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What this page is: Delvantic's full research page for Godaddy Inc. (GDDY) — AI-driven forensic equity research: mechanical valuation models (DCF, EPV, anchored-PE, scenario) plus three independent AI lenses (Quality / Value / Sentiment). Everything below is rendered server-side; you are not missing content that requires JavaScript. All scores are predictions and research opinions, not financial advice.
Our current read (analysis of 2026-08-23): Designation Gem · Gem Score +39 (−100…+100 Quality+Value blend) · Quality 66 · Value 17 · Sentiment -46 (timing only, not weighted) · Composite fair value $119.39 vs $91.15 at analysis
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profile-header/price-overview— company profile, live quote, market capextended-analysis— the core: three AI lens reads with findings, scores, and the analyst memofuture-predictions— our forward price-band predictionsmarket-narrative/ai-findings/gpt-critique— narrative context, cross-model findings, and an adversarial critique of our own analysis (near the end of the document)- Members-only sections (render as login gates for anonymous readers):
price-history,income-trend,key-metrics,financials(statement tables),insider-trading. The analysis above is public; the raw data tables require a free account.
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any ticker resolves at delvantic.com/stock/TICKER ·
raw inputs are public-company filings and market data (via licensed data feeds);
every model, score, lens read, and prediction on this page is Delvantic's own analysis.
Godaddy Inc.
GDDY NYSEGoDaddy Inc. is a technology company that provides cloud-based products and services to help individuals and small businesses establish and manage their online presence. The company focuses on delivering simple, integrated tools on a single platform, supported by personalized guidance for customers worldwide. Through its Core Platform segment, GoDaddy offers domain registration and management, domain aftermarket services, website hosting, security solutions, and related add-ons that form the foundation of a customer’s digital identity. Its Applications and Commerce segment provides website-building tools, proprietary software, online store and payments capabilities, marketing solutions, email, and productivity applications designed to enable customers to attract and engage users and conduct commerce online. GoDaddy serves entrepreneurs, small enterprises, developers, designers, organizations, and domain investors, playing a significant role in the infrastructure that supports small-business digitization. Founded in 1997 and headquartered in Tempe, Arizona, GoDaddy operates across the United States and international markets as a key provider in the domain, hosting, and small-business online services ecosystem.
Price Overview
Price History (1 Year)
Revenue & Net Income Trend
| Period | Revenue | Net Income | Net Margin | YoY/QoQ |
|---|
Key Metrics
EPS (Diluted): 6.22
Total Equity: $215.10M
Shares: 140,621,000
Total Debt: $3.78B
Cash: $1.08B
EBITDA: $1.24B
Total Debt: $3.78B
Cash: $1.08B
Revenue: $4.95B
Revenue: $4.95B
Revenue: $4.95B
Total Equity: $215.10M
Tax Rate: 14.2%
Equity: $215.10M
Total Debt: $3.78B
Cash: $1.08B
Current Liabilities: $3.00B
Long-Term Debt: $3.77B
Total Debt: $3.78B
Total Equity: $215.10M
Shares: 140,621,000
Shares: 140,621,000
CapEx: -$23.90M
Shares: 140,621,000
Stock Price: $90.79
Net Income: $875.00M
Industry Benchmarks
Income Statement (Annual)
Last updated: Aug 12, 2026 1:59pm (11d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | $3.8B | $4.1B | $4.3B | $4.6B | $5.0B |
| Cost of Revenue | $1.4B | $1.5B | $1.6B | $1.7B | $1.8B |
