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What this page is: Delvantic's full research page for Halliburton Company (HAL) — AI-driven forensic equity research: mechanical valuation models (DCF, EPV, anchored-PE, scenario) plus three independent AI lenses (Quality / Value / Sentiment). Everything below is rendered server-side; you are not missing content that requires JavaScript. All scores are predictions and research opinions, not financial advice.
Our current read (analysis of 2026-09-22): Designation Low · Gem Score -23 (−100…+100 Quality+Value blend) · Quality 4 · Value -41 · Sentiment -6 (timing only, not weighted) · Composite fair value $43.24 vs $35.49 at analysis
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profile-header/price-overview— company profile, live quote, market capextended-analysis— the core: three AI lens reads with findings, scores, and the analyst memofuture-predictions— our forward price-band predictionsmarket-narrative/ai-findings/gpt-critique— narrative context, cross-model findings, and an adversarial critique of our own analysis (near the end of the document)- Members-only sections (render as login gates for anonymous readers):
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Halliburton Company
HAL NYSEHalliburton Company is a global oilfield services company that provides products and services for the energy industry. Its business is centered on supporting upstream oil and gas customers across the well lifecycle, from locating hydrocarbons and evaluating reservoirs to drilling, completing, and producing wells. The company operates through two main segments: Completion and Production, and Drilling and Evaluation. These segments include services such as cementing, stimulation, intervention, artificial lift, pressure control, drilling fluids, directional drilling, wireline, perforating, and digital subsurface solutions. Halliburton Company serves national oil companies, major integrated energy companies, and independent producers worldwide, making it an important supplier of technical expertise, field execution, and specialized equipment in the global energy market.
Price Overview
Price History (1 Year)
Revenue & Net Income Trend
| Period | Revenue | Net Income | Net Margin | YoY/QoQ |
|---|
Key Metrics
EPS (Diluted): 1.50
Total Equity: $10.51B
Shares: 853,000,000
Total Debt: $7.16B
Cash: $2.21B
EBITDA: $3.40B
Total Debt: $7.16B
Cash: $2.21B
Revenue: $22.18B
Revenue: $22.18B
Revenue: $22.18B
Total Equity: $10.51B
Tax Rate: 27.0%
Equity: $10.51B
Total Debt: $7.16B
Cash: $2.21B
Current Liabilities: $5.59B
Long-Term Debt: $7.16B
Total Debt: $7.16B
Total Equity: $10.51B
Shares: 853,000,000
Shares: 853,000,000
CapEx: -$1.25B
Shares: 853,000,000
Stock Price: $35.49
Net Income: $1.28B
Industry Benchmarks
Income Statement (Annual)
Last updated: Aug 28, 2026 1:51am (25d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | $15.3B | $20.3B | $23.0B | $22.9B | $22.2B |
| Cost of Revenue | — | — | — | — | — |
| Gross Profit | — | — | — | — | — |
| Operating Expenses | — | — | — | — | — |
| Operating Income | $1.8B | $2.7B | $4.1B | $3.8B | $2.3B |
| Net Income | $1.5B | $1.6B | $2.6B | $2.5B | $1.3B |
| EBITDA | $2.7B | $3.6B | $5.1B | $4.9B | $3.4B |
| EPS | $1.63 | $1.74 | $2.93 | $2.84 | $1.50 |
| EPS (Diluted) | $1.63 | $1.73 | $2.92 | $2.83 | $1.50 |
Balance Sheet (Annual)
