For AI assistants & researchers — machine-readable summary of this page
What this page is: Delvantic's full research page for Insmed Incorporated (INSM) — AI-driven forensic equity research: mechanical valuation models (DCF, EPV, anchored-PE, scenario) plus three independent AI lenses (Quality / Value / Sentiment). Everything below is rendered server-side; you are not missing content that requires JavaScript. All scores are predictions and research opinions, not financial advice.
Our current read (analysis of 2026-10-08): Designation Low · Gem Score -61 (−100…+100 Quality+Value blend) · Quality -51 · Value -70 · Sentiment 34 (timing only, not weighted)
Page map (sections in order; each card carries a stable
reference-name attribute you can cite):
profile-header/price-overview— company profile, live quote, market capextended-analysis— the core: three AI lens reads with findings, scores, and the analyst memofuture-predictions— our forward price-band predictionsmarket-narrative/ai-findings/gpt-critique— narrative context, cross-model findings, and an adversarial critique of our own analysis (near the end of the document)- Members-only sections (render as login gates for anonymous readers):
price-history,income-trend,key-metrics,financials(statement tables),insider-trading. The analysis above is public; the raw data tables require a free account.
More for machine readers: site briefing at
/llms.txt ·
any ticker resolves at delvantic.com/stock/TICKER ·
raw inputs are public-company filings and market data (via licensed data feeds);
every model, score, lens read, and prediction on this page is Delvantic's own analysis.
Insmed Incorporated
INSM NASDAQInsmed Incorporated is a global biopharmaceutical company that develops and commercializes therapies for patients with serious and rare diseases. Its current portfolio includes an approved treatment for Mycobacterium avium complex lung disease, along with clinical-stage programs focused on pulmonary and inflammatory conditions. The company’s pipeline emphasizes innovative approaches such as oral therapies and inhaled medicines designed to address difficult-to-treat respiratory disorders. Insmed also conducts research across multiple scientific platforms, including protein engineering and other advanced drug-development technologies. Headquartered in Bridgewater, New Jersey, Insmed serves patients and healthcare providers in the United States, Europe, Japan, and other international markets, positioning itself as a specialist in rare-disease and specialty respiratory treatment.
Price Overview
Price History (1 Year)
Revenue & Net Income Trend
| Period | Revenue | Net Income | Net Margin | YoY/QoQ |
|---|
Key Metrics
EPS (Diluted): -6.42
Total Equity: $738.98M
Shares: 199,014,000
Total Debt: $561.68M
Cash: $510.45M
EBITDA: -$1.24B
Total Debt: $561.68M
Cash: $510.45M
Revenue: $606.42M
Shares: 199,014,000
Revenue: $606.42M
Revenue: $606.42M
Revenue: $606.42M
Total Equity: $738.98M
Tax Rate: -0.4%
Equity: $738.98M
Total Debt: $561.68M
Cash: $510.45M
Current Liabilities: $468.87M
Long-Term Debt: $561.68M
Total Debt: $561.68M
Total Equity: $738.98M
Shares: 199,014,000
Shares: 199,014,000
CapEx: -$32.56M
Shares: 199,014,000
Stock Price: $118.54
Net Income: -$1.28B
Industry Benchmarks
Income Statement (Annual)
