For AI assistants & researchers — machine-readable summary of this page
What this page is: Delvantic's full research page for EchoStar Corp. Class A Common Stock (ECHO) — AI-driven forensic equity research: mechanical valuation models (DCF, EPV, anchored-PE, scenario) plus three independent AI lenses (Quality / Value / Sentiment). Everything below is rendered server-side; you are not missing content that requires JavaScript. All scores are predictions and research opinions, not financial advice.
Our current read (analysis of 2026-10-07): Designation Low · Gem Score -76 (−100…+100 Quality+Value blend) · Quality -86 · Value -68 · Sentiment -68 (timing only, not weighted) · Composite fair value $-222.58 vs $86.44 at analysis
Page map (sections in order; each card carries a stable
reference-name attribute you can cite):
profile-header/price-overview— company profile, live quote, market capextended-analysis— the core: three AI lens reads with findings, scores, and the analyst memofuture-predictions— our forward price-band predictionsmarket-narrative/ai-findings/gpt-critique— narrative context, cross-model findings, and an adversarial critique of our own analysis (near the end of the document)- Members-only sections (render as login gates for anonymous readers):
price-history,income-trend,key-metrics,financials(statement tables),insider-trading. The analysis above is public; the raw data tables require a free account.
More for machine readers: site briefing at
/llms.txt ·
any ticker resolves at delvantic.com/stock/TICKER ·
raw inputs are public-company filings and market data (via licensed data feeds);
every model, score, lens read, and prediction on this page is Delvantic's own analysis.
EchoStar Corp. Class A Common Stock
ECHO NASDAQEchoStar Corp. Class A Common Stock represents ownership in EchoStar, a communications company that serves pay-TV, wireless, broadband, and satellite services markets. The company provides satellite television and streaming-based entertainment services through brands such as DISH and Sling, while also supporting mobile and broadband offerings under Boost Mobile, Gen Mobile, Hughes, and Hughesnet. EchoStar also develops and distributes digital set-top boxes and related products for direct-to-home satellite service providers. Its business spans consumer, enterprise, and connectivity-focused markets, with operations extending across the United States and international regions. EchoStar Corp. Class A Common Stock is used by investors to track a diversified communications business with exposure to subscription video, wireless services, and satellite-based connectivity solutions.
Price Overview
Price History (1 Year)
Revenue & Net Income Trend
| Period | Revenue | Net Income | Net Margin | YoY/QoQ |
|---|
Key Metrics
EPS (Diluted): -50.41
Total Equity: $5.81B
Shares: 287,589,000
Total Debt: $25.98B
Cash: $1.88B
EBITDA: -$16.14B
Total Debt: $25.98B
Cash: $1.88B
Revenue: $15.00B
Shares: 287,589,000
Revenue: $15.00B
Revenue: $15.00B
Revenue: $15.00B
Total Equity: $5.81B
Tax Rate: 23.2%
Equity: $5.81B
Total Debt: $25.98B
Cash: $1.88B
Current Liabilities: $12.36B
Long-Term Debt: $18.66B
Total Debt: $25.98B
Total Equity: $5.81B
Shares: 287,589,000
Shares: 287,589,000
CapEx: -$965.73M
Shares: 287,589,000
Stock Price: $86.44
Net Income: -$14.50B
Industry Benchmarks
Income Statement (Annual)
Last updated: Sep 1, 2026 4:12am (36d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | $2.0B | $2.0B | $17.0B | $15.8B | $15.0B |
| Cost of Revenue | $10.7B | $10.1B | $9.5B | $10.1B | $9.4B |
| Gross Profit | -$8.7B | -$8.1B | $7.5B | $5.7B | $5.6B |
| Operating Expenses | -$8.9B | -$8.3B | $7.8B | $6.0B | $23.3B |
| Operating Income | $217.0M | $189.6M | -$277.9M | -$304.1M | -$17.7B |
| Net Income | — | — | -$1.7B | -$119.5M | -$14.5B |
| EBITDA | $1.4B | $406.3M | $1.3B | $1.6B | -$16.1B |
| EPS | $0.81 | $2.10 | $-6.28 | $-0.44 | $-50.41 |
| EPS (Diluted) | $0.81 | $2.10 | $-6.28 | $-0.44 | $-50.41 |
Balance Sheet (Annual)
Last updated: Sep 1, 2026 4:00am (36d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cash & Equivalents | $535.9M | $704.5M | $1.8B | $4.3B | $1.9B |
| Total Current Assets | $1.9B | $2.1B | $4.9B | $8.1B | $5.1B |
| Total Assets | $6.0B | $6.2B | $57.1B | $60.9B | $43.0B |