Last updated: Aug 28, 2026 1:30am (25d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cash & Equivalents | $3.0B | $2.3B | $2.3B | $2.6B | $2.2B |
| Total Current Assets | $9.9B | $11.0B | $11.5B | $12.4B | $11.4B |
| Total Assets | $22.3B | $23.3B | $24.7B | $25.6B | $25.0B |
| Current Liabilities | $4.3B | $5.3B | $5.6B | $6.1B | $5.6B |
| Long-Term Debt | $9.1B | $7.9B | $7.6B | $7.2B | $7.2B |
| Total Liabilities | $15.6B | $15.3B | $15.3B | $15.0B | $14.5B |
| Total Equity | $6.7B | $8.0B | $9.4B | $10.5B | $10.5B |
| Retained Earnings | $9.7B | $10.6B | $12.5B | $14.3B | $15.0B |
Cash Flow (Annual)
Last updated: Aug 28, 2026 1:51am (25d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Operating Cash Flow | $1.9B | $2.2B | $3.5B | $3.9B | $2.9B |
| Capital Expenditure | -$799.0M | -$1.0B | -$1.4B | -$1.4B | -$1.3B |
| Free Cash Flow | $1.1B | $1.2B | $2.1B | $2.4B | $1.7B |
| Acquisitions (net) | — | — | -$13.0M | -$27.0M | -$185.0M |
| Net Debt Issued / (Repaid) | -$700.0M | -$1.2B | -$305.0M | -$100.0M | -$389.0M |
| Dividends Paid | — | — | — | — | — |
| Stock Buybacks | $0 | -$250.0M | -$800.0M | -$1.0B | -$1.0B |
| Net Change in Cash | $481.0M | -$698.0M | -$82.0M | $354.0M | -$412.0M |
Growth Trends (YoY %)
Last updated: Aug 28, 2026 1:51am (25d ago)| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue Growth | +32.7% | +13.4% | -0.3% | -3.3% |
| Gross Profit Growth | — | — | — | — |
| Operating Income Growth | +50.4% | +50.8% | -6.4% | -40.9% |
| Net Income Growth | +7.9% | +67.8% | -5.2% | -48.7% |
| EBITDA Growth | +34.9% | +39.3% | -3.5% | -30.7% |
Dividend History (Last 20)
Last updated: Aug 28, 2026 1:30am (25d ago)| Date | Dividend | Declaration | Record | Payment |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-06-03 | $0.17 | — | — | — |
| 2026-03-04 | $0.17 | — | — | — |
| 2025-12-03 | $0.17 | — | — | — |
| 2025-09-03 | $0.17 | — | — | — |
| 2025-06-04 | $0.17 | — | — | — |
| 2025-03-05 | $0.17 | — | — | — |
| 2024-12-04 | $0.17 | — | — | — |
| 2024-09-04 | $0.17 | — | — | — |
| 2024-06-05 | $0.17 | — | — | — |
| 2024-03-05 | $0.17 | — | — | — |
| 2023-12-06 | $0.16 | — | — | — |
| 2023-09-05 | $0.16 | — | — | — |
| 2023-06-06 | $0.16 | — | — | — |
| 2023-02-28 | $0.16 | — | — | — |
| 2022-12-07 | $0.12 | — | — | — |
| 2022-09-06 | $0.12 | — | — | — |
| 2022-05-31 | $0.12 | — | — | — |
| 2022-03-01 | $0.12 | — | — | — |
| 2021-12-08 | $0.05 | — | — | — |
| 2021-08-31 | $0.05 | — | — | — |
Deep Analysis
Risk : Reward — upside vs downside from this company's own quarters
Computed 2026-09-12 02:02A +1σ run of quarters pays +9%; a −1σ run costs 78%. Ratio 0.1:1 (μ 0.9%, σ 17.4% floored by sector, 16 pairs).
Older method (repeat-worst-quarter): -0.4 : 1
| Case | Growth | Margin | Fair value | vs price ($35.49) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Bull — recovery | +1% | 9.2% | $25.89 | -27% |
| Base — stabilizes | +1% | 8.0% | $22.54 | -36% |
| Bear — keeps slipping | +0% | 6.8% | $19.26 | -46% |
| Stress — last quarter repeats | -2% | 3.6% | $10.49 | -70% |
| Upside — a +1σ run of quarters (v2) | +18% | 7.9% | $38.84 | +9% |
| Stress — a −1σ run of quarters (v2) | -16% | 4.7% | $7.91 | -78% |
Narrative Economics
market-narrative step).
Growth Outlook
Analyzed 2026-08-28 02:01The question every valuation on this page silently assumes: is this company likely to grow? Judged forward — the business, its category, the world — against what's already printed.