| Gross Profit | $2.4B | $2.6B | $2.7B | $2.9B | $3.1B |
| Operating Expenses | $2.1B | $2.1B | $2.1B | $2.0B | $2.0B |
| Operating Income | $382.1M | $498.8M | $547.4M | $893.5M | $1.1B |
| Net Income | $242.3M | $352.2M | $1.4B | $936.9M | $875.0M |
| EBITDA | $581.7M | $693.4M | $718.7M | $1.0B | $1.2B |
| EPS | — | — | $9.27 | $6.63 | $6.34 |
| EPS (Diluted) | — | — | $9.08 | $6.45 | $6.22 |
Balance Sheet (Annual)
Last updated: Aug 2, 2026 9:55pm (20d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cash & Equivalents | $1.3B | $774.0M | $458.8M | $1.1B | $1.1B |
| Total Current Assets | $1.9B | $1.6B | $1.3B | $2.0B | $1.8B |
| Total Assets | $7.4B | $7.0B | $7.6B | $8.2B | $8.0B |
| Current Liabilities | $2.4B | $2.5B | $2.7B | $2.7B | $3.0B |
| Long-Term Debt | $3.9B | $3.8B | $3.8B | $3.8B | $3.8B |
| Total Liabilities | $7.3B | $7.3B | $7.5B | $7.5B | $7.8B |
| Total Equity | $83.2M | -$329.3M | $62.2M | $692.1M | $215.1M |
| Retained Earnings | -$1.5B | -$2.4B | -$2.3B | -$2.1B | -$2.8B |
Cash Flow (Annual)
Last updated: Aug 12, 2026 1:59pm (11d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Operating Cash Flow | $829.3M | $979.7M | $1.0B | $1.3B | $1.6B |
| Capital Expenditure | -$51.1M | -$59.7M | -$42.0M | -$26.6M | -$23.9M |
| Free Cash Flow | $778.2M | $920.0M | $1.0B | $1.3B | $1.6B |
| Acquisitions (net) | -$367.7M | -$72.5M | $0 | $0 | — |
| Net Debt Issued / (Repaid) | $767.6M | -$1.8B | -$1.8B | -$4.2B | -$24.6M |
| Dividends Paid | — | — | — | — | — |
| Stock Buybacks | -$526.0M | -$1.3B | -$1.3B | -$676.5M | -$1.6B |
| Net Change in Cash | $490.5M | -$481.7M | -$315.2M | $630.2M | -$8.1M |
Growth Trends (YoY %)
Last updated: Aug 12, 2026 1:59pm (11d ago)| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue Growth | +7.2% | +4.0% | +7.5% | +8.3% |
| Gross Profit Growth | +6.7% | +2.8% | +9.0% | +7.8% |
| Operating Income Growth | +30.5% | +9.7% | +63.2% | +26.2% |
| Net Income Growth | +45.4% | +290.3% | -31.9% | -6.6% |
| EBITDA Growth | +19.2% | +3.6% | +43.1% | +20.9% |
Deep Analysis
Risk : Reward — if the last quarter repeats
Live · as of 2026-08-22 02:03Recovery pays +7%; another quarter like the worst recent one costs 10%. Ratio 0.7:1.
| Case | Growth | Margin | Fair value | vs price ($91.15) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Bull — recovery | +10% | 20.5% | $97.87 | +7% |
| Base — stabilizes | +7% | 17.8% | $77.39 | -15% |
| Bear — keeps slipping | +3% | 15.2% | $60.09 | -34% |
| Stress — last quarter repeats | +6% | 19.6% | $81.93 | -10% |
Narrative Economics
market-narrative step).
AI Lens 4th lens · how AI reaches this business · 5-yr
2026-08-12GoDaddy's cost base is unusually human — large multilingual care and guidance organizations attached to a low-ARPU, tens-of-millions customer base — and AI deflection plus agentic self-serve onboarding converts directly into margin, which the 10%→22.8% operating-margin path already shows is convertible.
The high-margin attach layer — site builder, logos, copy, SEO tools, basic marketing email — is exactly what a free general model now produces in minutes; that layer is where Applications & Commerce ARPU growth lives, so AI erodes the growth mix while the domain base grows low-single-digit.
Whether Applications & Commerce ARPU and attach rates keep rising as Airo shifts from a bundled retention sweetener to a paid tier — watch A&C revenue growth and bookings versus Core Platform, and any disclosure that Airo monetization is incremental rather than defensive.
ICANN accreditation, registry relationships, the largest domains-under-management book with automatic renewal inertia, the aftermarket liquidity pool, and consumer brand recall that sends SMBs to GoDaddy at the moment of naming a business.
