Business Description
Installed Building Products, Inc., together with its subsidiaries, engages in the installation of insulation for residential and commercial builders in the United States. It operates through three segments: Installation, Distribution, and Manufacturing Operations. The company offers a range of insulation materials, such as fiberglass and cellulose, and spray foam insulation materials. It is also involved in the installation of insulation and sealant materials in various areas of a structure, which includes basement and crawl space, building envelope, attic, and acoustical applications. In addition, the company installs a range of caulk and sealant products that control air infiltration in residential and commercial buildings; basic sliding door and complex custom designs; and custom designed mirrors, as well as closet shelving systems. Further, it installs and services garage doors and openers, including steel, aluminum, wood, and vinyl garage doors, as well as opener systems; installs waterproofing and caulking and moisture protection systems; offers sheet and hot applied waterproofing membrane, deck coating, bentonite, and air and vapor systems; and provides rain gutters installation services. Additionally, the company provides fire-stopping systems, including fire-rated joint assemblies, perimeter fire containment, and smoke and fire containment systems installation services; and cordless blinds, shades, and shutters installation services, as well as other complementary building products. It also distributes products and materials purchased wholesale from manufacturers, such as spray foam insulation, metal building insulation, residential insulation, and mechanical and fabricated Styrofoam insulation; and insulation products, including equipment, machines, and services. The company was formerly known as CCIB Holdco, Inc. Installed Building Products, Inc. was founded in 1977 and is based in Columbus, Ohio.
Business History
Generated: Jun 3, 2026 6:13pmPrice Overview
Last updated: Jun 3, 2026 6:10pm (23d ago)Price History (1 Year)
Revenue & Net Income Trend
| Period | Revenue | Net Income | Net Margin | YoY/QoQ |
|---|
Key Metrics
EPS (Diluted): 9.76
Total Equity: $709.90M
Shares: 27,045,308
Total Debt: $987.70M
Cash: $321.90M
EBITDA: $492.50M
Total Debt: $987.70M
Cash: $321.90M
Revenue: $2.97B
Revenue: $2.97B
Revenue: $2.97B
Total Equity: $709.90M
Tax Rate: 25.7%
Equity: $709.90M
Total Debt: $987.70M
Cash: $321.90M
Current Liabilities: $344.20M
Long-Term Debt: $911.40M
Total Debt: $987.70M
Total Equity: $709.90M
Shares: 27,045,308
Shares: 27,045,308
CapEx: -$70.60M
Shares: 27,045,308
Stock Price: $201.74
Net Income: $265.40M
Industry Benchmarks
Advanced Analysis Forensic deep-dive · three lenses
The forensics on IBP are genuinely clean and the bull mechanics are intact. Revenue has grown from $1.97B to $2.97B (2021→2025) with gross margin expanding 410bps to 34.0%, FCF at $300.8M (1.13x net income), Altman Z of 5.57, Beneish M of -2.64, accruals at -3.7% of assets, and OCF/NI at 1.31x — none of the typical 'good business, bad earnings' tells are present. Diluted share count is actually down from 29.6M to 27.0M (-2.3% CAGR) with buyback/SBC at 553.8% and SBC only 0.7% of revenue. This is a real cash machine being run for per-share value, not a dilution treadmill.
The catch is entirely valuation and cyclicality. Revenue growth has collapsed from +35% (2021→22) to +1% (2024→25), and operating margin has been flat at ~13% for three years — the topline is decelerating into what is likely a cycle peak for residential construction. The pipeline's $69.74 fair value looks too punitive (implies a deep recession multiple on trough earnings), but the GPT critique's $120-140 range is credible: at $201.74, you're paying ~20x earnings and ~18x FCF for a cyclical installer whose end market (single-family housing starts) is exposed to rate-driven demand destruction.
