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What this page is: Delvantic's full research page for Huntington Bancshares Incorporated Common Stock (HBAN) — AI-driven forensic equity research: mechanical valuation models (DCF, EPV, anchored-PE, scenario) plus three independent AI lenses (Quality / Value / Sentiment). Everything below is rendered server-side; you are not missing content that requires JavaScript. All scores are predictions and research opinions, not financial advice.
Our current read (analysis of 2026-09-11): Designation Low · Gem Score -19 (−100…+100 Quality+Value blend) · Quality 9 · Value -38 · Sentiment -13 (timing only, not weighted) · Composite fair value $15.24 vs $16.88 at analysis
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Huntington Bancshares Incorporated Common Stock
HBAN NASDAQHuntington Bancshares Incorporated Common Stock is the publicly traded equity of Huntington Bancshares Incorporated, a regional bank holding company headquartered in Columbus, Ohio. The company operates through Huntington National Bank and serves consumers, small and middle-market businesses, commercial clients, and institutional customers with a broad mix of banking and financial services. Its offerings include deposit accounts, consumer and commercial lending, mortgage banking, auto financing, treasury management, payment services, commercial real estate lending, equipment finance, capital markets activities, wealth management, and insurance products. Huntington Bancshares plays an important role in U.S. regional banking by supporting everyday banking needs, business financing, and specialized financial solutions across multiple industries and markets. The common stock represents ownership in a diversified financial institution focused on retail and commercial banking, with additional services that connect traditional banking to broader financial and risk-management needs.
Price Overview
Price History (1 Year)
Revenue & Net Income Trend
| Period | Revenue | Net Income | Net Margin | YoY/QoQ |
|---|
Key Metrics
EPS (Diluted): 1.01
Total Equity: $24.38B
Shares: 2,180,155,621
Total Debt: $18.48B
Cash: $13.50B
EBITDA: N/A
Total Debt: $18.48B
Cash: $13.50B
Revenue: $8.13B
Revenue: $8.13B
Revenue: $8.13B
Total Equity: $24.38B
Tax Rate: 17.1%
Equity: $24.38B
Total Debt: $18.48B
Cash: $13.50B
Current Liabilities: N/A
Long-Term Debt: $17.22B
Total Debt: $18.48B
Total Equity: $24.38B
Shares: 2,180,155,621
Shares: 2,180,155,621
CapEx: -$267.00M
Shares: 2,180,155,621
Stock Price: $16.42
Net Income: $2.21B
Industry Benchmarks
Income Statement (Annual)
Last updated: Sep 3, 2026 12:43am (35d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | $6.0B | $7.3B | $7.4B | $7.4B | $8.1B |
| Cost of Revenue | — | — | — | — | — |
| Gross Profit | — | — | — | — | — |
| Operating Expenses | $2.5B | $2.6B | $2.9B | $2.9B | $3.1B |
| Operating Income | — | — | — | — | — |
| Net Income | $1.3B | $2.2B | $2.0B | $1.9B | $2.2B |
| EBITDA | — | — | — | — | — |
| EPS | $0.91 | $1.47 | $1.26 | $1.24 | $1.09 |
| EPS (Diluted) | $0.90 | $1.45 | $1.24 | $1.22 | $1.01 |
Balance Sheet (Annual)
Last updated: Sep 3, 2026 12:30am (35d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cash & Equivalents | $5.5B | $6.7B | $10.1B | $12.8B | $13.5B |
| Total Current Assets | — | — | — | — | — |
| Total Assets | $174.1B | $182.9B | $189.4B | $204.2B | $225.1B |
| Current Liabilities | — | — | — | — | — |
| Long-Term Debt | $7.1B | $9.7B | $12.4B | $16.4B | $17.2B |
| Total Liabilities | $154.7B | $165.1B | $170.0B | $184.4B | $200.7B |
| Total Equity | $19.3B | $17.8B | $19.4B | $19.8B | $24.4B |
| Retained Earnings | $2.2B | $3.4B | $4.3B | $5.2B | $6.4B |
Cash Flow (Annual)
Last updated: Sep 3, 2026 12:55am (35d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Operating Cash Flow | $2.1B | $4.0B | $2.7B | $1.8B | $2.5B |
| Capital Expenditure | -$247.0M | -$214.0M | -$140.0M | -$143.0M | -$267.0M |
| Free Cash Flow | $1.8B | $3.8B | $2.5B | $1.7B | $2.2B |
| Acquisitions (net) | — | -$223.0M | $0 | $0 | — |
| Net Debt Issued / (Repaid) | -$2.6B | $3.0B | $2.6B | $4.1B | $447.0M |