Claude Reading
Looking at the raw quarterlies first: revenue is actually stabilizing, not collapsing. The last four prints are $5.51B → $5.66B → $5.40B → $5.71B — that's flat-to-up sequentially, and Q2'26 at $5.71B is the highest print in the series. The "recent revenue YoY -3.3%" masks that the bottom appears to be in. Net income tells a messier story: Q3'25 collapsed to $18M (almost certainly a one-time charge — impairment or restructuring — not operational), which is dragging every trailing metric. Strip that quarter and TTM NI is closer to $2.05B, not the $1.28B annual figure, putting normalized P/E around 14-15x rather than 23.6x. The "earnings CAGR -30.3%" and "recent earnings YoY -48.7%" figures are arithmetic artifacts of that single quarter comparison, not a trend. The Market Forces module calling this "uninvestable at any reasonable valuation" with a "projected 50% EPS decline" is wildly overwrought — H1'26 NI of $995M annualizes to ~$2.0B, not a further 50% cut from an already-depressed base.
The balance sheet is fine, not stressed: $7.16B debt against $2.21B cash and $2.93B operating cash flow gives net debt/EBITDA around 1.7x, current ratio 2.04, ROIC 10.7% through a cyclical trough. FCF of $1.67B on a $29.6B market cap is a 5.6% FCF yield, and capex at $1.25B is ~5.6% of revenue — reasonable for OFS. Dividend of 1.9% is well-covered. This isn't a broken company; it's a cyclical trading at trough earnings. The synthesis composite of $42.97 pre-signal-adjustment is probably closer to right than the signal-adjusted $34.91, because the signal adjustment is being poisoned by the same one-quarter noise. Fair value on normalized $2.0-2.2B earnings at a defensible 15-16x multiple is $30-35B market cap, or roughly $36-42/share — putting current price at the low end of fair, not overvalued.
The contrarian bear case that actually has teeth (not the "uninvestable" hyperbole) is structural: North American frac is a commoditized, oversupplied market where Halliburton competes with private capacity that keeps returning after every cycle; international growth was the bull thesis and Saudi rig count cuts in 2024 gutted it; and completions intensity per well is plateauing as operators consolidate and demand efficiency over volume. Peer SLB trades at similar multiples with better international mix. The insider activity — three sales in two days in August 2026 totaling ~193K shares with zero buys — is not "neutral"; it's a mild negative signal, though small in dollar terms and possibly programmatic. The narrative module's read that "energy transition risk is priced in" is probably right — this stock hasn't been a growth story for a decade and doesn't pretend to be.
I dissent from Market Forces (which is catastrophizing off noisy metrics) and largely agree with the Synthesis fair-value verdict, though I'd anchor higher — closer to $38-40 than $35 — because the composite is being dragged down by signal adjustments reading Q3'25 as trend. This is a cyclical bottom trade with acceptable downside (10-15% to prior lows around $30) and modest upside (15-25% to $42-44) if 2026 continues the sequential revenue improvement visible in the last two prints. Not a table-pound, not a short. The thin spot in the data: no gross margin disclosed, no segment breakdown between Completion & Production vs. Drilling & Evaluation, and no visibility into international backlog which is what actually determines 2026-27 earnings trajectory. Without those, conviction can't exceed 3.
GPT Reading
What stands out is not a collapsing franchise but a business whose earnings power got hit sharply in 2025 and has only partially recovered, while the stock is already priced close to normalized value. Revenue has actually been remarkably stable: the last eight quarters sit in a narrow $5.40B-$5.71B band, and annual sales were $23.02B in 2023, $22.94B in 2024, and $22.18B in 2025. That is a mild top-line fade, not a structural break. The problem is margin volatility. Net income fell from $2.64B in 2023 to $2.50B in 2024 and then to $1.28B in 2025, with quarterly net margin swinging from 11.0% in 4Q24 to 3.8% in 1Q25 and an absurdly weak 0.3% in 3Q25 before rebounding to 10.4% in 4Q25 and 9.3% in 2Q26. So the market’s 23.6x P/E is not paying for a consistent 2025 business; it is paying through a trough and assuming something closer to the recent run rate is sustainable.
