Business Description
Based in Chicago, Equity LifeStyle Properties, Inc. operates as a self-managed Real Estate Investment Trust (REIT). As of January 25, 2021, its extensive portfolio includes 423 quality properties located across 33 U.S. states and British Columbia, collectively comprising 161,229 sites.
Business History
Generated: Jun 15, 2026 3:02amPrice Overview
Last updated: Jun 15, 2026 3:00am (12d ago)Price History (1 Year)
Revenue & Net Income Trend
| Period | Revenue | Net Income | Net Margin | YoY/QoQ |
|---|
Key Metrics
EPS (Diluted): 1.93
Total Equity: $1.76B
Shares: 200,114,000
Total Debt: $3.35B
Cash: $26.13M
EBITDA: $607.68M
Total Debt: $3.35B
Cash: $26.13M
Revenue: $1.53B
Revenue: $1.53B
Revenue: $1.53B
Total Equity: $1.76B
Tax Rate: -0.8%
Equity: $1.76B
Total Debt: $3.35B
Cash: $26.13M
Current Liabilities: $71.28M
Long-Term Debt: $3.27B
Total Debt: $3.35B
Total Equity: $1.76B
Shares: 200,114,000
Shares: 200,114,000
CapEx: -$237.09M
Shares: 200,114,000
Stock Price: $64.83
Net Income: $386.51M
Industry Benchmarks
Advanced Analysis Forensic deep-dive · three lenses
ELS is a textbook mature compounder in a defensive niche (manufactured home communities, RV resorts, marinas). Revenue has stepped up steadily from $1.32B (2021) to $1.53B (2025), operating margin has expanded from ~25% to 33.8%, and net income has grown from $262M to $387M — a clean, low-volatility trajectory consistent with a high-occupancy land-lord model. FCF of $334M on $387M of net income, plus OCF/NI of 1.69x and accruals at -3.9% of assets, points to high-quality, cash-backed earnings — exactly what you want to see in a REIT.
The quality knocks are structural rather than forensic. Net debt of $3.32B against only $26M of liquid cash is normal for a REIT but means the balance sheet is a working tool, not a cushion; $71M of short-term debt exceeds cash, so refinancing access is a permanent dependency. Diluted shares have grown from 182.9M to 200.1M (≈2.3%/yr) with essentially zero buyback, so equity issuance — typical REIT ATM funding — is quietly diluting per-unit growth. The Beneish M of -1.67 is technically a flag but inconsistent with the rest of the earnings-quality picture (strong OCF/NI, negative accruals); it likely reflects margin expansion and asset growth rather than manipulation. The GM% line (19.9 → 46.9 → 49.4 → 37.6) bounces enough to suggest reclassification rather than a real margin story — worth verifying but not alarming.
Insider tape is neutral-to-soft: zero open-market buys, one small sale, and the rest are routine awards and gifts. No conviction signal either way. Net: a high-integrity, well-run, defensive real-estate operator — solid, not fortress, because leverage and dilution are real per-share frictions.
Verify before trusting this (7)
- Debt maturity ladder and weighted-average interest rate — how much of the $3.32B net debt rolls in the next 24 months and at what spread
- Whether the ~2.3%/yr share growth is ATM issuance funding acquisitions/development (accretive) or compensation-related (dilutive)
- Same-property NOI growth vs headline revenue growth — to confirm organic strength vs acquired growth
- RV/marina segment exposure and any softness post-COVID normalization (RV demand has been volatile industry-wide)
- Reason for GM% reclassification swings between 2021, 2022-24, and 2025 — accounting policy change?
- Geographic concentration (Florida exposure) and hurricane/insurance cost trajectory
- Dividend payout ratio and AFFO coverage — required REIT distribution vs retained capital for reinvestment
ELS at $64.83 trades at roughly 22-24x forward AFFO and a sub-5% implied cap rate on its MH/RV portfolio — both at the high end of the residential REIT complex despite mid-single-digit FFO growth. The e2e synthesis flagged 'Priced for Perfection,' which fits: the price embeds durable 5-6% rent escalators, no occupancy slippage, no cap-rate normalization, and a benign rate path. That is a lot of good news already in the tape.
