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What this page is: Delvantic's full research page for United Therapeutics Corporation (UTHR) — AI-driven forensic equity research: mechanical valuation models (DCF, EPV, anchored-PE, scenario) plus three independent AI lenses (Quality / Value / Sentiment). Everything below is rendered server-side; you are not missing content that requires JavaScript. All scores are predictions and research opinions, not financial advice.
Our current read (analysis of 2026-08-23): Designation Watch · Gem Score +13 (−100…+100 Quality+Value blend) · Quality 63 · Value -28 · Sentiment 8 (timing only, not weighted) · Composite fair value $479.59 vs $508.22 at analysis
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profile-header/price-overview— company profile, live quote, market capextended-analysis— the core: three AI lens reads with findings, scores, and the analyst memofuture-predictions— our forward price-band predictionsmarket-narrative/ai-findings/gpt-critique— narrative context, cross-model findings, and an adversarial critique of our own analysis (near the end of the document)- Members-only sections (render as login gates for anonymous readers):
price-history,income-trend,key-metrics,financials(statement tables),insider-trading. The analysis above is public; the raw data tables require a free account.
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any ticker resolves at delvantic.com/stock/TICKER ·
raw inputs are public-company filings and market data (via licensed data feeds);
every model, score, lens read, and prediction on this page is Delvantic's own analysis.
United Therapeutics Corporation
UTHR NASDAQUnited Therapeutics Corporation is a biotechnology company specializing in therapies for pulmonary arterial hypertension (PAH), pulmonary hypertension associated with interstitial lung disease, and other serious conditions. Founded in 1996 and headquartered in Silver Spring, Maryland, the company operates as a public benefit corporation focused on developing innovative treatments and technologies. Its FDA-approved therapeutic portfolio includes Tyvaso (treprostinil), available in both inhalation powder and nebulized formulations; Remodulin Injection; Orenitram Extended-Release Tablets; Adcirca (tadalafil); and Unituxin for treating PAH and related conditions. Beyond traditional pharmaceuticals, United Therapeutics pursues transformational initiatives through its subsidiary Lung Biotechnology PBC to address the critical shortage of transplantable organs through xenotransplantation and bioengineering technologies. The company maintains a robust commercial presence, distributing products through healthcare provider networks and partnerships. Its pipeline includes clinical programs exploring new therapeutic indications, delivery mechanisms, and organ manufacturing solutions. United Therapeutics serves patients, healthcare providers, and research institutions globally, combining steady commercial performance with visionary medical innovation.
Price Overview
Price History (1 Year)
Revenue & Net Income Trend
| Period | Revenue | Net Income | Net Margin | YoY/QoQ |
|---|
Key Metrics
EPS (Diluted): 27.86
Total Equity: $7.10B
Shares: 47,900,000
Total Debt: $0.00
Cash: $1.56B
EBITDA: $1.58B
Total Debt: $0.00
Cash: $1.56B
Revenue: $3.18B
Revenue: $3.18B
Revenue: $3.18B
Total Equity: $7.10B
Tax Rate: 22.1%
Equity: $7.10B
Total Debt: $0.00
Cash: $1.56B
Current Liabilities: $560.60M
Long-Term Debt: $0.00
Total Debt: $0.00
Total Equity: $7.10B
Shares: 47,900,000
Shares: 47,900,000
CapEx: -$520.50M
