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What this page is: Delvantic's full research page for Corpay Inc. (CPAY) — AI-driven forensic equity research: mechanical valuation models (DCF, EPV, anchored-PE, scenario) plus three independent AI lenses (Quality / Value / Sentiment). Everything below is rendered server-side; you are not missing content that requires JavaScript. All scores are predictions and research opinions, not financial advice.
Our current read (analysis of 2026-09-21): Designation Watch · Gem Score +3 (−100…+100 Quality+Value blend) · Quality 34 · Value -17 · Sentiment -5 (timing only, not weighted) · Composite fair value $465.44 vs $407.88 at analysis
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Corpay Inc.
CPAY NYSECorpay Inc. is a global corporate payments company that provides specialized payment and expense management solutions for businesses and consumers. Corpay’s current offerings center on helping organizations control and automate spending across vehicle-related expenses, corporate payables, lodging, and cross-border transactions. Its product suite includes commercial cards, accounts payable automation, virtual cards, invoice and payment tools, foreign exchange and currency risk management, and mobility-focused payment solutions such as fuel, toll, parking, and EV charging payments. The company serves a wide range of industries that rely on controlled spending, streamlined vendor payments, and international money movement. Corpay Inc. also supports travel and workforce lodging needs through dedicated payment solutions. Headquartered in Atlanta, Georgia, Corpay plays a significant role in the business payments market by combining digital workflows, payments infrastructure, and spend controls to simplify how organizations manage everyday financial operations.
Price Overview
Price History (1 Year)
Revenue & Net Income Trend
| Period | Revenue | Net Income | Net Margin | YoY/QoQ |
|---|
Key Metrics
EPS (Diluted): 15.03
Total Equity: $4.23B
Shares: 71,058,000
Total Debt: $10.00B
Cash: $2.41B
EBITDA: $2.39B
Total Debt: $10.00B
Cash: $2.41B
Revenue: $4.53B
Revenue: $4.53B
Revenue: $4.53B
Total Equity: $4.23B
Tax Rate: 30.5%
Equity: $4.23B
Total Debt: $10.00B
Cash: $2.41B
Current Liabilities: $14.30B
Long-Term Debt: $6.66B
Total Debt: $10.00B
Total Equity: $4.23B
Shares: 71,058,000
Shares: 71,058,000
CapEx: -$200.76M
Shares: 71,058,000
Stock Price: $407.88
Net Income: $1.07B
Industry Benchmarks
Income Statement (Annual)
Last updated: Aug 30, 2026 5:38am (22d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | $2.8B | $3.4B | $3.8B | $4.0B | $4.5B |
| Cost of Revenue | — | — | — | — | — |
| Gross Profit | — | — | — | — | — |
| Operating Expenses | $485.8M | $584.1M | $603.4M | $616.9M | $733.0M |
| Operating Income | $1.2B | $1.4B | $1.7B | $1.8B | $2.0B |
| Net Income | $839.5M | $954.3M | $981.9M | $1.0B | $1.1B |
| EBITDA | $1.5B | $1.8B | $2.0B | $2.1B | $2.4B |
| EPS | $10.23 | $12.62 | $13.42 | $14.27 | $15.23 |
| EPS (Diluted) | $9.99 | $12.42 | $13.20 | $13.97 | $15.03 |
Balance Sheet (Annual)
Last updated: Aug 30, 2026 5:30am (22d ago)| Metric | 2023 | 2023 | 2024 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cash & Equivalents | — | $1.4B | — | $1.6B | $2.4B |
| Total Current Assets | $7.3B | $7.1B | — | $8.7B | $14.0B |
| Total Assets | $15.7B | $15.5B | — | $18.0B | $26.4B |
| Current Liabilities | $7.1B | $6.8B | — | $8.7B | $14.3B |
| Long-Term Debt | — | $4.6B | — | $5.2B | $6.7B |
| Total Liabilities | — | $12.2B | — | $14.8B | $22.2B |
| Total Equity | — | $3.3B | — | $3.1B | $4.2B |
| Retained Earnings | $7.9B | $8.2B | — | $9.2B | $10.3B |
Cash Flow (Annual)
Last updated: Aug 30, 2026 5:50am (22d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Operating Cash Flow | $1.2B | $754.8M | $2.1B | $1.9B | $1.5B |
| Capital Expenditure | -$111.5M | -$151.4M | -$153.8M | -$175.2M | -$200.8M |
| Free Cash Flow | $1.1B | $603.4M | $1.9B | $1.8B | $1.3B |
| Acquisitions (net) | -$602.1M | -$216.9M | -$428.3M | -$821.9M | $1.9B |
| Net Debt Issued / (Repaid) | $1.9B | $3.0B | $0 | $825.0M | $1.7B |
| Dividends Paid | — | — | — | — | — |
| Stock Buybacks | -$1.4B | -$1.4B | -$686.9M | -$1.3B | -$782.8M |
| Net Change in Cash | $774.1M | $38.5M | $852.4M | $1.3B | $4.5B |
Growth Trends (YoY %)
Last updated: Aug 30, 2026 5:38am (22d ago)| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue Growth | +20.9% | +9.6% | +5.8% | +13.9% |
| Gross Profit Growth | — | — | — | — |
| Operating Income Growth | +16.4% | +14.5% | +7.9% | +11.6% |
| Net Income Growth | +13.7% | +2.9% | +2.2% | +6.6% |
| EBITDA Growth | +15.9% | +12.7% | +7.3% | +11.7% |
Deep Analysis
Risk : Reward — upside vs downside from this company's own quarters
Computed 2026-09-18 02:42A +1σ run of quarters pays -15%; a −1σ run costs 55%. Ratio -0.3:1 (μ 16.2%, σ 7.5% , 16 pairs).
