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What this page is: Delvantic's full research page for EQT Corporation (EQT) — AI-driven forensic equity research: mechanical valuation models (DCF, EPV, anchored-PE, scenario) plus three independent AI lenses (Quality / Value / Sentiment). Everything below is rendered server-side; you are not missing content that requires JavaScript. All scores are predictions and research opinions, not financial advice.
Our current read (analysis of 2026-10-08): Designation Low · Gem Score -21 (−100…+100 Quality+Value blend) · Quality 4 · Value -37 · Sentiment 47 (timing only, not weighted) · Composite fair value $67.39 vs $54.00 at analysis
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EQT Corporation
EQT NYSEEQT Corporation is a vertically integrated natural gas company focused on the exploration, production, gathering, and transmission of energy resources in the Appalachian Basin. EQT Corporation’s current operations center on supplying natural gas, natural gas liquids, and oil to marketers, utilities, and industrial customers, supported by gathering systems, pipeline infrastructure, and transmission assets. The company also provides marketing services, contractual pipeline capacity management, and risk management solutions that help coordinate the movement and sale of its production. With production and midstream activities concentrated in Pennsylvania, West Virginia, and Ohio, EQT Corporation plays a significant role in the U.S. natural gas supply chain and broader energy market.
Price Overview
Price History (1 Year)
Revenue & Net Income Trend
| Period | Revenue | Net Income | Net Margin | YoY/QoQ |
|---|
Key Metrics
EPS (Diluted): 3.31
Total Equity: $27.36B
Shares: 615,717,000
Total Debt: $7.80B
Cash: $110.80M
EBITDA: $5.85B
Total Debt: $7.80B
Cash: $110.80M
Revenue: $8.64B
Revenue: $8.64B
Revenue: $8.64B
Total Equity: $27.36B
Tax Rate: 21.9%
Equity: $27.36B
Total Debt: $7.80B
Cash: $110.80M
Current Liabilities: $2.48B
Long-Term Debt: $7.29B
Total Debt: $7.80B
Total Equity: $27.36B
Shares: 615,717,000
Shares: 615,717,000
CapEx: -$2.29B
Shares: 615,717,000
Stock Price: $54.00
Net Income: $2.04B
Industry Benchmarks
Income Statement (Annual)
Last updated: Aug 26, 2026 5:21am (43d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | $3.1B | $7.5B | $6.9B | $5.3B | $8.6B |
| Cost of Revenue | $1.9B | $2.1B | $2.2B | $1.9B | $1.5B |
| Gross Profit | $1.1B | $5.4B | $4.8B | $3.4B | $7.1B |
| Operating Expenses | $2.5B | $2.7B | $2.4B | $2.7B | $3.9B |
| Operating Income | -$1.4B | $2.7B | $2.3B | $685.3M | $3.2B |
| Net Income | -$1.2B | $1.8B | $1.7B | $230.6M | $2.0B |
| EBITDA | $315.7M | $4.4B | $4.0B | $2.8B | $5.9B |
| EPS | $-1.85 | $2.83 | $2.77 | $0.45 | $3.33 |
| EPS (Diluted) | $-1.85 | $2.58 | $2.56 | $0.45 | $3.31 |
Balance Sheet (Annual)
Last updated: Aug 26, 2026 5:00am (43d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cash & Equivalents | $114.0M | $1.5B | $81.0M | $202.1M | $110.8M |
| Total Current Assets | $2.3B | $4.0B | $2.0B | $1.7B | $1.9B |
| Total Assets | $21.6B | $22.7B | $25.3B | $39.8B | $41.8B |
| Current Liabilities | $5.1B | $3.7B | $2.0B | $2.5B | $2.5B |
