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What this page is: Delvantic's full research page for Godaddy Inc. (GDDY) — AI-driven forensic equity research: mechanical valuation models (DCF, EPV, anchored-PE, scenario) plus three independent AI lenses (Quality / Value / Sentiment). Everything below is rendered server-side; you are not missing content that requires JavaScript. All scores are predictions and research opinions, not financial advice.
Our current read (analysis of 2026-10-07): Designation Watch · Gem Score -1 (−100…+100 Quality+Value blend) · Quality 48 · Value -34 · Sentiment -33 (timing only, not weighted) · Composite fair value $130.51 vs $99.81 at analysis
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profile-header/price-overview— company profile, live quote, market capextended-analysis— the core: three AI lens reads with findings, scores, and the analyst memofuture-predictions— our forward price-band predictionsmarket-narrative/ai-findings/gpt-critique— narrative context, cross-model findings, and an adversarial critique of our own analysis (near the end of the document)- Members-only sections (render as login gates for anonymous readers):
price-history,income-trend,key-metrics,financials(statement tables),insider-trading. The analysis above is public; the raw data tables require a free account.
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any ticker resolves at delvantic.com/stock/TICKER ·
raw inputs are public-company filings and market data (via licensed data feeds);
every model, score, lens read, and prediction on this page is Delvantic's own analysis.
Godaddy Inc.
GDDY NYSEGoDaddy Inc. Class A Common Stock represents the public equity of GoDaddy Inc., a technology company that provides cloud-based tools for building and managing an online presence. GoDaddy’s current offerings center on domain registration and renewals, website hosting, website security, and related internet services for individuals, small businesses, developers, and organizations. The company also provides applications and commerce solutions, including website-building tools, online store features, productivity tools, and email services, all designed to help customers create, operate, and grow digital properties on a single platform. Its business is organized around two segments: Core Platform, which covers domains, hosting, security, and registry-related services, and Applications and Commerce, which includes software-based and bundled digital products. GoDaddy plays a significant role in the small-business and self-service web-services market by combining essential infrastructure with user-friendly business tools.
Price Overview
Price History (1 Year)
Revenue & Net Income Trend
| Period | Revenue | Net Income | Net Margin | YoY/QoQ |
|---|
Key Metrics
EPS (Diluted): 6.22
Total Equity: $215.10M
Shares: 140,621,000
Total Debt: $3.78B
Cash: $1.08B
EBITDA: $1.24B
Total Debt: $3.78B
Cash: $1.08B
Revenue: $4.95B
Revenue: $4.95B
Revenue: $4.95B
Total Equity: $215.10M
Tax Rate: 14.2%
Equity: $215.10M
Total Debt: $3.78B
Cash: $1.08B
Current Liabilities: $3.00B
Long-Term Debt: $3.77B
Total Debt: $3.78B
Total Equity: $215.10M
Shares: 140,621,000
Shares: 140,621,000
CapEx: -$23.90M
Shares: 140,621,000
Stock Price: $99.45
