Business Description
Amkor Technology, Inc. operates internationally, delivering external semiconductor packaging and testing solutions across North America, Japan, Europe, the Middle East, Africa, and the broader Asia Pacific region. Their comprehensive, end-to-end offerings encompass a range of processes, including semiconductor wafer bumping, probing, back-grinding, package conceptualization, final packaging, testing, and direct shipment services. The company's product portfolio features flip-chip scale packages, critical for devices like smartphones, tablets, and other portable consumer electronics. They also provide flip-chip stacked chip-scale packages, designed for layering memory atop digital basebands and as application processors in mobile units. Flip-chip ball grid array packages cater to diverse applications in networking, data storage, computing, and general consumer products. Wafer-level CSP packages find use in power management systems, transceivers, sensors, wireless charging technologies, codecs, radar systems, and specialized silicon components. Their wafer-level fan-out packages are integral for integrated circuits, alongside silicon wafer integrated fan-out technology, which offers a thinner alternative to traditional laminate substrates. Additionally, Amkor supplies lead frame packages, commonly employed in electronic devices requiring low to medium pin count analog and mixed-signal functionalities. Substrate-based wirebond packages facilitate the connection of a die to its substrate. Micro-electro-mechanical systems (MEMS) packages involve miniature mechanical and electromechanical components. Furthermore, their advanced system-in-package (SiP) modules are vital for a broad array of applications, including radio frequency and front-end modules, basebands, connectivity solutions, fingerprint sensors, display and touchscreen drivers, various sensors and MEMS, and NAND memory and solid-state drives. The company primarily serves a clientele comprising integrated device manufacturers, fabless semiconductor enterprises, original equipment manufacturers, and contract foundries. Established in 1968, Amkor Technology, Inc. maintains its corporate headquarters in Tempe, Arizona.
Business History
Generated: Jun 16, 2026 3:02amPrice Overview
Last updated: Jun 16, 2026 3:00am (11d ago)Price History (1 Year)
Revenue & Net Income Trend
| Period | Revenue | Net Income | Net Margin | YoY/QoQ |
|---|
Key Metrics
EPS (Diluted): 1.51
Total Equity: $4.47B
Shares: 248,302,000
Total Debt: $1.52B
Cash: $1.38B
EBITDA: $1.16B
Total Debt: $1.52B
Cash: $1.38B
Revenue: $6.71B
Revenue: $6.71B
Revenue: $6.71B
Total Equity: $4.47B
Tax Rate: 15.4%
Equity: $4.47B
Total Debt: $1.52B
Cash: $1.38B
Current Liabilities: $1.71B
Long-Term Debt: $1.33B
Total Debt: $1.52B
Total Equity: $4.47B
Shares: 248,302,000
Shares: 248,302,000
CapEx: -$904.61M
Shares: 248,302,000
Stock Price: $85.44
Net Income: $373.90M
Industry Benchmarks
Advanced Analysis Forensic deep-dive · three lenses
Amkor is a mature OSAT (outsourced assembly & test) operator with genuinely clean financials: OCF/NI of 2.54x, accruals of -9.1% of assets, Beneish M -2.5 and Altman Z of 5.29 all point to high earnings integrity. The balance sheet is in good shape — $1.99B liquid cash, $474.5M net cash, and diluted shares essentially flat (0.3% CAGR) with SBC running at ~0% of revenue, which is unusual discipline for a tech-classified name and means per-share economics aren't being quietly eroded.
The business-quality concern is the earnings trajectory, not the accounting. Gross margin compressed from 20% (2021) → 18.8% → 14.5% → 14.8% → 14.0% (2025), and operating margin nearly halved from 12.4%/12.7% to ~7%. Net income fell from $765.8M (2022) to $373.9M (2025) on roughly flat revenue (~$6.3–7.1B band), and FCF has whipsawed ($341M → $190M → $520M → $345M → $191M) — symptomatic of heavy, cyclical capex inherent to advanced packaging. That's the OSAT reality: capital-intensive, customer-concentrated, with limited pricing power versus fabs.