| Long-Term Debt | $4.5B | $5.3B | $5.5B | $9.0B | $7.3B |
| Total Liabilities | $11.6B | $11.5B | $10.5B | $15.6B | $14.4B |
| Total Equity | $10.0B | $11.2B | $14.8B | $24.3B | $27.4B |
| Retained Earnings | -$115.8M | $1.3B | $2.7B | $2.6B | $4.2B |
Cash Flow (Annual)
Last updated: Aug 26, 2026 5:21am (43d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Operating Cash Flow | $1.7B | $3.5B | $3.2B | $2.8B | $5.1B |
| Capital Expenditure | -$1.1B | -$1.4B | -$2.0B | -$2.3B | -$2.3B |
| Free Cash Flow | $607.3M | $2.1B | $1.2B | $573.3M | $2.8B |
| Acquisitions (net) | -$1.0B | -$205.3M | -$2.3B | -$874.3M | -$483.5M |
| Net Debt Issued / (Repaid) | $845.7M | $83.0M | $234.2M | -$3.6B | -$1.4B |
| Dividends Paid | $0 | -$203.6M | -$228.3M | -$326.6M | -$389.6M |
| Stock Buybacks | -$12.9M | -$409.5M | -$201.0M | $0 | $0 |
| Net Change in Cash | $95.8M | $1.3B | -$1.4B | $121.1M | -$91.3M |
Growth Trends (YoY %)
Last updated: Aug 26, 2026 5:21am (43d ago)| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue Growth | +144.6% | -7.9% | -23.7% | +63.9% |
| Gross Profit Growth | +379.4% | -11.7% | -29.3% | +111.8% |
| Operating Income Growth | +299.7% | -14.8% | -70.4% | +374.2% |
| Net Income Growth | +253.2% | -2.0% | -86.7% | +784.4% |
| EBITDA Growth | +1,288.5% | -7.7% | -29.6% | +105.4% |
Dividend History (Last 20)
Last updated: Aug 25, 2026 7:44am (43d ago)| Date | Dividend | Declaration | Record | Payment |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-08-05 | $0.17 | — | — | — |
| 2026-05-06 | $0.17 | — | — | — |
| 2026-02-17 | $0.17 | — | — | — |
| 2025-11-05 | $0.17 | — | — | — |
| 2025-08-06 | $0.16 | — | — | — |
| 2025-05-07 | $0.16 | — | — | — |
| 2025-02-18 | $0.16 | — | — | — |
| 2024-11-06 | $0.16 | — | — | — |
| 2024-08-07 | $0.16 | — | — | — |
| 2024-05-07 | $0.16 | — | — | — |
| 2024-02-16 | $0.16 | — | — | — |
| 2023-11-07 | $0.16 | — | — | — |
| 2023-08-08 | $0.15 | — | — | — |
| 2023-05-09 | $0.15 | — | — | — |
| 2023-02-17 | $0.15 | — | — | — |
| 2022-11-08 | $0.15 | — | — | — |
| 2022-08-08 | $0.15 | — | — | — |
| 2022-05-10 | $0.13 | — | — | — |
| 2022-02-11 | $0.13 | — | — | — |
| 2020-02-13 | $0.03 | — | — | — |
Deep Analysis
Risk : Reward — upside vs downside from this company's own quarters
Computed 2026-09-16 02:02A +1σ run of quarters pays +356%; a −1σ run costs 83%. Ratio 4.3:1 (μ 32.6%, σ 66.4% , 14 pairs).
Older method (repeat-worst-quarter): 0.1 : 1
| Case | Growth | Margin | Fair value | vs price ($54.00) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Bull — recovery | -1% | 32.7% | $57.88 | +7% |
| Base — stabilizes | -1% | 28.4% | $50.01 | -7% |
| Bear — keeps slipping | -2% | 24.2% | $42.44 | -21% |
| Stress — last quarter repeats | -29% | 14.2% | $10.24 | -81% |
| Upside — a +1σ run of quarters (v2) | +50% | 31.3% | $246.15 | +356% |
| Stress — a −1σ run of quarters (v2) | -34% | 15.1% | $8.96 | -83% |
Narrative Economics
market-narrative step).
Growth Outlook
Analyzed 2026-08-26 06:00The question every valuation on this page silently assumes: is this company likely to grow? Judged forward — the business, its category, the world — against what's already printed.