Net Income: $875.00M
Industry Benchmarks
Income Statement (Annual)
Last updated: Aug 23, 2026 11:20pm (44d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | $3.8B | $4.1B | $4.3B | $4.6B | $5.0B |
| Cost of Revenue | $1.4B | $1.5B | $1.6B | $1.7B | $1.8B |
| Gross Profit | $2.4B | $2.6B | $2.7B | $2.9B | $3.1B |
| Operating Expenses | $2.1B | $2.1B | $2.1B | $2.0B | $2.0B |
| Operating Income | $382.1M | $498.8M | $547.4M | $893.5M | $1.1B |
| Net Income | $242.3M | $352.2M | $1.4B | $936.9M | $875.0M |
| EBITDA | $581.7M | $693.4M | $718.7M | $1.0B | $1.2B |
| EPS | — | — | $9.27 | $6.63 | $6.34 |
| EPS (Diluted) | — | — | $9.08 | $6.45 | $6.22 |
Balance Sheet (Annual)
Last updated: Aug 14, 2026 10:44am (54d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cash & Equivalents | $1.3B | $774.0M | $458.8M | $1.1B | $1.1B |
| Total Current Assets | $1.9B | $1.6B | $1.3B | $2.0B | $1.8B |
| Total Assets | $7.4B | $7.0B | $7.6B | $8.2B | $8.0B |
| Current Liabilities | $2.4B | $2.5B | $2.7B | $2.7B | $3.0B |
| Long-Term Debt | $3.9B | $3.8B | $3.8B | $3.8B | $3.8B |
| Total Liabilities | $7.3B | $7.3B | $7.5B | $7.5B | $7.8B |
| Total Equity | $83.2M | -$329.3M | $62.2M | $692.1M | $215.1M |
| Retained Earnings | -$1.5B | -$2.4B | -$2.3B | -$2.1B | -$2.8B |
Cash Flow (Annual)
Last updated: Aug 25, 2026 6:02pm (43d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Operating Cash Flow | $829.3M | $979.7M | $1.0B | $1.3B | $1.6B |
| Capital Expenditure | -$51.1M | -$59.7M | -$42.0M | -$26.6M | -$23.9M |
| Free Cash Flow | $778.2M | $920.0M | $1.0B | $1.3B | $1.6B |
| Acquisitions (net) | -$367.7M | -$72.5M | $0 | $0 | — |
| Net Debt Issued / (Repaid) | $767.6M | -$1.8B | -$1.8B | -$4.2B | -$24.6M |
| Dividends Paid | — | — | — | — | — |
| Stock Buybacks | -$526.0M | -$1.3B | -$1.3B | -$676.5M | -$1.6B |
| Net Change in Cash | $490.5M | -$481.7M | -$315.2M | $630.2M | -$8.1M |
Growth Trends (YoY %)
Last updated: Aug 23, 2026 11:20pm (44d ago)| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue Growth | +7.2% | +4.0% | +7.5% | +8.3% |
| Gross Profit Growth | +6.7% | +2.8% | +9.0% | +7.8% |
| Operating Income Growth | +30.5% | +9.7% | +63.2% | +26.2% |
| Net Income Growth | +45.4% | +290.3% | -31.9% | -6.6% |
| EBITDA Growth | +19.2% | +3.6% | +43.1% | +20.9% |
Deep Analysis
Risk : Reward — upside vs downside from this company's own quarters
Computed 2026-10-04 02:02A +1σ run of quarters pays +4%; a −1σ run costs 26%. Ratio 0.2:1 (μ 7.1%, σ 4.3% floored by sector, 16 pairs).
Older method (repeat-worst-quarter): 0.2 : 1
| Case | Growth | Margin | Fair value | vs price ($99.81) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Bull — recovery | +10% | 20.5% | $102.76 | +3% |
| Base — stabilizes | +7% | 17.8% | $81.78 | -18% |
| Bear — keeps slipping | +3% | 15.2% | $63.93 | -36% |
| Stress — last quarter repeats | +6% | 19.6% | $87.67 | -12% |
| Upside — a +1σ run of quarters (v2) | +11% | 19.6% | $103.53 | +4% |
| Stress — a −1σ run of quarters (v2) | +3% | 18.3% | $74.31 | -26% |
Narrative Economics
market-narrative step).
Growth Outlook
Analyzed 2026-08-25 18:10The question every valuation on this page silently assumes: is this company likely to grow? Judged forward — the business, its category, the world — against what's already printed.