AI Lens thesis
The need — a business must be findable and have a canonical identity — survives; the domain itself stays scarce because a registry namespace is not something a model can generate more of, and GoDaddy monetizes that scarcity at the widest distribution point. But GoDaddy stopped being purely a registrar: its margin story rests on attached applications whose marginal intellectual content (design, copy, SEO, imagery) is precisely the abundance AI creates, so willingness-to-pay for those SKUs compresses even as GoDaddy ships them cheaper. Simultaneously AI gives back on cost — the care organization is the single largest deflectable expense in the model. The second-order risk is architectural: if SMB discovery migrates from search-and-URL to assistant answers, the marginal value of a distinctive domain and of the website as a destination declines slowly but structurally, and GoDaddy is not the layer agents route through. Net: a genuine margin tailwind now, a slow demand-architecture question later.
What the market may be underestimating
Upside Agent-era identity: every AI-built micro-business, agent endpoint, and machine-readable storefront still needs a registered name, DNS, certificates and email — a proliferation of cheaply-created ventures is volume growth for the one product AI cannot manufacture more of, and GoDaddy sits at the default point of purchase.
Downside Bundling Airo free to defend churn quietly converts paid add-on SKUs into included features — revenue-neutral at best, ARPU-dilutive at worst — and the market may read the resulting retention as strength while the monetized unit hollows out beneath it.
Outcome range spread 48 · unresolved
Claude Reading
Looking at the raw print first: revenue went from $1.12B (Q2 '24) to $1.27B (Q1 '26), roughly 13% over seven quarters, and the last three quarters are flat at $1.27B — that's decelerating, not "steady 8% CAGR." Quarterly net margins bounce 16-19% with no clear expansion trend. FCF of $1.58B on $4.95B revenue is genuinely impressive (32% FCF margin), and at $11.49B market cap that's a ~14% FCF yield, or ~9% on enterprise value adjusted for the $3.78B debt / $1.08B cash. EV/EBITDA of 11.96 and P/E of 14.65 are cheap for anything growing 8%+ with this cash conversion. The $215M equity number driving the 59x P/B and 17.6x D/E is a buyback artifact — GDDY has repurchased aggressively, torching book value. That's not leverage risk in the traditional sense; it's financial engineering that only breaks if FCF breaks.
Where I diverge from the models: the synthesis says "undervalued, fair value $121" (+33%), but it's leaning on a DCF that assumes the 8% growth persists. The last three quarterly revenue prints are flat sequentially at $1.27B — that's the single most important datum in this file and every model glossed it. If Q2/Q3 2026 come in at $1.27-1.28B, the growth story compresses to ~5%, and fair value shifts materially lower. Market Forces' "terminal competitive decline" is overwrought — SMBs aren't abandoning domains en masse and Wix/Shopify serve different segments — but the sequential flatness is a real yellow flag that the bullish models are ignoring. Meanwhile earnings CAGR of -20% vs FCF CAGR of +25% is the kind of divergence that usually signals aggressive capitalization, stock-comp addbacks, or one-time tax items in the base year (2023 NI of $1.37B looks like a deferred tax benefit); trust the FCF over reported NI here.
The contrarian case even with everything aligned bullish: GDDY trades at 14x earnings for a reason — the market has watched this company for a decade and knows domain registration is a slow-melting ice cube subsidizing a hosting/apps business that has never truly broken out. AI-native site builders (Wix's AI, Squarespace's Blueprint, plus a wave of vibe-coding tools) genuinely threaten the "I need someone to build me a site" pipeline that feeds GDDY's Applications & Commerce segment. Insider activity is nothing — the June 3 awards are routine RSU grants and the two sales are small. There's no insider vote of confidence, and the stock is 50% off its high, meaning something broke in the tape that the fundamentals here don't fully explain (guidance cut? Aero adoption disappointment? The file doesn't say). Data gap: no segment breakdown, no ARPU trend, no bookings/net retention — for a "SaaS transition" thesis those are load-bearing.