Using that framing, the valuation looks roughly full rather than cheap. The last four quarters of net income sum to about $1.60B, which annualizes the recovery better than the depressed FY2025 number, and that would imply a forward-ish earnings multiple closer to 18x-19x on today’s $29.6B market cap. Free cash flow of $1.67B in 2025 gives only about a 5.6% FCF yield, acceptable but not compelling for a cyclical oilfield services name with negative 3-year revenue CAGR and much worse earnings CAGR. EV/EBITDA at 10.4x and EV/revenue at 1.59x are not distressed multiples; they assume Halliburton can defend double-digit operating economics despite a latest annual operating margin of just 10.2%, down hard from 17.7% in 2023 and 16.7% in 2024. Balance sheet risk is manageable—$7.16B debt against $2.21B cash and $10.51B equity is fine, current ratio above 2x is healthy—but that just removes downside tail risk; it does not create upside.
I also think one of the supplied signals overstates the bearishness. “Catastrophic margin compression” is too dramatic given the actual quarterly sequence. Yes, 2025 was ugly, but 4Q25, 1Q26, and 2Q26 already show net income of $589M, $461M, and $534M on essentially flat revenue, which suggests the business can still generate high-single-digit to low-double-digit net margins when conditions normalize. That is exactly why the stock has held in the mid-$30s despite the ugly 2025 print. But the opposite model error is to look at that stabilization and call the shares undervalued. If revenues are flat to down, and the best case is mostly a margin recovery back toward 2024 territory, then a lot of the thesis is multiple support from “normalized earnings,” not genuine growth. For a mature service company facing macro headwinds, I do not want to pay nearly 19x on recovered earnings for a business that earned $2.50B in 2024 but only $1.67B of free cash flow in 2025.
The best case against my read is straightforward: 2025 may have been the trough, and the stock looks cheap if you underwrite a return even partway toward 2023-2024 profitability. On 2024 net income of $2.50B, today’s market cap is only about 11.8x earnings; on 2023 operating income of $4.08B, the enterprise value could look quite reasonable. Recent quarterly revenues are improving sequentially from $5.40B to $5.71B through the first half of 2026, and recent net income is running well above the weak 2025 average. Cash generation also held up better than earnings, with $2.93B operating cash flow and $1.67B free cash flow in 2025, which supports the idea that the earnings slump had transitory or non-cash elements. If North American activity stabilizes and international work remains resilient, then this could be one of those cyclical names where the headline P/E looks expensive right before EPS snaps back.
What would change my mind is evidence that the 2026 recovery is durable enough to re-establish 2024-like economics. Concretely, if Halliburton can deliver two or three more quarters with revenue at or above $5.7B and net margins sustainably above 9.5%-10%, I would start underwriting at least $2.0B-$2.2B of annual earnings power and see upside from $35 toward the low-$40s. Conversely, if revenue stays stuck around $5.4B-$5.6B and margins slide back into the mid-single digits, then the current price is too generous and the stock belongs below $30. The near-term debate is not about survival or balance sheet stress; it is about whether 2025 was a one-year margin pothole or the start of a lower-return regime. Right now, the shares price in too much of the rebound for me to call them cheap.
Grok Reading
Halliburton’s numbers describe a mature oilfield-services franchise whose top line has barely budged while profitability has been cut in half. Annual revenue slipped only from $23.02B in 2023 to $22.18B in 2025 (−1.8% CAGR), and the last eight quarters still cluster tightly between $5.40B and $5.71B; this is not a demand collapse. What broke is the margin structure: operating income fell from $4.08B to $2.26B and net income from $2.64B to $1.28B, producing the −30% earnings CAGR and the −48.7% recent earnings YoY print. The 2025-09 quarter ($18M NI, 0.3% margin) was the low-water mark; subsequent quarters have reclaimed 8.5–10.4% net margins, and 2026 H1 already delivered $995M of net income on $11.11B of revenue—an annualized run-rate near $2B if the second half holds. Free-cash-flow quality remains the cleanest part of the story: $2.93B operating cash and $1.67B FCF against only $1.25B of capex, a 5.6% FCF yield on the $29.57B equity value, net debt of roughly $5.0B, and a current ratio of 2.04. At $35.49 the stock screens at 23.6× trailing earnings, 10.4× EV/EBITDA and 1.36× sales—multiples that look rich on 2025 trough profits but ordinary if the 2026 run-rate is sustainable.