Insider tape is neutral-to-slightly-negative: zero open-market buys, 13 sales (~$10.3M), but most named insider activity is routine award/exercise/sale mechanics, not a flight. Net: real business, clean books, durable but not dominant — quality is solid, not elite.
Verify before trusting this (6)
- Customer concentration in the 10-K — what % of revenue is Apple and top-5 customers, and is the trend rising?
- Capex outlook for advanced packaging (2.5D/3D, CoWoS-competitive capacity) — is the FCF compression driven by growth capex or maintenance?
- Segment mix: communications vs. compute vs. automotive — is the GM erosion mix-driven or pricing-driven?
- Long-term debt structure and maturity ladder beyond the $474.5M net cash figure
- Arizona facility ramp progress and any CHIPS Act funding terms/conditions
- Whether margin floor at ~14% GM / 7% OpM has stabilized or is still drifting down in quarterly trend
The e2e composite fair value of $16.05 (DCF $16.53, EPV floor $15.08) implies an absurd -82% downside vs the $85.44 price. I won't take that literally — a 5x gap usually means the cash-flow methods are anchored on trailing/normalized OSAT margins that have stepped down (gross margin compressed ~600bps, op margin roughly halved) and on a heavy capex profile that suppresses near-term FCF. The market is clearly underwriting a different business: an advanced-packaging beneficiary of AI/chiplet/HBM with structurally higher through-cycle margins and utilization.
Even giving the bull case meaningful credit, deserved value here is hard to push above the $50-65 range without assuming the cycle peak becomes the new baseline. Earnings quality is genuinely high (clean OCF conversion, flat share count, no SBC games), so I don't haircut further — but high quality of a structurally squeezed OSAT doesn't justify paying ~$21B market cap for a business whose own EPV floor sits near $15. The margin of safety isn't just absent; price is leaning hard on a heroic, sustained advanced-packaging supercycle.
Net: this is a Rich print. Not a screaming short — the secular packaging story is real and capacity is tight — but you're paying full freight plus an AI premium on a cyclical, capex-heavy, pricing-pressured OSAT.
Verify before trusting this (5)
- Advanced packaging mix as % of revenue and its gross margin vs mainstream OSAT work
- 2024/2025 capex guidance and resulting FCF trajectory — is reinvestment producing incremental ROIC or just defending share?
- Customer concentration disclosures (Apple exposure) and pricing terms in long-term agreements
- Utilization rates and any commentary on advanced packaging capacity adds (Vietnam, Arizona) coming online
- Through-cycle margin commentary on the call — management's own normalized op margin assumption
The macro tape is officially neutral but leans defensive: VIX in the upper half of its yearly range, 10y at 4.47%, and the S&P off its highs. That regime is barely a breeze on a low-beta defensive, but AMKR carries a 2.26 beta in a cyclical semi-cap-adjacent name, so any risk-off twitch is amplified roughly 2x into this stock. The narrative is the dominant force here: a strong but fragile cyclical-late-stage AI-packaging story with low cult support, meaning there is no diamond-hands base to defend the tape on a wobble. Price at $86.66 sits dramatically above what DCF supports, so the entire premium is narrative-funded - exactly the kind of setup that bleeds fastest when sentiment shifts. Analyst tone confirms the divergence: consensus Hold, target $76 (12% below spot), and the most recent revision came in at $80 - sell-side is not chasing the narrative, they are quietly anchoring lower. That gap between a hot story and cool analyst tone is a classic headwind tell. Offsetting tailwinds: the AI/HBM/chiplet narrative remains live and intense, momentum is not breaking, and the regime is not actually risk-off yet. Net read: more forces pressing down than up, but no crisis - a moderate headwind, not a strong one.