Shares: 47,900,000
Stock Price: $525.82
Net Income: $1.33B
Industry Benchmarks
Income Statement (Annual)
Last updated: Jul 30, 2026 6:47pm (24d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | $1.7B | $1.9B | $2.3B | $2.9B | $3.2B |
| Cost of Revenue | $122.5M | $151.6M | $257.5M | $309.7M | $384.4M |
| Gross Profit | $1.6B | $1.8B | $2.1B | $2.6B | $2.8B |
| Operating Expenses | $1.0B | $805.0M | $885.1M | $1.2B | $1.3B |
| Operating Income | $555.9M | $979.7M | $1.2B | $1.4B | $1.5B |
| Net Income | $475.8M | $727.3M | $984.8M | $1.2B | $1.3B |
| EBITDA | $605.8M | $1.0B | $1.2B | $1.4B | $1.6B |
| EPS | $10.60 | $15.98 | $21.04 | $26.44 | $30.13 |
| EPS (Diluted) | $10.06 | $15.00 | $19.81 | $24.64 | $27.86 |
Balance Sheet (Annual)
Last updated: Jul 30, 2026 6:26pm (24d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cash & Equivalents | $894.8M | $961.2M | $1.2B | $1.7B | $1.6B |
| Total Current Assets | $2.3B | $3.4B | $3.6B | $3.9B | $3.7B |
| Total Assets | $5.2B | $6.0B | $7.2B | $7.4B | $7.9B |
| Current Liabilities | $305.4M | $343.2M | $804.4M | $738.1M | $560.6M |
| Long-Term Debt | — | — | — | — | — |
| Total Liabilities | $1.2B | $1.2B | $1.2B | $920.0M | $783.8M |
| Total Equity | $4.0B | $4.8B | $6.0B | $6.4B | $7.1B |
| Retained Earnings | $4.3B | $5.0B | $6.0B | $7.2B | $8.6B |
Cash Flow (Annual)
Last updated: Jul 30, 2026 6:47pm (24d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Operating Cash Flow | $598.2M | $802.5M | $978.0M | $1.3B | $1.6B |
| Capital Expenditure | -$120.8M | -$138.8M | -$230.4M | -$246.5M | -$520.5M |
| Free Cash Flow | $477.4M | $663.7M | $747.6M | $1.1B | $1.0B |
| Acquisitions (net) | $0 | $0 | -$89.2M | $0 | $0 |
| Net Debt Issued / (Repaid) | — | — | — | — | — |
| Dividends Paid | — | — | — | — | — |
| Stock Buybacks | — | $0 | $0 | -$1.0B | -$1.0B |
| Net Change in Cash | $156.1M | $66.4M | $246.5M | $489.5M | -$140.1M |
Growth Trends (YoY %)
Last updated: Jul 30, 2026 6:47pm (24d ago)| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue Growth | +14.9% | +20.2% | +23.6% | +10.6% |
| Gross Profit Growth | +14.2% | +16.0% | +24.0% | +9.0% |
| Operating Income Growth | +76.2% | +20.9% | +16.2% | +8.4% |
| Net Income Growth | +52.9% | +35.4% | +21.4% | +11.7% |
| EBITDA Growth | +70.2% | +20.1% | +17.1% | +8.9% |
Deep Analysis
Risk : Reward — if the last quarter repeats
Live · as of 2026-08-19 11:14Even the bull case prices 16% below today — the ratio here measures the model-vs-market gap, not payoff odds. Another quarter like the worst recent one costs 44%.
| Case | Growth | Margin | Fair value | vs price ($508.22) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Bull — recovery | +10% | 35.0% | $425.34 | -16% |
| Base — stabilizes | +7% | 35.0% | $381.44 | -25% |
| Bear — keeps slipping | +3% | 35.0% | $341.29 | -33% |
| Stress — last quarter repeats | -2% | 35.0% | $285.60 | -44% |
Narrative Economics
market-narrative step).
AI Lens 4th lens · how AI reaches this business · 5-yr
2026-08-17AI compresses the design side of hard biology — multiplex gene-edit target selection, immune-rejection prediction, ML on ex vivo organ perfusion data — while the bottleneck assets (designated pathogen-free pig facilities, GMP organ/drug manufacturing, FDA pathway) stay physical and UTHR already owns them.
AI-accelerated discovery arms far better-capitalized rivals attacking PAH with newer mechanisms (activin/BMP pathway biologics) and helps 505(b)(2) and inhaled-device followers design around treprostinil formulations, shortening the cash-cow runway that funds everything else.