Older method (repeat-worst-quarter): 0.3 : 1
| Case | Growth | Margin | Fair value | vs price ($407.88) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Bull — recovery | +31% | 26.1% | $453.09 | +11% |
| Base — stabilizes | +21% | 22.7% | $296.52 | -27% |
| Bear — keeps slipping | +10% | 19.3% | $187.94 | -54% |
| Stress — last quarter repeats | +14% | 22.3% | $238.60 | -42% |
| Upside — a +1σ run of quarters (v2) | +24% | 24.4% | $347.28 | -15% |
| Stress — a −1σ run of quarters (v2) | +9% | 19.8% | $183.31 | -55% |
Narrative Economics
market-narrative step).
Growth Outlook
Analyzed 2026-08-30 05:58The question every valuation on this page silently assumes: is this company likely to grow? Judged forward — the business, its category, the world — against what's already printed.
Claude Reading
Looking at the raw quarterly tape first: revenue climbed from $1.03B (Q3'24) to $1.34B (Q2'26) — roughly 30% over seven quarters, or ~15% annualized, with sequential acceleration in the last two prints ($1.25B → $1.26B → $1.34B). That's not deceleration, that's re-acceleration. But net income is choppy: $350M in Q1'26 collapsed to $248M in Q2'26 despite revenue *growing* $80M sequentially. Margin compressed from 27.8% to 18.5% in one quarter — that's a 930bp drop on rising revenue, which is either a one-time charge, integration cost, or something uglier. TTM NI is roughly $1.14B; at $26.78B market cap that's ~23.5x earnings, not 27x. EV including $10B debt net of $2.4B cash gets you ~$34.4B EV, ~17x TTM EBIT of ~$2B. Not cheap for 10% revenue CAGR and mid-single-digit earnings CAGR, not egregious either.
The prior models are internally inconsistent and I want to flag it. Pre-flight calls it "decelerating growth and margin compression" — the recent-YoY revenue is +13.9% and the sequential Q2'26 print accelerated, so "decelerating" is stale framing from the annual lens. Market Forces goes nuclear ("destroying shareholder value... aggressive accounting... growth-at-any-cost") which is wildly inconsistent with FCF Quality flagged as "Strong" in the same output block and with $1.30B FCF on $4.53B revenue (28.7% FCF margin — elite). You can't have "aggressive accounting masking weakness" and "strong cash flow quality" simultaneously; one of these signals is garbage. I'd trust the cash number. However, fcf_cagr of -18.3% is real and matters — FCF has deteriorated from prior peaks even as reported earnings held up, which suggests working capital absorption from float/receivables in the payments book, or acquisition-related cash drag. That deserves scrutiny before dismissing the Market Forces alarm entirely.
The contrarian case worth taking seriously: debt/equity of 2.37, $10B gross debt against $4.23B equity and ~$2B operating income means interest coverage is likely 4-5x — adequate but not comfortable in a higher-for-longer rate regime. ROA of 4.05% versus ROE of 25.3% is pure leverage arithmetic; strip the leverage and this is a mid-teens returns business trading at 6.85x book. The insider tape on 8/18/2026 is textbook option-exercise-and-sell (matched share counts: 9,600 exercised → 9,600 sold; 2,463 → 2,463) — mechanical, not a signal. But zero open-market buying across the window is its own tell for a "steady compounder" narrative — insiders aren't accumulating at $408 either. Bear case for real: if the Q2'26 margin compression is structural (competition from Stripe verticals eating vehicle/fleet, FX spreads compressing), then 18.5% net margin is the new baseline and forward EPS is closer to $14-15, putting fair PE-25x value at $350-375, not $445.
