Business Description
Magnite, Inc. manages an independent, global platform dedicated to the digital advertising marketplace. This sophisticated system furnishes publishers—entities controlling digital content such as connected TV channels, mobile applications, and websites—with the necessary applications and utilities to oversee and monetize their ad inventory. Concurrently, it delivers services and tools for advertising buyers, including advertisers, agencies, agency trading desks, and demand-side platforms, enabling them to procure digital ad space. The company employs sales teams operating from various international locations to market its advanced technological solutions to both buying and selling parties. Formed in 2007, the enterprise was formerly known as The Rubicon Project, Inc. before rebranding as Magnite, Inc. in July 2020. Its corporate headquarters are located in New York, New York.
Business History
Generated: Jun 17, 2026 3:02amPrice Overview
Last updated: Jun 17, 2026 3:00am (10d ago)Price History (1 Year)
Revenue & Net Income Trend
| Period | Revenue | Net Income | Net Margin | YoY/QoQ |
|---|
Key Metrics
EPS (Diluted): 1.01
Total Equity: $922.35M
Shares: 153,770,000
Total Debt: $576.28M
Cash: $553.36M
EBITDA: $155.95M
Total Debt: $576.28M
Cash: $553.36M
Revenue: $713.95M
Revenue: $713.95M
Revenue: $713.95M
Total Equity: $922.35M
Tax Rate: -104.8%
Equity: $922.35M
Total Debt: $576.28M
Cash: $553.36M
Current Liabilities: $1.84B
Long-Term Debt: $347.67M
Total Debt: $576.28M
Total Equity: $922.35M
Shares: 153,770,000
Shares: 153,770,000
CapEx: -$70.54M
Shares: 153,770,000
Stock Price: $18.55
Net Income: $144.61M
Industry Benchmarks
Advanced Analysis Forensic deep-dive · three lenses
Magnite is showing a genuine business inflection. Revenue grew from $468M (2021) to $714M (2025), a ~11% CAGR, but the more important shift is margin: gross margin recovered from a 33.9% trough in 2023 to 62.7% in 2025, and operating margin swung from -25% to +13.7% over the same window. Net income turned from -$159M (2023) to +$144.6M (2025), and FCF compounded to $165.6M on $714M revenue (~23% FCF margin). OCF/NI of 391x reflects that NI just crossed zero — the cash was always there; GAAP earnings are finally catching up. Accruals at -8.2% of assets and Beneish M of -2.5 corroborate that earnings quality is clean.
The weaker side is the capital structure and per-share math. Diluted shares went from 136.3M to 153.8M (3.1% CAGR), SBC runs 10.7% of revenue, and buybacks recover only 25% of SBC — so per-share value is being quietly taxed even as the operating business improves. Net cash is slightly negative (-$22.9M) against $553M of liquid cash, meaning gross debt is meaningful; Altman Z of 0.83 flags that, though the model is unreliable for an asset-light ad-tech platform throwing off $165M FCF. Insider tape is informational rather than alarming — the June 'sales' are sell-to-cover paired with awards, with only modest discretionary selling and zero open-market buys.
Net: this looks like a maturing platform with real operating leverage and clean cash generation, held back from a higher grade by structural dilution and a balance sheet that is adequate rather than a fortress.
Verify before trusting this (6)
- Customer concentration — particularly CTV exposure to Netflix/Disney/major broadcaster deals disclosed in the 10-K
- Gross debt structure, maturities, and covenants behind the negative net cash position
- Whether the 2023→2024 gross margin jump (33.9%→61.3%) reflects a true mix/cost shift or a reclassification of traffic-acquisition costs
- SBC trajectory and any plans to step up buybacks beyond the current 25%-of-SBC pace
- Sustainability of CTV growth rate and take-rate as supply-path optimization pressures intensify
- Composition of the $144.6M 2025 net income — any one-time tax benefits or deferred tax asset releases
The e2e synthesis lands at 'Reasonable Premium,' which lines up with where the tape is: ~$2.66B market cap on a business that just turned the operating-leverage corner but still carries a sub-scale balance sheet and ~3%/yr dilution. The Company-Quality lens grades this a Solid 35 — credible mid-inflection, not an elite compounder — so deserved value gets a modest quality lift but nothing that justifies a steep premium. Earnings quality is clean (no haircut), which is the one thing keeping me from marking it down further.
