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What this page is: Delvantic's full research page for Roblox Corp. Class A Common Stock (RBLX) — AI-driven forensic equity research: mechanical valuation models (DCF, EPV, anchored-PE, scenario) plus three independent AI lenses (Quality / Value / Sentiment). Everything below is rendered server-side; you are not missing content that requires JavaScript. All scores are predictions and research opinions, not financial advice.
Our current read (analysis of 2026-10-07): Designation Low · Gem Score -52 (−100…+100 Quality+Value blend) · Quality -29 · Value -71 · Sentiment -60 (timing only, not weighted)
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profile-header/price-overview— company profile, live quote, market capextended-analysis— the core: three AI lens reads with findings, scores, and the analyst memofuture-predictions— our forward price-band predictionsmarket-narrative/ai-findings/gpt-critique— narrative context, cross-model findings, and an adversarial critique of our own analysis (near the end of the document)- Members-only sections (render as login gates for anonymous readers):
price-history,income-trend,key-metrics,financials(statement tables),insider-trading. The analysis above is public; the raw data tables require a free account.
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any ticker resolves at delvantic.com/stock/TICKER ·
raw inputs are public-company filings and market data (via licensed data feeds);
every model, score, lens read, and prediction on this page is Delvantic's own analysis.
Roblox Corp. Class A Common Stock
RBLX NYSERoblox Corp. Class A Common Stock represents ownership in Roblox Corporation, a global immersive platform centered on connection, creation, and play. Roblox operates an online ecosystem where users explore interactive 3D experiences, while developers and creators use Roblox Studio to build, publish, and manage their own content. The company’s platform also includes Roblox Client for accessing experiences and Roblox Cloud, which supports the infrastructure behind the service. Roblox’s business is built around a creator-driven model that combines user-generated content, digital commerce, and social interaction across gaming and entertainment. It serves consumers, independent developers, and brands that participate in virtual experiences, making it a notable name in the online gaming and digital platform market.
Price Overview
Price History (1 Year)
Revenue & Net Income Trend
| Period | Revenue | Net Income | Net Margin | YoY/QoQ |
|---|
Key Metrics
EPS (Diluted): -1.54
Total Equity: $374.98M
Shares: 689,612,000
Total Debt: $1.01B
Cash: $1.21B
EBITDA: -$1.01B
Total Debt: $1.01B
Cash: $1.21B
Revenue: $4.89B
Shares: 689,612,000
Revenue: $4.89B
Revenue: $4.89B
Revenue: $4.89B
Total Equity: $374.98M
Tax Rate: -0.3%
Equity: $374.98M
Total Debt: $1.01B
Cash: $1.21B
Current Liabilities: $5.13B
Long-Term Debt: $993.10M
Total Debt: $1.01B
Total Equity: $374.98M
Shares: 689,612,000
Shares: 689,612,000
CapEx: -$440.98M
Shares: 689,612,000
Stock Price: $38.53
Net Income: -$1.07B
Industry Benchmarks
Income Statement (Annual)
Last updated: Aug 30, 2026 4:40am (38d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | $1.9B | $2.2B | $2.8B | $3.6B | $4.9B |
| Cost of Revenue | $496.9M | $547.7M | $649.1M | $801.2M | $1.1B |
| Gross Profit | $1.4B | $1.7B | $2.2B | $2.8B | $3.8B |
| Operating Expenses | $1.9B | $2.6B | $3.4B | $3.9B | $5.1B |
| Operating Income | -$495.1M | -$923.8M | -$1.3B | -$1.1B | -$1.2B |
| Net Income | -$491.7M | -$924.4M | -$1.2B | -$935.4M | -$1.1B |
| EBITDA | -$419.5M | -$793.7M | -$1.1B | -$836.9M | -$1.0B |