I partially dissent from the synthesis "fair value $435" verdict — the composite feels anchored to a DCF that likely assumes margin normalization back to 24-26%, which the Q2'26 print calls into question. The narrative layer nailed it: this is a boring compounder where the absence of story is the story, and that caps multiple expansion. My read: at $408 you're paying ~18x forward EBIT for 10-12% revenue growth, mid-single-digit earnings growth, elite FCF conversion (when it shows up), and meaningful balance sheet leverage. That's fair, maybe modestly cheap if the margin dip reverses next quarter, modestly expensive if it doesn't. The synthesis's +6.8% upside is within noise. I wouldn't chase here; I'd want either (a) Q3'26 margin recovery back above 22% confirming Q2 was one-time, or (b) a pullback to $360-370 which would compress the multiple to a genuine margin of safety. The FCF trajectory is the key thing to watch — if -18.3% CAGR persists another year, the whole compounder thesis breaks.
GPT Reading
What jumps out first is that Corpay is still executing like a high-quality compounder operationally, but the stock is no bargain because the market already pays for most of that quality. Revenue has stepped up from $3.97B in 2024 to $4.53B in 2025, a solid 14% annual increase, and the quarterly run-rate has kept improving into 2026: $1.26B in Q1 and $1.34B in Q2 versus $1.01B and $1.10B in the comparable 2025 quarters. That is 24.8% and 21.8% year-over-year growth in the first half, stronger than the “mature earner” label suggests. Operating profit also expanded from $1.79B to $1.99B in 2025, keeping operating margin at an elite 44.0%. This is not a business masking weak economics with top-line growth; it is a genuinely high-margin payments/software hybrid with real scale advantages and good conversion of earnings into cash.
But the part that keeps me from calling it clearly undervalued is that the earnings quality is good, not pristine, and the valuation is not cheap enough to forgive that. Net income growth has lagged revenue growth: from $1.00B in 2024 to $1.07B in 2025, only 7%, and the quarterly margin trend in 2026 is wobblier than the revenue trend. Net margin was 25.8% in Q2 2025 and fell to 18.5% in Q2 2026; even if Q1 2026 was unusually strong at 27.8%, the two-quarter picture says revenue acceleration is not dropping through cleanly to the bottom line. At $26.8B market cap and 27.1x earnings, 6.4x sales, and 15.2x EV/EBITDA, the stock is priced for continued low-double-digit earnings compounding and stable margins. That is plausible, but not obviously conservative when free cash flow was $1.30B in 2025 against $10.0B of debt and only $2.41B of cash. Net debt of roughly $7.6B is manageable for this margin structure, yet it meaningfully reduces room for error if rates stay high or acquisition integration disappoints.
The raw cash numbers are supportive but also expose the limit of the bull case. Operating cash flow of $1.50B and free cash flow of $1.30B are strong in absolute terms, implying about a 4.9% FCF yield on market cap, respectable but hardly distressed. Return metrics are good where they should be good—25.3% ROE and 11.7% ROIC—but the balance sheet is doing some of that work, with debt/equity at 2.37x and a current ratio just under 1.0. For a stable payments platform, that leverage is acceptable; for a 27x earnings stock, it matters. I read Corpay as a very good business trading around fair value, maybe a touch rich if one assumes 2026 margin pressure is structural rather than temporary. The numbers support a stock somewhere around the high $300s to low $400s, not a big rerating vehicle from here.
The best counterargument is straightforward: the market may still be underestimating how much growth is left. If you annualize the first half of 2026, Corpay is tracking near $5.2B in revenue, which would be roughly 15% above 2025 even before considering any seasonal strength. A company growing 15%-plus with 44% operating margins, $1B-plus annual net income, and sticky B2B payment flows often deserves a premium multiple. On that framing, 15x EV/EBITDA is not demanding, especially if acquisitions and cross-sell in AP, travel, and FX keep organic growth elevated. I also would not lean too heavily on the insider sales; most of the disclosed activity looks like option exercise-related disposals rather than discretionary open-market dumping. If margins normalize back toward the 23%-26% quarterly net margin range seen through most of 2025, the current multiple could look undemanding.