Last updated: Aug 30, 2026 3:40am (39d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | $188.5M | $245.4M | $305.2M | $363.7M | $606.4M |
| Cost of Revenue | $44.2M | $55.1M | $65.6M | $85.7M | $122.9M |
| Gross Profit | $144.3M | $190.2M | $239.6M | $278.0M | $483.5M |
| Operating Expenses | $519.4M | $647.6M | $949.3M | $1.2B | $1.7B |
| Operating Income | -$375.1M | -$457.3M | -$709.6M | -$878.3M | -$1.2B |
| Net Income | -$434.7M | -$481.5M | -$749.6M | -$913.8M | -$1.3B |
| EBITDA | -$366.0M | -$452.0M | -$704.1M | -$872.3M | -$1.2B |
| EPS | $-3.88 | $-3.91 | $-5.34 | $-5.57 | $-6.42 |
| EPS (Diluted) | $-3.88 | $-3.91 | $-5.34 | $-5.57 | $-6.42 |
Balance Sheet (Annual)
Last updated: Aug 30, 2026 3:30am (39d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cash & Equivalents | $716.8M | $1.1B | $482.4M | $555.0M | $510.4M |
| Total Current Assets | $837.0M | $1.3B | $929.1M | $1.6B | $1.8B |
| Total Assets | $1.2B | $1.7B | $1.3B | $2.0B | $2.3B |
| Current Liabilities | $135.2M | $190.2M | $225.6M | $297.5M | $468.9M |
| Long-Term Debt | $580.7M | $1.2B | $1.2B | $1.1B | $561.7M |
| Total Liabilities | $833.0M | $1.6B | $1.7B | $1.7B | $1.5B |
| Total Equity | $410.5M | $88.0M | -$331.9M | $285.4M | $739.0M |
| Retained Earnings | -$2.3B | -$2.7B | -$3.4B | -$4.4B | -$5.6B |
Cash Flow (Annual)
Last updated: Aug 30, 2026 4:11am (39d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Operating Cash Flow | -$363.3M | -$400.4M | -$536.2M | -$683.9M | -$935.0M |
| Capital Expenditure | -$7.3M | -$9.9M | -$13.3M | -$21.9M | -$32.6M |
| Free Cash Flow | -$370.6M | -$410.3M | -$549.5M | -$705.8M | -$967.6M |
| Acquisitions (net) | — | — | — | — | — |
| Net Debt Issued / (Repaid) | — | — | — | — | — |
| Dividends Paid | — | — | — | — | — |
| Stock Buybacks | — | — | — | — | — |
| Net Change in Cash | $184.0M | $357.3M | -$591.7M | $72.7M | -$44.6M |
Growth Trends (YoY %)
Last updated: Aug 30, 2026 3:40am (39d ago)| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue Growth | +30.2% | +24.4% | +19.2% | +66.7% |
| Gross Profit Growth | +31.8% | +26.0% | +16.0% | +73.9% |
| Operating Income Growth | -21.9% | -55.2% | -23.8% | -42.0% |
| Net Income Growth | -10.8% | -55.7% | -21.9% | -39.7% |
| EBITDA Growth | -23.5% | -55.8% | -23.9% | -41.7% |
Deep Analysis
Risk : Reward — upside vs downside from this company's own quarters
Computed 2026-10-05 02:02A +1σ run of quarters pays -246%; a −1σ run costs 100%. Ratio -2.5:1 (μ 132.7%, σ 119.8% , 16 pairs).
Older method (repeat-worst-quarter): 2.7 : 1
| Case | Growth | Margin | Fair value | vs price ($118.54) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Bull — recovery | +180% | 17.3% | $439.19 | +270% |
| Base — stabilizes | +120% | 15.0% | $126.37 | +7% |
| Bear — keeps slipping | +60% | 12.8% | $23.21 | -80% |
| Stress — last quarter repeats | +296% | -76.9% | $0.00 | -100% |
| Upside — a +1σ run of quarters (v2) | +50% | -76.9% | $-173.50 | -246% |
| Stress — a −1σ run of quarters (v2) | +13% | -76.9% | $0.00 | -100% |
Narrative Economics
market-narrative step).
Growth Outlook
Analyzed 2026-08-30 04:39The question every valuation on this page silently assumes: is this company likely to grow? Judged forward — the business, its category, the world — against what's already printed.
