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What this page is: Delvantic's full research page for DocuSign Inc. (DOCU) — AI-driven forensic equity research: mechanical valuation models (DCF, EPV, anchored-PE, scenario) plus three independent AI lenses (Quality / Value / Sentiment). Everything below is rendered server-side; you are not missing content that requires JavaScript. All scores are predictions and research opinions, not financial advice.
Our current read (analysis of 2026-08-23): Designation Watch · Gem Score +18 (−100…+100 Quality+Value blend) · Quality 75 · Value -29 · Sentiment -9 (timing only, not weighted) · Composite fair value $53.27 vs $55.09 at analysis
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profile-header/price-overview— company profile, live quote, market capextended-analysis— the core: three AI lens reads with findings, scores, and the analyst memofuture-predictions— our forward price-band predictionsmarket-narrative/ai-findings/gpt-critique— narrative context, cross-model findings, and an adversarial critique of our own analysis (near the end of the document)- Members-only sections (render as login gates for anonymous readers):
price-history,income-trend,key-metrics,financials(statement tables),insider-trading. The analysis above is public; the raw data tables require a free account.
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any ticker resolves at delvantic.com/stock/TICKER ·
raw inputs are public-company filings and market data (via licensed data feeds);
every model, score, lens read, and prediction on this page is Delvantic's own analysis.
DocuSign Inc.
DOCU NASDAQDocuSign Inc. is a technology company that provides cloud-based agreement and electronic signature solutions for businesses and individuals worldwide. Its core platform enables users to prepare, send, sign, and manage digital agreements securely from virtually any device, helping to replace manual, paper-based workflows with automated, trackable processes. DocuSign’s offerings include electronic signatures, contract lifecycle management, document generation, web forms, notary capabilities, and standards-based digital signatures, supporting complex requirements such as identity management, authentication, and compliance. These solutions are used across sectors including financial services, real estate, healthcare, public sector, and technology to streamline onboarding, approvals, and contract execution. Through its Agreement Cloud suite, DocuSign integrates with major business applications to embed agreement workflows directly into existing systems. Founded in 2003 and headquartered in San Francisco, California, DocuSign plays a significant role in the enterprise software market by helping organizations reduce administrative friction and maintain secure, auditable records of their business transactions.
Price Overview
Price History (1 Year)
Revenue & Net Income Trend
| Period | Revenue | Net Income | Net Margin | YoY/QoQ |
|---|
Key Metrics
EPS (Diluted): 1.48
Total Equity: $1.92B
Shares: 209,118,000
Total Debt: $0.00
Cash: $602.44M
EBITDA: $414.66M
Total Debt: $0.00
Cash: $602.44M
Revenue: $3.22B
Revenue: $3.22B
Revenue: $3.22B
Total Equity: $1.92B
Tax Rate: 11.0%
Equity: $1.92B
Total Debt: $0.00
Cash: $602.44M
Current Liabilities: $2.04B
Long-Term Debt: $0.00
Total Debt: $0.00
Total Equity: $1.92B
Shares: 209,118,000
Shares: 209,118,000
CapEx: -$106.45M
Shares: 209,118,000
Stock Price: $55.09
Net Income: $309.09M
Industry Benchmarks
Income Statement (Annual)
Last updated: Aug 3, 2026 5:30pm (20d ago)| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 | 2026 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | $2.1B | $2.5B | $2.8B | $3.0B | $3.2B |
| Cost of Revenue | $466.5M | $536.1M | $572.6M | $621.7M | $663.1M |
| Gross Profit | $1.6B | $2.0B | $2.2B | $2.4B | $2.6B |
| Operating Expenses | $1.7B | $2.1B | $2.2B | $2.2B | $2.3B |
| Operating Income | -$61.9M | -$88.0M | $31.6M | $199.9M | $298.6M |
| Net Income | -$70.0M | -$97.5M | $74.0M | $1.1B | $309.1M |
| EBITDA | $20.0M | -$1.8M | $126.7M | $307.7M | $414.7M |