Claude Reading
GoDaddy's raw quarterly print is more constructive than the "shrinking option set" framing suggests. Revenue moved from $1.15B (Q3'24) to $1.30B (Q2'26) — that's ~13% over seven quarters, with sequential acceleration in the most recent quarter ($1.27B → $1.30B, a real step-up after four flattish quarters). Net margin has held 16–19% and TTM net income runs ~$910M. FCF of $1.58B on $4.95B revenue is a 32% FCF margin — that is not a business in structural decline; that is a toll-booth. At $12.73B market cap plus $2.7B net debt, EV is ~$15.4B, so EV/FCF ≈ 9.7x. For a business compounding revenue ~8% with expanding operating margin (op income $498M → $1.13B over four years, a 2.3x rise on 21% revenue growth), that multiple is cheap in absolute terms, not just relative.
The prior models are internally inconsistent and I'd flag it. Market Forces calls this a "value trap" with "structural deterioration" — but where is the deterioration in the numbers? Revenue is accelerating, not decelerating (Q2'26 YoY is 8.3% and the sequential jump is the largest in the series). Gross margin held at 63.6%. Operating margin expanded from 9.4% in 2022 to 22.8% in 2025. The Thesis Evaluation's -6 score leans heavily on "competitive obsolescence in high-margin adjacencies" — a story that should show up as either margin compression or revenue deceleration, and neither is present. Meanwhile Valuation Synthesis says +4.5% upside and Narrative says -4.3% to DCF; these are essentially "fairly valued" verdicts that contradict the bearish Market Forces read. The Pre-Flight anchor of "PE 16x vs software 25x" is the cleanest observation in the pile.
A careful contrarian bear would note: (1) earnings CAGR is -20.2% — the 2023 NI of $1.37B was inflated by a tax benefit, so the "decline" is optical, but a naive screener sees it; (2) book equity is $215M against $3.78B debt — the D/E of 17.6x and current ratio of 0.61 mean zero cushion if FCF hiccups, and interest expense is a real cap on EPS growth; (3) insider activity shows sales after awards, not open-market buying — neutral at best; (4) the 52-week drop from ~$150 to $99 implies the market saw something (likely a soft guide or Applications & Commerce segment miss) that isn't visible in aggregate quarterly revenue. The bear case isn't "GoDaddy is dying" — it's "AI-native site builders compress the Applications upsell path, and you're paying 16x for a domain registrar growing 5%." That's a legitimate concern but doesn't yet appear in the tape.
I dissent from the "slight upside / fairly valued" synthesis in the mild-bullish direction. At 9.7x EV/FCF with $1.58B FCF growing 25% CAGR, on a business showing sequential revenue acceleration and 600bps of operating margin expansion over three years, the stock is undervalued — not table-poundingly so, but meaningfully. A fair EV/FCF of 13–14x (still a discount to software peers, appropriate for the competitive overhang) implies EV ~$21B, equity ~$18B, or ~$140/share. Even haircutting for AI/no-code risk to 11x FCF gets $115. The drop from $150 to $99 looks like multiple compression on a still-improving business, not a broken thesis. The catalyst path is deleveraging (debt/FCF is only 2.4x — payable) plus continued buybacks shrinking the ~128M share count. Risk: if Q3'26 shows Applications & Commerce decelerating below 10%, the bear thesis gets teeth and $85 is the next stop.
GPT Reading
What stands out is how much better the business quality is than the “legacy web-hosting loser” caricature, and how much noisier the accounting is than the headline earnings CAGR suggests. Revenue has climbed from $3.82B in 2021 to $4.95B in 2025, about 6.7% annualized on these annual figures, and the quarterly run rate has now reached $1.30B in 2Q26 versus $1.15B in 3Q24. That is not a melting-ice-cube top line. The more important point is that profitability underneath has clearly improved: operating income went from $382M in 2021 to $1.13B in 2025, lifting operating margin from 10.0% to 22.8%, while gross margin held around 63.6%. The quarterly net margin band of roughly 16.4%-19.2% over the last eight quarters also looks unusually steady for a supposedly deteriorating franchise. This is a business with recurring revenue, real pricing power, and extremely light capital intensity: just $23.9M of capex on $4.95B of revenue in 2025. When a software-infrastructure company turns $1.60B of operating cash flow into $1.58B of free cash flow, I care a lot more about the durability of that cash machine than I do about whether the market calls it exciting.