Claude Reading
The raw numbers tell a cyclical story that the "high_growth_profitable" archetype badly mislabels. 2025 revenue of $8.64B and NI of $2.04B is a Henry Hub-driven peak, not a growth trajectory — 2024 NI was $230M, 2023 was $1.74B, 2022 was $1.77B, and 2021 was a $1.16B loss. The 784% earnings YoY and 56% FCF CAGR are artifacts of picking a trough base. Quarterly cadence confirms cyclicality: Q1 2026 posted $3.38B revenue and $1.49B NI (44% margin) on winter strip, then Q2 2026 collapsed to $1.81B revenue and $211M NI (11.7% margin). That's not deceleration — that's what a gas producer looks like when the curve normalizes. Annualizing the last two prints gets you closer to ~$10B revenue and ~$1.7B NI, or roughly $4.30/share, putting normalized P/E around 12–13x, not 16x.
The synthesis verdict of "$68 fair value, 26% upside" is where I most strongly dissent. Any DCF that treats 2025's $5.13B operating cash flow and $2.84B FCF as a run-rate is going to spit out a garbage-in number. At mid-cycle gas prices ($3.25–3.75 HH), EQT's FCF is closer to $1.5–2.0B, which on a $33.8B market cap and $7.8B debt ($41.6B EV) is a 4–5% FCF yield — fair, not cheap. EV/EBITDA of 6.9x is also mid-cycle-ish for Appalachian gas; peer AR and RRC trade in similar bands. The pre-flight note that the market implies ~$3.30/share normalized earnings is actually the honest read here, and it lands you at roughly current price. I side with the Market Forces "neutral" call and the narrative engine's "anchored / fragile" framing over the synthesis's $68 anchor.
The contrarian bull case does exist and isn't crazy: LNG export capacity is genuinely expanding (Plaquemines, Corpus Christi Stage 3, Rio Grande) through 2027, AI data center power demand is a real incremental gas call, and EQT's integrated midstream (post-Equitrans) gives it a structural cost advantage — sub-$2/Mcf breakevens are best-in-basin. If Henry Hub averages $4+ in 2026–27, EQT prints $3B+ FCF and the stock re-rates to $65–70. But that's an optionality argument, not a valuation argument, and it requires a commodity call I'm not willing to underwrite at 4.7x EV/revenue. The insider sale of 175K shares in August 2026, while not damning, does not suggest management sees the "21% discount" the DCF claims. Current ratio of 0.76 and $110M cash against $7.8B debt is manageable given operating cash flow but leaves zero room if strip collapses to $2.50.
Where the data is thin: the anonymized insider transactions ("?" filer) are essentially useless for signal, the 2026 dates suggest the file may be projected/forward-dated (verify), and there's no hedging disclosure — which for a gas producer is the single most important variable for 2026 earnings visibility. The "Below Sector Benchmarks" and "Low Revenue Confidence" secondary signals correctly capture what the growth-rate math obscures. I'd fade the synthesis's $68 print and land closer to $50–55 fair value on normalized mid-cycle assumptions, with $60+ requiring a sustained $4 HH environment. At $54, EQT is fairly valued for what it is: a well-run cyclical trading in the middle of its reasonable range, not a mispriced compounder. No edge long, no edge short.
GPT Reading
What jumps out first is how violently earnings power swings with gas prices, and why that makes the “high-growth profitable” label misleading. EQT did post a huge 2025 rebound: revenue rose to $8.64B from $5.27B in 2024, operating income to $3.25B from $685M, and net income to $2.04B from just $231M. Cash generation was real, not just accounting noise: operating cash flow hit $5.13B and free cash flow $2.84B after $2.29B of capex. On that backward-looking base, $54 does not look expensive at 16.3x earnings and 6.9x EV/EBITDA, especially for a scale gas producer with debt/equity only 0.29. But the quarterly line tells a more important story than the annual snapshot: revenue peaked at $3.38B in March 2026 with 44% net margins, then fell to $1.81B in June with margins down to 11.7%. That is not a business compounding cleanly; it is a commodity torque vehicle.