Verify before trusting this (4)
- Any HBM/AI capex commentary from TSMC, ASE, or hyperscalers that confirms or cracks the advanced-packaging demand story
- Further analyst target revisions - another cut would confirm sell-side capitulation away from the narrative
- VIX break above 20 or S&P drawdown past 5% - would convert the 2.26 beta from latent to active headwind
- Memory cycle commentary from Micron/SK Hynix that could swing the cyclical-late-stage read
Deep Analysis
Pre-flight intelligence scans the company first, then routes to the right analytical methods.
Income Statement (Annual)
Last updated: Jun 16, 2026 3:05am (11d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | $6.1B | $7.1B | $6.5B | $6.3B | $6.7B |
| Cost of Revenue | $4.9B | $5.8B | $5.6B | $5.4B | $5.8B |
| Gross Profit | $1.2B | $1.3B | $943.2M | $933.2M | $938.6M |
| Operating Expenses | $462.1M | $432.8M | $472.9M | $494.8M | $471.2M |
| Operating Income | $763.4M | $897.2M | $470.3M | $438.5M | $467.4M |
| Net Income | $643.0M | $765.8M | $359.8M | $354.0M | $373.9M |
| EBITDA | $1.3B | $1.5B | $1.1B | $1.1B | $1.2B |
| EPS | $2.64 | $3.13 | $1.46 | $1.44 | $1.51 |
| EPS (Diluted) | — | — | — | — | — |
Balance Sheet (Annual)
Last updated: Jun 16, 2026 3:00am (11d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cash & Equivalents | $826.7M | $959.1M | $1.1B | $1.1B | $1.4B |
| Total Current Assets | $2.9B | $3.3B | $3.2B | $3.1B | $3.9B |
| Total Assets | $6.0B | $6.8B | $6.8B | $6.9B | $8.1B |
| Current Liabilities | $1.7B | $1.7B | $1.4B | $1.5B | $1.7B |
| Long-Term Debt | $1.1B | $1.2B | $1.1B | $981.4M | $1.3B |
| Total Liabilities | $3.1B | $3.1B | $2.8B | $2.8B | $3.6B |
| Total Equity | $2.9B | $3.7B | $4.0B | $4.1B | $4.5B |
| Retained Earnings | $1.2B | $1.9B | $2.2B | $2.3B | $2.6B |
Cash Flow (Annual)
Last updated: Jun 16, 2026 3:05am (11d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Operating Cash Flow | $1.1B | $1.1B | $1.3B | $1.1B | $1.1B |
| Capital Expenditure | -$779.8M | -$908.3M | -$749.5M | -$743.8M | -$904.6M |
| Free Cash Flow | $341.5M | $190.5M | $520.6M | $345.1M | $191.0M |
| Acquisitions (net) | $3.2M | $3.1M | $8.4M | $4.0M | $110.3M |
| Debt Repayment | — | — | — | — | — |
| Dividends Paid | — | — | — | — | — |
| Stock Buybacks | $0 | $0 | $0 | $0 | $0 |
| Net Change in Cash | $129.3M | $130.9M | $158.2M | $13.7M | $311.8M |
Analyst Estimates (Annual)
Last updated: Jun 16, 2026 3:00am (11d ago)| Metric | 2026 | 2027 | 2028 | 2029 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue |
$7.6B $7.6B – $7.7B
|
$8.4B $8.1B – $8.7B
|
$9.1B $9.1B – $9.1B
|
$10.3B $9.9B – $10.7B
|
| EBITDA |
$1.4B $1.4B – $1.5B
|
$1.6B $1.5B – $1.7B
|
$1.7B $1.7B – $1.7B
|
$2.0B $1.9B – $2.0B
|
| Net Income |
$516.4M $513.9M – $518.9M
|
$565.6M $520.5M – $610.7M
|
$716.9M $712.7M – $721.1M
|
$903.8M $862.7M – $948.1M
|
| EPS | — | — | — | — |
Growth Trends (YoY %)
Last updated: Jun 16, 2026 3:05am (11d ago)| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue Growth | +15.5% | -8.3% | -2.9% | +6.2% |
| Gross Profit Growth | +8.5% | -29.1% | -1.1% | +0.6% |
| Operating Income Growth | +17.5% | -47.6% | -6.8% | +6.6% |
| Net Income Growth | +19.1% | -53.0% | -1.6% | +5.6% |
| EBITDA Growth | +14.9% | -25.8% | -3.9% | +6.6% |
Insider Trading (Recent)
Last updated: Jun 16, 2026 3:04am (11d ago)All SEC Form 4 codes
- P Purchase
- Open-market or private purchase of shares.