| EPS | $-0.97 | $-1.55 | $-1.87 | $-1.44 | $-1.54 |
| EPS (Diluted) | $-0.97 | $-1.55 | $-1.87 | $-1.44 | $-1.54 |
Balance Sheet (Annual)
Last updated: Aug 30, 2026 4:30am (38d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cash & Equivalents | $3.0B | $3.0B | $678.5M | $711.7M | $1.2B |
| Total Current Assets | $3.7B | $3.8B | $3.3B | $3.7B | $4.9B |
| Total Assets | $4.6B | $5.4B | $6.2B | $7.2B | $9.6B |
| Current Liabilities | $2.2B | $2.5B | $3.1B | $3.7B | $5.1B |
| Long-Term Debt | $987.7M | $989.0M | $1.0B | $1.0B | $993.1M |
| Total Liabilities | $4.0B | $5.1B | $6.1B | $7.0B | $9.2B |
| Total Equity | $592.9M | $305.0M | $68.6M | $208.7M | $375.0M |
| Retained Earnings | -$983.9M | -$1.9B | -$3.1B | -$4.0B | -$5.1B |
Cash Flow (Annual)
Last updated: Aug 30, 2026 4:53am (38d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Operating Cash Flow | $659.1M | $369.3M | $458.2M | $822.3M | $1.8B |
| Capital Expenditure | -$93.3M | -$426.2M | -$320.7M | -$179.6M | -$441.0M |
| Free Cash Flow | $565.8M | -$56.9M | $137.5M | $642.7M | $1.4B |
| Acquisitions (net) | -$45.7M | -$13.4M | -$3.9M | -$2.8M | $0 |
| Net Debt Issued / (Repaid) | $990.0M | $0 | $14.7M | $0 | $0 |
| Dividends Paid | — | — | — | — | — |
| Stock Buybacks | — | — | — | — | — |
| Net Change in Cash | $2.1B | -$26.8M | -$2.3B | $33.2M | $493.6M |
Growth Trends (YoY %)
Last updated: Aug 30, 2026 4:40am (38d ago)| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue Growth | +15.9% | +25.8% | +28.7% | +35.8% |
| Gross Profit Growth | +17.9% | +28.2% | +30.3% | +36.3% |
| Operating Income Growth | -86.6% | -36.3% | +15.5% | -15.9% |
| Net Income Growth | -88.0% | -24.6% | +18.8% | -13.9% |
| EBITDA Growth | -89.2% | -32.4% | +20.4% | -20.3% |
Deep Analysis
Risk : Reward — upside vs downside from this company's own quarters
Computed 2026-10-07 02:03A +1σ run of quarters pays -187%; a −1σ run costs 100%. Ratio -1.9:1 (μ 34.8%, σ 9.6% , 16 pairs).
Older method (repeat-worst-quarter): 0.1 : 1
| Case | Growth | Margin | Fair value | vs price ($38.53) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Bull — recovery | +63% | 17.3% | $43.32 | +12% |
| Base — stabilizes | +42% | 15.0% | $21.08 | -45% |
| Bear — keeps slipping | +21% | 12.8% | $9.02 | -77% |
| Stress — last quarter repeats | +48% | -17.6% | $0.00 | -100% |
| Upside — a +1σ run of quarters (v2) | +44% | -17.6% | $-33.38 | -187% |
| Stress — a −1σ run of quarters (v2) | +25% | -17.6% | $0.00 | -100% |
Narrative Economics
market-narrative step).
Growth Outlook
Analyzed 2026-08-30 05:05The question every valuation on this page silently assumes: is this company likely to grow? Judged forward — the business, its category, the world — against what's already printed.
Claude Reading
Looking at the raw quarterlies first: revenue went $919M → $1.04B → $1.08B → $1.36B → $1.41B → $1.44B → $1.47B. That's ~60% growth over eight quarters, and the most recent sequential (1.44→1.47) is +2.1%, versus the Q4→Q1 seasonal step that was +2.1% ex-holiday. YoY is decelerating in absolute terms (Q2 2026 $1.47B vs Q2 2025 $1.08B = 36% — still robust, but the model's "35.8% recent YoY" masks that the Q3-Q4 2025 jump ($1.08→$1.36B, +26% sequential) was the true inflection. That single quarter is doing enormous work in the growth narrative and looks like either a bookings/deferred-revenue reclassification, a Grow-a-Garden-style viral hit, or a genuine step-function — I'd want to know which before extrapolating. Net losses, meanwhile, are actually shrinking meaningfully: -$278M → -$316M → -$256M → -$246M → -$183M. That's real operating leverage, not just revenue growth outrunning losses.