At $12.73B market cap, the stock looks inexpensive for that cash generation. On 2025 free cash flow, the equity trades around an 8.1x P/FCF, or roughly a 12.4% FCF yield. Even if you haircut that because some of the cash flow strength comes from favorable working capital or stock comp dynamics that are not shown here, the valuation still screens low for a company growing revenue high single digits with 20%+ operating margins. The stated P/E of 16x is also not demanding, especially because the 2024 and 2023 net income numbers are clearly distorted by non-operating items: net income was actually higher in 2023 at $1.37B despite only $547M of operating income, while 2025 net income was $875M on $1.13B of operating income. In other words, the earnings trend is less informative than the operating and cash-flow trend, and those trends are good. EV/revenue at 3.18x and EV/EBITDA at 12.7x are not bargain-basement, but they are attractive for a sticky, mature software asset still compounding revenue around 8% and throwing off cash at this rate. My read is that the market is over-penalizing the “boring incumbent” label and underpricing the resilience of the installed base.
The balance sheet looks uglier than the economics. Debt is $3.78B against $1.08B cash, so net debt is about $2.70B, but against $1.58B of annual FCF that is manageable rather than scary. The tiny $215M equity base and absurd 65x price-to-book tell you almost nothing economically here; this is an asset-light, repurchase-heavy, intangible-heavy software company, not a bank. Similarly, the 17.6x debt-to-equity ratio and low 0.61 current ratio sound alarming in isolation but are largely artifacts of the capital structure and negative/near-zero book. What matters more is whether the company can service debt while still growing and compounding cash, and the numbers say yes. Quarterly revenue has not stalled, margins have not cracked, and net income in the first half of 2026 totals $454.7M on $2.57B revenue, annualizing to something comfortably above 2025 if current conditions hold. For a company priced just under $100, I think fair value is at least in the $115-$125 range if revenue can continue to grow 6%-8% and FCF stays above $1.5B.
The best bear case is that this is a peak-margin, financial-engineering story masquerading as a compounder. Revenue growth has moderated versus what investors may want from software, and the quarterly series shows a flattening around $1.27B-$1.30B rather than acceleration. Recent earnings growth is negative year over year in the model output, and annual net income fell from $936.9M in 2024 to $875.0M in 2025 despite higher revenue, which a skeptic would read as evidence that interest expense, competitive spend, or mix shift are pressuring true earnings power. The bear would also say that domains and basic hosting are commodity rails; AI site builders, Shopify, Wix, Squarespace, and other integrated platforms can siphon away the higher-value customer relationship, leaving GoDaddy with the lower-growth infrastructure layer. If that is right, then 12.7x EV/EBITDA is not cheap but fair for a business headed toward low-single-digit growth with limited strategic optionality. That case deserves respect, especially because insider activity here is not giving any obvious bullish signal.
What would change my mind is not a narrative event but a numbers break. If quarterly revenue growth slips below 5% year over year while operating margin falls back toward the mid-teens, that would suggest the moat is eroding and the current FCF yield is a trap. Likewise, if net debt stops trending down because cash generation weakens or buybacks/debt service start consuming the cushion, the equity story would deserve a lower multiple. On the other hand, if GoDaddy can hold quarterly revenue around $1.32B-$1.35B over the next couple of prints, sustain net margins near 17%-19%, and keep annual FCF around or above $1.5B, then the current sub-$100 price will look too low for a stable franchise with this kind of cash conversion.