Claude Reading
The raw quarterly print is the most important thing in this file and the models are underweighting it. Q2 2026 revenue of $425.5M is not a linear extrapolation from Q1's $306M or Q4 2025's $263.8M — that's a $119M sequential jump (+39% QoQ) and puts run-rate revenue at roughly $1.7B annualized versus the $606M FY25 the synthesis keeps anchoring on. Net loss simultaneously collapsed from -$328M in Q4 2025 to -$13M in Q2 2026. That is a launch curve, almost certainly brensocatib (Brinsupri) post-approval in bronchiectasis, and it materially rewrites the "single-product company with $606M revenue" framing that every downstream model — synthesis, thesis evaluation, market forces — is using. The P/S the thesis engine cites (42.7x on trailing) is actually closer to ~15x on forward run-rate, which is not "priced for perfection" for a rare-disease launch inflecting toward breakeven.
That said, the bear scaffolding isn't wrong, it's just mis-timed. FY25 burn was $968M FCF-negative against $510M cash and $562M debt — the company clearly raised or is about to raise, and the pre-flight model's "imminent funding crisis" flag would have been correct as of end-2025 but likely got resolved (equity raise, revenue-interest financing, or partnership) given they're still operating and margins have swung 250 percentage points in three quarters. I'd want to verify the share count hasn't ballooned — a $25.9B market cap on ~$118 implies ~218M shares, up meaningfully from prior years, and any DCF that ignores dilution history overstates per-share value. The insider selling pattern (Aug 6/10/17 clusters, all option-exercise-and-sell) is boilerplate 10b5-1 behavior around a launch inflection, not the "suspicious" signal Market Forces flagged; executives sell into strength on every biotech launch.
Where I disagree with the models: the Valuation Synthesis "Priced for Perfection" and Thesis Evaluation -12 score are backward-looking, benchmarking a $25.9B cap against stale trailing revenue while ignoring that Q2 already delivered ~70% of all of FY25's revenue in a single quarter. The Market Forces "avoid until brensocatib data derisks" line reads like it was written before the launch — brensocatib IS launching, that's what the $425M print is. Where I agree with the models: the pipeline-beyond-brensocatib (TPIP for PH-ILD, inhaled programs) is genuinely speculative and doesn't deserve credit yet; gross margin at 79.7% is good but not Vertex-good for a specialty inhaled/oral portfolio; and if Q2's jump includes stocking or a one-time channel fill, Q3 could disappoint and the stock re-rates hard given the 52-week range of $90-$213. A careful contrarian would also note that bronchiectasis launches have historically underdelivered vs. sell-side peak-sales models (see Bayer's ciprofloxacin DPI failures), and that DPP1 inhibitor class safety (periodontal, skin) could emerge post-launch.
Net: the models are anchored on stale FY25 numbers and missed the Q2 inflection. At $118 and ~$1.7B run-rate revenue with margins racing toward breakeven, INSM is not "priced for perfection" — it's priced roughly fairly for a successful dual-product rare-disease franchise, with pipeline optionality thrown in for free-ish. I'd peg fair value in the $110-$140 range depending on Q3 confirmation of the launch trajectory and clarity on dilution. The right trade is not "avoid" — it's "own a starter, add on Q3 confirmation, trim if Q3 shows the Q2 print was stocking." I dissent partially from the Priced-for-Perfection verdict: the trailing multiples are misleading and the synthesis is fighting last quarter's war. Direction is fairly valued leaning slightly undervalued, conviction moderate because the whole thesis hinges on one data point (Q2 was real recurring demand, not stocking) that I can't verify from this file.
GPT Reading
What jumps out is not the headline loss profile but the shape of the operating inflection. Revenue went from $92.8M in 2025 Q1 to $107.4M, then $142.3M, then $263.8M in Q4, $306.0M in 2026 Q1, and $425.5M in 2026 Q2. That is not ordinary biotech lumpiness; it is a step-change to a $1.7B annualized run rate in the latest quarter. Just as important, net losses narrowed from -$370.0M in 2025 Q3 and -$328.5M in Q4 to -$163.6M and then just -$13.2M in the latest quarter, taking net margin from -260% a year ago to -3.1%. For a company the screens still classify as “pre-profit,” the underlying data say it is on the edge of commercial self-funding if this revenue base is even roughly sustainable. That makes stale annual multiples like 39x sales on 2025 revenue actively misleading, because they capitalize a business that has plainly outgrown that denominator.