The synthesis calls this "priced for perfection" at 5.4x sales with $1B losses; I partially disagree with the framing. The reason is the accounting-vs-cash gap the synthesis flags but dismisses. Roblox recognizes bookings ratably over average user life (~24+ months) while collecting cash upfront — so $1.8B operating CF against a -$1.07B GAAP loss isn't an "accounting artifact," it's the opposite: deferred revenue is a real economic asset the P&L understates. FCF of $1.36B on a $27.5B EV is ~5% FCF yield, which is not remotely "priced for perfection" for a 30%+ grower. The synthesis is making a category error by treating GAAP margins as the truth-teller in a business where the accounting mechanically lags cash. The bear case has to be about durability of bookings growth, not about the loss line.
That said, the contrarian bear case is stronger than "youth platform ages out." It's this: stock-based comp is doing enormous lifting. FCF minus SBC is likely near zero or negative — Roblox has historically run $800M-$1B+ in SBC, roughly the entire GAAP loss. So "positive FCF" is largely shareholders paying employees in dilution. The 70.9x P/B and $375M equity against $1.01B debt tell you the balance sheet has been eroded by cumulative losses; equity has been continuously replenished by SBC-funded operations. The insider selling on 2026-08-20 (multiple S-Sale lines, no offsetting buys) is consistent with employees monetizing that SBC — neutral behaviorally but confirms the dilution engine. Also worth noting: the current ratio of 0.96 with $1.21B cash against $1.01B debt is thinner than it looks for a company still burning GAAP capital.
Where I land: the synthesis verdict of "priced for perfection" is too bearish given the FCF trajectory and shrinking loss line, but the narrative-economics read that "the price is 95% story" is directionally right about how far ahead sentiment has run relative to a durable moat. Fair value is bracketed: on 4x forward sales (~$6.5B run-rate) you get ~$26B EV / ~$36 per share; on 5.5x with continued 30% growth and margin trajectory holding, $40-45 is defensible; the bull-case $60+ requires the $1.36B FCF to double while SBC normalizes, which is not evidenced yet. Current $38.53 is roughly fair, not screamingly mispriced either way. I dissent from the "priced for perfection" framing but agree the risk/reward is unattractive without a pullback to the low $30s or a Q3 print that shows the loss line crossing toward breakeven. The decelerating quarterly trend flagged in revenue confidence is the single most important thing to watch — if next print is <$1.50B, the growth thesis cracks fast.
GPT Reading
What jumps out is that Roblox is no longer a small speculative story; it is a large platform putting up very real scale, but the market is still being asked to underwrite a margin structure that has not yet proved itself. Revenue has gone from $1.92B in 2021 to $4.89B in 2025, and the quarterly run-rate has now reached $1.47B in 2026-06, up about 36% from $1.08B a year earlier. That is excellent growth, and the recent sequence — $1.36B, $1.41B, $1.44B, $1.47B — shows a business still compounding off a much larger base. Gross profit also remains substantial: $3.82B on $4.89B of 2025 revenue, a gross margin around 78%. If I looked only at the top line and gross margin, I would say this deserves a premium multiple.
But the income statement says the platform’s scale is not yet translating into operating leverage in a convincing way. Annual operating loss was -$1.23B in 2025 versus -$1.06B in 2024 and -$1.26B in 2023; that is not a clean march toward profitability. Net loss worsened to -$1.07B in 2025 from -$935M in 2024 despite revenue jumping $1.29B. On a quarterly basis, the picture is improving, but from a very weak base: net margin moved from -25.7% in 2025-06 to -12.5% in 2026-06, which is real progress, yet still leaves a business losing $183M in a quarter with $1.47B of revenue. At $27.5B market cap and roughly 5.4x sales, investors are paying as though today’s losses are transitional rather than structural. That may turn out right, but the burden of proof is still on Roblox because creator payouts, infrastructure, trust and safety, and R&D all look like enduring costs of maintaining the ecosystem, not temporary launch expenses.