| EPS | $-0.36 | $-0.49 | $0.36 | $5.23 | $1.53 |
| EPS (Diluted) | $-0.36 | $-0.49 | $0.36 | $5.08 | $1.48 |
Balance Sheet (Annual)
Last updated: Aug 3, 2026 5:10pm (20d ago)| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 | 2026 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cash & Equivalents | $509.1M | $721.9M | $797.1M | $648.6M | $602.4M |
| Total Current Assets | $1.3B | $1.6B | $1.6B | $1.5B | $1.5B |
| Total Assets | $2.5B | $3.0B | $3.0B | $4.0B | $4.2B |
| Current Liabilities | $1.4B | $2.2B | $1.7B | $1.8B | $2.0B |
| Long-Term Debt | — | — | — | — | — |
| Total Liabilities | $2.3B | $2.4B | $1.8B | $2.0B | $2.3B |
| Total Equity | $275.5M | $617.3M | $1.1B | $2.0B | $1.9B |
| Retained Earnings | -$1.4B | -$1.6B | -$1.7B | -$1.3B | -$1.9B |
Cash Flow (Annual)
Last updated: Aug 3, 2026 5:30pm (20d ago)| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 | 2026 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Operating Cash Flow | $506.5M | $506.8M | $979.5M | $1.0B | $1.2B |
| Capital Expenditure | -$61.4M | -$77.7M | -$92.4M | -$97.0M | -$106.4M |
| Free Cash Flow | $445.1M | $429.1M | $887.1M | $920.3M | $1.1B |
| Acquisitions (net) | -$6.4M | $0 | $0 | -$143.6M | $0 |
| Net Debt Issued / (Repaid) | — | — | — | — | — |
| Dividends Paid | — | — | — | — | — |
| Stock Buybacks | $0 | -$63.0M | -$145.5M | -$683.5M | -$869.1M |
| Net Change in Cash | -$56.7M | $213.5M | $78.3M | -$141.9M | -$41.4M |
Growth Trends (YoY %)
Last updated: Aug 3, 2026 5:30pm (20d ago)| Metric | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 | 2026 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue Growth | +19.4% | +9.8% | +7.8% | +8.2% |
| Gross Profit Growth | +20.7% | +10.6% | +7.6% | +8.5% |
| Operating Income Growth | -42.3% | +135.9% | +532.0% | +49.3% |
| Net Income Growth | -39.3% | +175.9% | +1,343.5% | -71.1% |
| EBITDA Growth | -108.9% | +7,233.8% | +142.9% | +34.7% |
Deep Analysis
Risk : Reward — if the last quarter repeats
Live · as of 2026-08-19 08:48Recovery pays +16%; another quarter like the worst recent one costs 62%. Ratio 0.3:1.
| Case | Growth | Margin | Fair value | vs price ($55.09) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Bull — recovery | +13% | 28.8% | $63.73 | +16% |
| Base — stabilizes | +8% | 25.1% | $48.67 | -12% |
| Bear — keeps slipping | +4% | 21.3% | $36.30 | -34% |
| Stress — last quarter repeats | +9% | 10.0% | $20.82 | -62% |
Narrative Economics
market-narrative step).
Claude Reading
The raw trajectory tells a coherent story: revenue climbed from $736M (Jul-24) to $830M (Apr-26), a 12.8% cumulative gain over seven quarters — call it ~7% annualized, decelerating from the 8.2% YoY print. More telling is the sequential pattern: $836.9M in Jan-26 slipped to $830.2M in Apr-26. That's the first sequential decline in the visible series and it deserves more weight than the models give it. Net margins are stable in a 7.9–10.8% band ex the $888M Jul-24 tax-benefit distortion (which mechanically inflates the 104% earnings CAGR and the trailing PE math — the real earnings power is ~$315M/yr, not the reported figure). At $10.5B market cap against $1.06B FCF, DOCU trades at ~10x FCF, which is emphatically not "37x PE" territory. The synthesis leaning on PE is analytically lazy here.
On that FCF multiple, the bear case has to work harder than the market-forces model suggests. 10x FCF for a business with 79% gross margins, zero debt, $602M cash, 20% ROIC, and mid-single-digit growth is cheap even if you believe Microsoft/Adobe commoditize e-signature over five years. The DCF-anchored "fair value $53–59" range implicitly assumes FCF stagnates or declines — reasonable as a bear scenario, aggressive as a base case given FCF grew 9.2% CAGR. Where I part with the bullish read: the Apr-26 sequential softness, the decelerating quarterly trend flagged in revenue confidence, and the insider activity which is 100% awards (grants, not open-market buys) — that's not "neutral," it's the absence of a signal that would matter, and dilution from those grants is real at ~750K shares in a single day.