The core issue for valuation is that the market cap of $33.8B is being placed on top of earnings that have already shown they can compress fast. If I annualize the most recent quarter’s $211M net income, you get roughly $845M of earnings power, which would imply a P/E around 40x, not 16x. Even taking the last four quarters together, net income is about $3.16B, but that includes an obvious outlier quarter at $1.49B. The market is therefore capitalizing something closer to elevated cycle earnings while pretending it is buying a cheap value stock. The same distortion appears in sales multiples: 3.8x trailing revenue and 4.7x EV/revenue are not bargain levels for an upstream producer whose 2021 revenue was $3.06B, 2022 was $7.50B, 2023 slipped to $6.91B, and 2024 dropped to $5.27B before rebounding. That is not a stable top line deserving a premium revenue multiple.
I also don’t buy the balance-sheet alarmism embedded in some of the model commentary, but I don’t translate that into bullishness. Yes, cash is only $111M and the current ratio is 0.76, so near-term liquidity optics are not pretty. But this is not a distressed capital structure with $7.8B of debt against a business that just produced $5.13B of operating cash flow and $2.84B of free cash flow in 2025. The real risk is not refinancing panic; it is paying too much for cyclical cash flow at a moment when recent quarterly fundamentals are already normalizing downward. EQT looks like a very good operator in a hard-to-love asset class, and good operators in commodity businesses can still be overvalued when the tape extrapolates peak margins.
The strongest case against my caution is straightforward: if 2025 was not peak but the first inning of structurally tighter U.S. gas markets, then $54 is not demanding. On 2025 numbers, free cash flow yield is roughly 8.4% on the current market cap, book value is substantial at $27.4B, and the company has shown it can convert favorable pricing into extraordinary profitability. The quarterly volatility I’m emphasizing could just reflect timing, hedges, and seasonality rather than deterioration. A bull would also say that a 1.2x price/book multiple and sub-7x EV/EBITDA are entirely reasonable for a large-scale low-cost producer with integrated assets if LNG demand and power demand keep lifting the strip. I weigh that less heavily because the latest quarter already showed how fast the earnings machine cools when pricing or mix moves against you; a commodity producer trading on “normalized” earnings deserves a discount, not confidence that normalization will stay high.
What would change my mind is evidence that the March 2026 quarter was not a spike. If EQT can sustain quarterly revenue above $2.5B and net margins above 25% for the next two or three quarters, while keeping annual free cash flow comfortably above $2.5B and bringing debt down from $7.8B, then the current price would look too low. Conversely, if the next couple of quarters look more like June 2026 — around $1.8B of revenue and low-teens margins — then the stock is expensive on true mid-cycle earnings and should trade materially lower, more in the mid-$40s than the mid-$50s.
Grok Reading
EQT’s 2025 print—$8.64B revenue and $2.04B net income, against $5.27B and $231M the year before—looks like a cyclical windfall, not a new earnings regime. Operating cash flow of $5.13B and free cash flow of $2.84B on only $2.29B of capex are the real signal: the Appalachian machine converts gas price strength into cash at a high rate, and an 8-plus percent FCF yield at a $33.8B equity value / roughly $41.5B enterprise value is not expensive for a scaled low-cost producer. EV/EBITDA of 6.9x and a 1.21x book multiple reinforce that the market is not awarding a growth multiple. What stands out equally, though, is the mean-reversion already visible in the tape: Q1 2026’s $3.38B revenue and 44% net margin collapsed into Q2’s $1.81B and 11.7% margin. That is commodity reality, not execution failure. The rule-based “high_growth_profitable” label is a misfit; the 11.9% revenue CAGR and 63.9% recent revenue YoY are cycle math, and ROE/ROIC of roughly 7.5%/7.2% show mediocre capital returns once the gas price gift is stripped out. Cash of $111M against $7.8B of debt and a 0.76 current ratio is the balance-sheet soft spot, but D/E of 0.29 and multi-billion FCF make the “dangerously low interest coverage” flag in the synthesis overstated.