Whether computational design measurably pulls forward UKidney/UThymoKidney and lung xeno timelines versus consuming cash for another decade — observable in IND/clinical-cohort progress and preclinical survival durations, not in AI announcements.
FDA approvals plus REMS-grade specialty distribution, treprostinil and dry-powder device manufacturing scale, the DPF xeno pig herd and Lung Bioengineering perfusion network — none of which cheap software can conjure.
AI Lens thesis
UTHR monetizes per-patient chronic prescriptions of physically manufactured prostacyclins delivered via proprietary devices at ~88% gross margin; none of that unit is information-processing, so cheap intelligence cannot substitute the product or disintermediate the prescriber-payer channel. AI reaches the company almost entirely through R&D: it can cut the cost of designing edits, predicting immunogenicity and reading perfusion/registry data, which is precisely the input-constrained part of the organ-manufacturing program, and it simultaneously lowers the design cost for competitors targeting the same PAH patients. Because the scarce things — approvals, liability ownership, sterile manufacturing, live donor animals — are exactly what stays scarce when design becomes abundant, the net structural effect is mildly positive; but the dominant five-year variables here (patent litigation, Winrevair-class competition, moonshot execution) are not AI variables, so exposure is genuinely low.
What the market may be underestimating
Upside UTHR's ex vivo lung perfusion and xeno preclinical datasets are small but almost uniquely proprietary — the exact narrow, hard-to-collect data where a modest model advantage translates into regulatory-grade evidence no entrant can reproduce by scraping.
Downside AI-driven payer utilization management and automated prior-authorization/step-therapy logic can systematically steer patients toward cheaper inhaled treprostinil alternatives faster than a sales force can defend, eroding net price without any change in prescriber intent.
Outcome range spread 38
Growth Outlook
Analyzed 2026-08-17 16:29The question every valuation on this page silently assumes: is this company likely to grow? Judged forward — the business, its category, the world — against what's already printed.
Claude Reading
The raw quarterly tape is the tell here. UTHR printed $799.5M in Q3 2025, then $790.2M, $781.5M, and $783.3M in the two most recent quarters — that's a sequential plateau/mild decline, not the "compounding compounder" the trailing 16.9% revenue CAGR suggests. Year-over-year Q2 2026 vs Q2 2025 is $783.3M vs $798.6M, i.e., -1.9%. The company that grew revenue from $1.69B (2021) to $3.18B (2025) has hit a wall in the last three quarters, and this happens to coincide precisely with sotatercept's commercial ramp. The momentum module's "recent_revenue_yoy: 10.6%" is stale — it's picking up the 2024 comparison, not the actual last two quarters, which are negative. That single fact reframes everything: the pre-flight thesis calling this a "10-15% growth" story is wrong on current data; it's a zero-growth story with a very fat 42% net margin under first competitive attack.
Given that, the synthesis "fair value $479, current $508, -4.5%" reads too generous. At 18x P/E on TTM earnings of ~$1.31B and market cap $21.4B, you're paying a market multiple for a franchise that (a) just went ex-growth, (b) faces a mechanistically differentiated competitor in Merck's Winrevair actively taking share, and (c) has Tyvaso patent/formulation defenses that buy time but not permanence. The thesis-evaluation module's -21 score and the market-forces "damning insider selling" read are closer to right than the synthesis's blandly-neutral composite. 89 insider sales and zero buys on 2026-08-13 alone (option-exercise-and-dump pattern) is not noise — it's what insiders do when they think the multiple is as good as it gets. The balance sheet is genuinely fortress-like ($1.56B cash, zero debt, current ratio 6.6), and FCF of $1.04B is real, but a debt-free cash-rich mature pharma with decelerating-to-negative revenue growth should trade at 12-14x earnings, not 18x — that's a $380-440 fair value range, materially below both current price and the composite.