The valuation is still extreme, but it is extreme against old numbers. Using the latest quarter, the market cap of $25.9B is about 15x annualized revenue, not 39x. That is still rich for a one-product commercial story, but the distinction matters: 15x on a business growing 60%+ and nearing breakeven is expensive; 39x on a business losing over $1B is absurd. The gross margin profile also supports the idea that revenue scale can do real work here: 2025 gross margin was 79.7%, so incremental sales should carry high contribution if launch and R&D spend stop accelerating. The core tension in the numbers is that annual operating cash flow was still -$935.0M and free cash flow -$967.6M in 2025, while cash was only $510.4M against $561.7M of debt at year-end. On a backward-looking basis that screams dilution risk. On the quarterly trajectory, though, it also looks like 2025 may have been the peak-burn investment year before a sharp revenue step-up. I do not think the stock is cheap, but I do think the market is paying for a business that may have crossed from “science project” to “commercial platform” faster than the backward metrics capture.
My read, then, is that INSM is not a short on valuation alone at $118.54, but neither is it obviously attractive because so much of the rerating has already happened. A $25.9B equity value against even a generous $1.5B-$1.8B current revenue base still requires either sustained hypergrowth in the existing franchise or a very successful second-act pipeline. Since the balance sheet ended 2025 with net debt and less than a year of burn runway on 2025 cash flow, the company likely needed the 2026 revenue surge to be real, durable, and repeated. If it is, the downside compresses dramatically because financing risk falls away. If it is not, this valuation has very little support from assets on hand: book equity was only $739.0M, and the P/B above 30 tells you how little hard balance-sheet protection exists. So the story the numbers tell me is not “priced for perfection” in the lazy sense; it is “priced for sustained commercial escape velocity.” That is a narrower and more testable claim.
The best case against my relatively less-bearish read is straightforward: one quarter does not erase a history of cash destruction. Full-year revenue was $606.4M in 2025, while operating loss was -$1.25B and net loss -$1.28B, both worse than 2024 despite only $242.7M of added revenue. That means the company historically spent several dollars to buy each dollar of growth. Even after the latest quarter, trailing four-quarter revenue is about $1.14B, so the stock still trades around 23x trailing sales—far from cheap. The latest insider tape also leans poorly, with option exercises followed by sales including 239,850 shares on 2026-08-10, and there are no offsetting open-market buys shown. A smart bear would say the annual and cash flow statements are the truth, the quarter is the exception, and investors are underwriting blockbuster outcomes before cash generation proves durable.
I weigh that bear case differently because the income statement has already started to reconcile with the narrative in a way that many biotech promotions never do. Moving from -$321.7M net loss in 2025 Q2 to -$13.2M in 2026 Q2 on revenue growth from $107.4M to $425.5M is too large an operational improvement to dismiss as noise without evidence of one-time items, which we do not have here. What would change my mind quickly is simple: if the next two quarters fail to hold revenue above roughly $350M per quarter, or if net losses widen back beyond, say, -$100M despite that revenue base, then the “commercial escape velocity” thesis is false and the stock is plainly overvalued. Conversely, if annualized revenue stays above $1.5B and operating cash burn collapses toward breakeven, then today’s valuation becomes much easier to defend and I would stop fighting the premium.