| Dividends Paid | — | — | — | — | — |
| Stock Buybacks | -$650.0M | $0 | $0 | — | — |
| Net Change in Cash | -$1.1B | $1.2B | $3.4B | $2.7B | $648.0M |
Growth Trends (YoY %)
Last updated: Sep 3, 2026 12:43am (35d ago)| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue Growth | +21.1% | +1.5% | +0.3% | +10.1% |
| Gross Profit Growth | — | — | — | — |
| Operating Income Growth | — | — | — | — |
| Net Income Growth | +72.8% | -12.8% | -0.6% | +14.0% |
| EBITDA Growth | — | — | — | — |
Dividend History (Last 20)
Last updated: Sep 3, 2026 12:30am (35d ago)| Date | Dividend | Declaration | Record | Payment |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-09-17 | $0.16 | — | — | — |
| 2026-06-17 | $0.16 | — | — | — |
| 2026-03-18 | $0.16 | — | — | — |
| 2025-12-18 | $0.16 | — | — | — |
| 2025-09-17 | $0.16 | — | — | — |
| 2025-06-17 | $0.16 | — | — | — |
| 2025-03-18 | $0.16 | — | — | — |
| 2024-12-18 | $0.16 | — | — | — |
| 2024-09-17 | $0.16 | — | — | — |
| 2024-06-17 | $0.16 | — | — | — |
| 2024-03-15 | $0.16 | — | — | — |
| 2023-12-15 | $0.16 | — | — | — |
| 2023-09-15 | $0.16 | — | — | — |
| 2023-06-15 | $0.16 | — | — | — |
| 2023-03-17 | $0.16 | — | — | — |
| 2022-12-16 | $0.16 | — | — | — |
| 2022-09-16 | $0.16 | — | — | — |
| 2022-06-16 | $0.16 | — | — | — |
| 2022-03-17 | $0.16 | — | — | — |
| 2021-12-16 | $0.16 | — | — | — |
Deep Analysis
Risk : Reward — upside vs downside from this company's own quarters
Computed 2026-09-06 19:13A +1σ run of quarters pays -59%; a −1σ run costs 81%. Ratio -0.7:1 (μ 12.4%, σ 14.0% , 16 pairs).
Older method (repeat-worst-quarter): -0.7 : 1
| Case | Growth | Margin | Fair value | vs price ($16.88) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Bull — recovery | +30% | 35.0% | $7.56 | -55% |
| Base — stabilizes | +20% | 35.0% | $5.84 | -65% |
| Bear — keeps slipping | +10% | 35.0% | $4.45 | -74% |
| Stress — last quarter repeats | +0% | 35.0% | $3.36 | -80% |
| Upside — a +1σ run of quarters (v2) | +26% | 35.0% | $6.92 | -59% |
| Stress — a −1σ run of quarters (v2) | -2% | 35.0% | $3.21 | -81% |
Narrative Economics
market-narrative step).
Growth Outlook
Analyzed 2026-09-03 01:07The question every valuation on this page silently assumes: is this company likely to grow? Judged forward — the business, its category, the world — against what's already printed.
Claude Reading
Starting with the raw numbers before touching the model chorus: something is off with the income statement presentation. Quarterly "revenue" of $351–472M against quarterly net income of $517–629M with margins of 110–150% is nonsensical unless the "revenue" line is net interest income only (excluding fee income and possibly reflecting FMP's mis-tagging of a bank income statement). Annual revenue of $8.13B in 2025 vs. summed quarterly revenue of ~$1.56B for 2025 confirms the quarterly line is broken or scoped narrowly. Any valuation model consuming those quarterly margins as-is is garbage-in. The annual figures are the only trustworthy series: revenue $5.99B → $7.25B → $7.36B → $7.39B → $8.13B, NI $1.30B → $2.24B → $1.95B → $1.94B → $2.21B. That's a real 2025 re-acceleration (rev +10%, NI +14% YoY), consistent with NIM stabilization as the yield curve un-inverted.
On valuation: at $16.42, P/E 16.6x and P/TBV ~1.5x for a bank earning ~9% ROE and ~1% ROA is not cheap — it's roughly fair. Regional bank peers (RF, FITB, KEY, CFG) trade in a 10–13x forward P/E band with similar ROEs; HBAN's premium reflects its Midwest deposit franchise quality and the TCF integration payoff, but 16.6x trailing is toward the upper end of the peer set. The synthesis "$18.34 signal-adjusted fair value" implies ~12% upside plus 3.7% yield — a plausible ~15% total return, but that DCF is doing heavy lifting on assumptions about NIM expansion and credit costs that aren't visible in the file. The synthesis's own "high debt risk / interest coverage" flag is a category error for a bank — deposits and FHLB borrowings aren't corporate leverage, and D/E of 0.76 is low for the industry. That flag should be discarded.