The contrarian case worth stress-testing: the Q1-Q2 2026 softness could be inventory/channel timing rather than share loss, Tyvaso DPI is still ramping into idiopathic pulmonary fibrosis (a real TAM expansion if the TETON trials read out positively), and the Rothblatt xenotransplant optionality is genuinely non-zero — UKidney and the 10-gene pig program are further along than skeptics grant. If TETON hits and organ manufacturing produces even one FDA-approved product this decade, the $21B market cap looks laughably small. But you're not underwriting that with fundamentals; you're underwriting it with faith, and the narrative module's honest read that only ~5% of price is story-premium suggests the market itself isn't giving much credit to the moonshots either. The stale-data risk cuts both ways: I don't have the sotatercept-vs-Tyvaso Q2 2026 script data, don't know if the plateau is pricing, mix, or volume, and don't have management's guidance color. Those are exactly the numbers that would settle this.
Net: I dissent from the synthesis's "fair value" and side with the thesis-evaluation module. The quarterly trajectory shows the growth engine has stalled at exactly the moment competition arrived, insiders are voting with size, and 18x on a business that may print flat-to-declining revenue for the next 4-6 quarters is not a bargain — it's a rerating candidate. Fair value $420-450 assuming Tyvaso DPI holds the line and sotatercept takes 15-20% share by 2028; downside $340-360 if the plateau turns into an air pocket and sotatercept takes 25%+. The optionality argument doesn't rescue the multiple because you get the optionality for free at $420 too. I'd wait for either (a) two quarters of stabilized/growing revenue proving the plateau was transient, or (b) a $430 handle before starting a position. At $508, the risk/reward is negatively skewed by roughly 2:1.
GPT Reading
What jumps out here is how little the market is paying for a business that has already proven it can grow through the “mature franchise” label. Revenue went from $1.69B in 2021 to $3.18B in 2025, an 88% increase in four years, while net income nearly tripled from $475.8M to $1.33B. This is not a deteriorating specialty pharma milking a patent tail; it is a company compounding at a mid-teens clip with elite profitability. The 2025 numbers are especially strong: gross margin 87.9%, operating margin 46.9%, net margin 41.9%, ROIC 21.0%, and $1.04B of free cash flow after a hefty $520.5M of capex. On the balance sheet, there is no debt and $1.56B of cash. At $21.4B market cap and 18.2x earnings, the stock is being valued more like a stable pharma asset than a business that has delivered 16%-17% CAGR in revenue, earnings, and FCF.
The quarterly pattern also tells a better story than the “decelerating” label implies. Yes, revenue has flattened around the high-$700Ms over the last six quarters—$794.4M, $798.6M, $799.5M, $790.2M, $781.5M, $783.3M—but that comes after a step-up from the 2024 run rate of roughly $742M per quarter in Q3-Q4 2024. In other words, this looks more like digestion after a strong product mix shift than a franchise rolling over. Importantly, earnings are holding at extraordinary levels despite that pause: net margins have ranged from 35.2% to 46.1% in the last six quarters, with the latest quarter at 42.5%. A company posting $333M of quarterly net income on $783M of sales is demonstrating pricing power and operating leverage that the market rarely gets at a low-teens EV/EBITDA multiple. If this were truly ex-growth and vulnerable, I would expect a much sharper collapse in margins or cash generation; instead, operating cash flow was $1.56B in 2025.
I think the market is over-weighting two concerns: that PAH is near a structural peak, and that the “vision” assets are either worthless or a distraction. Even if you assign almost no value to the regenerative medicine and transplant optionality, the core business screens cheap on quality-adjusted terms. EV/revenue of 6.3x for a business with 42% net margins and no leverage is not demanding. A rough owner-earnings lens gets you to a 4.8%-5.0% FCF yield on current market cap, and that is before giving credit for any continued top-line growth. If free cash flow merely grows in the high single digits from the current ~$1.0B base, fair value is above the current price. The market narrative says only a modest premium is being paid for the “moonshot” story; I’d go further and say the stock is basically pricing that optionality at near zero. For a company with this balance sheet and this profitability, that asymmetry is attractive.