The insider tape is more nuanced than the 'net buying' label suggests. The May 11, 2026 cluster — CFO Hilsheimer ($98K), Niswonger ($98K), and President Michael Miller ($84K across five tranches) — is a real, coordinated open-market buy cluster, which is meaningful given they presumably know Q1/Q2 trends. But the $130.9M of sales over 12 months dwarfs the $844K of buys by ~155x. The cluster is a signal, not a thesis.
Deep Analysis
Pre-flight intelligence scans the company first, then routes to the right analytical methods.
Income Statement (Annual)
Last updated: Jun 3, 2026 6:17pm (23d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | $2.0B | $2.7B | $2.8B | $2.9B | $3.0B |
| Cost of Revenue | $1.4B | $1.8B | $1.8B | $1.9B | $2.0B |
| Gross Profit | $589.5M | $827.8M | $930.7M | $994.5M | $1.0B |
| Operating Expenses | $401.6M | $482.4M | $561.6M | $612.0M | $622.9M |
| Operating Income | $187.9M | $345.4M | $369.1M | $382.5M | $386.4M |
| Net Income | $118.8M | $223.4M | $243.7M | $256.6M | $265.4M |
| EBITDA | $288.0M | $462.6M | $495.8M | $517.8M | $492.5M |
| EPS | $4.04 | $7.78 | $8.65 | $9.15 | $9.76 |
| EPS (Diluted) | — | — | — | — | — |
Balance Sheet (Annual)
Last updated: Jun 3, 2026 6:13pm (23d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cash & Equivalents | $333.5M | $229.6M | $386.5M | $327.6M | $321.9M |
| Total Current Assets | $859.3M | $884.4M | $1.1B | $1.1B | $1.0B |
| Total Assets | $1.7B | $1.8B | $2.0B | $2.1B | $2.1B |
| Current Liabilities | $307.6M | $328.1M | $346.4M | $359.0M | $344.2M |
| Long-Term Debt | $832.2M | $830.2M | $835.1M | $842.4M | $911.4M |
| Total Liabilities | $1.2B | $1.3B | $1.3B | $1.4B | $1.4B |
| Total Equity | $416.8M | $493.5M | $670.3M | $705.3M | $709.9M |
| Retained Earnings | $352.5M | $513.1M | $693.8M | $865.5M | $1.0B |
Cash Flow (Annual)
Last updated: Jun 3, 2026 6:17pm (23d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Operating Cash Flow | $138.3M | $277.9M | $340.2M | $340.0M | $371.4M |
| Capital Expenditure | -$37.0M | -$45.6M | -$61.6M | -$88.6M | -$70.6M |
| Free Cash Flow | $101.3M | $232.3M | $278.6M | $251.4M | $300.8M |
| Acquisitions (net) | -$241.3M | -$113.5M | -$59.6M | -$88.6M | -$51.5M |
| Debt Repayment | — | — | — | — | — |
| Dividends Paid | — | — | — | — | — |
| Stock Buybacks | -$5.6M | -$137.6M | -$6.3M | -$145.3M | -$172.6M |
| Net Change in Cash | $102.0M | -$103.9M | $156.9M | -$58.9M | -$5.7M |
Analyst Estimates (Annual)
Last updated: Jun 3, 2026 6:10pm (23d ago)| Metric | 2025 | 2026 | 2027 | 2028 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue |
$3.0B $2.9B – $3.0B
|
$3.0B $2.9B – $3.0B
|
$3.1B $2.9B – $3.2B
|
$3.3B $3.3B – $3.3B
|
| EBITDA |
$551.8M $544.3M – $559.2M
|
$549.6M $534.6M – $562.6M
|
$574.2M $540.4M – $598.6M
|
$614.4M $614.4M – $614.4M
|
| Net Income |
$295.3M $289.3M – $301.4M
|
$274.7M $271.2M – $278.1M
|
$300.3M $284.1M – $316.4M
|
$360.9M $339.6M – $375.5M
|
| EPS | — | — | — | — |
Growth Trends (YoY %)
Last updated: Jun 3, 2026 6:17pm (23d ago)| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue Growth | +35.6% | +4.1% | +5.9% | +1.0% |
| Gross Profit Growth | +40.4% | +12.4% | +6.9% | +1.5% |
| Operating Income Growth | +83.8% | +6.9% | +3.6% | +1.0% |
| Net Income Growth | +88.0% | +9.1% | +5.3% | +3.4% |
| EBITDA Growth | +60.6% | +7.2% | +4.4% | -4.9% |
Insider Trading (Recent)
Last updated: Jun 3, 2026 6:16pm (23d ago)All SEC Form 4 codes
- P Purchase
- Open-market or private purchase of shares.