The biggest trap here is the free cash flow. $1.80B of operating cash flow and $1.36B of free cash flow in 2025 look fantastic next to a -$1.07B net loss, and they are the strongest fact in the bull case. But I do not think they deserve to be capitalized at face value the way mature software FCF would be. When cash generation exceeds earnings by more than $2.4B, you need to ask whether the business economics are actually better than GAAP suggests or whether timing and platform accounting create a flattering cash profile. For Roblox, where deferred revenue mechanics and non-cash expenses can be material, I am reluctant to treat $1.36B FCF as proof that 20%+ eventual net margins are around the corner. The balance sheet is fine, not bulletproof: $1.21B cash against $1.01B debt means no immediate financing stress, but equity is only $375M, current ratio is below 1.0, and the eye-watering 70x book value simply underscores how little hard balance-sheet backing exists under the stock. My read is that at $38.53, the shares are not absurdly expensive if growth holds near 30%+, but they are still priced ahead of demonstrated economics; fair value is closer to the low $30s unless margins keep improving rapidly.
The best argument against my caution is that the operating model may be inflecting right now, and the raw quarterly data does support that possibility. Net loss narrowed from -$316M in 2025-12 to -$246M in 2026-03 and then -$183M in 2026-06 while revenue rose each quarter; that is the exact pattern bulls want to see. If Roblox can grow revenue 30%+ while cutting net margin losses from roughly -22% to low teens in a year, then the business may be much closer to self-funding scale economics than skeptics admit. A 78% gross margin business with strong engagement does not need heroic assumptions to become profitable if opex growth slows just modestly. On that view, 5.4x sales is not demanding for a category-defining consumer internet platform, especially after a 73% collapse from the prior peak. I weigh that less heavily because I have not yet seen annual operating losses actually compress through a full cycle; one or two better quarters do not erase several years of scale without earnings.
What would change my mind is straightforward. If the next few quarters show revenue sustaining above $1.5B with net losses shrinking below $150M and then below $100M, I would take that as evidence the margin flywheel is real rather than hoped for. More importantly, I want to see annual operating loss move decisively under $1.0B and then toward the mid-hundreds of millions while free cash flow stays above $1.0B; that combination would validate both growth and cash quality. On the other side, if revenue growth slips into the teens while net margins stall around -15% to -20%, the stock should not hold a mid-5x sales multiple. This is a good business, probably not yet a good stock at $38.53.
Grok Reading
The raw numbers describe a platform that is scaling, not a platform that is healing. Revenue climbed from $3.60B in 2024 to $4.89B in 2025 and the last four quarters print $1.36B → $1.41B → $1.44B → $1.47B, a ~36% year-ago run rate off the $1.08B print in Q2 2025. That growth is real and still double-digit sequential in absolute dollars. What is not healing is the P&L geometry: operating loss widened to −$1.23B in 2025 from −$1.06B the year prior even as gross margin sits at a healthy 78%. Quarterly net margins have narrowed from the mid-twenties toward −12.5% in the latest quarter, which is directionally better, but the company is still destroying more than a billion dollars of GAAP earnings a year at nearly $5B of scale. The $1.36B free-cash-flow figure is the number bulls will tattoo on their foreheads; it is also the number that requires the most skepticism. The gap between −$1.07B net income and +$1.36B FCF is roughly $2.4B of non-cash and working-capital items—stock-based compensation, deferred Robux revenue, and the usual platform accounting. Rule-based labels already flag FCF quality as poor, and that flag is correct. At $38.53 the equity is $27.5B, or about 5.4× sales and roughly 20× that reported FCF. After a 73% drawdown from the $142 fantasy multiple, this is no longer a meme valuation—but it is still a valuation that assumes the margin structure eventually bends without the growth rate breaking.