- S Sale
- Open-market or private sale of shares.
- A Award / grant
- Grant or award of securities (RSUs, options, etc.) under Rule 16b-3.
- D Return to issuer
- Securities disposed back to the company under Rule 16b-3.
- F In-kind (tax)
- Shares withheld or delivered to pay the option-exercise price or tax — not an open-market sale.
- I Discretionary
- Discretionary transaction under an employee plan — Rule 16b-3(f).
- M Option exercise
- Exercise or conversion of a derivative (option/RSU) into shares — exempt.
- C Conversion
- Conversion of a derivative security into the underlying shares.
- E Short expiration
- Expiration of a short derivative position.
- H Long expiration
- Expiration or cancellation of a long derivative position with value received.
- O OTM exercise
- Exercise of an out-of-the-money derivative.
- X ITM exercise
- Exercise of an in-the-money or at-the-money derivative.
- G Gift
- Bona fide gift of securities.
- L Small acquisition
- Small acquisition under Rule 16a-6.
- W Inheritance
- Acquisition or disposition by will or the laws of descent.
- Z Voting trust
- Deposit into or withdrawal from a voting trust.
- J Other
- Other acquisition or disposition (explained in a Form 4 footnote).
- K Equity swap
- Transaction in an equity swap or similar instrument.
- U Tender / buyout
- Disposition via tender of shares in a change-of-control transaction.
Compensation-plan codes (A, D, F, M) are routine and rarely directional. Open-market P (buy) and S (sale) carry the most signal.
| Date | Insider | Type | Shares | Price | Value |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-06-23 | KIM SUSAN Y | A-Award | 2.52 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-06-23 | WATSON DAVID N | A-Award | 2.52 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-06-23 | Tily Gil C. | A-Award | 2.52 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-06-23 | Rutten Guillaume Marie Jean | A-Award | 2.52 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-06-23 | Morse Robert Randolph | A-Award | 9.43 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-06-23 | Morse Robert Randolph | A-Award | 8.17 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-06-23 | Morse Robert Randolph | A-Award | 2.52 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-06-23 | McCourt MaryFrances | A-Award | 8.17 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-06-23 | McCourt MaryFrances | A-Award | 2.52 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-06-23 | Liao Daniel JL | A-Award | 9.43 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-06-23 | Liao Daniel JL | A-Award | 2.52 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-06-23 | CHURCHILL WINSTON J | A-Award | 2.52 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-06-23 | Carolin Roger Anthony | A-Award | 9.43 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-06-23 | Carolin Roger Anthony | A-Award | 8.17 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-06-23 | Carolin Roger Anthony | A-Award | 2.52 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-06-23 | ALEXANDER DOUGLAS A | A-Award | 9.43 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-06-23 | ALEXANDER DOUGLAS A | A-Award | 8.38 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-06-23 | ALEXANDER DOUGLAS A | A-Award | 8.17 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-06-23 | ALEXANDER DOUGLAS A | A-Award | 2.52 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-06-16 | ROGERS MARK N | M-Exempt | 5,000.00 | $7.40 | $37,000 |