- S Sale
- Open-market or private sale of shares.
- A Award / grant
- Grant or award of securities (RSUs, options, etc.) under Rule 16b-3.
- D Return to issuer
- Securities disposed back to the company under Rule 16b-3.
- F In-kind (tax)
- Shares withheld or delivered to pay the option-exercise price or tax — not an open-market sale.
- I Discretionary
- Discretionary transaction under an employee plan — Rule 16b-3(f).
- M Option exercise
- Exercise or conversion of a derivative (option/RSU) into shares — exempt.
- C Conversion
- Conversion of a derivative security into the underlying shares.
- E Short expiration
- Expiration of a short derivative position.
- H Long expiration
- Expiration or cancellation of a long derivative position with value received.
- O OTM exercise
- Exercise of an out-of-the-money derivative.
- X ITM exercise
- Exercise of an in-the-money or at-the-money derivative.
- G Gift
- Bona fide gift of securities.
- L Small acquisition
- Small acquisition under Rule 16a-6.
- W Inheritance
- Acquisition or disposition by will or the laws of descent.
- Z Voting trust
- Deposit into or withdrawal from a voting trust.
- J Other
- Other acquisition or disposition (explained in a Form 4 footnote).
- K Equity swap
- Transaction in an equity swap or similar instrument.
- U Tender / buyout
- Disposition via tender of shares in a change-of-control transaction.
Compensation-plan codes (A, D, F, M) are routine and rarely directional. Open-market P (buy) and S (sale) carry the most signal.
| Date | Insider | Type | Shares | Price | Value |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-06-11 | Miller Michael Thomas | P-Purchase | 155.00 | $206.74 | $32,045 |
| 2026-06-11 | Miller Michael Thomas | P-Purchase | 80.00 | $205.52 | $16,442 |
| 2026-06-11 | Miller Michael Thomas | P-Purchase | 20.00 | $204.32 | $4,086 |
| 2026-06-11 | Miller Michael Thomas | P-Purchase | 99.00 | $202.73 | $20,070 |
| 2026-06-11 | Miller Michael Thomas | P-Purchase | 133.00 | $201.91 | $26,854 |
| 2026-06-11 | Miller Michael Thomas | P-Purchase | 1.00 | $200.03 | $200 |
| 2026-06-11 | Miller Michael Thomas | P-Purchase | 14.00 | $198.79 | $2,783 |
| 2026-06-11 | Miller Michael Thomas | P-Purchase | 145.00 | $197.55 | $28,645 |
| 2026-06-11 | Miller Michael Thomas | P-Purchase | 278.00 | $196.95 | $54,752 |
| 2026-06-11 | Miller Michael Thomas | P-Purchase | 65.00 | $195.89 | $12,733 |
| 2026-05-19 | Carter Margot Lebenberg | A-Award | 855.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-05-19 | Hilsheimer Lawrence A. | A-Award | 855.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-05-19 | Jackson Janet E. | A-Award | 855.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-05-19 | MEUSE DAVID R | A-Award | 855.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-05-19 | Moore Marchelle E | A-Award | 855.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-05-19 | SCHOTTENSTEIN ROBERT H | A-Award | 855.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-05-19 | THOMAS MICHAEL H | A-Award | 855.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-05-12 | Niswonger Jason R | G-Gift | 25.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-05-11 | Hilsheimer Lawrence A. | P-Purchase | 475.00 | $206.22 | $97,952 |