The models contradict each other in ways worth naming. Pre-flight says "market wants evidence CLM offsets eSignature deceleration"; market-forces flags "existential risk from Microsoft commoditization"; narrative layer calls it a "steady compounder" priced at fair value. These can't all be right. If Microsoft/Copilot genuinely commoditizes e-signature over 2–3 years, 10x FCF is a value trap and fair value is $35–40. If DocuSign's IAM/CLM platform pivot gets any traction, this is a $75–85 stock on multiple expansion alone (15x FCF with flat growth). The synthesis verdict of $59 splits the difference without committing to which world we're in — a cop-out. A contrarian would note that every mature SaaS name that survived the 2022–23 rerate and now generates $1B+ FCF has eventually been either acquired (think Splunk at 7x sales) or rerated; DOCU at 3.1x EV/revenue and $10B cap is squarely in strategic-acquirer range for Adobe, Salesforce, or PE.
I dissent modestly from the "fair value" synthesis and lean undervalued, but with lower conviction than a table-pound. The FCF yield (~10%) provides real downside protection that the PE-anchored models understate; the sequential Q1-26 dip and structural AI-disruption risk cap the upside case. Fair value on my read is $65–70 — 12–13x FCF, still a discount to mature software peers — implying ~20% upside from $55. That's a starter-position setup, not a back-up-the-truck. The catalyst path is either (a) two more quarters proving Apr-26 was noise not trend, (b) a credible CLM/IAM growth number breaking out in the next print, or (c) strategic interest surfacing. If Q2-26 shows another sequential decline and IAM commentary stays vague, my $65 anchor drops to $50 fast. The models' "fair value / neutral" verdicts are defensible but under-weight the FCF multiple and over-weight the reported PE.
GPT Reading
What jumps out is that DocuSign is no longer a growth story in the way software investors usually mean it, but it is a very real cash machine. Revenue went from $2.11B in FY2022 to $3.22B in FY2026, a decent 11%-ish annualized climb over four years, but the more important point is the recent shape: quarterly revenue has moved from $736.0M in July 2024 to $836.9M in January 2026, then slipped seasonally to $830.2M in April 2026. That is steady, not exciting, and the year-over-year growth in the latest quarter is 8.7% against $763.7M. Against that muted top-line backdrop, profitability has improved materially: operating income reached $298.6M in FY2026 versus just $31.6M in FY2024, and net income excluding the obvious one-off distortion in FY2025 is now running around a 9-11% quarterly margin. Gross margin near 79% and free cash flow of $1.06B on $3.22B of revenue imply a remarkable 33% FCF margin. For a company with no debt and $602M cash, that matters more than the lack of hypergrowth.
The market cap of $10.52B values that business at about 3.3x trailing revenue and just under 10x trailing free cash flow, using the annual cash flow provided. That is not a demanding multiple for a sticky software asset with 79% gross margins, positive ROIC of 20.2%, and demonstrated ability to expand earnings while still growing high single digits. The reported PE of 37x looks scarier than the business really is because GAAP earnings are depressed relative to cash generation and because the FY2025 net income number of $1.07B is clearly unusable as a run-rate anchor given the absurd $888.2M quarterly profit in July 2024. If I normalize this on FY2026 operating profit of $298.6M or the recent quarterly net income cadence of roughly $315M annualized, the stock is not obviously cheap on earnings, but it is cheap enough on enterprise value to revenue and especially on free cash flow to argue that the market is pricing DocuSign like a slowly melting asset. The raw numbers do not show melt; they show a mature category leader that has found margin discipline.
What keeps me from being more aggressive is that the revenue line is telling a plain story: this is an 8% grower until proven otherwise. Sequentially, the business is flattening around the low-$800M quarterly range rather than compounding rapidly, and software names with this growth profile usually need either stronger operating leverage or a clearer platform second act to earn a much higher multiple. The current ratio of 0.73 is also a reminder that this is not a fortress on every metric, even if debt is zero. And while insider activity here is just award grants rather than meaningful open-market buying or selling, the absence of purchases means insiders are not signaling obvious undervaluation. If the core e-signature product is drifting toward utility status, then 3.1x EV/revenue and 23.9x EV/EBITDA could be fair rather than cheap.
The best bear case is straightforward and respectable: DocuSign may be near its steady-state economics, not at the start of a new compounding phase. Revenue growth has decelerated from the pandemic era to high single digits, recent quarterly net income actually dipped from $90.3M in January 2026 to $78.2M in April 2026, and the company trades at 37x annual earnings for a business with sub-10% growth. If competitive pressure from broader workflow suites compresses pricing even modestly, the market could decide this deserves more like 2.5x sales or 20-25x normalized earnings, which would put the stock below $50. I weigh that risk less heavily because the cash flow statement says customers are still paying, the margin structure says the product still has value, and debt-free balance sheet optionality reduces downside severity. Mature software with $1B+ FCF and no leverage usually does not stay permanently mispriced at ~10x FCF unless deterioration becomes visible in bookings and retention, neither of which is evidenced here.