Against that, $18.55 looks like the market has already underwritten the bull narrative: pure-play CTV/programmatic plumbing, margin expansion, FCF inflection. To make money from here you need the platform-monopoly thesis to actually play out against Google/Amazon/Meta vertical integration — that's the priced-in assumption, and it's not conservative. I don't see a margin of safety, but I also don't see egregious overvaluation. This is the textbook 'good business the market understands' setup.
Verify before trusting this (4)
- CTV take-rate trend and Disney/Netflix-class publisher renewal terms — directly drives deserved revenue multiple
- SBC as % of revenue and net share count trajectory — confirms whether dilution drag is improving
- Forward FCF guide and any one-time items in recent EBITDA — separates inflection from cycle bounce
- Customer concentration disclosure — bear case on consolidation needs sizing
The market tape is genuinely neutral (regime score +11, VIX 17, S&P just 1.8% off highs), so there is no broad risk-off avalanche to crush MGNI right now, but with a beta of 2.31 any drift toward risk-off would land hard on this name. Macro is a mild headwind via 4.43% 10y rates pressuring unprofitable/low-margin ad-tech multiples, and MGNI sits in exactly the cohort that gets re-rated on rate shocks. Net macro: small headwind, not acute. The narrative is the prime force and it is genuinely two-sided: the CTV-plumbing bull story is intact and moderately durable, but the 'big-tech walled gardens are squeezing the middleman' bear thesis is the structural overhang that keeps a permanent discount on the name. Cult coefficient is low, so there is no momentum-mob bid to lean on. Analyst tone is constructively positive (18 Buys, consensus Buy, one upward revision to $20) but the consensus target $19.25 is only ~6% above spot, meaning the sell side is lukewarm in dollar terms even if Buy-rated. Momentum is strong-positive over 3y (+46pp) which is a real tailwind on the tape, but the 7% recent CAGR has cooled. Net: forces roughly offset.
Verify before trusting this (4)
- Any Google/Amazon/Meta ad-stack announcement that escalates the walled-garden squeeze narrative
- CTV ad-spend data points from Roku, Trade Desk, Disney that ratify or break the bull story
- VIX breaking above 20 or S&P breaking below recent support - would amplify on a 2.31 beta
- Whether the upward target revisions broaden from one analyst to a cluster
Deep Analysis
Pre-flight intelligence scans the company first, then routes to the right analytical methods.
Income Statement (Annual)
Last updated: Jun 17, 2026 3:06am (10d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | $468.4M | $577.1M | $619.7M | $668.2M | $714.0M |
| Cost of Revenue | $201.7M | $307.2M | $409.9M | $258.8M | $266.6M |
| Gross Profit | $266.8M | $269.9M | $209.8M | $409.3M | $447.3M |
| Operating Expenses | $347.8M | $382.7M | $364.8M | $358.2M | $349.6M |
| Operating Income | -$81.1M | -$112.8M | -$155.0M | $51.1M | $97.8M |
| Net Income | $65,000 | -$130.3M | -$159.2M | $22.8M | $144.6M |
| EBITDA | $71.7M | $109.7M | $115.6M | $112.0M | $155.9M |
| EPS | $0.00 | $-0.98 | $-1.17 | $0.16 | $1.01 |
| EPS (Diluted) | — | — | — | — | — |
Balance Sheet (Annual)