The valuation-synthesis composite of $42.97 before the headwind haircut, versus the signal-adjusted $34.91 that sits 1.6% below the current price, is therefore the right tension to resolve. I side with the unadjusted anchor. Revenue stability plus sequential margin repair implies the market is already capitalizing a mid-cycle earnings base closer to $2B than to the depressed $1.28B, which would put the forward multiple nearer 15× and EV/EBITDA in the high single digits—levels that have historically marked fair-to-cheap territory for HAL in prior cycle troughs. Insider sales of roughly 193k shares in mid-August 2026 are visible but small relative to float and do not override the cash-generation picture. The “steady-compounder / fundamentals-anchored” narrative layer is consistent with the tape: the stock is trading within a couple of percent of DCF value, not on energy-transition mythology or super-cycle euphoria.
The strongest contrary case is the Market Forces verdict of “catastrophic margin compression” and structural industry deterioration. A skeptic would note that operating margin has already compressed from the mid-teens to ~10%, that FCF itself is declining at a 10% CAGR, that ROE of 12.2% and ROIC of 10.7% are only adequate for a capital-intensive cyclicals business, and that a 23.6× P/E on any further earnings disappointment leaves no margin of safety. Energy-transition budget shifts and North American drilling efficiency could keep completion and production-services pricing under permanent pressure, turning the recent 8–9% net-margin recovery into a temporary dead-cat bounce rather than mean reversion. If that path materializes, the $42.97 composite is fantasy and even $35 is too high. I weigh that risk as real but already partially discounted: the stock sits in the lower half of its $21–$44 range, the balance sheet is not stretched (D/E 0.68), and the absolute dollar of FCF still covers the dividend and leaves surplus. Structural decline would show up first as sub-$20B revenue and sub-$1B FCF; neither is evident yet.
I would flip to outright bearish if two consecutive quarters print net margins back below 4% or if trailing-twelve-month revenue breaks $20B on the downside with FCF under $1.2B. I would become table-pounding bullish if 2026 full-year net income clears $2.2B and North American rig and completion activity stabilizes enough to push operating margin back toward 14%. Until those prints arrive, the stock is a modestly cheap cyclical, not a value trap and not a compounder.
Big-3 Panel — where each AI stands
Advanced Analysis Forensic deep-dive · separate lenses
Halliburton is a mature, self-funding oilfield services business generating $1.67B FCF on $22.18B revenue in 2025, with a five-year OCF/NI of 1.57x and negative accruals (-4% of assets) — the mechanical earnings-quality picture is clean and Altman Z of 3.53 sits in the safe zone. Management is a net buyer of its own stock, taking diluted share count from 908M (2022) to 853M (2025), a -1.1% CAGR that quietly compounds per-share value. Balance sheet carries roughly $4.95B net debt against $2.21B liquid cash — manageable given FCF but not a fortress cushion in a cyclical industry. The concerning fact in the raw tape is the 2025 reversal: operating margin collapsed from 17.7% (2023) and 16.7% (2024) to 10.2%, and net income nearly halved from $2.50B to $1.28B on revenue that also slipped from $22.94B to $22.18B. This is characteristic North American pressure-pumping cyclicality, not obvious accounting stress (FCF actually rose to $1.67B as working capital released), but it exposes the lack of durable pricing power. Insider tape shows only sales (CEO Miller sold $4.4M in Aug 2026), which is not alarming for a mature-earner comp plan but offers no confirming buy signal.