Deserved value, even crediting the Solid quality grade and clean earnings, lands roughly in the high $50s to low $60s — call it ~$58-62 on a quality-adjusted basis. The $3.3B net debt load and ongoing share creep argue against paying a premium to that range. Against $64.83, the gap is unfavorable by ~5-10%; nothing screams short, but nothing offers a real cushion either. The bull case (demographics, irreplaceable assets) is the consensus view and is the reason the multiple is already full.
Verify before trusting this (5)
- 2024/2025 same-store NOI growth guidance and rent escalator assumptions
- Debt maturity schedule and weighted-average cost of debt vs current refi rates
- Transaction-market cap rates for recent MH/RV portfolio deals
- Share count trend and ATM issuance activity
- Any state-level rent control developments in core markets (FL, CA, AZ)
ELS is the textbook 'no-story' steady compounder: minimal narrative intensity, low cult coefficient, durable but boring archetype. That means very little of the price is sentiment-driven, so neither macro euphoria nor narrative panic moves this name much. With beta 0.68 and a defensive manufactured-housing/RV cash-flow profile, the neutral S&P tape (score +11, VIX 17.3) barely registers here. The dominant non-fundamental force is the rate backdrop - 10y at 4.48% is a persistent, low-grade headwind for all residential REITs and weighs on multiple even when operations are fine. Analyst tone is quietly supportive: 13 Buys vs 8 Holds, zero Sells, and a $70.83 target implying about 13% upside to spot. But revisions have stalled (0 this month, $0 avg change), which signals the sell side is not actively pushing the story higher - tone is constructive but inert. Momentum is positive on a multi-year basis and deleveraging (D/E 2.46 to 1.90) is a quiet tailwind for credit-sensitive narrative observers. Net: a small rate/REIT-cohort headwind offset by defensive low-beta positioning and a constructive but sleepy analyst posture. Sentiment is not a meaningful driver here in either direction.
Verify before trusting this (4)
- Direction of the 10y - a move back below 4% would lift the whole residential REIT cohort and ELS with it
- Any rent-control or manufactured-housing regulatory headline that could activate the dormant bear narrative
- Whether analyst revisions break their flatline (positive or negative) after the next FFO print
- Sector rotation flows - REIT ETF (VNQ/IYR) momentum is a better tell on this name than single-stock news
Deep Analysis
Pre-flight intelligence scans the company first, then routes to the right analytical methods.
Income Statement (Annual)
Last updated: Jun 15, 2026 3:06am (12d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | $1.3B | $1.4B | $1.4B | $1.4B | $1.5B |
| Cost of Revenue | $1.1B | $730.4M | $731.7M | $725.3M | $955.1M |
| Gross Profit | $262.1M | $644.6M | $672.5M | $708.0M | $576.3M |
| Operating Expenses | -$120.9M | $294.9M | $299.4M | $292.1M | $58.4M |
| Operating Income | $382.9M | $349.7M | $373.1M | $415.9M | $517.9M |
| Net Income | $262.5M | $284.6M | $314.2M | $367.0M | $386.5M |
| EBITDA | $572.4M | $622.4M | $660.6M | $731.6M | $607.7M |
| EPS | $1.43 | $1.53 | $1.69 | $1.96 | $1.93 |
| EPS (Diluted) | — | — | — | — | — |
Balance Sheet (Annual)
Last updated: Jun 15, 2026 3:00am (12d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cash & Equivalents | $94.1M | $2.6M | $4.2M | $5.6M | $26.1M |
| Total Current Assets | $163.4M | $67.7M | $79.9M | $75.3M | $119.5M |