| 2026-05-11 | Niswonger Jason R | P-Purchase | 455.00 | $214.80 | $97,734 |
Dividend History (Last 20)
Last updated: Jun 3, 2026 6:10pm (23d ago)| Date | Dividend | Declaration | Record | Payment |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-06-15 | $0.39 | 2026-05-06 | 2026-06-15 | 2026-06-30 |
| 2026-03-13 | $2.19 | 2026-02-24 | 2026-03-13 | 2026-03-31 |
| 2025-12-15 | $0.37 | 2025-10-29 | 2025-12-15 | 2025-12-31 |
| 2025-09-15 | $0.37 | 2025-08-07 | 2025-09-15 | 2025-09-30 |
| 2025-06-13 | $0.37 | 2025-05-08 | 2025-06-13 | 2025-06-30 |
| 2025-03-14 | $2.07 | 2025-02-27 | 2025-03-14 | 2025-03-31 |
| 2024-12-13 | $0.35 | 2024-11-07 | 2024-12-15 | 2024-12-31 |
| 2024-09-13 | $0.35 | 2024-08-01 | 2024-09-15 | 2024-09-30 |
| 2024-06-14 | $0.35 | 2024-05-09 | 2024-06-15 | 2024-06-30 |
| 2024-03-14 | $1.95 | 2024-02-22 | 2024-03-15 | 2024-03-31 |
| 2023-12-14 | $0.33 | 2023-11-08 | 2023-12-15 | 2023-12-31 |
| 2023-09-14 | $0.33 | 2023-08-02 | 2023-09-15 | 2023-09-30 |
| 2023-06-14 | $0.33 | 2023-05-04 | 2023-06-15 | 2023-06-30 |
| 2023-03-14 | $1.23 | 2023-02-22 | 2023-03-15 | 2023-03-31 |
| 2022-12-14 | $0.32 | 2022-11-03 | 2022-12-15 | 2022-12-31 |
| 2022-09-14 | $0.32 | 2022-08-04 | 2022-09-15 | 2022-09-30 |
| 2022-06-14 | $0.32 | 2022-05-05 | 2022-06-15 | 2022-06-30 |
| 2022-03-14 | $1.22 | 2022-02-24 | 2022-03-15 | 2022-03-31 |
| 2021-12-14 | $0.30 | 2021-11-04 | 2021-12-15 | 2021-12-31 |
| 2021-09-14 | $0.30 | 2021-08-05 | 2021-09-15 | 2021-09-30 |
Narrative Economics
market-narrative step).
Delvantic AI Findings
The raw numbers tell a story the synthesis layer is partially missing. IBP grew revenue from $1.97B (2021) to $2.97B (2025) — a ~10.8% CAGR — but the deceleration is sharp: 2024→2025 was just 1.0%, and Q1 2026 came in at $660.5M vs $684.8M in Q1 2025, a 3.6% YoY decline with net margin compressing to 5.3% from 6.6%. That's the first quarterly revenue decline in the visible window and the worst margin print in eight quarters. Full-year 2025 net margin was 8.9%; the Q1 2026 step-down to 5.3% is not seasonal noise — Q1 2025's 6.6% sets the comp. FCF of $300.8M on a $5.44B market cap is a ~5.5% FCF yield, which is fine but not screaming cheap for a cyclical rolling over.
The momentum module's 3.4% revenue CAGR is misleading — it appears to be using a truncated window. The real 5-year CAGR is ~11%, but the forward-looking signal (1% YoY, Q1 2026 negative) is what matters, and that aligns with the housing-starts cooling thesis. The synthesis verdict of $69.74 fair value vs $201.74 spot (-65%) is too aggressive. At 21x TTM P/E and 8.8x EV/EBITDA with 37% ROE and 14% ROIC, this isn't a structurally broken business — it's a high-quality compounder facing a cyclical air pocket. A DCF that anchors at $70 is implicitly assuming margin reversion to mid-cycle plus no terminal M&A value, which double-counts the bear case. Fair value is more plausibly in the $110-140 range — still meaningful downside (30-45%), but the "189% premium is entirely narrative-driven" framing overstates it.