| Current Liabilities | $460.1M | $422.8M | $8.0B | $5.8B | $12.4B |
| Long-Term Debt | $1.5B | $1.5B | $19.7B | $25.7B | $18.7B |
| Total Liabilities | $2.6B | $2.6B | $36.7B | $40.7B | $37.2B |
| Total Equity | $3.4B | $3.6B | $20.4B | $20.2B | $5.8B |
| Retained Earnings | $656.5M | $833.5M | $11.7B | $11.6B | -$2.9B |
Cash Flow (Annual)
Last updated: Sep 1, 2026 4:36am (36d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Operating Cash Flow | $632.2M | $529.6M | $2.4B | $1.3B | -$99.4M |
| Capital Expenditure | -$438.4M | -$325.9M | -$3.1B | -$1.5B | -$965.7M |
| Free Cash Flow | $193.8M | $203.7M | -$668.3M | -$292.2M | -$1.1B |
| Acquisitions (net) | — | — | — | — | — |
| Net Debt Issued / (Repaid) | $6.8B | $2.0B | $1.5B | $5.4B | $150.0M |
| Dividends Paid | — | — | — | — | — |
| Stock Buybacks | -$261.4M | -$89.3M | — | — | -$48.5M |
| Net Change in Cash | -$359.9M | $169.0M | -$650.2M | $2.7B | -$2.4B |
Growth Trends (YoY %)
Last updated: Sep 1, 2026 4:12am (36d ago)| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue Growth | +0.6% | +751.6% | -7.0% | -5.2% |
| Gross Profit Growth | +7.1% | +192.5% | -24.2% | -2.3% |
| Operating Income Growth | -12.6% | -246.5% | -9.4% | -5,728.6% |
| Net Income Growth | — | — | +93.0% | -12,026.9% |
| EBITDA Growth | -71.6% | +224.9% | +23.2% | -1,092.4% |
Deep Analysis
Risk : Reward — upside vs downside from this company's own quarters
Computed 2026-09-18 02:42A +1σ run of quarters pays -768%; a −1σ run costs 100%. Ratio -7.7:1 (μ 43.9%, σ 197.8% , 16 pairs).
Older method (repeat-worst-quarter): -0.8 : 1
| Case | Growth | Margin | Fair value | vs price ($86.44) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Bull — recovery | -3% | 12.4% | $21.11 | -76% |
| Base — stabilizes | -6% | 10.8% | $12.79 | -85% |
| Bear — keeps slipping | -9% | 9.2% | $5.85 | -93% |
| Stress — last quarter repeats | -4% | -38.7% | $0.00 | -100% |
| Upside — a +1σ run of quarters (v2) | +50% | -30.5% | $-577.51 | -768% |
| Stress — a −1σ run of quarters (v2) | -50% | -38.7% | $0.00 | -100% |
Narrative Economics
market-narrative step).
Growth Outlook
Analyzed 2026-09-01 05:13The question every valuation on this page silently assumes: is this company likely to grow? Judged forward — the business, its category, the world — against what's already printed.
Claude Reading
The raw numbers here don't describe a "pre-profit growth" company — that classification is simply wrong. EchoStar did $15.0B in 2025 revenue, down from $15.83B in 2024 and $17.02B in 2023: this is a shrinking legacy business, not a pre-profit ramp. Q2 2026's $8.46B "net income" on $3.58B revenue is almost certainly a gain on asset sale (the July 2026 gift transactions of 13M+ shares and the timing align with the widely-reported AT&T/SpaceX spectrum monetization events); it is not operating earnings and should be entirely discounted. Strip that out and the trailing four quarters still show operating losses on decelerating revenue (-5.2% YoY most recently, -6.1% CAGR). Gross margin has compressed from ~44% in 2023 to 37% in 2025. Operating cash flow was negative $99M and FCF was negative $1.07B on a $26B debt stack against $1.88B cash and a 0.42 current ratio. That is a balance sheet under duress, not a growth story.
The synthesis verdict ("Priced for Perfection") and the market-forces call ("distressed liquidation masquerading") are directionally right but they were written before — or without properly weighting — the fact that spectrum monetization has actually begun. The July 2026 insider gift activity (two blocks of 5M shares, two blocks of 1.5M shares — Ergen family estate planning, almost certainly) coincides with realized spectrum value events that management can now point to as validation of the sum-of-parts thesis. That's why the stock is at $86 and not $30. The thesis-evaluation model's -16 score with 72-weighted "spectrum floor" bull argument now has an empirical anchor it didn't have six months ago. The synthesis correctly flags the 5-10% historical success rate for these transformations, but the specific bear argument "fourth carrier has never worked" is being partially neutralized as EchoStar sheds the fourth-carrier pretense and becomes a spectrum landlord/MVNO — a materially different (and higher-probability) business model.