Verify before trusting this (5)
- Cause of 2025 operating margin compression — pricing, mix, or one-time charges in the 10-K MD&A
- Customer/geographic concentration, especially North America land pressure pumping exposure
- Debt maturity schedule and covenant terms against the $4.95B net debt
- Whether 2025 buyback pace was sustained despite lower earnings, and remaining authorization
- Segment-level operating income trend (Completion & Production vs Drilling & Evaluation)
The composite fair value of $42.97 looks optimistic once you strip out the anchored-PE of $66.47, which is clearly a runaway output for a cyclical services name whose 2025 operating margin swung 750bp lower on flat revenue. The more defensible anchors are the DCF at $37.99 and the EPV floor at $29.42, which bracket the current $35.49 price almost perfectly. The signal-adjusted FV of $34.91 says the same thing: this is priced. Quality is solid but not premium - clean earnings, buybacks, ~$5B net debt, but thin pricing power and full E&P capex sensitivity. That profile deserves a mid-cycle multiple, not a premium. With price 2% ABOVE signal-adjusted FV and only ~10% below the DCF, there is no gap to exploit - you are paying for the business you are getting. Bull case requires a sustained completions upcycle; bear case (energy transition, offshore mix shift, margin compression) is live and already showing up in 2025 numbers. Neither is decisively priced in, which is the definition of fair.
Verify before trusting this (4)
- North America completions pricing and frac fleet utilization trends in next quarterly guidance
- International segment margin trajectory and offshore backlog conversion
- Capex and buyback cadence given ~$5B net debt
- Any one-time charges or impairments embedded in the 2025 margin drop
Sentiment pressure on HAL is muted in both directions. The archetype is a steady-compounder with minimal narrative intensity and low cult following, so there is no hot story bidding it up and no active de-rating breaking it down. With beta 0.75 the mildly risk-on tape (VIX 14.5, S&P near highs) barely reaches this name - it neither benefits from the melt-up in high-beta growth nor suffers acute macro stress. The 72-hour news flow is modestly constructive: a headline BP integrated contract for the Bumerangue deepwater appraisal in Brazil validates HAL's positioning in premium offshore work and cuts against the 'legacy asset in decline' bear frame. Countering that is the persistent energy-transition overhang and a sector that global generalist money continues to underweight, which caps enthusiasm even on good news. Net: a slight positive news pulse inside a durable-but-sleepy narrative, sitting in a tape that neither rewards nor punishes it much.
Verify before trusting this (4)
- OPEC+ signaling and crude tape - a sharp oil selloff would swamp the positive contract narrative
- Analyst target revisions post BP-Bumerangue award - any upgrades would shift the tone
- North American frac activity commentary from peers (SLB, BKR) that could confirm or crack the pricing-power story
- Any generalist rotation into energy on inflation reacceleration - would meaningfully lift the whole cohort
The world is not abandoning oilfield services; it is de-rating their volume growth. Operators have converted the shale era into a maintenance-and-efficiency era: fewer, longer, faster wells, flat budgets, and relentless pressure on service pricing. That makes the category a low-single-digit shrinker rather than a cliff, and it rewards scale players who can substitute technology and equipment differentiation for price. HAL sits on the right side of that sort — recurring production work plus internationally weighted drilling exposure — which is why its revenue has flattened while the category still declines. But the same forces cap the upside: efficiency gains accrue to the customer, and there is no capex boom to lever. Energy transition is a slow discount rate on terminal value, not a near-term revenue event; the more binding constraint over two to three years is North American capacity oversupply and the absence of a sanctioning cycle large enough to restore prior-peak margins.
When we made this prediction on Aug 28, 2026, HAL was $36.14. We expect it to be $38.50 by Feb 2027, and we consider it great value under $29.00. This is an early model (v0.6.0) — the direction is more reliable than the exact price. Made Aug 28, 2026.
Blue is our prediction, starting the day we made it. Grey is a slower route to the same place — the same destination, taking longer. Black is the actual price, so you can see how we are doing.
Post-Report Due Diligence NOTES
Evidence for a closer look, not a verdict — no score or designation on this page has been changed by it. Items marked material are ones where a conclusion above moves to the other side of the price.
adjusted_earnings
flips up 25%
cost_of_capital
flips down 25%
shares
flips down 25%