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What this page is: Delvantic's full research page for HF Sinclair Corporation (DINO) — AI-driven forensic equity research: mechanical valuation models (DCF, EPV, anchored-PE, scenario) plus three independent AI lenses (Quality / Value / Sentiment). Everything below is rendered server-side; you are not missing content that requires JavaScript. All scores are predictions and research opinions, not financial advice.
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profile-header/price-overview— company profile, live quote, market capextended-analysis— the core: three AI lens reads with findings, scores, and the analyst memofuture-predictions— our forward price-band predictionsmarket-narrative/ai-findings/gpt-critique— narrative context, cross-model findings, and an adversarial critique of our own analysis (near the end of the document)- Members-only sections (render as login gates for anonymous readers):
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HF Sinclair Corporation
DINO NYSEHF Sinclair Corporation is an independent energy company that produces, refines, and markets a broad range of petroleum and specialty products. Its current operations span refining, marketing, renewables, lubricants and specialty products, and midstream logistics, supporting the supply of gasoline, diesel fuel, jet fuel, renewable diesel, specialty lubricants, specialty chemicals, and asphalt-related products. The company serves industrial, commercial, and wholesale markets through a network of refineries, terminals, pipelines, and branded distribution channels across the United States. HF Sinclair Corporation plays a significant role in the North American energy market by connecting crude oil processing with product distribution and transportation, while also serving customers that rely on fuels, lubricants, and other refined products for everyday operations.
Price Overview
Price History (1 Year)
Revenue & Net Income Trend
| Period | Revenue | Net Income | Net Margin | YoY/QoQ |
|---|
Key Metrics
EPS (Diluted): 3.08
Total Equity: $9.25B
Shares: 186,465,000
Total Debt: $2.84B
Cash: $978.00M
EBITDA: $1.84B
Total Debt: $2.84B
Cash: $978.00M
Revenue: $26.87B
Revenue: $26.87B
Revenue: $26.87B
Total Equity: $9.25B
Tax Rate: 19.9%
Equity: $9.25B
Total Debt: $2.84B
Cash: $978.00M
Current Liabilities: $2.49B
Long-Term Debt: $2.84B
Total Debt: $2.84B
Total Equity: $9.25B
Shares: 186,465,000
Shares: 186,465,000
CapEx: -$449.00M
Shares: 186,465,000
Stock Price: $105.41
Net Income: $579.00M
Industry Benchmarks
Income Statement (Annual)
Last updated: Sep 6, 2026 3:03pm (31d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | $18.4B | $38.2B | $32.0B | $28.6B | $26.9B |
| Cost of Revenue | $15.3B | $30.7B | $26.1B | $27.0B | $24.6B |
| Gross Profit | $3.1B | $7.5B | $5.9B | $1.6B | $2.3B |
| Operating Expenses | $2.4B | $3.4B | $3.7B | $1.3B | $1.4B |
| Operating Income | $749.2M | $4.1B | $2.2B | $261.0M | $927.0M |
| Net Income | $558.3M | $2.9B | $1.6B | $177.0M | $579.0M |
| EBITDA | $1.3B | $4.7B | $3.0B | $1.1B | $1.8B |
| EPS | $3.39 | $14.28 | $8.29 | $0.91 | $3.08 |
| EPS (Diluted) | $3.39 | $14.28 | $8.29 | $0.91 | $3.08 |
Balance Sheet (Annual)
Last updated: Sep 3, 2026 3:45pm (34d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cash & Equivalents | $234.4M | $1.7B | $1.4B | $800.0M | $978.0M |
| Total Current Assets | $3.8B | $6.7B | $6.1B | $5.0B | $4.8B |
| Total Assets | $12.9B | $18.1B | $17.7B | $16.6B | $16.5B |
| Current Liabilities | $2.1B | $3.2B | $2.8B | $3.0B | $2.5B |
| Long-Term Debt | $3.1B | $3.0B | $2.8B | $2.4B | $2.8B |
| Total Liabilities | $6.6B | $8.1B | $7.5B | $7.3B | $7.3B |
| Total Equity | $6.3B | $10.0B | $10.2B | $9.3B | $9.2B |
| Retained Earnings | $4.4B | $4.1B | $5.4B | $5.2B | $5.4B |
Cash Flow (Annual)
Last updated: Sep 6, 2026 3:06pm (31d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Operating Cash Flow | $406.7M | $3.8B | $2.3B | $1.1B | $1.3B |
| Capital Expenditure | -$725.1M | -$485.0M | -$353.5M | -$470.0M | -$449.0M |
| Free Cash Flow | -$318.4M | $3.3B | $1.9B | $640.0M | $866.0M |
| Acquisitions (net) | -$624.3M | -$251.4M | $0 | $0 | — |
| Net Debt Issued / (Repaid) | $0 | -$41.4M | -$307.8M | $0 | $1.9B |
| Dividends Paid | -$57.7M | -$255.9M | -$340.7M | -$386.0M | -$376.0M |
| Stock Buybacks | -$7.1M | -$1.4B | -$999.3M | -$672.0M | -$354.0M |
| Net Change in Cash | -$1.1B | $1.4B | -$311.3M | -$554.0M | $178.0M |
Growth Trends (YoY %)
Last updated: Sep 6, 2026 3:03pm (31d ago)| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue Growth | +107.8% | -16.3% | -10.6% | -6.0% |