The contrarian case against every model here: this may not be a transformation bet at all — it may be a controlled wind-down where equity holders get paid via serial asset sales before creditors force the issue. If Boost is deprioritized and spectrum is monetized in tranches, the $26B debt becomes manageable and residual equity could exceed current market cap. But — and this is where I side with the skeptics — the $25.11B market cap already prices in successful execution of that plan. Book value is $5.81B, so P/B of 4.27 is not distressed; it's optimistic. For $86 to be justified, spectrum + Hughes + residual DISH cash flows net of debt must clear ~$25B in NPV terms, which requires spectrum realizations closer to the high end of published estimates ($30-40B gross) and continued satellite/pay-TV cash generation through wind-down. That's plausible but not the base case. The narrative-economics read of "unanchored, fragile, moderate intensity" is correct — one bad quarterly print or a stalled spectrum deal collapses this.
I partially agree with the synthesis. "Priced for Perfection" overstates it — $86 is priced for a good outcome, not a perfect one, and recent spectrum deals give the bull case actual proof points the models haven't fully digested. But I do not think it's undervalued. Insider selling (small dollar amounts but consistent) plus massive gifting (estate planning ahead of what?) is not a confidence signal. Negative operating cash flow with $26B debt in a rising-rate environment remains the core risk. Fair value is probably $55-70 assuming base-case spectrum realizations and orderly wind-down of pay-TV; upside to $110-130 requires the wireless pivot or premium spectrum sale to materialize. Risk-reward is roughly symmetric with a fat left tail (distressed recap wipes equity to $20s). Not a short given ongoing spectrum catalysts, not a long given valuation already reflects the bull thesis. If forced, I lean modestly overvalued.
GPT Reading
At $86.44, the first thing I cannot get comfortable with is that this equity is being valued at $25.1B while the operating business, as shown here, is neither growing nor self-funding. Revenue fell from $17.02B in 2023 to $15.83B in 2024 and $15.00B in 2025, a two-year decline of roughly 12%. The quarterly run-rate keeps slipping too: $3.97B in 4Q24, $3.87B in 1Q25, $3.72B in 2Q25, $3.61B in 3Q25, $3.80B in 4Q25, $3.67B in 1Q26, and $3.58B in 2Q26. That is not a business proving a turnaround; it is a business shrinking at the top line while carrying telecom-scale leverage. Gross profit is still positive at $5.56B in 2025, but that only makes the operating line more alarming: operating loss of $17.72B and net loss of $14.50B on $15.00B of sales. Even allowing for huge non-cash impairments, a company with debt of $25.98B, cash of just $1.88B, current ratio of 0.42, and free cash flow of negative $1.07B does not get the benefit of hand-waving away accounting losses.
What stands out most is the mismatch between the “pre-profit growth” style framing and the actual data. This is not behaving like a classic pre-profit grower sacrificing earnings for expansion while revenue compounds at 20-30%; it looks more like a mature, declining revenue base trying to finance a strategic pivot with a stressed balance sheet. The 2025 revenue base of $15B against an enterprise value implied by EV/revenue of 3.26x suggests the market is effectively assigning nearly $49B of enterprise value to a company with negative operating earnings and negative free cash flow. That can only make sense if hidden asset value is both large and monetizable. Maybe it is, but the operating statements alone do not support this price. Book value is only $5.81B, so the stock trades at 4.28x book despite deeply negative ROE and ROIC. For a telecom with capital intensity still near $966M of capex in 2025 and no demonstrated earnings power, that is rich, not cheap.
The wild quarterly net income swings reinforce my skepticism rather than reduce it. A $12.78B loss in 3Q25 followed by a $1.21B loss in 4Q25 and then a $8.46B profit in 2Q26 tells me the income statement is being dominated by revaluations, impairments, or one-time items. In other words, the headline profit in the most recent quarter is not evidence that the business has turned. If anything, the better anchor is cash generation, and cash generation is poor: operating cash flow was negative $99M for 2025, and after nearly $1.0B of capex, free cash flow was negative by more than $1B. A leveraged telecom can survive ugly GAAP if EBITDA and cash conversion are strong; here, the data provided does not show that cushion. When the stock is already at $25B market cap, investors are paying now for a restructuring outcome that has not shown up in either revenue stabilization or cash flow.