Last updated: Jun 17, 2026 3:00am (10d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cash & Equivalents | $230.4M | $326.3M | $326.2M | $483.2M | $553.4M |
| Total Current Assets | $1.2B | $1.3B | $1.5B | $1.7B | $1.9B |
| Total Assets | $2.7B | $2.7B | $2.7B | $2.9B | $3.2B |
| Current Liabilities | $1.0B | $1.1B | $1.4B | $1.5B | $1.8B |
| Long-Term Debt | $720.0M | $722.8M | $533.0M | $550.1M | $347.7M |
| Total Liabilities | $1.8B | $1.9B | $2.0B | $2.1B | $2.2B |
| Total Equity | $880.8M | $791.3M | $701.7M | $768.2M | $922.4M |
| Retained Earnings | -$394.5M | -$524.8M | -$684.0M | -$661.2M | -$516.6M |
Cash Flow (Annual)
Last updated: Jun 17, 2026 3:06am (10d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Operating Cash Flow | $126.6M | $192.6M | $214.4M | $235.2M | $236.2M |
| Capital Expenditure | -$29.1M | -$44.4M | -$37.4M | -$32.8M | -$70.5M |
| Free Cash Flow | $97.5M | $148.2M | $177.0M | $202.4M | $165.6M |
| Acquisitions (net) | -$661.9M | -$20.8M | $0 | $0 | $0 |
| Debt Repayment | — | — | — | — | — |
| Dividends Paid | — | — | — | — | — |
| Stock Buybacks | -$6.0M | -$15.7M | $0 | -$14.6M | -$46.3M |
| Net Change in Cash | $113.0M | $95.8M | $-283,000 | $157.0M | $70.1M |
Analyst Estimates (Annual)
Last updated: Jun 17, 2026 3:00am (10d ago)| Metric | 2027 | 2028 | 2029 | 2030 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue |
$820.4M $813.1M – $840.3M
|
$1.1B $1.1B – $1.1B
|
$1.0B $999.8M – $1.0B
|
$1.1B $1.1B – $1.1B
|
| EBITDA |
$220.5M $218.5M – $225.8M
|
$288.1M $285.5M – $295.1M
|
$271.1M $268.7M – $277.7M
|
$297.4M $294.7M – $304.6M
|
| Net Income |
$189.1M $130.5M – $247.7M
|
$198.8M $119.6M – $278.1M
|
$187.6M $185.4M – $193.5M
|
$239.9M $237.1M – $247.4M
|
| EPS | — | — | — | — |
Growth Trends (YoY %)
Last updated: Jun 17, 2026 3:06am (10d ago)| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue Growth | +23.2% | +7.4% | +7.8% | +6.9% |
| Gross Profit Growth | +1.2% | -22.3% | +95.1% | +9.3% |
| Operating Income Growth | -39.1% | -37.4% | +133.0% | +91.4% |
| Net Income Growth | -200,596.9% | -22.1% | +114.3% | +534.7% |
| EBITDA Growth | +52.9% | +5.4% | -3.1% | +39.2% |
Insider Trading (Recent)
Last updated: Jun 17, 2026 3:05am (10d ago)All SEC Form 4 codes
- P Purchase
- Open-market or private purchase of shares.
- S Sale
- Open-market or private sale of shares.
- A Award / grant
- Grant or award of securities (RSUs, options, etc.) under Rule 16b-3.
- D Return to issuer
- Securities disposed back to the company under Rule 16b-3.
- F In-kind (tax)
- Shares withheld or delivered to pay the option-exercise price or tax — not an open-market sale.
- I Discretionary
- Discretionary transaction under an employee plan — Rule 16b-3(f).
- M Option exercise
- Exercise or conversion of a derivative (option/RSU) into shares — exempt.
- C Conversion
- Conversion of a derivative security into the underlying shares.
- E Short expiration
- Expiration of a short derivative position.
- H Long expiration
- Expiration or cancellation of a long derivative position with value received.
- O OTM exercise
- Exercise of an out-of-the-money derivative.
- X ITM exercise
- Exercise of an in-the-money or at-the-money derivative.
- G Gift
- Bona fide gift of securities.
- L Small acquisition
- Small acquisition under Rule 16a-6.
- W Inheritance
- Acquisition or disposition by will or the laws of descent.