The prior valuation composite at $68–$72 (+26% from $54) is directionally right that the stock is not rich on mid-cycle cash generation, yet it overstates conviction. A 16.3x P/E on ~$3.26 of trailing EPS only looks moderate if 2025-style net income repeats; if earnings settle closer to the $1.0–1.5B zone that 2022–2024 history and the Q2 2026 run-rate imply, the multiple expands into the mid-20s or higher and the “discount” evaporates. Secondary signals—macro headwinds, below-sector benchmarks, low revenue confidence, decelerating quarterly trend—align with that risk. The narrative layer is honest: the bull case (LNG exports, data-center power, midstream integration) is contingent, the bear case (flat domestic gas demand, LNG capacity saturation, low price ceiling) is data-supported, and a moderate, fragile, low-cult narrative means there is no story premium to lean on. Insider activity is not alarming, but the August 2026 sale of 175k shares does not help the bull case. Net: at $54 the stock embeds rational skepticism rather than panic, and the cash-flow yield compensates for cyclicality better than the fully_priced label suggests—but the 26% upside targets bake in a friendlier gas strip than the latest quarter supports.
The strongest case against this read is straightforward. Skeptics will argue that $2.84B of FCF and 38% operating margins are peak-cycle artifacts; strip them toward 2024’s $685M operating income and the equity is no longer cheap. They will cite revenue swinging from $1.28B to $3.38B across recent quarters as proof that any DCF or composite fair value near $70 is speculative, that EV/revenue of 4.7x is demanding for a flat-to-down volume commodity business, and that structural U.S. gas demand plus LNG terminal constraints cap the upside that Appalachian bulls need. They will also note that a sub-1 current ratio and negligible cash leave little cushion if prices stay soft while maintenance capex continues. I weigh that case seriously—it is why conviction cannot be high—but I do not fully yield to it because leverage is modest, FCF still covers the debt stock in roughly three years even at haircut levels, the midstream-integrated cost position is real, and a 7x EV/EBITDA / ~8% FCF yield already prices a fair amount of that structural gloom. The market is cautious, not blind; paying $54 for durable low-cost inventory and optionality on any LNG/AI demand firming is a better risk-reward than the bear narrative’s “cheap for a reason, avoid” conclusion.
What would flip the verdict: sustained Henry Hub realizations that push trailing-twelve-month net income back through $2B with margins holding above ~25%, or a clean multi-quarter revenue base above ~$2.5B that proves 2025 was not a one-off—those would justify moving toward the $65–70 zone and raise conviction. Conversely, another two quarters of sub-$2B revenue and sub-15% net margins, FCF compression below ~$1.5B, or a refinancing/liquidity event against the thin cash balance would push the stock toward fair-to-overvalued at $54 and force a defensive stance.
Qwen Reading local experiment · off-panel
The number that should make any analyst pause is the Q2 2026 print: revenue collapsed 46% quarter-over-quarter from $3.38B to $1.81B, and net income fell 86% from $1.49B to $211.4M, with the margin compressing from 44% to 11.7%. That is not a "cyclical wobble." That is the commodity price environment that produced 2025's extraordinary $2.04B net income and 37.6% operating margin already reversing. The rule-based model slaps a "high_growth_profitable" label on this with 0.74 confidence, and I think that is the single most misleading output in the entire briefing. EQT is a Henry Hub price taker with Appalachian wells and a midstream pipeline. Its 11.9% revenue CAGR is a price artifact, not a volume story. The 784% earnings YoY growth is a recovery from 2024's $230.6M trough, not a trajectory. Calling this a growth stock is like calling a wheat farmer a tech company because the harvest was good.
The valuation math gets distorted by that misclassification. At $54 and a $33.78B market cap, the 16.25x P/E looks reasonable until you realize it is anchored to 2025, which is the peak year in the five-year window. Strip out 2025 and the 2022-2023 earnings cluster sits at roughly $1.75B. At that normalized level, EQT trades at about 19x, which is not a discount for a commodity producer with zero pricing power, a 0.76 current ratio, and a business whose quarterly margins can swing from 44% to 12% in a single quarter. The EV/EBITDA of 6.9x is mid-pack for Appalachian E&Ps, not the 4-5x you'd want for a genuine value entry. The valuation synthesis model's $68-72 composite fair value is almost certainly built on 2025 earnings as the base case, which the Q2 2026 data is already telling you is not the base case. I would put a more honest fair-value range at $42-52, which means the stock is at the top of that band, not the bottom.