What would change my mind is fairly specific. If the next two quarters show revenue still above 15% year-over-year while net margin recovers back above 23% and free cash flow tracks toward $1.5B-$1.6B annualized, then today’s price would look too low and I would move bullish, with upside into the mid-$400s justified. On the other hand, if revenue growth slips back toward high single digits while quarterly net income stays stuck near the Q2 2026 level of 18%-19% margin, then 27x earnings is too full and I would want the stock closer to $340-$360 to compensate for leverage and maturing growth.
Grok Reading
The numbers describe a high-quality payments franchise that is still compounding revenue but is no longer compounding free cash the way a mature earner should. Annual revenue climbed from $2.83B in 2021 to $4.53B in 2025, a 9.8% CAGR, and the last two reported quarters ($1.26B then $1.34B) imply recent YoY revenue growth near 14%—faster than the multi-year trend. Operating margin sits at a formidable 44% and net margin around 24% on the annual print, with $1.50B of operating cash and $1.30B of FCF against only $201M of capex. That is the attractive core: sticky B2B spend infrastructure throwing off real cash at scale. What stands out against that surface strength is the disconnect between revenue and cash earnings power. Earnings CAGR is only 4.4%, FCF CAGR is −18.3%, and the June 2026 quarter delivered $248M of net income on $1.34B of revenue—an 18.5% net margin that is a sharp step-down from the mid-20s that dominated the prior seven quarters (including 27.8% in the immediately preceding quarter). ROIC of 11.7% and ROA of 4.0% are mediocre once you notice $10.0B of total debt against $4.23B of equity and a current ratio of 0.98; net leverage is roughly 5–6× FCF. At $407.88 the stock screens at 27× earnings, 6.4× sales and 15× EV/EBITDA—full for a business whose cash generation is deteriorating even as top-line growth remains respectable.
I read this as a competent, slightly boring compounder that the market has correctly refused to award a growth multiple. The pre-flight and narrative layers call it a steady-compounder with minimal cult energy trading a few percent below composite fair value near $435–445; that math is plausible on trailing margins and a mid-teens growth fade, but it underweights the FCF slope and the balance-sheet load. A 27× PE on 4–7% earnings growth with negative FCF CAGR and refinancing risk on $10B of debt is not a bargain—it is a fair-to-full price for quality that is no longer expanding economic profit. Insider activity on the latest tape is almost entirely option exercise followed by sale, which is not catastrophic but fits a picture of management not leaning into undervaluation. Sector leadership and good revenue confidence keep a floor under the name; they do not justify re-rating from here unless margins and FCF re-accelerate.
The strongest case against this caution is straightforward and quantitative. Trailing operating margin of 44% and net margin of 23.6% remain elite for infrastructure software; ROE of 25% shows equity holders are still earning well despite leverage; recent revenue YoY of 13.9% beats the 9.8% CAGR, so the growth engine has not stalled; and the valuation synthesis’s own composite ($435–445) implies roughly 7% upside from $407.88 with methods only “mixed,” not broken. A bull can also argue the June margin dip is noise—seasonality, FX, or a one-time item—while the secular B2B digitization TAM and high switching costs support mid-teens EV/EBITDA indefinitely. I weigh that less heavily because FCF is the binding constraint for a levered mature earner: a −18% FCF CAGR, interest-coverage flags already raised by the models, and a sub-1.0 current ratio mean the quality of those 44% operating margins is not fully converting to unlevered owner earnings. Paying 27× for decelerating cash conversion is the wrong side of the trade even if revenue stays double-digit for a few more quarters.
I would flip toward a clear undervalued call if the next two quarters restore net margins above 23% and FCF converts back above ~90% of net income while net debt/FCF trends down through $5B, or if management guides organic revenue sustainably above 12% with stable unit economics. I would flip decisively overvalued on another quarter of sub-20% net margin, FCF below $250M, or any refinance that pushes interest expense enough to cut EPS mid-teens without offsetting growth.