GPT Reading
What stands out to me is how much of the GoDaddy story is now a cash-flow and capital-allocation story rather than a growth story. Revenue has moved from $4.25B in 2023 to $4.57B in 2024 and $4.95B in 2025, with the quarterly run-rate now around $1.27B, so this is still a business growing high single digits, not a melting ice cube. The more important shift is profitability quality: operating income improved from $547M in 2023 to $894M in 2024 and $1.13B in 2025, lifting operating margin to 22.8%. Free cash flow of $1.58B on $4.95B of revenue is exceptional at roughly 32%, helped by capex of only $24M. At a $11.5B market cap, that is a mid-teens FCF yield on equity before even adjusting for growth. For a sticky, recurring SMB infrastructure franchise, that is plainly cheap unless you believe cash generation is peaking.
I think the market is over-penalizing the business for being unglamorous and under-crediting the durability in the numbers. The latest four quarters total about $5.02B of revenue and $870M of net income, so at $90.8 the stock is around 13x trailing earnings and roughly 2.3x trailing sales. EV/revenue near 3.0x and EV/EBITDA near 12x are not demanding for a software-like model with gross margins above 63% and rising operating leverage. The supposed contradiction in the data is net income: 2024 net income of $937M fell to $875M in 2025 even as operating income rose sharply, and the latest quarter’s net income of $215M was down from $220M a year earlier despite revenue growth. To me that is exactly why anchoring on P/E alone is too simplistic here. The business is clearly getting more efficient operationally; below-the-line noise and a highly engineered balance sheet are obscuring that improvement. With only $215M of equity and $3.78B of debt, book-value metrics are useless and ROE is distorted to the point of irrelevance.
That balance sheet is the biggest thing preventing me from being outright aggressive. Net debt is still about $2.7B, current ratio is just 0.61, and debt/equity looks absurd because equity has been ground down. GoDaddy can carry leverage because the cash flow is real, but the model is less forgiving if growth slips from 8% to low single digits while competition intensifies. Also, quarterly revenue has flattened at $1.27B for the last three quarters after stepping up consistently through 2024 and early 2025. That does not prove a stall, but it does support the market’s skepticism that this is maturing into a utility. I still come out positive because the valuation already reflects that skepticism: if a company with 16%-19% net margins, 23% operating margins, and 32% FCF margins is only being valued at 14-15x earnings, you do not need a heroic growth revival to make money here.
The strongest bear case is that 2025 may have been the high-water mark for quality. Revenue growth has decelerated from double-digit style quarterly step-ups to a nearly flat recent run-rate, recent earnings were down 6.6% year over year, and the business sits in categories where differentiation is never obvious enough to command a premium forever. A smart bear would also point out that the 2023 net income spike to $1.37B and the 2024-2025 fluctuations make reported earnings less trustworthy than the cash metrics, and that a company leaning this hard on financial engineering can look optically cheap right before growth normalizes lower. If you assume revenue growth fades toward 3%-4% and the market keeps treating GoDaddy as a mature utility, then 12x-14x earnings and around 12x EBITDA may actually be fair, not cheap. I weigh that differently because the cash generation is not hypothetical: $1.60B of operating cash flow and $1.58B of free cash flow against an $11.49B market cap gives the company room to delever, repurchase stock, or simply let per-share value compound even without multiple expansion.
What would change my mind is straightforward. If the next two quarters show revenue still stuck around $1.27B and operating margin slipping back below 21%, then the “steady compounder” framing breaks and the stock probably deserves to stay around 12x-13x earnings. Likewise, if free cash flow falls materially below $1.4B annualized without a clear reinvestment payoff, then today’s cheapness is a trap. On the other hand, if revenue re-accelerates back toward 8%-9% with quarterly sales moving through $1.30B while net debt trends down and annual FCF holds around $1.5B+, I think the market will be forced to re-rate this closer to 16x-18x earnings or roughly $105-$120.
