratio of 138.6% is a TTM artifact of depressed earnings, not a sign of dividend unsustainability. The insider data is uninformative: all ten entries are "A-Award" equity compensation grants, not open-market purchases or sales, so the "No Insider Transactions" signal is technically correct but vacuous.
My own read at $46.97: the stock is roughly fairly valued, perhaps modestly overvalued. At approximately 15x 5-year average earnings ($1.08B) and 2.4x book, the multiple is reasonable for a top-five alternative asset manager with a clean balance sheet, but it is not cheap. The 33% drawdown from the $69.85 52-week high has already done substantial de-rating work, and the market is pricing in a carry drought that may persist through 2026-2027 as 2021-2022 vintage funds navigate a tougher exit environment. The structural AUM tailwind — pension funds and endowments shifting from 60/40 into alternatives — is real but shared across at least five competitors, which caps the multiple. The key variable is not AUM growth, which is slow and steady, but the timing of the next meaningful carry event, which could add $1-2B to a single quarter's revenue and re-rate the stock violently in either direction. At $47, the risk/reward is balanced; I would not initiate a position here, but I would not short it either. The $9.51 "fair value" is a model artifact, and the "overvalued" verdict built on it is wrong.
GPT Reading
Grok Reading
Advanced Analysis Forensic deep-dive · separate lenses
Carlyle's P&L is volatile in the way asset managers are: revenue swung from $3.13B (2023) to $6.27B (2022) to $6.21B (2025) to $3.61B (2026), and net income ranged from +$2.00B to -$396.9M over the same window. Three of five years produced positive net income, and the 2025 print of $1.26B on $6.21B revenue shows the model can generate real profit when deal flow and performance fees align. Share-count discipline is a genuine strength: diluted shares moved only from 364.7M to 367.7M over four years (roughly 0.2% CAGR), and buybacks exceeded stock-based compensation by 145%, so per-share value is being protected rather than eroded. The insider tape shows only zero-dollar compensation awards (A-Award) across a dozen executives in May and August 2026; there are no open-market buys or sells, which is neutral rather than a red flag.
The cash-flow picture is where the business looks genuinely stressed. Free cash flow was negative in four of the five years shown (-$725.5M in 2023, -$210.7M in 2024, -$161.8M in 2025) and then plunged to -$4.12B in the trailing-twelve-month window through mid-2026. Operating cash flow to net income sits at -2.4x, meaning the company is spending far more cash than it reports in earnings. The balance sheet carries $1.26B of liquid cash, which is 7.5% of the $16.7B market cap, and the liquidity module flags a runway of roughly 1.2 quarters at the current FCF burn. For an asset manager, part of that outflow likely reflects fund capital calls and working-capital swings rather than pure operational burn, but the magnitude and the four-year pattern of negative FCF are hard to dismiss as a one-time artifact. The Altman Z of 0.65 lands in the distress zone, though that model is calibrated for industrial firms and is less reliable for a financial-services balance sheet.
Net: the business is not failing, and the equity discipline is real, but the cash-generation engine is weak and the latest period shows a sharp deterioration that warrants scrutiny before calling the model durable.
Verify before trusting this (6)
- 10-K / 10-Q: Break down the -$4.12B TTM FCF into operating, investing, and financing components to determine how much is fund capital calls vs. true operational burn.
- 10-K: Management-fee revenue vs. performance-fee / carried-interest revenue split to gauge how much of the revenue volatility is structural vs. cyclical.
- 10-K: AUM trajectory and net inflows/outflows over the trailing four quarters to assess whether the revenue base is expanding or contracting.
- Convertible or preferred debt terms: any large maturities or redemption features that could force a cash outflow in the next 12 months.
- Customer / fund concentration: whether a small number of institutional LPs or a single large fund drives a disproportionate share of performance fees.
- SBC policy: the 11.5% SBC-to-revenue ratio is high; verify vesting schedules and whether the 145% buyback coverage is sustainable or a one-time treasury deployment.
The e2e composite fair value is $9.51 (signal-adjusted $9.25) against a price of $46.97, implying the stock is priced at about 5x what the anchored-PE method attributes to the business. Even if I discount that FV by half to account for the model potentially underweighting recurring carry income, the implied value is still only ~$19, leaving the stock 2.5x rich. The earnings-quality flag (Weak, score -1) and the Company-Quality lens (Mixed, score -31, with deeply negative cash flow in four of five years) both argue for a lower deserved value, not a higher one. The bear narrative captures the core issue: the market is paying a platform-monopoly premium for a fee-collector whose cash generation is lumpy and whose AUM growth is cyclical capital deployment, not structural demand. At $46.97 the price already assumes sustained top-quartile carry realization, zero fee compression, and continued AUM flywheel acceleration - a heroic stack.
Verify before trusting this (5)
- Latest 10-Q: split recurring fee income vs carry income to see how much of trailing earnings is truly recurring
- Management guidance on AUM net inflows for next 2 quarters - is the flywheel accelerating or plateauing
- Fee-rate disclosure: any sign of compression in private credit or buyout management fees
- Cash flow from operations vs net income reconciliation for the last 4 quarters to quantify the quality gap
- Carry realization schedule: how much of the next 2 years of carry is already committed vs speculative
This lens hasn't been run for this ticker yet.
This lens hasn't been run for this ticker yet.
Prediction unavailable. No usable fair-value anchor — composite, DCF and anchored-PE are all absent from valuation-synthesis. Typical for pre-profit / narrative-platform names where those methods don't apply.