Big-3 Panel — where each AI stands
Advanced Analysis Forensic deep-dive · separate lenses
Corpay is a mature, high-margin payments/software business: revenue has compounded from $2.83B (2021) to $4.53B (2025) - roughly 12% CAGR - while operating margin held in a tight 42-45% band and net income grew from $840M to $1.07B. FCF is consistently strong at $1.30B in 2025 with OCF/NI of 1.54x, indicating reported earnings convert to cash cleanly. Diluted share count has fallen from 84.1M to 71.1M (-4.1% CAGR) and buybacks are 1,028% of SBC (SBC only 2.3% of revenue), so per-share value is being concentrated rather than diluted - a genuine mark of capital discipline. The clear soft spot is the balance sheet: net debt of roughly $7.6B against $2.4B liquid cash, with $3.35B of short-term debt exceeding cash on hand. That drives the Altman Z of 1.67 into the 'distress' zone, though the model is poorly calibrated for asset-light, fee-based financial platforms - the $1.3B annual FCF makes covering and refinancing the near-term stack very manageable in normal credit markets, but not costless. Insider behavior is a yellow flag rather than red: 15 sells and 0 buys over 12 months ($45.7M), with recent Alan King activity being option-exercise-and-sell (mechanical), while CEO Clarke received a 100K share award. Nothing screams distress, but there are no conviction buys either.
Verify before trusting this (6)
- Debt maturity schedule and covenants on the $3.35B short-term stack
- Composition of customer float vs corporate cash within the $2.41B liquid balance
- Recent M&A activity that may explain 2022 FCF dip and current leverage
- Segment mix (Vehicle/Corporate Payments/Lodging) and any customer concentration
- Whether recent insider sells are 10b5-1 scheduled or discretionary
- Organic vs acquired revenue growth to gauge underlying business momentum
The e2e synthesis lands at a composite FV of $445 and signal-adjusted $435 against a $408 price - a 7% upside that is well inside noise for a levered payments compounder. The anchored-PE method ($444) is the cleanest anchor and essentially agrees with the composite; the DCF at $622 looks like a runaway terminal-value output I would not lean on, and the EPV floor of $91 is a reminder that if growth truly stalled the downside is not trivial. Averaging the credible signals, deserved value sits in the low-to-mid $400s, right where the stock trades. What is priced in: continued mid-single-digit organic growth, stable mid-40s margins, ongoing buybacks, and successful bolt-on M&A. That is a reasonable base case for this business, not a heroic one - but it is also not being handed to you at a discount. For a Strong (not Fortress) business carrying real leverage, a 7% notional upside is not a margin of safety.
Verify before trusting this (5)
- Organic revenue growth ex-M&A and ex-FX in the next print
- Take-rate trends in Vehicle and Corporate Payments segments
- Net leverage trajectory and any refinancing at higher rates
- M&A cadence and multiples paid on recent bolt-ons
- Any change to buyback pace vs deleveraging priority
Corpay sits in a rare spot: the market has essentially no story on it. Narrative intensity is minimal, cult factor is low, and the archetype is 'steady compounder' - meaning there is no euphoric bid to fade and no collapsing thesis to punish. With beta 0.87 and a boring fintech-infrastructure profile, the risk-on tape (+35) offers only a mild lift, and the macro headwind from 4.67% 10y / 25.9 market PE is similarly muted here versus higher-multiple software peers.
Verify before trusting this (4)
- Whether any bolt-on M&A or Corporate Payments segment print sparks an actual narrative upgrade
- Signs of Stripe or Mastercard vertical encroachment that could seed a bear story
- Analyst target revision cadence post-Q2 - divergence would matter more than absolute tone
- 10y yield behavior - a break below 4.25% would meaningfully lift low-narrative compounders
B2B payments is in the middle innings of a decades-long migration from checks, wires and manual AP to embedded card and virtual-account rails; the demand signal is steady rather than cyclical, which favors incumbents with distribution and ERP integration over point solutions. The competitive threat is real but mis-specified in the bear case: Stripe and network verticals attack consumer-adjacent and enterprise-API flows, while Corpay's defensibility sits in unglamorous mid-market workflow lock-in and FX hedging relationships. The genuine structural questions are whether the vehicle/fuel leg erodes faster than payments compounds, and whether serial M&A keeps producing accretive assets at reasonable cost with rates near 4.7%.
When we made this prediction on Aug 30, 2026, CPAY was $407.88. We expect it to be $445.00 by Mar 2027, and we consider it great value under $355.00. This is an early model (v0.6.0) — the direction is more reliable than the exact price. Made Aug 30, 2026.
Blue is our prediction, starting the day we made it. Grey is a slower route to the same place — the same destination, taking longer. Black is the actual price, so you can see how we are doing.
Post-Report Due Diligence NOTES
Evidence for a closer look, not a verdict — no score or designation on this page has been changed by it. Items marked material are ones where a conclusion above moves to the other side of the price.
trailing_eps
flips down 10%
adjusted_pe
flips down 10%