Business Description
Charter Communications, Inc. operates as a broadband connectivity and cable operator company serving residential and commercial customers in the United States. The company offers subscription-based video services, including video on demand, high-definition television, digital video recorder, pay-per-view services. It provides Internet services, such as security suite that protects computers from viruses and spyware, and threats from malicious actors; in-home WiFi, which provides customers with high performance wireless routers to enhance their in-home wireless Internet experience; out-of-home WiFi; and Spectrum WiFi services, as well as video services. The company also offers voice communications services using voice over Internet protocol technology; and broadband communications solutions, such as Internet access, data networking, fiber connectivity, video entertainment, and business telephone services to cellular towers and office buildings for business and carrier organizations. In addition, it provides mobile services; offers video programming, static IP and business WiFi, email and security, and multi-line telephone services, as well as Web-based service management; sells local advertising across various platforms for networks, such as TBS, CNN, and ESPN; sells advertising inventory to local sports and news channels; and offers Audience App for optimizes linear inventory. Further, the company offers communications products and managed service solutions; data connectivity services to mobile and wireline carriers on a wholesale basis; and owns and operates regional sports and news networks. It serves approximately 32 million customers in 41 states. The company was founded in 1993 and is headquartered in Stamford, Connecticut.
Business History
Generated: Jun 3, 2026 7:23pmPrice Overview
Last updated: Jun 3, 2026 8:18pm (23d ago)Price History (1 Year)
Revenue & Net Income Trend
| Period | Revenue | Net Income | Net Margin | YoY/QoQ |
|---|
Key Metrics
EPS (Diluted): 36.90
Total Equity: $16.05B
Shares: 137,744,000
Total Debt: $97.12B
Cash: $477.00M
EBITDA: $21.21B
Total Debt: $97.12B
Cash: $477.00M
Revenue: $54.77B
Revenue: $54.77B
Revenue: $54.77B
Total Equity: $16.05B
Tax Rate: 22.7%
Equity: $16.05B
Total Debt: $97.12B
Cash: $477.00M
Current Liabilities: $13.31B
Long-Term Debt: $95.45B
Total Debt: $97.12B
Total Equity: $16.05B
Shares: 137,744,000
Shares: 137,744,000
CapEx: -$11.66B
Shares: 137,744,000
Stock Price: $129.01
Net Income: $4.99B
Industry Benchmarks
Advanced Analysis Forensic deep-dive · three lenses
The headline math is genuinely striking: $15.9B market cap against $4.42B TTM FCF is a ~28% FCF yield, and the diluted share count has collapsed from 193M (2021) to 137.7M (2025) — a -8.1% CAGR, with buyback dollars running 1,209% of SBC. SBC is trivial at 1.2% of revenue. Earnings quality is clean (OCF/NI 3.13x, accruals -7%, Beneish -2.65). On the operating side, gross margin has expanded from 39.9% to 46.3% and operating margin from 21% to 24.3% while revenue plateaued at ~$55B — this is a mature business optimizing, not growing.
The catch is the capital structure. Net debt is $96.6B against $477M of liquid cash and $1.67B of short-term debt — Altman Z at 0.6 sits squarely in distress territory. FCF has been volatile and trending the wrong way at the wrong time: $8.68B (2021) → $6.10B (2022) → $3.49B (2023) → $3.16B (2024) → $4.42B (2025). The 2025 bounce is encouraging but the run-rate is roughly half of 2021. With ~$96B of debt rolling over the next several years into a higher-rate environment, every 100bps of incremental interest cost is ~$1B of FCF gone. That's the entire equity thesis on a knife's edge.
Insider tape is genuinely bullish and the pipeline's 'mixed' label undersells it: late-April 2026 shows a cluster of open-market P-purchases from the CEO (Winfrey, ~$1.2M across two tickets), CFO-tier (Ramos $1.4M, Davis $995K, Nair $175K) all on the same day (4/28) — that's a coordinated insider signal at ~$170-175/share, well above today's $129. Rutledge's May sales are the retired former CEO unwinding, not a current-management signal. Liberty Broadband's 1.3M share 'D-Return' is a structural transaction, not a vote.
Deep Analysis
Pre-flight intelligence scans the company first, then routes to the right analytical methods.