| Gross Profit Growth | +138.6% | -20.9% | -73.7% | +47.8% |
| Operating Income Growth | +441.2% | -45.7% | -88.2% | +255.2% |
| Net Income Growth | +423.5% | -45.6% | -88.9% | +227.1% |
| EBITDA Growth | +276.1% | -36.9% | -63.2% | +68.0% |
Dividend History (Last 20)
Last updated: Sep 6, 2026 3:00pm (31d ago)| Date | Dividend | Declaration | Record | Payment |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-08-11 | $0.53 | — | — | — |
| 2026-05-11 | $0.50 | — | — | — |
| 2026-03-02 | $0.50 | — | — | — |
| 2025-11-19 | $0.50 | — | — | — |
| 2025-08-21 | $0.50 | — | — | — |
| 2025-05-15 | $0.50 | — | — | — |
| 2025-03-06 | $0.50 | — | — | — |
| 2024-11-21 | $0.50 | — | — | — |
| 2024-08-21 | $0.50 | — | — | — |
| 2024-05-21 | $0.50 | — | — | — |
| 2024-02-23 | $0.50 | — | — | — |
| 2023-11-15 | $0.45 | — | — | — |
| 2023-08-16 | $0.45 | — | — | — |
| 2023-05-17 | $0.45 | — | — | — |
| 2023-03-06 | $0.45 | — | — | — |
| 2022-11-18 | $0.40 | — | — | — |
| 2022-08-17 | $0.40 | — | — | — |
| 2022-05-20 | $0.40 | — | — | — |
| 2021-02-26 | $0.35 | — | — | — |
| 2020-11-20 | $0.35 | — | — | — |
Deep Analysis
Risk : Reward — upside vs downside from this company's own quarters
Not computed yetNarrative Economics
market-narrative step).
Claude Reading
The raw quarterly data tells a story the prior models partially miss. Revenue has fallen from $38.2B in 2022 to $26.87B in 2025 — a 30% decline in three years — and the 2025-2026 "recovery" in net income (from $177M to $579M, then to $648M and $892M in the first two quarters of 2026) is a recovery from a near-zero base, not a re-acceleration. The 227% YoY earnings growth the momentum module flags is arithmetic, not momentum. More troubling: Q2 2026 revenue of $10.39B is a 46% sequential jump from Q1's $7.12B and 55% above the trailing four-quarter average of ~$7.8B. No refiner adds 46% revenue in one quarter without a one-time item, a divestiture reversal, or a data error. The "accelerating revenue" confidence signal is almost certainly contaminated by this anomaly, and I would not build a thesis on it. Strip that quarter out and the revenue trend is flat-to-declining, which is the honest read.
The valuation math is where the models diverge from me most sharply. The synthesis calls DINO undervalued at a composite of $117.61 and a signal-adjusted $130.52, implying 24% upside. I think that's too generous by a meaningful margin. At $105.41, the stock trades at 2.13x book, 11.7x EV/EBITDA, and 34x trailing earnings. The 34x P/E is indeed a trough artifact, as the pre-flight correctly notes, but the more honest multiple is against five-year average net income of roughly $1.17B, which gives 16x — unremarkable for a refiner, not cheap. On a P/B basis, book value per share is approximately $52 ($9.25B equity / ~178M shares), so the market is paying 2.0x book. For a company with 6.3% ROE, 6.7% ROIC, and a revenue base shrinking at 8.3% CAGR, 2x book is the top of the normal range, not the bottom. The FCF yield of 4.6% ($866M on $18.74B cap) is the single best fundamental argument for the stock, and the balance sheet is genuinely conservative (D/E 0.31, current ratio 1.94, net debt of only ~$1.86B). But a 4.6% FCF yield on a declining-revenue commodity processor does not clear the bar for "undervalued." I'd put fair value in the $88-$100 range, which means the stock is roughly fairly valued to modestly overvalued at $105.
The classification and narrative layers are where the model stack most clearly misfires. Tagging DINO as "dividend_income" at 0.5 confidence is wrong: a 1.92% yield with a 65% payout ratio on trough earnings is a token dividend, not an income thesis. The "steady-compounder" archetype in the narrative layer is flatly contradicted by the data — revenue CAGR is negative, earnings swing from -$214M to +$892M within eight quarters, and the 2022 peak of $2.92B net income was driven by a Ukraine-shock crack spread environment that is not repeatable. The narrative layer's own conclusion that "the story is the absence of one" is the most accurate sentence in the entire file, yet it sits inside a framework that still assigns a "durable" narrative and a "steady-compounder" label. The thesis evaluation's -10 score is the most honest output in the stack, and I'd push it slightly more negative given the structural revenue decline. The insider data — two 15,000-share purchases in May and August 2026, small sales of 600-2,400 shares — is directionally positive but quantitatively trivial at ~$1.6M per buy; it's not a signal, it's noise.