The balance sheet does not rescue the story. $1.21B of cash against $1.01B of debt leaves the firm net-cash, which is fine, yet equity is only $375M, current ratio is under 1.0, and debt-to-equity prints 2.7×. The 71× price-to-book is an artifact of that thin book, not a quality signal. Insider tapes on the most recent date are almost entirely sales. None of this is catastrophic for a pre-profit platform, but none of it is the signature of a business that has already earned a scarcity multiple either. The market narrative layer is doing most of the remaining work: platform-monopoly mythology, aging-up ARPU dreams, and the Minecraft-successor framing still justify a mid-single-digit sales multiple on negative earnings. Strip the story and you have a high-gross-margin UGC network whose creator-payout and safety cost stack has so far refused to deliver operating leverage at the scale already achieved.
The strongest case against this read is straightforward and quantitative. A 32% revenue CAGR, 36% recent organic growth, 78% gross margins, and reported FCF of $1.36B at a $27.5B enterprise would look cheap in almost any other software or interactive-media context—especially after the stock has already absorbed a three-quarters peak-to-trough decline and the market has stopped underwriting 500M-DAU metaverse destiny. Margin progression from −26% toward −12.5% over the last several quarters is evidence that some operating leverage is appearing, and the bull stack (network effects still compounding, unit economics theoretically proven by positive FCF, Western ARPU still under-monetized relative to Asia) is coherent if you believe creator economics and trust-and-safety costs are scalable rather than structural. I weigh that case down because the same trajectory that produced $4.89B of revenue still produced a larger operating loss in dollars, because FCF is contaminated by deferred-revenue timing and SBC, and because the core demographic ceiling and regulatory surface area are not abstract risks—they are the reason the stock was repriced in the first place. Paying 5.4× sales for the hope that both 25%+ growth and mid-teens margins arrive together is not the bargain the post-crash chart suggests; it is a fair price for an unresolved experiment.
I would flip constructive on two concrete prints: a quarter of positive operating income (not just less-negative net margin) while revenue growth stays above 20%, and evidence that bookings growth is not running materially ahead of recognized revenue in a way that manufactures the FCF optics. A sustained ARPU step-up in the 13+ cohorts without a DAU collapse would also move the needle. Until those show up, the stock at $38.53 looks like a fairly valued platform with residual narrative premium and an unfinished margin story.
Big-3 Panel — where each AI stands
Advanced Analysis Forensic deep-dive · separate lenses
Roblox is scaling impressively at the top line: revenue compounded from $1.92B (2021) to $4.89B (2025), roughly 26% CAGR, with gross margin steadily rising from 74.1% to 78.1%. FCF turned decisively positive, reaching $1.36B in 2025 versus a modest $565.8M in 2021 and a negative print in 2022, so the business self-funds with $3.06B liquid cash and $2.05B net cash. That is genuine progress and removes near-term survival risk despite an Altman Z of 1.11 (the Z-score is unreliable here given the asset-light, deferred-revenue-heavy model). The quality problem is that GAAP economics remain deeply negative. Operating margin is still -25.2% in 2025 and net loss was $1.07B - actually wider than 2021's $491.7M loss on 2.5x the revenue. The gap between $1.36B FCF and a $1.07B net loss is largely deferred revenue and stock-based comp, not underlying profitability. SBC runs at 23.1% of revenue, and diluted shares grew from 505.9M to 689.6M (8.1% CAGR, ~36% cumulative) with zero buybacks to offset. Per-share value creation is materially lagging the business. Insider tape is all sales (51 sells / 0 buys, ~$12.7M), including founder David Baszucki - a mixed but not alarming pattern for a founder-led growth company, though there is no offsetting insider conviction buy.