| Total Assets | $5.3B | $5.5B | $5.6B | $5.6B | $5.7B |
| Current Liabilities | $896.5M | $785.1M | $627.5M | $694.2M | $71.3M |
| Long-Term Debt | $2.9B | $3.2B | $3.5B | $3.1B | $3.3B |
| Total Liabilities | $3.8B | $4.0B | $4.1B | $3.8B | $3.9B |
| Total Equity | $1.4B | $1.4B | $1.4B | $1.7B | $1.8B |
| Retained Earnings | -$183.7M | -$204.2M | -$223.6M | -$215.0M | -$225.0M |
Cash Flow (Annual)
Last updated: Jun 15, 2026 3:06am (12d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Operating Cash Flow | $509.0M | $475.8M | $548.0M | $596.7M | $571.1M |
| Capital Expenditure | -$204.3M | -$249.3M | -$317.1M | -$241.3M | -$237.1M |
| Free Cash Flow | $304.8M | $226.5M | $230.9M | $355.4M | $334.1M |
| Acquisitions (net) | -$91.5M | -$26.4M | -$9.3M | -$10.3M | -$9.7M |
| Debt Repayment | — | — | — | — | — |
| Dividends Paid | — | — | — | — | — |
| Stock Buybacks | $0 | $0 | $0 | $0 | $0 |
| Net Change in Cash | $99.3M | -$101.1M | $7.6M | -$5.4M | $1.6M |
Analyst Estimates (Annual)
Last updated: Jun 15, 2026 3:00am (12d ago)| Metric | 2027 | 2028 | 2029 | 2030 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue |
$1.6B $1.6B – $1.7B
|
$1.7B $1.7B – $1.7B
|
$1.9B $1.8B – $1.9B
|
$1.9B $1.8B – $2.0B
|
| EBITDA |
$743.0M $715.9M – $761.2M
|
$775.5M $769.0M – $782.0M
|
$841.4M $805.7M – $861.3M
|
$873.0M $835.9M – $893.7M
|
| Net Income |
$438.4M $435.1M – $441.6M
|
$473.8M $468.7M – $478.9M
|
$490.3M $463.2M – $505.4M
|
$510.3M $482.1M – $526.0M
|
| EPS | — | — | — | — |
Growth Trends (YoY %)
Last updated: Jun 15, 2026 3:06am (12d ago)| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue Growth | +4.5% | +2.1% | +2.1% | +6.8% |
| Gross Profit Growth | +146.0% | +4.3% | +5.3% | -18.6% |
| Operating Income Growth | -8.7% | +6.7% | +11.5% | +24.5% |
| Net Income Growth | +8.4% | +10.4% | +16.8% | +5.3% |
| EBITDA Growth | +8.7% | +6.1% | +10.7% | -16.9% |
Insider Trading (Recent)
Last updated: Jun 15, 2026 3:05am (12d ago)All SEC Form 4 codes
- P Purchase
- Open-market or private purchase of shares.
- S Sale
- Open-market or private sale of shares.
- A Award / grant
- Grant or award of securities (RSUs, options, etc.) under Rule 16b-3.
- D Return to issuer
- Securities disposed back to the company under Rule 16b-3.
- F In-kind (tax)
- Shares withheld or delivered to pay the option-exercise price or tax — not an open-market sale.
- I Discretionary
- Discretionary transaction under an employee plan — Rule 16b-3(f).
- M Option exercise
- Exercise or conversion of a derivative (option/RSU) into shares — exempt.
- C Conversion
- Conversion of a derivative security into the underlying shares.
- E Short expiration
- Expiration of a short derivative position.
- H Long expiration
- Expiration or cancellation of a long derivative position with value received.
- O OTM exercise
- Exercise of an out-of-the-money derivative.
- X ITM exercise
- Exercise of an in-the-money or at-the-money derivative.
- G Gift
- Bona fide gift of securities.
- L Small acquisition
- Small acquisition under Rule 16a-6.
- W Inheritance
- Acquisition or disposition by will or the laws of descent.
- Z Voting trust
- Deposit into or withdrawal from a voting trust.
- J Other
- Other acquisition or disposition (explained in a Form 4 footnote).
- K Equity swap
- Transaction in an equity swap or similar instrument.
- U Tender / buyout
- Disposition via tender of shares in a change-of-control transaction.
Compensation-plan codes (A, D, F, M) are routine and rarely directional. Open-market P (buy) and S (sale) carry the most signal.