The strongest case against my skepticism is the cash flow. $5.13B in operating cash flow against $2.29B of capex yields $2.84B in free cash flow, a 33% FCF margin that is genuinely impressive even for a peak year. The balance sheet is not the "dangerously low interest coverage" the valuation flags suggest: $7.80B of debt against $27.36B of equity (D/E of 0.285) with over $5B in annual operating cash flow is a comfortable position, and the 19% payout ratio means the company is retaining the vast majority of earnings for reinvestment and debt paydown. The midstream gathering and transmission assets do provide a revenue floor that pure E&Ps lack, and the 82% gross margin in 2025 reflects real operational cost discipline. A smart opponent would also point to the structural demand tailwinds—LNG export terminal buildout, data-center power demand, coal-to-gas displacement—and argue that 2025's earnings level is the new floor, not the ceiling. I weigh that argument, but I note that the Q2 2026 margin compression to 11.7% suggests the "new floor" is already lower than 2025's "new ceiling," and the narrative layer's own assessment of "fragile" durability and "cyclical-late-stage" positioning is more honest than the bull case.
The insider data adds a small but real yellow flag. The April 2026 cluster of four 66,666-share awards (roughly 266K shares total) was followed by sales of 98K shares in early June and a 175K-share sale on August 14. That is roughly 273K shares sold in the last three months, about $14.7M at $54. Against a $33.8B market cap it is noise, but the pattern—sell the grant, then sell more—tells you insiders are not accumulating at $54. They are distributing. That is not a red flag in a vacuum, but it is a data point that the people who know the well-by-well economics best are not betting their own capital on the current price being a discount.
What would flip me: a Q3 2026 (September) print showing revenue back above $2.5B with margins recovering to 25%+ would tell me the Q2 dip was a one-quarter gas price blip rather than a structural fade, and I would revise my fair-value range upward. A sustained Henry Hub above $3.75/MMBtu through the 2026-27 heating season, combined with announced LNG export volume growth beyond current terminal capacity, would validate the "new floor" thesis. Conversely, if Q3 revenue comes in below $1.8B or margins stay under 15%, the 2025 earnings level was a peak, the 16x P/E is actually 25x+ on normalized earnings, and the stock has meaningful downside toward the low $40s.
Big-3 Panel — where each AI stands
Advanced Analysis Forensic deep-dive · separate lenses
EQT is a large US natural gas producer showing the classic commodity-cyclical signature: revenue swinging from $3.06B (2021) to $7.50B (2022) to $5.27B (2024) to $8.64B (2025), with operating margin oscillating from -44.4% to +37.6% across the same span. The 2025 print is genuinely strong -- $8.64B revenue, 82.3% gross margin, 37.6% operating margin, $2.04B net income and $2.84B FCF -- and earnings quality mechanics are clean (OCF/NI 3.42x, accruals -8% of assets, Beneish M -2.51). The company self-funds from operations and buybacks (182% of SBC) more than offset the modest 0.7%-of-revenue stock comp, with diluted share count actually down slightly (CAGR -0.4%). The concerns are structural rather than accounting. Net debt sits at roughly $7.7B against only $110.8M of liquid cash, and $507M of short-term debt exceeds cash on hand -- balance sheet is a constraint, not a cushion, and Altman Z of 1.99 lands in the grey zone. Volatility in operating margin (13% in 2024 vs 37.6% in 2025) confirms EQT does not control its own P&L; Henry Hub does. Net income collapsed 87% from 2023 ($1.74B) to 2024 ($230.6M) on a modest revenue decline, showing severe operating leverage in the wrong direction. Insider tape is not encouraging on the margin: Toby Rice sold $9.6M in the strongest year, zero open-market buys. Not a red flag alone, but no conviction signal either. Overall: a well-run, cash-generative gas producer with intact accounting and disciplined share count, sitting on meaningful leverage in a price-taker industry.