The strongest case against my bearish read is straightforward: the market may not care about current earnings because it is valuing non-income-statement assets and strategic optionality. With debt roughly equal to market cap, the equity could still be worth far more than conventional multiples imply if spectrum, satellite infrastructure, and network assets have scarcity value well above book. The odd annual history also hints at transformative transactions that make backward comparisons noisy, so the 2023-2025 revenue decline may understate integration potential or overstate legacy business deterioration. And the latest quarter’s $8.46B net income, however nonrecurring it may be, could reflect real balance-sheet repair or asset markups that narrow solvency risk. If a strategic buyer would pay aggressively for spectrum or if management can monetize assets without destroying the operating base, then 1.66x sales is not obviously absurd for a collection of hard-to-replicate communications assets.
I still weigh those arguments lower because the burden of proof is now on execution and liquidity, not theoretical asset value. To change my mind, I would want to see at least two consecutive quarters with revenue no worse than flat year over year, positive operating income excluding special items, and positive operating cash flow that comfortably covers capex. More concretely, if quarterly revenue can hold around $3.6B-$3.8B instead of continuing to drift down, and annual free cash flow can move from negative $1.07B to breakeven or better without asset fire sales, then the transformation case becomes investable. Short of that, any catalyst tied to asset value needs to be explicit: a large spectrum sale, a refinancing that materially extends maturities at acceptable cost, or a disclosed transaction that proves equity value above today’s price. Until one of those happens, $86 looks like a price built on optionality while the underlying business is still deteriorating.
Grok Reading
EchoStar at $86.44 and a $25.11B market cap is a leveraged spectrum option wrapped in a shrinking telecom. Revenue has slid from $17.02B in 2023 to $15.00B in 2025 and is still falling at a roughly −5% to −6% clip (recent quarterly run-rate $3.58–3.67B versus $3.8–4.0B a year earlier). The sole bright print—$8.46B net income in the June 2026 quarter on a 237% margin—is almost certainly a one-time asset or spectrum-related gain, not operating earnings; the prior five quarters produced cumulative losses exceeding $14B, including a −$12.78B wipeout. Annual 2025 operating income was −$17.72B, free cash flow −$1.07B, and operating cash flow still negative. Gross margin near 37% is serviceable; everything below the gross line is broken. With $25.98B of debt, $1.88B of cash, a current ratio of 0.42 and debt-to-equity of 4.5×, the capital structure leaves almost no room for execution error. Enterprise value near $49B on declining, loss-making sales implies the market is capitalizing spectrum and a Boost Mobile buildout that has never demonstrated scale economics in a three-carrier U.S. wireless market.
The numbers do not support an ongoing concern valued on cash flows. Negative ROE, ROIC and ROA, an EV/EBITDA that is meaningless because EBITDA itself is negative, and a −6% revenue CAGR confirm secular pay-TV erosion is outrunning any Hughes broadband or Boost contribution. Capex of nearly $1B against negative operating cash flow means the wireless pivot is being debt-funded while legacy cash generation shrinks. Insider activity is noise—large gifts and small option-related sales—not a vote of confidence. Prior model labels of “pre-profit growth” and “priced for perfection” understate the problem: this is not a young compounder burning cash for growth; it is a post-acquisition conglomerate whose core DISH-derived revenue base is in structural decline and whose transformation thesis has produced no clean proof points after years of narrative.
The smart opposing case is straightforward and must be weighed. Spectrum holdings acquired with DISH are real, scarce, and historically valued by strategics in the mid-teens to low-twenties of billions; a full or partial monetization, Open RAN cost takeout, or carrier takeout could clear a large fraction of the $26B debt stack and leave residual equity. The June 2026 $8.5B gain may be the first visible step in that monetization, and the stock’s roughly two-thirds drawdown from its 52-week high already embeds substantial distress. Book equity will have jumped on that gain, so trailing P/B looks less punitive on a refreshed basis. If wholesale network economics work and Boost stops being a share donor, the fourth-carrier graveyard argument weakens. I discount this path because fourth-carrier attempts in the U.S. have a near-zero success rate, debt service and refinancing risk dominate near-term cash, and every quarter of −5% revenue and billion-dollar FCF burn erodes the equity option’s time value. Asset value that can only be realized in a forced sale or bankruptcy is not the same as investable upside at a $25B equity capitalization.
I would flip to neutral or constructive only on clear evidence that spectrum is being sold or leased at prices that materially delever the balance sheet, that quarterly free cash flow turns sustainably non-negative without one-time gains, or that Boost posts several consecutive quarters of accelerating net subscriber adds and rising ARPU while pay-TV losses decelerate. Absent those prints, $86 still overvalues a shrinking, cash-burning operator whose equity is a high-beta claim on assets already encumbered by debt larger than the market cap.