| Date | Insider | Type | Shares | Price | Value |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-05-01 | CONTIS DAVID J | G-Gift | 802.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-05-01 | CONTIS DAVID J | G-Gift | 111.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-05-01 | CONTIS DAVID J | G-Gift | 111.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-05-01 | CONTIS DAVID J | G-Gift | 802.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-05-01 | Freedman Constance | A-Award | 60.00 | $53.77 | $3,226 |
| 2026-04-28 | HENEGHAN THOMAS | A-Award | 1,595.00 | $62.60 | $99,847 |
| 2026-04-28 | HENEGHAN THOMAS | A-Award | 14,375.00 | $62.60 | $899,875 |
| 2026-04-28 | Peppet Scott R | A-Award | 320.00 | $62.60 | $20,032 |
| 2026-04-28 | Peppet Scott R | A-Award | 2,316.00 | $62.60 | $144,982 |
| 2026-04-28 | Papandreou Radhika | A-Award | 120.00 | $62.60 | $7,512 |
| 2026-04-28 | Papandreou Radhika | A-Award | 2,316.00 | $62.60 | $144,982 |
| 2026-04-28 | Freedman Constance | A-Award | 240.00 | $62.60 | $15,024 |
| 2026-04-28 | Freedman Constance | A-Award | 2,316.00 | $62.60 | $144,982 |
| 2026-04-29 | CONTIS DAVID J | G-Gift | 196.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-04-29 | CONTIS DAVID J | G-Gift | 104.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-04-29 | CONTIS DAVID J | G-Gift | 758.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-04-28 | CONTIS DAVID J | A-Award | 200.00 | $62.60 | $12,520 |
| 2026-04-28 | CONTIS DAVID J | A-Award | 319.00 | $62.60 | $19,969 |
| 2026-04-28 | CONTIS DAVID J | A-Award | 2,316.00 | $62.60 | $144,982 |
| 2026-04-29 | CONTIS DAVID J | G-Gift | 758.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
Dividend History (Last 20)
Last updated: Jun 15, 2026 3:00am (12d ago)| Date | Dividend | Declaration | Record | Payment |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-06-26 | $0.54 | 2026-04-28 | 2026-06-26 | 2026-07-10 |
| 2026-03-27 | $0.54 | 2026-02-03 | 2026-03-27 | 2026-04-10 |
| 2025-12-26 | $0.52 | 2025-10-28 | 2025-12-26 | 2026-01-09 |
| 2025-09-26 | $0.52 | 2025-07-29 | 2025-09-26 | 2025-10-10 |
| 2025-06-27 | $0.52 | 2025-04-29 | 2025-06-27 | 2025-07-11 |
| 2025-03-28 | $0.52 | 2025-02-06 | 2025-03-28 | 2025-04-11 |
| 2024-12-27 | $0.48 | 2024-10-30 | 2024-12-27 | 2025-01-10 |
| 2024-09-27 | $0.48 | 2024-07-30 | 2024-09-27 | 2024-10-11 |
| 2024-06-28 | $0.48 | 2024-04-30 | 2024-06-28 | 2024-07-12 |
| 2024-03-27 | $0.48 | 2024-02-06 | 2024-03-28 | 2024-04-12 |
| 2023-12-28 | $0.45 | 2023-10-24 | 2023-12-29 | 2024-01-12 |
| 2023-09-28 | $0.45 | 2023-07-25 | 2023-09-29 | 2023-10-13 |
| 2023-06-29 | $0.45 | 2023-04-25 | 2023-06-30 | 2023-07-14 |
| 2023-03-30 | $0.45 | 2023-02-07 | 2023-03-31 | 2023-04-14 |
| 2022-12-29 | $0.41 | 2022-10-27 | 2022-12-30 | 2023-01-13 |
| 2022-09-29 | $0.41 | 2022-07-26 | 2022-09-30 | 2022-10-14 |
| 2022-06-23 | $0.41 | 2022-04-28 | 2022-06-24 | 2022-07-08 |
| 2022-03-24 | $0.41 | 2022-03-03 | 2022-03-25 | 2022-04-08 |
| 2021-12-30 | $0.36 | 2021-10-26 | 2021-12-31 | 2022-01-14 |
| 2021-09-23 | $0.36 | 2021-07-26 | 2021-09-24 | 2021-10-08 |
Narrative Economics
market-narrative step).
Delvantic AI Findings
Starting from the raw numbers: ELS is doing $1.53B TTM revenue growing ~7% YoY in the most recent quarter, with net margins oscillating 21-30% quarter to quarter (seasonal RV pattern). The 5-year revenue CAGR is 4.4% — this is a low-single-digit grower, full stop. Net income compounded faster (10.9%) largely because 2021's op margin was depressed and the base normalized. The "20.3% FCF CAGR" the synthesis model is panicking about is a base-effect artifact off a low 2021 starting point, not a forward run-rate. Operating cash flow of $571M against a $12.57B market cap is a ~4.5% operating yield; FCF of $334M is a 2.7% FCF yield. Add the 3.34% dividend and you're getting paid roughly a 6% blended return assuming low-single-digit rent escalators — which is exactly what a mature MH/RV REIT should yield in a ~4% 10-year world. Not cheap, not absurd.