Grok Reading
GoDaddy at $99.45 is a cash-compounding infrastructure business the market has already marked down from roughly $150, and the numbers justify treating that de-rating as largely complete rather than the start of a structural collapse. Revenue has marched from $3.82B in 2021 to $4.95B in 2025 at a 7.9% CAGR, with the latest quarter at $1.30B still printing mid-to-high single-digit growth; more importantly, operating income nearly tripled over the same span from $382M to $1.13B while free cash flow hit $1.58B on only $24M of capex. That is a 12.4% FCF yield on the $12.73B equity value—an extraordinarily high cash return for a business still expanding the top line at ~8% with 63.6% gross margins and 22.8% operating margins. Net income is noisier ($1.37B in 2023, then $937M and $875M), which is why the −20% earnings CAGR misleads; the operating and cash engines are intact and improving. At 16× trailing earnings, 2.8× sales and 12.7× EV/EBITDA, the stock is priced like a utility, not like software, which matches the mature-earner reality rather than a growth fantasy.
The balance sheet is the ugly twin of that cash machine: $3.78B of debt against $1.08B cash and a wafer-thin $215M of book equity produces the absurd 65× P/B and 17.6× debt-to-equity, plus a 0.61 current ratio. Those optics are real, but they are also the residue of years of buybacks and an intangibles-heavy model; the $1.6B of annual operating cash flow comfortably services the leverage and funds further deleveraging. Domain registration remains a high-switching-cost annuity that underwrites the FCF, while Applications and Commerce provide the incremental growth. The quantitative models’ “slight upside” to roughly $104–117 is directionally right; the market is not paying for a narrative premium and is barely discounting the cash flows at all.
The strongest contrary case is that this is a value trap dressed as a compounder. Revenue growth is already flagged as decelerating, competitive pressure from Wix, Squarespace, Shopify and AI-native site builders is real, and the thesis evaluation’s slight bear tilt (−6) correctly notes that higher-margin adjacencies can erode even while the domain fortress holds. Interest expense on nearly $4B of debt will keep capping reported earnings power into 2026–27, and the compressed multiple versus software peers is not a free lunch—it is the market correctly refusing to pay 25× for a business that may settle into mid-single-digit growth forever. If FCF conversion stalls or net adds in the commerce stack roll over, the 12% yield becomes a melting ice cube rather than a re-rating catalyst. I weigh this seriously but secondary: the absolute cash generation is too large, too consistent, and too lightly capped relative to enterprise value for the obsolescence story to dominate at this price.
What flips the verdict is concrete. Two more quarters of revenue growth slipping under 5% with operating margin compression below 20%, or a clear step-down in trailing FCF below $1.3B, would push me to fairly valued or worse. Conversely, sustained double-digit Applications growth plus debt paydown that restores equity and drops net leverage would justify a move toward the mid-$120s and a more aggressive stance.
Big-3 Panel — where each AI stands
Advanced Analysis Forensic deep-dive · separate lenses
Revenue has compounded steadily from $3.82B (2021) to $4.95B (2025), roughly 6.7% CAGR, while operating margin has more than doubled from 10% to 22.8% and FCF has doubled from $778M to $1.58B. Gross margin is stable in the 63-64% band, so the operating leverage is coming from opex discipline, not mix inflation. OCF/NI of 2.03x and accruals of -5.2% of assets mark earnings as conservative and cash-backed; Beneish M at -2.97 shows no manipulation flags. Capital allocation is a genuine strength: diluted shares fell from 151.5M (2023) to 140.6M (2025), a -3.6% CAGR, with buybacks running 387% of the 6.4%-of-revenue SBC bill - per-share value is being concentrated, not eroded. The one clear constraint is the balance sheet: $1.08B liquid cash against $2.70B net debt and an Altman Z of 1.4 in the distress zone. For an asset-light software/registrar business with $1.58B of annual FCF, distress-model output overstates real risk, but leverage does mean the balance sheet is a working constraint rather than a cushion. Insider activity is routine trim-after-vest selling with no open-market buys - neutral, not adverse.