The best bear case is straightforward and serious: this is still fundamentally a concentrated PAH franchise, quarterly revenue has stalled around $780M-$800M, and insider selling is conspicuous. If the growth of 2021-2025 was largely a one-time product transition benefit, then 18x earnings is not cheap for a business heading toward patent erosion or competitive encroachment. On that view, the latest two quarters—$781.5M and $783.3M of revenue—matter more than the annual CAGR, because they may be showing the normalized plateau. The large cluster of August sales, while partly linked to an option exercise, gives skeptics an easy signal that management is not pounding the table here. And if future competition compresses net margins from ~42% toward the low 30s, the earnings base investors are capitalizing today would prove too generous.
I weigh those risks differently because the current valuation already discounts a lot of stagnation. A company with no debt, $1.56B cash, 18.8% ROE, 21.0% ROIC, and over $1B of annual FCF does not need heroic assumptions to justify $508. What would change my mind is not more insider noise but operating evidence: two or three consecutive quarters of revenue falling below $750M, annualized net margin slipping under 35%, or free cash flow dropping materially below $900M without a credible reinvestment payoff. Conversely, if revenue resumes even high-single-digit growth off the current ~$3.1B-$3.2B base while margins stay around 40%, the stock should not be at 18x earnings; that would support a re-rating into at least the mid-$500s to low-$600s even before assigning much value to pipeline optionality.
Grok Reading
United Therapeutics at $508 is a high-quality franchise that has stopped growing. Annual revenue scaled from $1.69B in 2021 to $3.18B in 2025 at a 16.9% CAGR with pristine 88% gross and 42% net margins, zero debt, $1.56B cash, and $1.04B of free cash flow. That history is real. The current tape is different: the last six reported quarters sit in a tight $781–800M band, and the first half of 2026 ($1.565B) is already down roughly 1.8% versus the first half of 2025 ($1.593B). Net income followed the same path—$608M in H1 2026 versus $632M a year earlier. Sequential and year-over-year deceleration is no longer a forecast; it is in the print. At 18.2× trailing earnings and 6.3× EV/revenue for a business whose top line has flattened while competitive pressure from sotatercept intensifies, the multiple still prices mid-single-digit compounding that the recent data no longer support.
The balance sheet and cash conversion remain fortress-like—current ratio 6.6, ROIC 21%, operating cash flow $1.56B—so the company can fund its elevated $520M capex (the organ and regenerative programs) without stress. That quality deserves a premium to generic specialty pharma. It does not deserve 18× when revenue has stalled, FCF yield is only ~4.9%, and every visible insider transaction in the latest cluster is a sale following option exercises. The valuation synthesis composite near $485 already flagged a 4–5% overvaluation; the H1 2026 decline makes that gap look understated rather than overstated. The PAH franchise (Tyvaso DPI lifecycle, Remodulin, etc.) still throws off enormous cash and can defend share for several more years, but the growth engine that justified the re-rating from 2021–2024 has visibly cooled.
The strongest contrary case is straightforward: margins are elite and stable, the net-cash balance sheet eliminates distress risk, Tyvaso DPI genuinely extends the runway three to five years, and the market may be over-discounting sotatercept’s share take. A smart bull also notes that $1B-plus FCF and a founder-controlled public-benefit structure give management decades to commercialize the xenotransplant and organ-manufacturing pipeline without capital-market dependence; if those programs produce even one approvable asset, today’s multiple will look cheap in hindsight. I weigh this less heavily because the narrative premium is already embedded (the stock sits modestly above the cash-flow-derived fair-value band) and because the only hard evidence in the last eighteen months is decelerating PAH revenue plus relentless insider selling—not pipeline de-risking. Quality without growth is a bond proxy; at 18× earnings it is an expensive bond proxy.
I would flip to neutral or constructive on two concrete developments: a return to at least mid-single-digit revenue growth for two consecutive quarters (re-acceleration above $820M) that proves the Tyvaso franchise can still expand, or clear clinical/regulatory milestones that pull the organ programs forward by several years and justify treating a larger slice of the market cap as option value. Absent those, the stock is priced for durability it is not currently delivering.