A contrarian would press three points the models underweight. First, refining is a zero-sum margin game: HF Sinclair's 8.6% gross margin in 2025 is still less than half the 19.5% it posted in 2022, and the industry overcapacity problem is structural, not cyclical. Second, the renewable diesel segment that the bull case leans on is a rounding error against a $27B revenue base and faces its own feedstock-cost and RIN-regulatory risks; it is a hedge, not a growth engine. Third, the 2025 Q4 loss of $28M after three profitable quarters in 2025 is a reminder that this P&L is a seesaw, not a compounder, and the "recovery" narrative is one bad crack-spread quarter away from evaporating. The data is also thin: no segment breakdown, no forward guidance, no crack-spread sensitivity, and the Q2 2026 revenue spike is unexplained. I dissent from the "undervalued" verdict. The stock is a solid, conservatively levered refiner trading at the top of its normal valuation band, with a declining revenue base and no credible growth catalyst. It is not a buy at $105; it becomes interesting below $90, where the FCF yield crosses 5.5% and the P/B drops toward 1.7x.
GPT Reading
Grok Reading
Advanced Analysis Forensic deep-dive · separate lenses
HF Sinclair is a large US refiner whose profitability is almost entirely a function of crack spreads. Revenue swung from $18.4B (2021) to $38.2B (2022) and back down to $26.9B (2025), while operating margin compressed from 10.6% to 0.9% in 2024 before partially recovering to 3.5% in 2025. The 2024 near-breakeven year (net income $177M on $28.6B revenue) is the single most important data point: it shows the business has no structural pricing power and can be pushed to the edge of unprofitability by a single adverse spread environment. Even so, the company generated $640M of FCF in that trough year and $866M in 2025, confirming the asset base still produces cash when the cycle turns. Net debt of $1.87B is a constraint but not an existential threat given self-funding status and an Altman Z of 3.99. Earnings quality is clean: OCF/NI of 2.4x, negative accruals of -3.5% of assets, and a Beneish M of -2.98 all point to conservative, cash-backed reporting. Share count has actually declined from the 2022 peak of 202.6M to 186.5M in 2025, aided by a $100M buyback (REH Advisors return of 1.5M shares in May 2026), and SBC is a negligible 0.1% of revenue. Insiders, notably Franklin Myers, made open-market purchases of 15K shares at roughly $1.0-1.3M each in May and August 2026, a modest but genuine signal of personal conviction.
Verify before trusting this (5)
- 10-K segment detail: what share of revenue and EBITDA comes from refining vs. marketing vs. other, and how concentrated is the refining contribution?
- Convertible or preferred debt terms in the $1.87B net debt: maturity wall, covenants, and whether any instruments carry equity conversion features that could dilute in a recovery.
- Customer and supplier concentration: does the company rely on a small number of crude suppliers or product offtakers that could shift terms?
- Capex plan and maintenance capex vs. growth capex split: is the $640-866M FCF being consumed by mandatory maintenance, or is there genuine discretionary capacity?
- 2025 10-K discussion of crack-spread assumptions and whether management guides to a structural margin floor or explicitly acknowledges the 2024-type year can recur.
At $105.41, DINO sits about 12 percent below the e2e composite fair value of $117.61 and roughly 24 percent below the signal-adjusted figure of $130.52. The DCF output of $183.59 is 74 percent above price and, for a commodity refiner with no structural moat and margins that can compress to under 1 percent in a bad crack-spread year, is almost certainly a runaway method; I would discount it heavily. The EPV floor of $51.62 means the stock trades at roughly 2x asset value, which is a reasonable going-concern premium for an integrated refiner with midstream logistics and a growing renewable-diesel line. Earnings quality is high (score 3), so no haircut is warranted, and the clean balance sheet plus active buybacks support the number. But the Company-Quality lens grades this Mixed (-4): a well-run commodity machine, not a durable franchise. The market appears to be pricing it correctly as a cash-generating spread business with a solid dividend, not as a growth story. The 12 percent gap to composite FV is real but thin for a business where a single bad spread year can erase a year of earnings.
Verify before trusting this (5)
- Latest quarterly crack-spread commentary and management guidance on 2025-2026 spread assumptions to test whether the DCF's $183.59 is grounded or aspirational
- Renewable-diesel segment revenue and EBITDA as a percentage of total, to confirm whether it is truly a rounding error or a meaningful margin contributor
- Share buyback authorization remaining and pace, since ongoing repurchases shrink the float and support per-share value
- Midstream logistics contract terms and duration to assess whether that segment provides any genuine margin stability versus the refining core
- Any one-time items in the most recent quarter that may be inflating or deflating reported EPS relative to run-rate
This lens hasn't been run for this ticker yet.
This lens hasn't been run for this ticker yet.