Verify before trusting this (5)
- Debt maturity ladder and covenants -- how much of the $507M short-term debt is refinanced vs due in cash
- Hedging book: what % of 2026-2027 production is hedged and at what prices
- Realized natural gas price vs Henry Hub and unit cash cost per Mcfe to gauge cost-curve position
- Any Equitrans/pipeline acquisition impacts on 2025 revenue jump vs organic volume growth
- Reserve replacement ratio and PV-10 disclosure for durability of the asset base
The composite fair value of $71.96 and signal-adjusted $68.28 imply ~26% upside, but the components disagree violently: DCF $40.78, EPV floor $23.06, anchored P/E $134.92. The P/E anchor is a runaway output — it is capitalizing a cyclical trough/peak earnings figure and should be heavily discounted. Weighting the cash-based methods (DCF and EPV) more honestly puts deserved value in the $35-$55 range, with the anchored composite stretching it toward $65-$70 only if you believe mid-cycle gas prices normalize higher. Against a $54 price, that is essentially fair, not cheap. What's priced in: a gas price recovery driven by LNG exports and AI power demand, continued low-cost execution, and the $7.7B net debt getting worked down without a Henry Hub relapse. That is a plausible bull case, not a heroic one — but it is largely in the tape. The 2024 net income collapse to $230.6M shows how quickly the earnings base evaporates when gas prices weaken, and there is no cash cushion to absorb another leg down. Earnings quality is clean, which supports the deserved value, but does not create a discount. Solid business, reasonable price, no dislocation.
Verify before trusting this (5)
- Realized gas price assumptions and hedging book for 2025-2026
- Mid-cycle Henry Hub embedded in sell-side models vs current strip
- Debt paydown schedule and covenant headroom
- Midstream cash flow contribution post-Equitrans integration
- Capex intensity and free cash flow breakeven gas price
The pressure on EQT right now is net positive and coming almost entirely from narrative flow. Recent headlines are stacking the exact bull triggers the market wants to hear on a nat-gas E&P: an earnings beat driven by higher realized gas prices, explicit data-center power demand, LNG export pull, and a 10-year gas contract framed as proof the shares are 'undervalued.' That is a coherent, on-trend AI/power story landing on a name the tape is already predisposed to reward, and momentum (63.9% recent vs 11.9% long-term) shows the flow is real, not hypothetical. The macro tape is a mild positive: VIX 15.5, S&P barely off highs, risk-on regime. With a 0.58 beta, EQT barely feels macro cross-currents in either direction, so the higher-rates/stretched-PE headwind is muted here and the narrative dominates. The offset is that the archetype is 'cyclical-late-stage' with 'fragile' durability and low cult coefficient - meaning this tailwind can flip fast on a warm winter print, an LNG-capacity headline, or a gas price roll. But right now, today, the press is upward.
Verify before trusting this (4)
- Winter weather forecasts and Henry Hub strip - a warm outlook would crack the demand story fast
- LNG export capacity headlines or delays at Gulf terminals
- Sell-side target revisions following the earnings beat and 10-year deal
- Whether the 'AI power demand' narrative broadens or fatigues across the energy cohort
Natural gas is the one hydrocarbon with a genuine demand-side story right now: US LNG export capacity is still ramping toward the back half of the decade, and data-center electrification is adding firm power load in exactly the PJM footprint EQT feeds. That converts Appalachia from a stranded-supply basin into a demand-adjacent one, which is the single most important structural change for EQT versus the 2020-2023 period. The counterweight is that shale gas supply is the most elastic in the world — every price signal invites Haynesville and associated gas back, capping the upside and keeping the category's long-run revenue CAGR negative. So the world read is: volumes and utilization improve durably; realized price does not compound. That splits the ladder — operational growth is real near-term, structural growth reverts to volume-plus-inflation at best.
When we made this prediction on Aug 26, 2026, EQT was $55.30. We expect it to be $55.00 by Feb 2027, and we consider it great value under $42.00. This is an early model (v0.6.0) — the direction is more reliable than the exact price. Made Aug 26, 2026.
Blue is our prediction, starting the day we made it. Grey is a slower route to the same place — the same destination, taking longer. Black is the actual price, so you can see how we are doing.