Big-3 Panel — where each AI stands
Claude — Second Response · overvalued revised
VERDICT: Overvalued at $508 — tightening fair value to $440-470 on GPT's margin-durability point; still wait for a sub-$470 handle or two quarters of re-acceleration above $820M
Grok's read essentially converges on my direction with a tighter fair-value band ($470-490 vs my $420-450), and the H1 2026 stack he flagged — $1.565B vs $1.593B, -1.8% — is the same data point I anchored on, so that's mutual reinforcement rather than a challenge. GPT's rebuttal is the one I have to engage seriously, and the argument that actually gave me pause is this: net margins have held at 42.5% in the latest quarter and net income was $333M on $783M of revenue while the plateau was happening. If this were genuine competitive share loss to Winrevair, I'd expect margin compression showing up first — discounting, GTN concessions, higher promotional spend. That's not in the numbers yet. GPT's framing that this looks more like "digestion after a product mix step-up" than a roll-over is a fair alternative reading of the same tape.
But I don't think it survives the multiple question, which is what we're actually debating. GPT's bull case requires the market to re-rate a business that just printed -1.8% H1 YoY to a *higher* multiple than 18x on the argument that margins are elite. Elite margins under first competitive attack are the *setup* for a de-rating, not a defense against one — the market pays for margin durability, and durability isn't proven until you see it hold through a full sotatercept ramp cycle, which we haven't. His $575-625 fair value implicitly capitalizes ~$1B FCF at 20-22x, and I can't get there for a franchise where the *only* hard evidence in the last four quarters is deceleration and insider distribution. His own stated flip-conditions (revenue below $750M, margins under 35%) are asymmetric — those are catastrophe triggers, not evidence triggers, and setting the bar that low is how you stay long into a rerating.
Grok's $470-490 band is probably more defensible than my $420-450 given the margin resilience GPT correctly emphasized. I'll tighten toward it: fair value $440-470, still below $508, still not a buy here. What moved me was the margin-holding-through-plateau data point; what didn't move me was the quality-deserves-a-premium argument, because that's what got the stock to 18x in the first place.
GPT — Second Response · fairly valued changed direction
VERDICT: Revised to roughly fairly valued/slightly overvalued at $508; I’d see better risk/reward around $450-$480, and would only argue >$550 again if revenue reaccelerates above ~$820M for multiple quarters.
Claude and Grok both force a sharper framing than I used: the annual 2021-2025 CAGR is no longer the right anchor if the live issue is whether the franchise has already crossed into flat-to-declining growth under sotatercept pressure. The specific point that moved me is the H1 2026 comparison: $1.565B versus $1.593B in H1 2025, with Q2 2026 down YoY against Q2 2025. I acknowledged a plateau, but I underweighted that the last two reported quarters are not just “digesting” a step-up; they are negative on a YoY basis. That materially weakens my prior claim that the market was valuing a still-clear mid-teens compounder too cheaply. On current evidence, it is more accurate to call this an elite-margin franchise whose growth has stalled exactly as a serious competitor ramps.
What did not move me all the way to a hard bear case is the same thing I liked initially: the core cash economics are exceptional and unusually resilient. A debt-free balance sheet, $1.56B cash, ~42% net margins, and $1.04B FCF mean this is not a broken asset, just one that probably deserves a lower multiple until growth reappears. I’m less persuaded by insider selling as a decisive signal because the option-exercise pattern is common, but I do accept the colleagues’ core multiple argument: 18x earnings is not compelling for a zero-to-negative growth specialty pharma franchise, even one of very high quality. So I am revising from “undervalued” to roughly fairly valued/slightly rich. I’d want either a lower entry around the high-$400s or concrete proof that revenue can reaccelerate above the recent ~$780M-$800M band before getting bullish again.