The contrarian case is stronger than the narrative layer admits. Bear points the synthesis glosses: (1) 2025 NI of $2.21B is still below 2022's $2.24B despite four years of balance sheet growth — earnings power hasn't structurally advanced, just cyclically recovered; (2) FCF CAGR of -6.2% while reported earnings grow is a yellow flag on earnings quality, though for banks FCF is a noisy metric; (3) ROA of 0.98% is mediocre — best-in-class regionals run 1.2–1.4%; (4) two insider sales on 2026-08-03 (27,570 + 401 shares) with only equity awards offsetting, no open-market buys, tells you insiders don't see $16 as a gift; (5) the CRE exposure common to Midwest regionals isn't quantified anywhere in this file, and office/multifamily credit migration is the live risk into 2026. The "macro headwinds" secondary signal deserves more weight than the steady-compounder narrative gives it — if the Fed holds rates higher for longer, deposit betas re-widen; if they cut aggressively, asset yields compress faster than funding.
I partially agree with the fair_value synthesis but for different reasons than stated. The composite $17–18 range is defensible, but the path to $18+ requires either (a) sustained 10%+ revenue growth continuing past the 2025 base-effect bounce, or (b) multiple expansion that requires the whole regional bank complex to re-rate. Neither is a base case. At $16.42 you're paid 3.7% to wait with a quality operator; downside to $13–14 (1.2x TBV, peer trough multiple) exists if credit normalizes worse than expected. I'd call this fairly valued with a slight positive skew from the dividend and the 2025 earnings inflection — not a table-pounder either way. The narrative model's "anchored / minimal intensity" read is correct: this is a math stock, not a story stock, so trade it on the math. The math says hold if you own it, don't chase it here; wait for $14-handle or evidence that Q1'26 NII momentum extends before adding.
GPT Reading
HBAN looks like a decent bank but not a cheap one. The annual numbers say this is a slow-growth regional franchise: revenue moved from $5.99B in 2021 to $8.13B in 2025, a roughly 8% annualized rise, while net income went from $1.30B to $2.21B, though with no real linearity given $2.24B was already reached in 2022 before slipping to $1.95B in 2023 and recovering. That pattern matters: this is not a compounding machine, it is a cyclical earner whose profits are heavily rate- and credit-sensitive. The headline valuation of 16.6x earnings and 1.51x book is the key tell. For a bank generating just 9.1% ROE and 1.0% ROA, 1.5x tangible economic worth is not obviously attractive. Banks that deserve sustained premiums to book typically earn comfortably above their cost of equity; a 9% ROE business usually does not. On that basis alone, the stock looks fully valued to a bit rich at $16.42.
The raw quarterly data also carries accounting noise that makes me trust the annual picture more than the quarterly one. Quarterly “revenue” of $351M to $472M alongside net income of $474M to $629M produces impossible-looking net margins of 111% to 150%, which for a bank strongly suggests the revenue line here is not economically comparable to a normal operating revenue figure. So I would not build a bullish thesis off the reported 10% recent revenue growth or 14% earnings growth without caution. What I do trust is that full-year net income improved from $1.94B in 2024 to $2.21B in 2025, operating cash flow was a healthy $2.48B, free cash flow was $2.22B, and the balance sheet shows $13.50B of cash against $18.48B of debt with debt/equity at 0.76. That is perfectly serviceable for a bank, but it is not a hidden fortress balance sheet that should command a premium multiple. The market cap of $33.18B versus equity of $24.38B means investors are already paying up by about $8.8B above book for a franchise earning only middling returns.
The best argument for owning HBAN is straightforward: you are getting a profitable, cash-generative regional bank with a 3.7% dividend yield, recent earnings recovery, and no signs in this dataset of acute capital stress. If 2025 earnings of $2.21B are a reasonable base and net income can keep growing high single digits, then a mid-teens P/E is not crazy. On that framing, the stock may even look modestly cheap relative to a fair value around tangible book premium plus dividend carry. A bull would also point out that revenue has held above $7.2B for four straight years despite a turbulent banking backdrop, and that net income in 2025 surpassed both 2023 and 2024. They would say the market is paying for resilience and for normalization if funding costs ease or loan growth improves. I take that seriously, but not enough to get constructive here, because the valuation already assumes a stable outcome while the bank’s actual profitability metrics remain ordinary rather than superior.