Income Statement (Annual)
Last updated: Jun 3, 2026 8:23pm (23d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | $51.7B | $54.0B | $54.6B | $55.1B | $54.8B |
| Cost of Revenue | $31.1B | $30.6B | $33.3B | $29.8B | $29.4B |
| Gross Profit | $20.6B | $23.4B | $21.3B | $25.3B | $25.4B |
| Operating Expenses | $9.8B | $11.2B | $8.8B | $12.1B | $12.0B |
| Operating Income | $10.9B | $12.2B | $12.5B | $13.2B | $13.3B |
| Net Income | $4.7B | $5.1B | $4.6B | $5.1B | $5.0B |
| EBITDA | $19.8B | $20.9B | $20.7B | $21.4B | $21.2B |
| EPS | $25.34 | $31.30 | $30.54 | $35.53 | $36.90 |
| EPS (Diluted) | — | — | — | — | — |
Balance Sheet (Annual)
Last updated: Jun 3, 2026 7:20pm (23d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cash & Equivalents | $601.0M | $645.0M | $709.0M | $459.0M | $477.0M |
| Total Current Assets | $3.6B | $4.0B | $4.1B | $4.2B | $5.1B |
| Total Assets | $142.5B | $144.5B | $147.2B | $150.0B | $154.2B |
| Current Liabilities | $12.5B | $12.1B | $13.2B | $13.5B | $13.3B |
| Long-Term Debt | $88.6B | $96.1B | $95.8B | $92.1B | $95.5B |
| Total Liabilities | $124.3B | $132.0B | $132.5B | $130.3B | $133.7B |
| Total Equity | $14.1B | $9.1B | $11.1B | $15.6B | $16.1B |
| Retained Earnings | -$12.7B | -$14.8B | -$12.3B | -$7.8B | -$5.4B |
Cash Flow (Annual)
Last updated: Jun 3, 2026 8:23pm (23d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Operating Cash Flow | $16.2B | $14.9B | $14.4B | $14.4B | $16.1B |
| Capital Expenditure | -$7.6B | -$8.8B | -$10.9B | -$11.3B | -$11.7B |
| Free Cash Flow | $8.7B | $6.1B | $3.5B | $3.2B | $4.4B |
| Acquisitions (net) | -$2.2B | -$1.6B | -$427.0M | -$189.0M | $0 |
| Debt Repayment | — | — | — | — | — |
| Dividends Paid | — | — | — | — | — |
| Stock Buybacks | -$15.4B | -$10.3B | -$3.2B | -$1.2B | -$5.1B |
| Net Change in Cash | -$400.0M | $44.0M | $64.0M | -$203.0M | $92.0M |
Analyst Estimates (Annual)
Last updated: Jun 3, 2026 7:20pm (23d ago)| Metric | 2027 | 2028 | 2029 | 2030 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue |
$53.9B $52.2B – $54.8B
|
$54.2B $54.2B – $54.2B
|
$54.8B $53.8B – $55.5B
|
$55.4B $54.4B – $56.0B
|
| EBITDA |
$21.2B $20.5B – $21.5B
|
$21.3B $21.3B – $21.3B
|
$21.5B $21.1B – $21.8B
|
$21.7B $21.4B – $22.0B
|
| Net Income |
$6.2B $5.6B – $6.8B
|
$4.9B $4.0B – $9.9B
|
$7.3B $7.2B – $7.4B
|
$8.4B $8.2B – $8.6B
|
| EPS | — | — | — | — |
Growth Trends (YoY %)
Last updated: Jun 3, 2026 8:23pm (23d ago)| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue Growth | +4.5% | +1.1% | +0.9% | -0.6% |
| Gross Profit Growth | +13.7% | -9.2% | +19.1% | +0.2% |
| Operating Income Growth | +12.8% | +2.1% | +5.9% | +0.6% |
| Net Income Growth | +8.6% | -9.9% | +11.5% | -1.9% |
| EBITDA Growth | +5.8% | -0.9% | +3.2% | -0.9% |
Insider Trading (Recent)
Last updated: Jun 3, 2026 7:27pm (23d ago)All SEC Form 4 codes
- P Purchase
- Open-market or private purchase of shares.
- S Sale
- Open-market or private sale of shares.
- A Award / grant
- Grant or award of securities (RSUs, options, etc.) under Rule 16b-3.