Verify before trusting this (5)
- Composition and maturity ladder of the debt stack behind the $2.70B net-debt figure
- Whether the 2023 net income spike ($1.37B) reflects a deferred-tax valuation-allowance release rather than operating gains
- Customer/segment concentration between core domains/hosting and Applications & Commerce
- Retention and ARPU trends underlying the 6-7% revenue growth to confirm durability of the subscription base
- Any convertible or floating-rate exposure that could tighten the balance-sheet constraint
The composite fair value of $116.74 and signal-adjusted $104.27 imply only 4-17% upside from $99.81, which is inside the noise band for a mature SaaS-registrar. The methods disagree sharply - DCF at $150.88, anchored P/E at $123.67, EPV floor at $41.54 - and that spread tells you the answer depends almost entirely on assumed growth persistence. On $1.58B of FCF against a $12.7B market cap, the stock trades near an 8% FCF yield, which is a reasonable but not screaming price for a mid-single-digit grower with expanding margins and aggressive buybacks. Quality is strong, but that quality already appears embedded in the multiple. What is priced in: continued mid-single-digit revenue growth, ongoing margin expansion, and steady buyback-driven EPS compounding. The bear case (Wix/Squarespace/AI disruption, SMB churn) is not being discounted materially. Margin of safety is thin: the EPV floor of $41.54 shows what you own if growth stalls, and that is a scary asymmetric downside relative to a 4% base-case upside. I need this cheaper before the risk/reward tilts.
Verify before trusting this (5)
- FY guidance for revenue growth and FCF - any deceleration below mid-single-digits breaks the anchored-PE case
- Applications & Commerce segment growth vs Core Platform - mix shift is the margin story
- Buyback pace and remaining authorization
- Net debt trajectory and refinancing schedule
- Any commentary on AI/no-code competitive impact on new customer adds and ARPU
GDDY sits under a mild but persistent headwind. The dominant sentiment force right now is the newly filed shareholder class actions over alleged false promotion practices - law-firm PR is amplifying it, and it directly attacks the customer-growth narrative that is the only story this otherwise boring name has. On top of that, competitor Wix is being framed by the tape as the AI-and-no-code winner, feeding the secular bear script that GoDaddy is a legacy registrar being disrupted. Insider selling two weeks ago and a screen calling GDDY an 'unpopular stock' reinforce a cool tone.
Verify before trusting this (4)
- Whether the class actions gain traction (lead plaintiff filings, media pickup) or fade
- Nvidia earnings and Jackson Hole tone - a risk-on flip would let low-beta names lag, a risk-off flip would help GDDY relatively
- Any sell-side target cuts citing litigation or competitive pressure from Wix/Squarespace
- Follow-on insider transactions or 10b5-1 disclosures
SMB digitization keeps widening the installed base of entities needing a domain, a site and a payment rail — the demand side is intact and secular. But the world is repricing the middle of that stack: AI and no-code push site construction toward zero marginal cost, so value concentrates at the two ends — the domain/registry toll booth (defensible, inertial, price-takable) and integrated commerce/payments (contested by Shopify, Wix, Squarespace, Stripe-native stacks). GoDaddy owns the first end outright and is a follower at the second. Higher-for-longer rates and a slowing infrastructure-software cycle mute new business formation near-term, which is exactly where the customer-count weakness shows up. Net: a durable cash-generative franchise whose growth ceiling is set by ARPU rather than by the world's direction.
When we made this prediction on Aug 26, 2026, GDDY was $96.13. We expect it to be $109.00 by Feb 2027, and we consider it great value under $82.00. This is an early model (v0.6.0) — the direction is more reliable than the exact price. Made Aug 26, 2026.
Blue is our prediction, starting the day we made it. Grey is a slower route to the same place — the same destination, taking longer. Black is the actual price, so you can see how we are doing.
Post-Report Due Diligence UNSETTLED
Evidence for a closer look, not a verdict — no score or designation on this page has been changed by it. Items marked material are ones where a conclusion above moves to the other side of the price.
trailing_eps
flips down 5%
adjusted_pe
flips down 5%