Big-3 Panel — where each AI stands
Advanced Analysis Forensic deep-dive · separate lenses
EchoStar (post-DISH merger) is a capital-intensive telecom carrying roughly $26B of net debt against $2.98B of liquid cash, with $7.32B of short-term debt already exceeding cash on hand. Revenue has actually contracted from $17.0B (2023) to $15.0B (2025) while operating margin collapsed to -118% and net income to -$14.5B in 2025 (impairments/write-downs implied). Free cash flow has gone the wrong way every year post-merger: +$204M (2022) to -$668M, -$292M, and -$1.07B in 2025. Runway math is roughly 11 quarters absent refinancing or asset sales.
Verify before trusting this (6)
- Maturity schedule and covenants on the $7.32B short-term debt and total debt stack
- Nature of the $14.5B 2025 net loss - impairment composition vs. cash operating losses
- Progress and terms of any spectrum monetization or partnership (e.g., AT&T/other carriers)
- Capex trajectory for 5G network buildout obligations and FCC milestone commitments
- Segment-level cash generation (Hughes, Boost Mobile, DISH TV) to isolate the melting-ice-cube pieces
- Any covenants or triggers tied to Ergen family share transfers/trust restructurings
The e2e synthesis flags ECHO as priced for a wireless turnaround requiring the $8B+ spectrum stack to monetize in a saturated market. That is a heroic assumption to embed in a $25.1B market cap when the underlying business is losing $14.5B, burning cash, and has more than tripled its share count. Deserved value here is essentially an option on Ergen's spectrum/asset monetization minus the drag from shrinking pay-TV and a sub-scale Boost Mobile - a wide, low-confidence range that most reasonable bridges land below today's price.
Verify before trusting this (4)
- Any spectrum sale, lease, or network-services deal terms and proceeds
- Boost Mobile net adds and postpaid ARPU trajectory
- Free cash flow guidance and refinancing plans for near-term maturities
- Segment-level EBITDA excluding one-offs to see the true run-rate cash engine
ECHO carries a fragile, low-cult turnaround story into a mildly risk-on tape, but the tape is doing little to lift a name whose narrative is actively deteriorating. Momentum is strong-negative (-6.1% CAGR, -86.6pp over three years) and D/E has ballooned from 1.12 to 4.47 - that is the kind of leverage print that keeps generalist money away and forces the story to defend itself rather than compound. With beta near 1.0 and a communications-services domicile, the macro crosswinds are ordinary; the pressure here is idiosyncratic and narrative-driven. The only visible news pulse is a Sling college-football marketing push - promotional, not thesis-changing, and does nothing to address the spectrum/Boost monetization questions the story actually hinges on. Analyst tone is quiet rather than supportive, and 'hidden asset' turnaround tales without a fresh catalyst tend to bleed sentiment quietly. Net: a persistent, ordinary-to-moderate headwind - not a crash force, but a tape that keeps marking the story lower until a real spectrum or wireless catalyst lands.
Verify before trusting this (5)
- Any concrete spectrum monetization headline (sale, lease, partnership) that would harden the narrative
- Boost Mobile subscriber trajectory and any wireless partnership news
- Debt refinancing or covenant headlines given the D/E jump
- Shift in analyst target revisions or a downgrade cluster that would confirm sentiment breakdown
- Sector rotation into or out of legacy pay-TV/satellite names
The world is moving connectivity spend from linear video to mobile data and broadband — the exact direction EchoStar is trying to pivot into, but from the wrong starting mass. Two forces matter specifically here: (1) host-network and satellite-direct-to-device arrangements are collapsing the cost of being a wireless retailer, which favors an asset-light Boost far more than the old build-your-own-network plan; (2) linear video substitution is terminal, so the pay-TV cash engine is a melting-ice funding source, not a base. Macro is a headwind for a levered issuer: a 4.73% 10-year raises the cost of bridging the transition. Net world read: the strategic direction is aligned with where demand is going, the arithmetic of the current revenue mix is not, and the gap is measured in years.
When we made this prediction on Sep 1, 2026, ECHO was $86.28. We expect it to be $62.00 by Mar 2027, and we consider it great value under $55.00. This is an early model (v0.6.0) — the direction is more reliable than the exact price. Made Sep 1, 2026.
Blue is our prediction, starting the day we made it. Grey is a slower route to the same place — the same destination, taking longer. Black is the actual price, so you can see how we are doing.