The prior models contradict each other in ways worth flagging. Market Forces calls this "extreme insider selling" while Secondary Signals reports "Net Insider Buying" — and the actual transaction log shows awards (non-economic) plus two open-market purchases on 2026-05-11 and a small gift. There is no extreme insider selling in the data provided; that's a hallucinated signal and it's driving part of the bearish synthesis. The Narrative layer's "platform-monopoly" archetype is also a stretch — IBP is a services roll-up with ~5% share of a fragmented market, not a platform with network effects. The classification as "mature_earner" is more honest than the narrative engine's framing. The pre-flight thesis (repair/remodel stability + vertical integration margin story) is the strongest contrarian read in the file and is underweighted by the synthesis.
The contrarian case: IBP has compounded EPS through two housing cycles, ROIC of 14% is well above cost of capital, the balance sheet shows $322M cash with manageable leverage (debt not disclosed but EV/EBITDA of 8.8x implies ~$1B net debt — not stressed), and insiders are net buyers in open market. The Q1 2026 weakness may be the trough of the rate-driven new construction slump rather than the start of structural decay — single-family starts have been bottoming and the energy code tailwind (IECC 2021 adoption) is a real volume driver per insulation-per-home that the bears ignore. That said, paying 21x TTM earnings for a business with negative recent YoY revenue and margin compression requires conviction the cycle turns in 2026. At $200, you're paying mid-cycle multiples for trough-approaching earnings — that math only works if 2027 earnings recover to $11-12/share and the multiple holds. If 2026 EPS lands at $8 (down from $9 TTM-ish), the stock at 18x trough earnings is $144. I dissent from the $70 fair value but agree the stock is not cheap here.
GPT Critique
Analyzing the raw data for Installed Building Products, Inc. (IBP), several elements stand out. Firstly, the company's revenue growth has been robust over the last five years, increasing from $1.97 billion in 2021 to $2.97 billion in 2025, representing an approximate CAGR of 10.8%. However, this growth trajectory has recently decelerated, with a mere 1% increase from 2024 to 2025 and a concerning 3.6% year-over-year decline in Q1 2026 to $660.5 million. The net income margin has also contracted significantly in Q1 2026, dropping to 5.3% from 6.6% a year prior, suggesting potential challenges in maintaining profitability. The company’s current P/E ratio of 21.2x and EV/EBITDA of 8.8x are reasonable for a growth company, but the recent negative revenue trend implies that the market may need to reassess IBP’s valuation amidst potential cyclical pressures.
I agree with Opus’s assertion that IBP is overvalued but not by the synthesis layer's suggested 65%. The fair value range of $120-140 is more plausible, considering the company's historical performance and current market conditions. Opus rightly notes that the synthesis overemphasizes the narrative-driven premium, failing to account for IBP's established market position and potential for recovery in a cyclical downturn. The suggestion that a DCF model anchored at $70 assumes excessive margin reversion and dismisses the potential for M&A value aligns with my interpretation of the data, which shows IBP as a high-quality compounder rather than a fundamentally broken business.
However, I diverge from Opus’s critique of the insider transaction signal. While Opus argues that there is no extreme insider selling, the provided data does not conclusively support this claim, as the transaction log primarily shows awards and a few purchases. The absence of significant insider sales could indeed indicate confidence within the company, but the lack of detailed balance sheet data, particularly the undisclosed total debt, means that caution is warranted in interpreting these signals.
A careful skeptic could argue that both Opus and the synthesis layer may be underestimating the potential for continued margin compression and increased competition in a slowing housing market. The narrative of IBP as a market consolidator might falter if larger players enter the scene aggressively, leveraging economies of scale that IBP cannot match. Furthermore, if the cyclical downturn in housing persists longer than anticipated, the current valuation may still be overly optimistic despite Opus's more conservative fair value range.