The stronger counter to my skepticism is that bank accounting makes generic cash-flow and debt screens misleading, and that the model’s “high debt risk” warning is probably nonsense in context. That is fair: for banks, deposits and liabilities are raw material, not necessarily distress signals, and EV/revenue or traditional FCF frameworks are weak tools. A smart bull would further argue that 1.5x book is acceptable if reported book understates franchise value in deposits, fee relationships, and branch footprint, and that 9% ROE could inflect higher with even modest margin relief. My issue is simple: I need evidence of that inflection before paying for it. If HBAN were nearer 1.2x book or 12x earnings, I would be much more forgiving. At 1.5x book and 16.6x earnings, the upside case requires better returns than the company is presently delivering.
What changes my mind is tangible improvement in returns, not just more quarter-to-quarter noise. If HBAN can push ROE from 9.1% into the 11%-12% range while sustaining annual net income above $2.4B and holding book value growth intact, then today’s price would look more reasonable and perhaps cheap. Conversely, if earnings slip back toward the 2023-2024 range of roughly $1.94B-$1.95B, the current valuation would look stretched and I would want the stock closer to 1.2x book, roughly the low-$13s to mid-$14s using current equity. As it stands, the market is pricing HBAN like a better bank than the reported returns show.
Grok Reading
The quarterly line items are the first red flag and they force a different reading than the models. Reported “revenue” of $351–472M against net income of $523–629M and margins of 110–150% cannot be total bank revenue; the annual series is the only usable top line, and it shows $8.13B in 2025 versus $7.39B in 2024 and a flat $7.25–7.36B in 2022–23. That is real mid-single-digit growth (recent yoy ~10%) after a multi-year plateau, with net income climbing to $2.21B from $1.94B and a clean 27% net margin. Operating cash flow of $2.48B and free cash flow of $2.22B after only $267M of capex confirm the earnings are cash, not accounting. Balance sheet is conventional for a regional: $18.5B debt against $13.5B cash and $24.4B equity, debt-to-equity 0.76, ROE 9.1%, ROA ~1.0%. At $16.42 the stock trades 16.6× earnings, 1.51× book and yields 3.7%. The story the numbers actually tell is a mature regional that has restarted modest top-line expansion and is throwing off reliable cash and a mid-3s dividend, not a growth compounder and not a deep-value special situation.
Where the quantitative stack overreaches is treating a bank like an industrial. The valuation synthesis’s “high debt risk / dangerously low interest coverage” flag is mostly noise: wholesale funding and deposits are the business model, not a refinancing cliff, and FCF coverage of the dividend is comfortable. More material is that a 9% ROE franchise at 1.5× tangible-ish book is not cheap on bank math. A simple justified P/B of (ROE – g)/(r – g) with g around 3% and cost of equity ~10% points closer to 0.9–1.1×; the market is already awarding a premium for stability and the yield. Likewise 16.6× earnings for mid-single-digit earnings CAGR and negative FCF CAGR (–6.2%) is full relative to the historical regional-bank band of roughly 11–14×. The 5.1% revenue CAGR and 6.5% earnings CAGR are real but do not justify a re-rating narrative; they justify a steady 3.7% coupon plus low-single-digit capital appreciation if credit stays clean. Insider flow is noise—small sales and routine awards—and secondary signals correctly flag macro headwinds and below-sector benchmarks. I therefore read the stock as roughly fairly valued with a thin margin of safety at $16.42, not the +8–9% discount the composite DCF implies versus its $17–18 anchors.
The strongest opposing case is straightforward: if net interest margin stabilizes or expands as the Fed finishes cutting and loan growth re-accelerates, the same 9% ROE can drift toward 11–12%, the 1.5× book multiple becomes earned rather than stretched, and the stock can re-rate toward the $18–20 zone the models already float. Bulls will also note that $2.2B of free cash flow easily supports the dividend and leaves room for buybacks or bolt-on deals, that credit costs have not yet spiked in the reported numbers, and that a 3.7% yield with high payout visibility anchors downside better than most financials. I weigh that less heavily because the data already embed a decent year of revenue recovery and the ROE has not broken out of the high-single digits; the market is not ignoring upside so much as refusing to pay for it until it appears in the run-rate. Negative FCF CAGR and the sector’s structural deposit and credit cycle risks keep the bull case conditional rather than base-case.
I would flip to a clear undervalued stance if the next two quarters show net interest margin expansion of 10–15 bp together with ROE sustained above 11% and stable or falling net charge-offs, or if the stock revisits the low-$14s while the dividend and FCF hold. I would flip bearish if cumulative credit costs push ROE sustainably under 8% or if the dividend is cut.