What would change my mind is not a story about AI or contract lifecycle management; it is numbers. If quarterly revenue falls below roughly $820M without seasonality explaining it, or if year-over-year growth slips to 5% or less while quarterly net margin drops back toward 6-7%, then I would read the current valuation as a value trap. Conversely, if DocuSign can print two or three quarters of reacceleration toward 10-12% revenue growth while sustaining $250M+ annualized operating income expansion and preserving a 30%+ FCF margin, then the stock deserves a rerating toward at least 4x sales, which supports a share price in the low-to-mid $60s. At $55, I think the market is still under-crediting the durability of the cash engine.
Grok Reading
The numbers that dominate this tape are free cash flow and the valuation disconnect around it. DocuSign generated $1.06B of FCF on $3.22B of revenue in FY2026 — a 33% FCF margin — with operating cash flow of $1.17B and only $106M of capex. That is elite cash conversion for any software business, let alone one trading at 3.08x EV/revenue and a 10% FCF yield on the $10.52B market cap. Annual revenue has compounded from $2.11B to $3.22B over four years, settling into a steady 8% CAGR with recent quarterly prints of $800.6M, $818.4M, $836.9M and $830.2M; the latest quarter is essentially flat sequentially and up roughly 8–9% year-on-year. Gross margin holds at 79.4%, operating margin has expanded to 9.3% from losses three years ago, and the balance sheet carries zero debt against $602M cash. The PE of 37x is a distorted artifact of the noisy earnings path (the $1.07B NI in FY2025 and the $888M quarterly spike in mid-2024 were clearly one-time inflated); cash earnings tell the real story. This is a mature, high-quality cash compounder that the market is still pricing like a faded growth story rather than a durable mid-teens ROIC business throwing off a billion dollars a year.
What stands out against the prior models is how cheap the enterprise multiple looks once you normalize for FCF quality. At 3.6x sales and 23.9x EV/EBITDA with no leverage, the stock sits well below typical profitable SaaS comps that grow at similar rates. The sequential revenue stutter in the April quarter and the “decelerating” tag are real, but they do not erase the fact that absolute dollar growth is still adding roughly $250M of revenue per year while FCF continues to scale. ROE of 16% and ROIC of 20% confirm capital is being deployed productively. Insider activity is pure equity awards — noise, not signal. The current ratio of 0.73 looks ugly until you remember deferred revenue is the culprit in subscription businesses; solvency is not the issue.
The strongest case against this read is straightforward: growth has structurally rolled over from the pandemic spike and shows no clear reacceleration path, so 37x earnings and even 10x FCF may still be too rich if the top line drifts toward 5% and Microsoft or Adobe further commoditize core e-signature. Recent revenue YoY of 8.2% and a flat-to-down sequential quarter support the skeptic view that CLM and broader IAM have not yet offset maturation of the signature franchise. Earnings CAGR looks spectacular only because of the trough-to-peak swing from losses; trailing twelve-month net income power is closer to $300M, and the FY2025 NI figure is not repeatable. Macro headwinds and “below sector benchmarks” secondary signals reinforce that this can easily re-rate lower toward 2.5x sales if growth disappoints another two quarters. I weigh this less heavily because the FCF yield already embeds a no-growth-to-low-growth outcome and still leaves a wide margin of safety; a 33% FCF margin business with zero debt does not need 15% growth to justify $55.
I would flip to a more cautious or outright fair-value stance if the next two quarters show revenue growth sustaining below 6% with FCF margins compressing under 28%, or if management signals material pricing pressure from platform competitors. Conversely, a print above 10% revenue growth with stable 30%+ FCF margins would push me to higher conviction undervalued.