Dividend History (Last 20)
Last updated: Jun 16, 2026 3:00am (11d ago)| Date | Dividend | Declaration | Record | Payment |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-06-03 | $0.08 | 2026-05-13 | 2026-06-03 | 2026-06-23 |
| 2026-03-12 | $0.08 | 2026-02-19 | 2026-03-12 | 2026-03-31 |
| 2025-12-03 | $0.08 | 2025-11-12 | 2025-12-03 | 2025-12-23 |
| 2025-09-03 | $0.08 | 2025-08-13 | 2025-09-03 | 2025-09-23 |
| 2025-06-05 | $0.08 | 2025-05-15 | 2025-06-05 | 2025-06-25 |
| 2025-03-13 | $0.08 | 2025-02-20 | 2025-03-13 | 2025-04-02 |
| 2024-12-04 | $0.49 | 2024-11-13 | 2024-12-04 | 2024-12-23 |
| 2024-09-03 | $0.08 | 2024-08-13 | 2024-09-03 | 2024-09-23 |
| 2024-06-04 | $0.08 | 2024-05-14 | 2024-06-04 | 2024-06-24 |
| 2024-03-11 | $0.08 | 2024-02-20 | 2024-03-12 | 2024-04-01 |
| 2023-12-04 | $0.08 | 2023-11-14 | 2023-12-05 | 2023-12-26 |
| 2023-09-01 | $0.08 | 2023-08-15 | 2023-09-05 | 2023-09-25 |
| 2023-06-05 | $0.08 | 2023-05-16 | 2023-06-06 | 2023-06-26 |
| 2023-02-27 | $0.08 | 2023-02-07 | 2023-02-28 | 2023-03-20 |
| 2022-12-05 | $0.08 | 2022-11-15 | 2022-12-06 | 2022-12-27 |
| 2022-09-02 | $0.05 | 2022-08-16 | 2022-09-06 | 2022-09-26 |
| 2022-06-06 | $0.05 | 2022-05-17 | 2022-06-07 | 2022-06-27 |
| 2022-02-28 | $0.05 | 2022-02-08 | 2022-03-01 | 2022-03-21 |
| 2021-12-06 | $0.05 | 2021-11-16 | 2021-12-07 | 2021-12-28 |
| 2021-09-03 | $0.04 | 2021-08-17 | 2021-09-07 | 2021-09-30 |
Narrative Economics
market-narrative step).
Delvantic AI Findings
The raw quarterly tape tells a more nuanced story than either the synthesis or the narrative layer admits. Q1 2026 revenue of $1.68B is up 27% YoY from Q1 2025's $1.32B, and net income of $83.4M is up 4x from $21.1M — that's not a "decelerating" trend, that's a cyclical inflection. Full-year 2025 revenue ($6.71B) and NI ($373.9M) finally exceeded 2024, breaking a three-year slide from the 2022 peak ($7.09B rev, $765.8M NI). But — and this is what bulls miss — 2025 net margin was 5.6% versus 10.8% in 2022. Even with revenue back near peak, earnings are half. The 2022 cycle peak was the anomaly, not a baseline. So when the narrative engine says "$65-70 of price is story," it's directionally right but the math needs sharpening: a normalized through-cycle NI of ~$450M gets you a 47x P/E at $85, or if you give it 2022-peak earnings power ($765M), it's 27x. Neither is cheap for a capex-heavy OSAT.
The DCF-derived $15.80 fair value the synthesis cites is almost certainly garbage, and I'd push back hard on parading it as a usable anchor. FCF CAGR of -39% is being driven by $904M of capex against $1.10B of operating cash flow — that's a deliberate capacity buildout for advanced packaging (CHIPS Act Arizona facility, HBM/2.5D capacity), not a deteriorating business. Using trailing FCF in a DCF when the company is mid-investment-cycle produces nonsense. The right question isn't "what is steady-state FCF today" but "what does FCF look like in 2027-2028 when Arizona stops eating cash and starts producing it." If you believe management's capacity additions monetize at even 15% gross margin (current is 14%), incremental revenue of $1.5-2B at maturity drops $200-300M to operating income. That gets you to a fair value range of $45-60, not $16 and not $85.