Grok Reading
GoDaddy at $90.80 is a cash-compounding mature infrastructure business the market is pricing like a melting ice cube. Revenue has marched from $3.82B in 2021 to $4.95B in 2025 at a 7.9% CAGR, with the last twelve months still printing ~8% year-over-year and quarterly run-rate locked near $1.27B. More important than the top line is the operating leverage: operating income more than doubled from $382M to $1.13B over that span, operating margin expanded from roughly 10% to 22.8%, and free cash flow hit $1.58B—an extraordinary 32% FCF margin on almost no capital intensity ($24M capex). At an $11.5B market cap that is a ~13.8% FCF yield. EV/EBITDA of 12x and a 14.7x P/E are not SaaS multiples; they are utility multiples, and they sit well below the composite fair-value work pointing near $121. The balance-sheet optics are ugly—$3.78B debt, only $215M of book equity, D/E of 17.6x, current ratio 0.61—but net debt of roughly $2.7B is less than 1.8 turns of annual FCF, so the leverage is financial engineering and buybacks, not distress. ROIC at 33% confirms the economic engine is intact. The story the numbers tell is a sticky, recurring SMB franchise converting scale into cash faster than the market will acknowledge.
The earnings CAGR of –20% is a statistical artifact of the 2023 NI spike to $1.37B; strip that out and net income has climbed from the low-$200Ms to the mid-$800Ms while quarterly net margins have stabilized in the 16–19% band. Recent quarters show revenue flattening sequentially at $1.27B, which is deceleration, not collapse, and still consistent with mid-single-digit to high-single-digit growth. Insider activity is noise—routine awards and small sales. The P/B of 60 is meaningless given the deliberately hollowed-out equity account; ignore it.
The strongest opposing case is straightforward: domains and commodity hosting are being nibbled by AI site-builders, Shopify, Wix, and free alternatives, the Applications layer has not obviously re-accelerated the whole, and the market is correctly embedding a future in which FCF stagnates or declines. A smart bear cites the decelerating quarterly revenue trend, the sub-1.0 current ratio, the $3.8B debt stack in a higher-rate world, and the fact that multiple independent signals (Market Forces “terminal decline,” thesis score essentially zero, macro headwinds) refuse to give the stock credit for its cash generation. They would also note that a 13–14% FCF yield is often a value trap when the numerator is about to shrink. I weigh that differently because the last five years of actual results show revenue still compounding near 8%, FCF CAGR of 25%, and margin expansion continuing into 2025; the “catastrophic 10% annual FCF decline” the market appears to price has simply not shown up in the reported numbers. Until Applications genuinely rolls over or domain volumes turn negative, the discount looks like over-discounting of a known, slow competitive grind rather than imminent earnings death.
What would flip me is two consecutive quarters of revenue growth falling below 3% combined with FCF margin compression below 25%, or a clear step-down in trailing twelve-month FCF below $1.2B. An aggressive debt-funded buyback that pushes net leverage above 3x FCF without corresponding EPS accretion would also force a re-rating lower. Conversely, any evidence that ARPU expansion or international attach is re-accelerating top-line growth toward double digits would push the stock toward the $120 area faster than the models imply.
Big-3 Panel — where each AI stands
Advanced Analysis Forensic deep-dive · separate lenses
Revenue has compounded steadily from $3.82B (2021) to $4.95B (2025), roughly 6.7% CAGR, while operating margin has more than doubled from 10% to 22.8% — a clean operating-leverage story on stable 64% gross margins. FCF has scaled from $778M to $1.58B, and OCF/NI of 2.03x with accruals at -5.2% of assets says the reported earnings are backed by cash, not accounting flattery. Beneish M at -2.97 is firmly in non-manipulator territory. Capital allocation is genuinely shareholder-friendly: diluted shares fell from 151.5M to 140.6M (-3.6% CAGR) with buybacks running at 387% of SBC, so the 6.4%-of-revenue SBC is being more than mopped up. The one real blemish is the balance sheet: net debt of $2.70B against $1.08B liquid cash, and Altman Z of 1.3 nominally in the 'distress' band. For an asset-light software/registrar business throwing off $1.58B of FCF, the Z-score is misleading (the model is calibrated for asset-heavy firms), but the leverage is real and constrains flexibility. Insider tape is routine: seven small sales, no buys, alongside annual director awards — nothing directional, but nothing supportive either.