- Z Voting trust
- Deposit into or withdrawal from a voting trust.
- J Other
- Other acquisition or disposition (explained in a Form 4 footnote).
- K Equity swap
- Transaction in an equity swap or similar instrument.
- U Tender / buyout
- Disposition via tender of shares in a change-of-control transaction.
Compensation-plan codes (A, D, F, M) are routine and rarely directional. Open-market P (buy) and S (sale) carry the most signal.
| Date | Insider | Type | Shares | Price | Value |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-06-17 | Buckley Sean Patrick | S-Sale | 19,233.00 | $19.00 | $365,427 |
| 2026-06-16 | Knopper Douglas S | S-Sale | 37,337.00 | $18.10 | $675,800 |
| 2026-06-15 | Buonasera David | S-Sale | 1,057.00 | $17.00 | $17,969 |
| 2026-06-16 | Buonasera David | S-Sale | 11,233.00 | $18.00 | $202,194 |
| 2026-06-17 | Buonasera David | S-Sale | 1,409.00 | $19.00 | $26,771 |
| 2026-06-15 | BARRETT MICHAEL G. | M-Exempt | 178,596.00 | $5.80 | $1.0M |
| 2026-06-15 | BARRETT MICHAEL G. | M-Exempt | 178,596.00 | $5.80 | $1.0M |
| 2026-06-16 | BARRETT MICHAEL G. | M-Exempt | 100,000.00 | $5.80 | $580,000 |
| 2026-06-16 | BARRETT MICHAEL G. | M-Exempt | 100,000.00 | $5.80 | $580,000 |
| 2026-06-16 | BARRETT MICHAEL G. | S-Sale | 100,000.00 | $17.50 | $1.8M |
| 2026-06-15 | BARRETT MICHAEL G. | S-Sale | 178,596.00 | $16.59 | $3.0M |
| 2026-06-08 | Caine Paul | A-Award | 13,798.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-06-08 | Yu Diane | A-Award | 13,798.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-06-08 | Spillane Robert F | A-Award | 13,798.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-06-08 | Harden Sarah Patricia | A-Award | 13,798.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-06-08 | Knopper Douglas S | A-Award | 13,798.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-06-10 | Knopper Douglas S | S-Sale | 10,766.00 | $15.73 | $169,349 |
| 2026-06-08 | Rossman James | A-Award | 13,798.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-06-08 | Lam Rachel | A-Award | 13,798.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-06-08 | PEARSON DAVID T. | A-Award | 13,798.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
Narrative Economics
market-narrative step).
Delvantic AI Findings
Looking at the raw quarterly trajectory first: Q1 2026 revenue of $164.4M is up just 5.5% YoY from Q1 2025's $155.8M, and net margin collapsed back to 2.7% from the headline-grabbing 59.9% in Q4 2025. That Q4 NI of $123.1M on $205.4M revenue is almost certainly a tax benefit or deferred tax asset release — operating margins don't swing from 6% to 60% organically in a quarter. Strip that out and trailing four quarters of "normalized" net income is closer to $40-50M, not the $144.6M annual figure. The TTM P/E of 16.8x is therefore misleading; on cleaner earnings, you're paying 50-65x. FCF of $165.6M on a $2.66B market cap is the more honest anchor — roughly 6.2% FCF yield, which is fine but not cheap for a 7% revenue grower with decelerating momentum.
The synthesis verdict of "Reasonable Premium" and the pre-flight's "pre-profit-platform" framing contradict each other in a revealing way. Pre-flight is closer to right: Magnite is not a mature earner despite the rule-based classifier's 0.9 confidence — three of the last four years showed GAAP operating losses, and 2025's $97.8M operating profit is the first real proof point. Calling this a mature earner because of one clean year ignores that the cumulative operating losses from 2021-2023 totaled roughly -$349M. The market-forces "neutral" call and the narrative layer's identification of moderate-intensity platform-monopoly storytelling are the most honest reads here. The bear case — Google/Amazon/TTD vertically integrating and squeezing the neutral middleman — is not hypothetical; it's already happening, and the 5.5% Q1 YoY growth print suggests it may be biting.