Where I agree with the prior models: the insider activity is mildly concerning but not damning — A-Awards and M-Exempts dominate, with only modest open-market sales (~7,000 shares total). The "Neutral Insider Activity" tag is correct; this is routine equity comp recycling, not informed selling. The market-forces "Neutral" call is closer to right than the synthesis "overvalued" verdict. Where the contrarian case bites: AMKR's customer concentration with Apple (~20%+ of revenue historically) means a single iPhone cycle miss craters a year. The 14% gross margin floor is structurally low versus TSMC's 50%+ or even ASE's 16-17%, meaning AMKR is the price-taker in OSAT, not the price-maker. Intel Foundry's in-housing of advanced packaging is a real long-term threat the bear story correctly flags. And the 2022 cycle "proved" margin upside was 19% gross — so even peak isn't great.
My read: the synthesis verdict of "overvalued, fair value $15.80" is wrong by a wide margin — it's using a broken DCF on a mid-cycle capex story. The narrative layer's "fragile" durability tag is right directionally but overstated; chiplet/advanced packaging demand is more structural than memory-cycle exposure suggests. But the stock at $85 with a 48x TTM P/E, 5.6% net margins, negative FCF growth, and a sector tagged as "lagging peers" is pricing in a clean execution of the Arizona ramp plus sustained AI packaging tightness through 2027. That's a lot to underwrite. I'd anchor fair value at $50-60 based on normalized 2027 earnings of ~$500-600M at a 20x multiple — meaning the stock is ~40% overvalued, not 80%. I dissent from the synthesis's magnitude but agree with its direction. Wait for either a cyclical pullback to the $55-65 range or a Q2/Q3 2026 print confirming the margin trajectory before committing.
GPT Critique
In examining Amkor Technology, the raw data tells a story of a company that is navigating through a cyclical recovery but still grappling with significant challenges. Revenue has demonstrated variability over recent quarters, with notable increases such as the 27% year-over-year rise to $1.68 billion in Q1 2026. However, margins remain a critical concern, dropping from a historical high of 10.8% in 2022 to just 5.6% in 2025, suggesting that while revenue might be rebounding, profitability lags. This disparity underscores the capital-intensive nature of Amkor's operations, as evidenced by their substantial capital expenditures ($904.6 million) heavily impacting free cash flow, which has notably contracted by 39.4% CAGR.
I find myself in agreement with Opus on several fronts, particularly regarding the flawed application of a DCF model that produces a $15.80 fair value estimate, which is indeed overly pessimistic given the ongoing investment cycle aimed at future growth. Opus rightly points out that trailing FCF is inappropriate for a company in the midst of a strategic capacity buildout. The prospect of future cash flows post-investment in advanced packaging facilities, notably in Arizona, could indeed shift the company's financial trajectory significantly by 2027-2028. I also concur with Opus's assessment that the current stock price of $85.44 reflects an optimistic narrative premium rather than fundamental reality, bolstered by the speculative belief in structural demand for advanced packaging.
Where I diverge from Opus is on the matter of insider activity. While they downplay its significance, the pattern of sales, albeit small, combined with the broader context of a high P/E ratio (48.5) and low net margins warrants more caution. This insider behavior might suggest a lack of confidence in the immediate realization of the bullish narrative driving the current valuation. Furthermore, the company's reliance on a concentrated customer base such as Apple introduces volatility risk that the market may not be adequately pricing.
A skeptic might argue that both Opus and I are overly focused on the potential upside of Amkor's strategic investments without adequately accounting for execution risks and competitive pressures. The semiconductor industry is subject to rapid technological shifts and pricing pressures, and Amkor's comparatively low gross margins (14%) indicate vulnerability to these factors. Additionally, the narrative surrounding AI and chiplet demand, while compelling, remains speculative and contingent on broader industry trends that could easily reverse.