Grok Reading
The raw numbers show a company mid-inflection, not the slow bleed the 2025 annuals imply. Quarterly revenue went from $107.4M in Q2 2025 to $425.5M in Q2 2026—nearly 4×—with Q1 2026 already at $306.0M and Q4 2025 at $263.8M. That is not ARIKAYCE grind; something commercially material landed. Net loss collapsed from hundreds of millions per quarter to just −$13.2M (−3.1% margin) in the latest period, while trailing annual gross margin sits at ~80%. Annual 2025 revenue of $606.4M is already obsolete as a run-rate base; the current two-quarter pace annualizes near $1.5B. Against that, a $25.9B market cap and ~$118.50 price still embeds a ~15–17× forward sales multiple and perfection on pipeline conversion. Cash of $510.4M against 2025 FCF burn of −$967.6M and net debt roughly flat was a genuine funding cliff; the near-breakeven quarter is the only thing that keeps the balance sheet from being disqualifying. Secondary flags calling revenue “decelerating” or “low confidence” simply do not match the sequential print. Insiders exercising and selling hundreds of thousands of shares into the August 2026 window is classic liquidity after a re-rating, not proof of fraud, but it is not accumulation either.
The valuation synthesis and thesis score (−12) correctly flag that $26B still requires brensocatib (or equivalents) to become a multi-billion franchise and ARIKAYCE to keep expanding without a hard ceiling. P/S on trailing 2025 is still ~39–43×; EV/Revenue and P/B (~32×) are extreme for a name that has never posted a full-year profit and whose ROE/ROIC/ROA remain deeply negative. Operating cash flow of −$935M in 2025 means equity and debt markets remain the real capital structure until the Q2 run-rate proves durable for four consecutive quarters. Single-product history plus binary late-stage pulmonary risk justifies a discount to the narrative of a scaled rare-disease platform. At $118 the stock is not pricing a base case; it is pricing the bull case as the base.
The strongest pushback is that the market is simply marking the company to the new economics faster than lagging annual models. If $425M quarters sustain and mix shifts toward higher-margin oral/inhaled products, 2026–27 revenue lands $1.6–2.0B with operating leverage that could flip FCF positive inside two years at 80% gross margins. In that frame, 12–15× forward sales for a first-in-class bronchiectasis asset plus an entrenched NTM franchise is aggressive but not unprecedented for specialty pharma growth, and the 52-week range up to $213 shows the market has already been willing to pay more when data cooperates. I weigh this less because cash was critically thin relative to burn, insider flows were one-way sales, and the entire $26B still rests on clinical and commercial execution that has not yet delivered a second approved major product in a full year of financials. The rear-view $606M and −$1.28B NI are stale; the forward multiple is still rich until durability is proven.
I would flip to a constructive stance on two clean prints of sequential revenue ≥$400M with positive or near-zero operating cash flow, plus unambiguous brensocatib label/uptake data that supports peak sales well above $2B without major safety or reimbursement friction. Dilutive financing above ~$1B or a clinical/commercial miss that resets the quarterly run-rate back toward $200–250M would confirm the overvaluation case and push the stock toward the low end of its recent range.
Big-3 Panel — where each AI stands
Advanced Analysis Forensic deep-dive · separate lenses
Insmed is a commercial-stage rare-disease company showing real top-line acceleration: revenue jumped from $363.7M in 2024 to $606.4M in 2025 (+67%), on structurally high 76-80% gross margins. That is the durable, high-quality piece of the business - a specialty product (Arikayce, with pipeline optionality) with pricing power and expanding scale. Earnings-quality mechanicals are clean: Beneish M -1.97, Altman Z 5.85, no accrual manipulation flags, and OCF/NI of 0.77x is normal for a loss-maker. The problem is the funding model. Operating margin remains catastrophically negative (-205.6% in 2025), net loss widened to -$1.28B, and FCF burn reached -$967.6M. Liquid cash of $1.43B against that burn implies under 6 quarters of runway - so continued capital raises are effectively certain. Diluted share count has compounded at 15.4%/yr (112M in 2021 to 199M in 2025, a 78% increase in four years), and SBC runs at 25.2% of revenue, meaning per-share economics are being materially eroded even as the enterprise grows. Insider tape reinforces the concern: 11 sales / 0 open-market buys over 12 months, ~$39.8M sold, including a $32M single-day sale by Adsett after option exercises. That is a compensation-monetization pattern, not a conviction signal. Business is real and scaling, but survival math depends on capital markets access and pipeline execution.