- D Return to issuer
- Securities disposed back to the company under Rule 16b-3.
- F In-kind (tax)
- Shares withheld or delivered to pay the option-exercise price or tax — not an open-market sale.
- I Discretionary
- Discretionary transaction under an employee plan — Rule 16b-3(f).
- M Option exercise
- Exercise or conversion of a derivative (option/RSU) into shares — exempt.
- C Conversion
- Conversion of a derivative security into the underlying shares.
- E Short expiration
- Expiration of a short derivative position.
- H Long expiration
- Expiration or cancellation of a long derivative position with value received.
- O OTM exercise
- Exercise of an out-of-the-money derivative.
- X ITM exercise
- Exercise of an in-the-money or at-the-money derivative.
- G Gift
- Bona fide gift of securities.
- L Small acquisition
- Small acquisition under Rule 16a-6.
- W Inheritance
- Acquisition or disposition by will or the laws of descent.
- Z Voting trust
- Deposit into or withdrawal from a voting trust.
- J Other
- Other acquisition or disposition (explained in a Form 4 footnote).
- K Equity swap
- Transaction in an equity swap or similar instrument.
- U Tender / buyout
- Disposition via tender of shares in a change-of-control transaction.
Compensation-plan codes (A, D, F, M) are routine and rarely directional. Open-market P (buy) and S (sale) carry the most signal.
| Date | Insider | Type | Shares | Price | Value |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-06-11 | Liberty Broadband Corp | D-Return | 31,315.00 | $162.86 | $5.1M |
| 2026-05-26 | Rutledge Thomas | S-Sale | 69,633.00 | $144.45 | $10.1M |
| 2026-05-27 | Rutledge Thomas | S-Sale | 9,100.00 | $146.96 | $1.3M |
| 2026-05-27 | Rutledge Thomas | S-Sale | 9,100.00 | $146.92 | $1.3M |
| 2026-05-15 | Haughton Jamal H | A-Award | 8,972.00 | $142.69 | $1.3M |
| 2026-05-15 | Haughton Jamal H | A-Award | 1,150.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-05-15 | Ramos Mauricio | P-Purchase | 9,929.00 | $140.93 | $1.4M |
| 2026-05-12 | Liberty Broadband Corp | D-Return | 1,262,078.00 | $204.33 | $257.9M |
| 2026-04-28 | Davis Wade | P-Purchase | 5,728.00 | $173.72 | $995,068 |
| 2026-04-28 | Nair Balan | P-Purchase | 1,000.00 | $175.46 | $175,460 |
| 2026-04-28 | Winfrey Christopher L | P-Purchase | 3,468.00 | $172.23 | $597,311 |
| 2026-04-28 | Winfrey Christopher L | P-Purchase | 3,468.00 | $172.23 | $597,311 |
| 2026-04-21 | Zinterhofer Eric Louis | A-Award | 489.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-04-21 | Zinterhofer Eric Louis | A-Award | 1,530.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-04-21 | WARGO J DAVID | A-Award | 918.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-04-21 | Slaski Carolyn J | A-Award | 918.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-04-21 | Rutledge Thomas | M-Exempt | 904,200.00 | $222.92 | $201.6M |
| 2026-04-21 | Rutledge Thomas | M-Exempt | 723,360.00 | $232.34 | $168.1M |
| 2026-04-21 | Rutledge Thomas | A-Award | 489.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-04-21 | Rutledge Thomas | A-Award | 918.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
Narrative Economics
market-narrative step).
Delvantic AI Findings
Starting from the raw numbers: Charter is doing $54.8B in revenue with virtually zero growth (0.2% 5yr CAGR, -0.6% YoY), $13.3B operating income, $5.0B net income, and $4.4B FCF after $11.7B capex. At $129 the market cap is $15.9B — so this trades at roughly 3.2x earnings and 3.6x FCF on the equity. That is extraordinary, but the equity is a thin sliver of a heavily levered enterprise: EV/EBITDA of 5.5x and EV/revenue of 2.3x imply roughly $110-120B in net debt sitting ahead of equity holders. The quarterly trajectory is mildly negative — revenue has slipped from $13.93B (Q4'24) to $13.60B (Q1'26), and net margin has compressed from 10.5% to 8.6%. Not a cliff, but not stable either. The $477M cash balance against a 0.39 current ratio screams leverage discipline, not distress — Charter runs lean because it can roll debt and convert OCF reliably ($16.1B).