Grok — Second Response · overvalued revised
VERDICT: Overvalued at $508; fair value now $430-460 on ex-growth 13-14× PE, wait for $440 handle or re-acceleration
The quarterly tape Claude highlights is decisive and underweighted in my first pass. Sequential prints of $799.5M → $790.2M → $781.5M → $783.3M, plus H1 2026 already -1.8% YoY, are not “digestion after a step-up”; they are a clear plateau that coincides with Winrevair’s ramp. That reframes the 16.9% historical CAGR as backward-looking and makes the 18.2× trailing PE look even richer than I initially allowed. Claude’s 12-14× range for a debt-free but now zero-growth specialty franchise is the right peer frame once growth has stalled; applying it to the ~$1.31B TTM earnings base pulls fair value into the mid-$400s rather than my original $470-490 band. Insider selling clusters reinforce the signal rather than noise.
GPT’s quality arguments (elite 42% net margins, fortress balance sheet, $1B+ FCF) are correct and already priced; they do not justify calling $508 undervalued. Holding margins while revenue flattens simply confirms this is still a high-quality cash cow, not evidence the growth engine has reignited. The “optionality is free” claim also fails: at 18× the market is already embedding durability the recent numbers no longer deliver. I would need two quarters back above $820M or a concrete TETON/organ milestone before treating the multiple as supported. Absent that, the risk remains asymmetric to the downside.
Advanced Analysis Forensic deep-dive · separate lenses
UTHR compounds cleanly on every operating dimension the data exposes. Revenue climbed from $1.69B (2021) to $3.18B (2025), a ~17% CAGR, while operating margin expanded from 33% to a 46-51% band and net income nearly tripled to $1.33B. Gross margin has drifted down modestly (92.7% to 87.9%) but remains in specialty-pharma elite territory. Cash conversion is genuine: FCF of $1.04B in 2025, OCF/NI of 1.13x, accruals -1.6% of assets, Beneish M -2.29, Altman Z 19.44 - no mechanical red flags. The balance sheet is a fortress: $2.92B liquid cash, zero net debt, and FCF that fully self-funds the business. Dilution is essentially absent - diluted share count went from 47.3M (2021) to 47.9M (2025), a 0.3% CAGR, with buybacks running 347% of SBC. That is rare discipline for a biotech-adjacent name where SBC (4.6% of revenue) would normally leak through. The clear soft spots are qualitative and outside the numbers: heavy reliance on the Remodulin/Tyvaso PAH franchise (not visible in the provided data but material to durability), and an insider tape showing 92 sales and 0 buys over 12 months, including a cluster of option-exercise-and-sell activity from the founder/chair. Neither breaks the quality thesis, but both cap it below the top tier.
Verify before trusting this (6)
- Revenue concentration by product (Tyvaso, Remodulin, Orenitram, Unituxin) and any patent/exclusivity cliffs
- Whether the 5pt gross margin decline is mix (Tyvaso DPI ramp) or pricing pressure
- Terms and cadence of the buyback program vs SBC issuance
- Whether Rothblatt sales are under a 10b5-1 plan and any other named-executive selling
- Pipeline progress (organ manufacturing, xenotransplantation) and R&D capitalization treatment
- Customer/payer concentration and specialty pharmacy channel exposure
The composite fair value of $479.59 and signal-adjusted FV of $485.47 both sit modestly below the $508.22 price, implying roughly -4% to -6% upside. The methods bracket the answer sensibly: DCF at $464, EPV floor at $331 (a mature-cashflow anchor, not a target), and an anchored-PE at $659 that reflects optimistic multiple assumptions. Averaging away the PE outlier leaves deserved value in the high $400s, which is where the stock trades. Earnings quality is high, so no haircut is warranted, and the strong-business grade supports paying a full multiple - but not a premium to it. What's priced in: continued PAH franchise cash generation, Tyvaso expansion holding off generics/biosimilars, and a modest option value on the regenerative/xenotransplant moonshots. What has to go right to justify today's price is not heroic, but it does assume PAH holds. There is no discernible margin of safety here; the market appears to understand this business.