Verify before trusting this (5)
- Arikayce revenue concentration versus pipeline (brensocatib, TPIP) contribution to 2025 growth
- Terms and maturity of any convertible notes or debt in the capital structure
- Guided operating expense trajectory and timing of any expected profitability inflection
- Details of the Adsett $32M sale - 10b5-1 plan vs discretionary
- Whether SBC of 25.2% of revenue is normalizing as revenue scales or remains structurally high
The e2e synthesis flags INSM as priced for a $4B+ franchise that ARIKAYCE alone cannot plausibly deliver; against a ~$25.9B market cap, that reads as roughly 6x a plausible mature ARIKAYCE revenue line, meaning the equity is essentially a call option on brensocatib (bronchiectasis) and the inhaled/IPF pipeline succeeding, scaling, and being funded to profitability. That is a heroic stack of ifs for a company the quality lens describes as burning nearly $1B/yr and diluting 15%+ annually - each year of delay compounds share count and shrinks per-share deserved value.
Verify before trusting this (4)
- Latest ARIKAYCE run-rate revenue and gross margin trajectory
- Cash runway and next expected raise size/timing
- Brensocatib Phase 3 (ASPEN) readout timing and any regulatory interactions
- Fully diluted share count including options/warrants vs basic count used in market cap
The tape is mildly risk-on with VIX at 14 and the S&P near highs, which is a friendly backdrop for a low-beta (0.79) biotech that trades on its own catalysts more than the index. INSM's own narrative flipped decisively bullish after the August 6 Q2 print, when Brinsupri posted record revenue and forced guidance up, wiping out the May Q1 disappointment. That is a live, strengthening story with momentum (+66.7% recent vs +41% long-term CAGR) and fresh media framing it as the 'better long-term pick' versus peers - classic tailwind conditions for a turnaround-bet archetype. Offsetting that: rates at 4.67% and a 25.9x market PE are a persistent drag on long-duration, cash-burning biotech, and the narrative durability is only moderate with low cult coefficient, meaning the bid is real but not fanatical. Any pipeline stumble or launch-trajectory wobble (as May showed) can reprice this name 20%+ in a session. Net, the non-fundamental pressure leans positive but is not a mania.
Verify before trusting this (4)
- Next Brinsupri quarterly revenue and script trend - the single variable that owns the narrative
- Any sell-side target revisions post the Q2 beat - are analysts chasing or fading
- Pipeline readouts in bronchiectasis/IPF that could either extend or crack the turnaround story
- Whether biotech sector flows (XBI) hold up if the risk-on tape wobbles
The world is short of approved therapies in chronic pulmonary inflammatory disease, and payers have shown willingness to fund rare/specialty respiratory drugs at high per-patient economics — that is the specific structural tailwind here, not a generic biotech rally. Macro is flagged as a headwind (10y at 4.67), which matters to a cash-consuming developer mainly through financing cost and the discount applied to distant pipeline value; it does not touch prescription demand for a rare-disease drug in the next eight quarters. Industry-wide margin expansion (+6.2pp operating) suggests the sector's cost discipline phase is over and commercial-stage biotechs are converting revenue to profit faster than in the prior cycle — a supportive backdrop for this company crossing from loss to leverage.
When we made this prediction on Aug 30, 2026, INSM was $118.54. We expect it to be $102.00 by Mar 2027, and we consider it great value under $80.00. This is an early model (v0.6.0) — the direction is more reliable than the exact price. Made Aug 30, 2026.
Blue is our prediction, starting the day we made it. Grey is a slower route to the same place — the same destination, taking longer. Black is the actual price, so you can see how we are doing.