On the prior models: the Valuation Synthesis output of an "$860 fair value" is nonsensical and should be discarded — it's almost certainly a DCF that didn't haircut terminal growth or didn't net out the debt stack properly. Ignore it. The Pre-Flight "melting ice cube" framing and Market Forces "value trap" call are directionally right about the secular pressure but overstate the speed of decay: broadband ARPU and the mobile (Spectrum Mobile) ramp have actually offset video losses well enough to keep total revenue flat for five years running. The Narrative layer's read — that the discount is the math, not the story — is the most honest take in the file. The insider signal is interesting: actual P-Purchases on the open market in April/May 2026 alongside routine sales is mildly bullish, though sizes are small.
The contrarian case the models underweight: Charter's equity is a levered call on broadband ARPU stability. If FCF holds at ~$4B and management continues the aggressive buyback (share count has been cut roughly in half over the last decade), per-share FCF compounds even with flat revenue. At a $15.9B cap, they can theoretically retire ~25% of the float annually with FCF alone. That's the bull math no DCF captures cleanly. The contrarian bear case the models also underweight: capex is $11.7B and rising as Charter funds the rural buildout and network evolution — if FCF gets squeezed to $2-3B while ~$110B of debt needs refinancing at 6%+ rates versus the 4% coupons rolling off, interest coverage compresses fast and the equity gets pinched from both ends. The 70% drawdown isn't capitulation noise; it's the bond market repricing duration risk flowing into the most levered equity in the sector.
My verdict: I dissent from the Market Forces "value trap" framing and the Synthesis "$780 fair value" both — they're opposite errors. This isn't worth $780 and it isn't a zero. Apply a defensible frame: $4B normalized FCF, 15% required return on a levered, secularly-pressured equity, and -1% terminal — that yields roughly $25B equity value, or ~$200/share. Even haircutting FCF to $3B to reflect capex and refi pressure gets you to ~$150/share. At $129 the equity is pricing in genuine FCF erosion to ~$2.5B and/or a refinancing accident. That's possible but not base case given the Q1'26 print still shows $1.16B in quarterly net income. The asymmetry favors longs with position sizing discipline — this is a 2-3% portfolio position, not a 10% conviction bet, because the leverage means a wrong thesis kills the equity entirely. The insider buying corroborates that management thinks the same.
GPT Critique
Charter Communications presents a complex investment case. The raw data reveals a company with stagnant revenue growth, as evidenced by the 0.2% CAGR over five years and a slight YoY decline. However, Charter maintains a substantial operating income of $13.3 billion and a free cash flow (FCF) of $4.42 billion despite hefty capital expenditures. The company’s balance sheet shows a concerningly low cash balance of $477 million and a current ratio of 0.39, indicating potential liquidity constraints. Moreover, Charter's price-to-earnings ratio of 3.28 and price-to-sales ratio of 0.52 suggest a significant undervaluation, yet these figures must be contextualized within its high leverage and the broader sector's declining dynamics.
Opus argues that Charter is undervalued but acknowledges the high-risk nature of its leveraged position, suggesting a fair value between $160 and $200. I agree with Opus's assessment that the $860 fair value from the Valuation Synthesis is implausible; the model likely failed to adequately account for the debt burden or overestimated growth prospects. I also concur with the dismissal of the "value trap" notion from the Market Forces section. While Charter faces secular challenges, the stability of broadband ARPU and the contribution of Spectrum Mobile provide some offsets against video losses. However, where I diverge slightly is on the optimism regarding Charter's ability to maintain FCF at levels sufficient to sustain aggressive buybacks. The ongoing capital expenditure demands, particularly with rural expansion, combined with refinancing risks, could squeeze FCF below the optimistic $4 billion level cited by Opus.
A careful skeptic might argue that both Opus's and my views underestimate the potential for further technological disruption and competitive pressures to accelerate Charter's revenue decline. The persistence of high leverage amid rising interest rates could exacerbate refinancing challenges, making the equity even more vulnerable. Additionally, while insider purchases might indicate management confidence, the relatively small transaction sizes may not be strong enough signals to counterbalance the structural industry headwinds.