Verify before trusting this (4)
- Tyvaso DPI script trends and any generic/biosimilar entry timing for treprostinil franchise
- Ralinepag and Tyvaso IPF pipeline readouts - key to justifying growth in DCF
- Capital allocation on xenotransplant/organ manufacturing spend vs buybacks
- Next guidance update on revenue growth durability into 2025-2026
UTHR sits in an unusual sentiment pocket: a low-beta (0.56) healthcare name in a mildly risk-on tape means the market's positive drift transmits weakly here. Rate/PE headwinds also hit this name lightly given its cash-generative PAH base. Net macro pressure is close to neutral. The active narrative is a mission-driven-bet with medium cult coefficient and moderate durability, currently intensity 'strong' but on a moderate-durability foundation - Rothblatt's organ-transplant moonshot gives the stock an identity and a small ~5% narrative premium, but it is not a mania and not visibly cracking either. It sits, it does not press. News flow is quietly supportive: TETON-PPF full enrollment is a clean pipeline milestone that reinforces the near-term PAH-expansion leg of the bull story, and Q2 beat with competitive dynamics acknowledged - neither a euphoria trigger nor a break. Momentum has cooled (10.6% recent vs 16.9% long-term), suggesting the narrative is losing a touch of intensity without breaking. Net: a slight tailwind from a supportive tape and clean news, offset by fading momentum and a mature-franchise overhang. Balanced, leaning faintly positive.
Verify before trusting this (4)
- Any TETON-PPF interim data leak or timing guidance - would sharpen the near-term narrative
- Sell-side target revisions post Q2 - are analysts trimming or holding the moonshot premium
- Signs of generic Tyvaso launch timing shifting - direct hit to the cash-flow anchor of the story
- Whether biotech/PAH peer sentiment rotates (sector flow) - would amplify or dampen the mild tailwind
UTHR monetizes per-patient chronic prescriptions of physically manufactured prostacyclins delivered via proprietary devices at ~88% gross margin; none of that unit is information-processing, so cheap intelligence cannot substitute the product or disintermediate the prescriber-payer channel. AI reaches the company almost entirely through R&D: it can cut the cost of designing edits, predicting immunogenicity and reading perfusion/registry data, which is precisely the input-constrained part of the organ-manufacturing program, and it simultaneously lowers the design cost for competitors targeting the same PAH patients. Because the scarce things — approvals, liability ownership, sterile manufacturing, live donor animals — are exactly what stays scarce when design becomes abundant, the net structural effect is mildly positive; but the dominant five-year variables here (patent litigation, Winrevair-class competition, moonshot execution) are not AI variables, so exposure is genuinely low.
None surfaced.
Verify before trusting this (8)
- Xeno facility capacity buildout
- Device manufacturing scale-up capex
- New approvals or label expansions
- PAH diagnosis and prevalence trends
- PH-ILD label expansion uptake
- US transplant waitlist counts
- New 505(b)(2) PAH filings
- AI-native biotech PAH pipelines
Macro is largely irrelevant to demand here: PAH therapy is a chronic, reimbursed, life-sustaining category insulated from consumer cycles, and a 4.63% 10-year yield affects discounting, not prescriptions. What matters in the outside world is policy and competitive structure — US drug-pricing mechanics compress net price on mature specialty brands over time, while the arrival of both a same-molecule inhaled competitor and a new-mechanism upstream therapy has changed the shape of the PAH market for the first time in roughly a decade. The offsetting world-level fact is that the fibrotic-lung-disease population is large and poorly served, so the one credible re-acceleration path runs through indication expansion rather than through the macro or the existing PAH pool.
When we made this prediction on Aug 18, 2026, UTHR was $508.48. We expect it to be $483.00 by Feb 2027, and we consider it great value under $425.00. This is an early model (v0.6.0) — the direction is more reliable than the exact price. Made Aug 18, 2026.
Blue is our prediction, starting the day we made it. Grey is a slower route to the same place — the same destination, taking longer. Black is the actual price, so you can see how we are doing.