Big-3 Panel — where each AI stands
Advanced Analysis Forensic deep-dive · separate lenses
The trajectory is unambiguous: revenue has scaled from $2.11B (FY22) to $3.22B (FY26) at a mid-teens then high-single-digit pace, while operating margin has swung from -2.9% to +9.3% and FCF has more than doubled to $1.06B. Gross margin sits at ~79% and is stable, which is characteristic of a durable SaaS gross-profit engine. OCF/NI of 1.1x, accruals at -18.4% of assets, and a Beneish M of -3.26 all point to clean earnings; the FY25 net income of $1.07B is inflated by a deferred tax benefit (FCF only $920M then $1.06B is the truer run-rate), but this is a quality-of-earnings nuance, not a manipulation flag. Balance sheet is self-funding: $602M cash, no net debt, and $1.06B in annual FCF means external capital is not needed. Dilution is well-contained: diluted share count went 196.7M to 210.3M over four years (~1.6% CAGR) and actually ticked down from 210.3M to 209.1M in the latest year, suggesting buybacks are now offsetting SBC - a meaningful discipline shift for a former growth-at-any-cost name. Altman Z of 2.95 (grey) is the one mildly soft mechanical read, reflecting an asset-light model rather than distress. What keeps this from a top-tier grade is the durability question the numbers cannot answer: revenue growth has decelerated from ~19% to ~7-8%, and the core e-signature market faces credible competitive pressure (Adobe, Dropbox Sign, native platform features). Insider activity is all sell-side (9 sales, 0 buys) though modest in size and consistent with routine post-award liquidation.
Verify before trusting this (6)
- Net revenue retention / dollar-based retention rate in 10-K to confirm stickiness
- SBC as a percent of revenue and buyback authorization/execution to confirm dilution discipline is structural
- Customer concentration and enterprise vs SMB mix
- Nature and durability of the FY25 deferred tax benefit that inflated GAAP net income to $1.07B
- IAM (Intelligent Agreement Management) product traction as evidence of platform expansion beyond e-signature
- Competitive positioning vs Adobe Sign and native platform e-signature offerings
The e2e composite fair value of $53.25 sits within 4% of the $55.09 price, and the signal-adjusted $59 implies just ~7% upside - that is textbook fairly valued, not a mispricing. The method spread is wide and instructive: DCF at $87 assumes the FCF ramp extrapolates, EPV floor at $11 says the steady-state earnings power alone justifies almost nothing, and the anchored P/E at $27 suggests peers/history would price this materially lower. Averaging these honestly, the market is paying for the transition already visible in the $1B+ FCF but not for heroic reacceleration.
Verify before trusting this (4)
- Billings and net dollar retention trajectory in next print - is growth stabilizing above 8% or drifting toward mid-single digits
- IAM (Intelligent Agreement Management) attach and revenue contribution - the reacceleration lever
- SBC as % of revenue and buyback pace vs dilution - the FCF-to-shareholder bridge
- Competitive commentary on Microsoft/Adobe pricing pressure in enterprise renewals
The market regime is mildly constructive (score +22, VIX 16, S&P barely off highs) and DOCU's 0.9 beta means the tape neither helps nor hurts much. There is no dominant story here - narrative intensity is explicitly minimal and cult coefficient is low, so the stock is not being pushed by momentum traders, meme flow, or a thematic bid. That is unusual for a former pandemic darling and it matters: the absence of narrative IS the sentiment condition. Fundamentals-wise the market is pricing steady cash generation, not an inflection, which caps upside enthusiasm but also removes the bear catalyst. Macro cross-currents are mixed but muted for this name. Rates at 4.68% and market PE 26.9 are a generic headwind for software multiples, but DOCU already trades near DCF fair value and isn't a long-duration story stock, so the rate sensitivity is dampened. Momentum readings are quietly positive (8% CAGR, 3yr acceleration, low vol) which is a mild tailwind that gets zero airtime because no analyst or narrative is amplifying it. Net: a stock the market has largely stopped arguing about, drifting on its own operating results rather than being pushed by external pressure.
Verify before trusting this (4)
- Any Microsoft or Adobe product announcement that could re-ignite the commoditization bear story
- Analyst target revisions or downgrades that would signal sell-side tone breaking
- Whether IVES / AI-agreement narrative gains traction and pulls DOCU into a thematic bid
- Next earnings reaction - a beat could awaken a dormant compounder story, a miss revives the 'maturing' bear
This lens hasn't been run for this ticker yet.
When we made this prediction on Aug 4, 2026, DOCU was $55.13. We expect it to be $63.00 by Feb 2027, and we consider it great value under $44.00. This is an early model (v0.6.0) — the direction is more reliable than the exact price. Made Aug 4, 2026.
Blue is our prediction, starting the day we made it. Grey is a slower route to the same place — the same destination, taking longer. Black is the actual price, so you can see how we are doing.