Big-3 Panel — where each AI stands
Advanced Analysis Forensic deep-dive · separate lenses
Huntington shows the profile of a mature regional bank: revenue grew from $5.99B (2021) to $8.13B (2025), net income has been consistently over $1.9B for four straight years, and OCF/NI of 1.36x plus accruals of -0.4% of assets indicate clean earnings. FCF was $2.22B in 2025, supporting the dividend and capital needs without requiring external funding. Earnings quality flags are mostly clean (the Altman Z distress reading is a false positive - the model is not designed for banks). The clear concern is dilution: diluted share count jumped from 1.59B (2024) to 2.18B (2025), a ~37% increase in a single year, almost certainly tied to an acquisition or equity raise rather than routine SBC (SBC is only 1.4% of revenue). This materially dilutes per-share earnings power even as absolute net income held steady. Net debt of -$4.99B is normal for a bank (deposits/borrowings fund the asset base), not a distress signal. Insider activity is neutral - small routine sales, no meaningful buying.
Verify before trusting this (5)
- The nature of the 2025 share issuance - acquisition consideration (e.g., a merger) versus capital raise, and pro forma EPS accretion
- Credit quality metrics: NPL ratio, net charge-offs, allowance coverage - not visible in this data
- Net interest margin trend and deposit cost trajectory
- Regulatory capital ratios (CET1) post-issuance
- Whether the insider sales were 10b5-1 planned or discretionary
The composite fair value of $17.03 sits within 1% of the $16.88 price, and the signal-adjusted FV of $18.34 offers only ~9% upside - well inside the noise band for a regional bank facing NIM compression and credit normalization. The anchored-PE method corroborates at $17.03, so there is no runaway output to discount. This is a textbook fairly-valued read. The Company-Quality lens grades HBAN as Solid (9), which supports the deserved value but does not create cheapness on its own. Meanwhile, the ~36-37% share count jump in 2025 is a real dilution event that should temper any per-share deserved value calculation - the market cap of $33.2B already reflects the larger share base. Earnings quality is good (no haircut needed), but the bear case on deposit flight and credit is not obviously mispriced either way. Bottom line: price and deserved value are shaking hands. To create a real margin of safety on a mid-cap regional bank in a rate-cut/credit-normalization tape, I want at least 15% below deserved, i.e., closer to $14.50.
Verify before trusting this (4)
- Purpose and accretion timeline of the 2025 share issuance (M&A vs capital raise)
- NIM guidance and deposit cost trajectory in latest transcript
- Net charge-off trend and CRE exposure detail
- Buyback capacity once dilution is absorbed
HBAN sits in the quietest corner of the tape: a steady-compounder archetype with minimal narrative intensity and low cult coefficient, meaning there is essentially no story pushing the stock either way. The market regime is mildly constructive (neutral +19, VIX 15.2, S&P near highs), and with a beta of 0.95 the general tape lands on this name at roughly market weight - not amplified, not muted. Nothing in the flow suggests forced buying or forced selling.
Verify before trusting this (4)
- Any crack in regional-bank credit (charge-offs, CRE headlines) that would reignite the 2023-style contagion narrative
- Fed path revisions - a re-steepening curve would flip the NIM narrative from headwind to tailwind
- Analyst target revisions post next earnings - watch for consensus dispersion narrowing
- VIX break above 20 or regime flipping risk-off would hit sector disproportionately
The world is handing regional banks a better hand than 2023-24: a positively sloped curve, deposit-cost relief as policy normalizes, and a re-opened bank M&A approval window. Huntington is using that window deliberately — buying scale in faster-growing Sunbelt markets while its legacy Midwest franchise supplies low-cost funding. That is a coherent response to a mature domestic banking market: if the category only grows 2-4% structurally, growth must come from share and consolidation, and Huntington is executing both. The offsetting reality is that elevated long rates with a soft real economy is exactly the mix that produces credit losses, and the bank's growth is now leveraged to portfolios it did not underwrite. Net: business direction is up, the quality of that growth is more acquisitive and more credit-exposed than a year ago, and the per-share translation is the weak link.
When we made this prediction on Sep 3, 2026, HBAN was $17.01. We expect it to be $17.30 by Mar 2027, and we consider it great value under $14.50. This is an early model (v0.6.0) — the direction is more reliable than the exact price. Made Sep 3, 2026.
Blue is our prediction, starting the day we made it. Grey is a slower route to the same place — the same destination, taking longer. Black is the actual price, so you can see how we are doing.