Verify before trusting this (5)
- Debt maturity ladder and covenants on the $2.70B net debt position
- Whether the 2023 $1.37B net income spike reflects a deferred tax asset release or similar one-timer
- Customer/segment concentration and mix between domains, hosting, and Applications & Commerce
- Renewal/retention rates and ARPU trend to confirm durability of margin expansion
- Whether SBC dilution is fully offset on a fair-value basis (not just share count) once options/RSU grants are considered
Price is $91.15 against a composite FV of $121.09 (signal-adjusted $121.16), implying ~33% upside. The inputs bracket sensibly: DCF at $161.34 is the aggressive anchor (assumes durable FCF compounding), EPV floor at $69.56 marks the no-growth downside, and the anchored P/E at $92.13 essentially says the market is paying a fair multiple on current earnings. The truth sits between the anchored-PE and the DCF, and the composite $121 is a reasonable midpoint I do not need to discount further given Good earnings quality.
Verify before trusting this (5)
- Bookings and ARR growth trajectory - any deceleration below mid-single-digits invalidates the composite FV
- Applications & Commerce segment margin trend - the operating leverage story depends on this
- Buyback pace vs SBC issuance in latest 10-Q
- Management commentary on AI/no-code competitive pressure in domains and Websites+Marketing
- Net debt paydown pace and refinancing terms
The macro tape is mildly risk-on (VIX 15, S&P near highs), which normally would lift a beta-0.92 software infrastructure name. But GDDY isn't riding that tape - it took a 16.7% gap-down on July 30 after a soft full-year outlook, and the follow-through news flow (CFO defending Airo, ARPU narrative, analyst pieces framing GDDY as an underperformer) shows the Street is still relitigating the story rather than moving on. That is textbook post-earnings sentiment drag on a name whose narrative was already only 'minimal intensity, moderate durability' - there's no cult, no story to defend it.
Verify before trusting this (4)
- Any target-price revisions in the next 2-4 weeks - stale 'moderately optimistic' consensus is the most likely source of a negative drip
- Whether Airo/ARPU commentary from the CFO tour changes buy-side tone or just gets absorbed
- Sector rotation signal: do SMB-software peers (WIX, SQSP) trade with GDDY or decouple
- Next print - a clean beat with reaccelerating bookings would break the post-earnings wound; another soft guide extends the headwind materially
The need — a business must be findable and have a canonical identity — survives; the domain itself stays scarce because a registry namespace is not something a model can generate more of, and GoDaddy monetizes that scarcity at the widest distribution point. But GoDaddy stopped being purely a registrar: its margin story rests on attached applications whose marginal intellectual content (design, copy, SEO, imagery) is precisely the abundance AI creates, so willingness-to-pay for those SKUs compresses even as GoDaddy ships them cheaper. Simultaneously AI gives back on cost — the care organization is the single largest deflectable expense in the model. The second-order risk is architectural: if SMB discovery migrates from search-and-URL to assistant answers, the marginal value of a distinctive domain and of the website as a destination declines slowly but structurally, and GoDaddy is not the layer agents route through. Net: a genuine margin tailwind now, a slow demand-architecture question later.
Verify before trusting this (8)
- Airo paid tier attach disclosure
- Competitor free AI builder launches
- Gross margin stability near 64%
- Website builder subscriber counts
- A&C ARPU direction
- Churn in first-year cohorts
- Care headcount and cost per customer
- Operating margin above 23%
This lens hasn't been run for this ticker yet.
When we made this prediction on Aug 14, 2026, GDDY was $100.50. We expect it to be $118.00 by Feb 2027, and we consider it great value under $82.00. This is an early model (v0.6.0) — the direction is more reliable than the exact price. Made Aug 14, 2026.
Blue is our prediction, starting the day we made it. Grey is a slower route to the same place — the same destination, taking longer. Black is the actual price, so you can see how we are doing.