Verify before trusting this (5)
- Bookings vs revenue and deferred-revenue roll to confirm how much of $1.36B FCF is durable vs timing
- Segment/geography and any customer/platform concentration (Apple/Google fee dependency) in the 10-K
- SBC vesting schedule and any RSU refresh cadence that would predict future dilution rate
- DAU/hours/ARPU trends and safety/regulatory exposure disclosures
- Any authorized buyback program or capital-return policy commentary
The e2e synthesis is blunt: today's price embeds 25%+ sustained growth to eventual 15% margins, and neither is visible in the trajectory. On ~$4B TTM bookings that implies a mid-teens EV/bookings multiple against a business still posting widening GAAP losses and diluting shareholders ~36% over five years. Reported FCF flatters the picture via SBC and deferred revenue - so the deserved-value math has to be run on a haircut basis, and once you do, the gap flips from 'expensive but growing into it' to 'priced beyond what the fundamentals deserve.' Against a mixed-quality lens (score -29), the deserved multiple should compress, not expand. My rough deserved range on quality-adjusted cash economics sits closer to $28-$33 - meaning $38.53 offers negative margin of safety, roughly 15-25% above where I'd call it fair. Not egregiously overvalued - engagement and bookings growth are real - but the bull case needs the platform-monopoly narrative to actually cash out, and the bear's churn/moderation/moat critique is unresolved. This is a 'wait' price, not a 'buy' price.
Verify before trusting this (5)
- Bookings growth deceleration cadence in next 2 quarters
- SBC as % of bookings and net dilution rate
- Path to GAAP profitability or explicit margin guidance
- Advertising/immersive ads monetization ramp
- DAU age-mix shift toward 17+ cohort (higher ARPU)
The macro backdrop is mildly risk-on with a 14 VIX, which would normally be a tailwind for a high-beta (1.46) story stock like RBLX. But the tape is not the story here: the pressure on this name is coming almost entirely from a narrative in active deterioration. The platform-monopoly / generational-successor thesis that carried the multiple is running into two consecutive quarters of engagement and bookings misses tied to age-verification and child-safety headwinds, plus a lingering shareholder-claims probe. Analyst tone has shifted, exemplified by the BofA downgrade in May, and the valuation debate in the last 72h is now openly framing shares as either a DCF bargain or multiples-expensive, meaning the bull consensus is fracturing. With ~95% of the price being story and the story losing intensity, insider selling (even 10b5-1) adds a small confirmatory drag. Stock-specifically: RBLX is unprofitable, high-beta, retail-cult adjacent, and its narrative durability is only 'moderate' - exactly the profile that gets punished when a story cracks, regardless of a calm broader tape. Momentum has been strong on a multi-year view, but the recent event path (May -18%, July guide-down) is the tape that matters now.
Verify before trusting this (5)
- Next bookings/DAU print - whether age-verification drag annualizes or persists
- Any further sell-side downgrades or target cuts post-Q2
- Progress or escalation on the shareholder-claims probe and safety regulatory front
- Sector rotation signal: if high-beta consumer internet (peers like U, SNAP, PINS) starts leading again, RBLX headwind eases
- VIX break above 18 or S&P drawdown deepening - would amplify beta pressure fast
Two structural currents matter. First, attention among under-20s continues consolidating into a handful of persistent social platforms rather than discrete titles — that favors UGC platforms with network effects and works against packaged-game economics. Second, regulation of minors online is tightening globally (age assurance, design codes, ad restrictions on minors); this is a genuine cost and friction tax on Roblox specifically and simultaneously a barrier that new entrants must clear. Brand advertising is migrating into playable/immersive formats, which is additive to Roblox's monetization surface. Macro is a modest headwind (10y 4.67%, flagged headwinds), but low-ticket digital spend by young users is among the least income-elastic discretionary categories, so demand risk is smaller than the macro label implies; FX translation is the more real drag.
When we made this prediction on Aug 30, 2026, RBLX was $38.53. We expect it to be $33.50 by Mar 2027, and we consider it great value under $28.00. This is an early model (v0.6.0) — the direction is more reliable than the exact price. Made Aug 30, 2026.
Blue is our prediction, starting the day we made it. Grey is a slower route to the same place — the same destination, taking longer. Black is the actual price, so you can see how we are doing.