A careful contrarian would press on three things. First, the insider activity table shows ten transactions in a two-day window in June 2026 — eight awards and two sales, all identical lot sizes — this looks like routine RSU vest-and-sell mechanics, not informed selling, so the "Unusual Selling Activity" flag is probably overweighted. Second, the revenue deceleration is real: 2024 grew 7.8%, 2025 grew 6.9%, and Q1 2026 annualized is tracking ~5-6%. The CTV secular tailwind narrative requires acceleration, not deceleration, to justify a 3.3x EV/sales multiple on a low-moat intermediary. Third, the balance sheet tile shows "—" for total debt and equity, which is a real gap — Magnite carried roughly $360M in term loan debt as of recent filings, so the "$553M cash" figure overstates net liquidity. Net cash is closer to $190M, materially changing EV calculations the models leaned on.
I dissent partially from the "Reasonable Premium" synthesis. At $18.55, you're paying ~16x normalized FCF for a business with 6-7% top-line growth, a one-time tax-benefit-flattered earnings base, decelerating quarterly trends, and structural competitive pressure from companies with 100x its R&D budget. The bull case requires CTV mix-shift to re-accelerate growth to low double-digits and operating margins to expand from 13.7% toward 20%+ — plausible but unproven, and Q1 2026's 2.7% net margin is the opposite signal. Fair value on a sober 8% revenue CAGR with margins stabilizing at 15% operating gets me to roughly $15-16, suggesting the stock is 15-20% rich, not "reasonable." The asymmetry isn't there: upside to $24-25 on a CTV re-acceleration thesis vs. downside to $12-13 if growth slips below 5% and Google/Amazon take share. Wait for either a Q2 print that confirms re-acceleration above 8% YoY, or a pullback to $15 that builds in a real margin of safety. The models are anchoring too heavily on the 2025 annual snapshot and not enough on the Q1 2026 deceleration.
GPT Critique
In examining Magnite, Inc.'s financials, several patterns emerge that are noteworthy. The company's recent revenue growth is modest, with a 6.9% year-over-year increase in 2025 and a further deceleration to a 5.5% increase in Q1 2026 compared to Q1 2025. The sharp net income jump to $123.1 million in Q4 2025, followed by a significant drop to $4.4 million in Q1 2026, suggests that the Q4 spike was likely due to a non-recurring event such as a tax benefit, not organic operational improvement. The operating cash flow of $236.2 million and the free cash flow of $165.6 million indicate solid cash generation, yet these figures are juxtaposed with a slowdown in revenue growth and a modest net margin of 2.7% in the latest quarter.
I find myself in agreement with Opus's assertion that the Q4 2025 net income was likely inflated by a one-time financial event, distorting the company's earnings picture. His claim that the trailing P/E ratio of 16.8x is misleading is supported by the more realistic assessment of earnings, which when normalized, suggest a much higher effective multiple. This aligns with the observation that free cash flow provides a more reliable valuation anchor for Magnite, given the current growth trajectory and margin pressures.
However, I diverge from Opus on the classification of Magnite as a "mature earner." The narrative of a "pre-profit-platform" seems more fitting, considering the historical operating losses and the recent reliance on a single profitable year. The notion of a platform monopoly lacks robustness given the aggressive competition from major tech companies, which is likely to impact Magnite's market position and pricing power. Opus's insight into the insider selling activity as routine vest-and-sell transactions rather than strategic divestment is a valid counterpoint to the "Unusual Selling Activity" flag, which I agree may be overstated.
A careful skeptic might argue that both analyses are overly focused on past performance and not sufficiently on forward-looking potential. They might question the emphasis on deceleration in revenue growth without considering market dynamics or internal strategic shifts that could reignite growth. Additionally, skeptics would scrutinize the balance sheet's lack of clarity regarding debt and equity, which could obscure the company's true financial resilience.