Where I disagree with the prior stack: the Valuation Synthesis verdict of "Priced for Perfection" leaning on "30.9% implied FCF growth" is mis-specified. No serious analyst underwrites ELS at 30% FCF growth — the sell-side models 4-6% same-site NOI growth and 5-7% FFO/share growth, which is what the 32x P/E and 26x EV/EBITDA actually embed once you adjust for REIT accounting (depreciation overstates economic decay on land-heavy MH parks; P/AFFO is the right lens and would be closer to ~22-24x). The Market Forces "thin interest coverage" claim can't be evaluated because total debt is literally missing from the file — that's a real gap, not a thesis. The Narrative Economics read is the most honest of the bunch: this is a spreadsheet stock, narrative-minimal, anchored to cap rates. I agree with that framing.
The contrarian case nobody's making forcefully enough: ELS trades at a meaningful premium to peers (SUI, AMH) on every multiple, and the premium has historically been justified by best-in-class same-site NOI growth (5-6% vs. apartment REITs at 2-3%) and irreplaceable infill locations (Florida/Arizona/California coast). But the stock is down materially from its 2021-2022 highs near $90, and the rate-sensitive REIT trade has been a value trap for three years running. The real risk isn't "rent control activism" — it's that Florida hurricane insurance costs are eating into MH park margins (note gross margin compressed from 49% in 2024 to 38% in 2025 — that's a *huge* shift and the synthesis layer didn't flag it). That gross margin collapse from $708M to $576M on rising revenue is the single most important number in this file and it's being ignored. Either it's a reclassification (likely — REIT segment reporting changes happen) or it's a genuine cost-structure deterioration, and I can't tell which from the data given.
GPT Critique
The raw data on Equity LifeStyle Properties, Inc. (ELS) presents a picture of a mature REIT with steady revenue growth but signals potential underlying issues that deserve attention. The quarterly revenue shows a consistent improvement, from $367.5M in early 2025 to $397.6M in early 2026, indicating a 6.8% YoY growth rate. However, net income margins are volatile, ranging from 21.4% to 29.7%, which suggests some instability, potentially due to seasonal factors or cost pressures. The annual figures reinforce a narrative of steady but modest growth, with a 5-year revenue CAGR of 4.4% and earnings growing at 10.9%. Yet, the gross margin dropped significantly from 49% in 2024 to 37.6% in 2025, which might indicate rising costs or operational inefficiencies that are not fully addressed in the narrative.
I agree with Opus's dismissal of the "Priced for Perfection" thesis. The argument that ELS is being priced for an improbable growth trajectory is not supported by the data. The market's pricing of ELS seems more aligned with expectations of stable, incremental growth typical of a mature REIT rather than explosive expansion. The PE ratio of 32.6x and EV/EBITDA of 26.0x, while high, are reflective of a stable income-generating asset in a low interest rate environment. However, I diverge from Opus's relatively benign view of the gross margin compression. This decline is critical and may suggest underlying cost issues, possibly linked to insurance premiums or operational inefficiencies, that could undermine future profitability if persistent.
Opus's criticism of the missing debt data is valid but incomplete without acknowledging the potential implications of such gaps. The absence of debt figures makes it difficult to assess ELS's financial leverage and interest coverage, which are crucial for evaluating risk in a rising interest rate environment. Moreover, Opus's suggestion of a rate-driven derate to the high-$50s as a buying opportunity seems overly optimistic without clarity on the gross margin issue. The insider transactions, primarily consisting of awards and gifts with no significant open-market buys, add to a cautious outlook, indicating that insiders may not be particularly confident in ELS's current valuation.
A careful skeptic of both analyses might argue that the market's current pricing reflects a reasonable balance of ELS's defensive characteristics and the inherent risks in its operating environment. They would point out that the stable cash flow generation and dividend yield are attractive in a volatile market, but the margin compression and potential cost headwinds are significant risks that justify the market's caution. Moreover, the lack of insider buying could be interpreted as a signal that even those closest to the company see limited upside at current valuations.