Business Description
Reliance Steel & Aluminum Co. operates as a diversified metal solutions provider and the metals service center company in the United States, Canada, and internationally. The company distributes a line of approximately 100,000 metal products, including alloy, aluminum, brass, copper, carbon steel, stainless steel, titanium, and specialty steel products; and provides metals processing services to general manufacturing, non-residential construction, transportation, aerospace, energy, electronics and semiconductor fabrication, and heavy industries. It also distributes non-ferrous metals products and tubular building products; and manufactures specialty extruded metals, fabricated parts, and welded components. As of December 31, 2021, the company operated a network of approximately 315 locations in 40 states in the United States and 13 in other countries. It sells its products directly to original equipment manufacturers, which primarily include small machine shops and fabricators. The company was founded in 1939 and is headquartered in Los Angeles, California.
Business History
Generated: Jun 7, 2026 5:21pmPrice Overview
Last updated: Jun 7, 2026 5:18pm (19d ago)Price History (1 Year)
Revenue & Net Income Trend
| Period | Revenue | Net Income | Net Margin | YoY/QoQ |
|---|
Key Metrics
EPS (Diluted): 14.07
Total Equity: $7.17B
Shares: 52,875,000
Total Debt: $1.74B
Cash: $216.60M
EBITDA: $1.30B
Total Debt: $1.74B
Cash: $216.60M
Revenue: $14.29B
Revenue: $14.29B
Revenue: $14.29B
Total Equity: $7.17B
Tax Rate: 23.5%
Equity: $7.17B
Total Debt: $1.74B
Cash: $216.60M
Current Liabilities: $848.10M
Long-Term Debt: $1.67B
Total Debt: $1.74B
Total Equity: $7.17B
Shares: 52,875,000
Shares: 52,875,000
CapEx: -$328.90M
Shares: 52,875,000
Stock Price: $394.41
Net Income: $739.40M
Industry Benchmarks
Deep Analysis
Pre-flight intelligence scans the company first, then routes to the right analytical methods.
Income Statement (Annual)
Last updated: Jun 7, 2026 5:25pm (19d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | $14.1B | $17.0B | $14.8B | $13.8B | $14.3B |
| Cost of Revenue | $9.8B | $12.0B | $10.5B | $10.0B | $10.5B |
| Gross Profit | $4.3B | $5.0B | $4.3B | $3.8B | $3.8B |
| Operating Expenses | $2.3B | $2.5B | $2.6B | $2.7B | $2.8B |
| Operating Income | $2.0B | $2.5B | $1.7B | $1.2B | $1.0B |
| Net Income | $1.4B | $1.8B | $1.3B | $875.2M | $739.4M |
| EBITDA | $2.3B | $2.7B | $2.0B | $1.4B | $1.3B |
| EPS | $22.35 | $30.39 | $22.90 | $15.70 | $14.07 |
| EPS (Diluted) | — | — | — | — | — |
Balance Sheet (Annual)
Last updated: Jun 7, 2026 5:21pm (19d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cash & Equivalents | $300.5M | $1.2B | $1.1B | $318.1M | $216.6M |
| Total Current Assets | $4.2B | $4.9B | $4.8B | $3.9B | $4.1B |
| Total Assets | $9.5B | $10.3B | $10.5B | $10.0B | $10.4B |
| Current Liabilities | $1.1B | $1.4B | $843.6M | $1.2B | $848.1M |
| Long-Term Debt | $1.6B | $1.1B | $1.1B | $742.8M | $1.7B |
| Total Liabilities | $3.4B | $3.2B | $2.7B | $2.8B | $3.2B |
| Total Equity | $6.1B | $7.1B | $7.7B | $7.2B | $7.2B |
| Retained Earnings | $6.2B | $7.2B | $7.8B | $7.3B | $7.3B |
Cash Flow (Annual)
Last updated: Jun 7, 2026 5:25pm (19d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Operating Cash Flow | $799.4M | $2.1B | $1.7B | $1.4B | $831.4M |
| Capital Expenditure | -$236.6M | -$341.8M | -$468.8M | -$430.6M | -$328.9M |
| Free Cash Flow | $562.8M | $1.8B | $1.2B | $999.2M | $502.5M |
| Acquisitions (net) | -$439.3M | $10.9M | -$24.0M | -$364.6M | -$2.8M |
| Debt Repayment | — | — | — | — | — |
| Dividends Paid | — | — | — | — | — |
| Stock Buybacks | -$323.5M | -$630.3M | -$479.5M | -$1.1B | -$594.1M |
| Net Change in Cash | -$383.0M | $872.9M | -$93.2M | -$762.1M | -$101.5M |
Analyst Estimates (Annual)
Last updated: Jun 7, 2026 5:18pm (19d ago)| Metric | 2027 | 2028 | 2029 | 2030 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue |
$16.1B $16.0B – $16.3B
|
$16.3B $16.1B – $16.4B
|
$15.3B $14.9B – $15.6B
|
$15.2B $14.8B – $15.5B
|
| EBITDA |
$2.1B $2.1B – $2.1B
|
$2.1B $2.1B – $2.1B
|
$2.0B $2.0B – $2.0B
|
$2.0B $1.9B – $2.0B
|
| Net Income |
$1.0B $1.0B – $1.2B
|
$1.1B $1.0B – $1.1B
|
$934.3M $907.6M – $963.1M
|
$919.4M $893.1M – $947.6M
|
| EPS | — | — | — | — |
Growth Trends (YoY %)
Last updated: Jun 7, 2026 5:25pm (19d ago)| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue Growth | +20.8% | -13.0% | -6.6% | +3.3% |
| Gross Profit Growth | +17.6% | -14.2% | -10.8% | -0.2% |
| Operating Income Growth | +28.4% | -30.7% | -32.4% | -13.0% |
| Net Income Growth | +30.2% | -27.4% | -34.5% | -15.5% |
| EBITDA Growth | +20.8% | -25.9% | -28.5% | -10.1% |
Insider Trading (Recent)
Last updated: Jun 7, 2026 5:24pm (19d ago)All SEC Form 4 codes
- P Purchase
- Open-market or private purchase of shares.
- S Sale
- Open-market or private sale of shares.
- A Award / grant
- Grant or award of securities (RSUs, options, etc.) under Rule 16b-3.
- D Return to issuer
- Securities disposed back to the company under Rule 16b-3.
- F In-kind (tax)
- Shares withheld or delivered to pay the option-exercise price or tax — not an open-market sale.
- I Discretionary
- Discretionary transaction under an employee plan — Rule 16b-3(f).
- M Option exercise
- Exercise or conversion of a derivative (option/RSU) into shares — exempt.
- C Conversion
- Conversion of a derivative security into the underlying shares.
- E Short expiration
- Expiration of a short derivative position.
- H Long expiration
- Expiration or cancellation of a long derivative position with value received.
- O OTM exercise
- Exercise of an out-of-the-money derivative.
- X ITM exercise
- Exercise of an in-the-money or at-the-money derivative.
- G Gift
- Bona fide gift of securities.
- L Small acquisition
- Small acquisition under Rule 16a-6.
- W Inheritance
- Acquisition or disposition by will or the laws of descent.
- Z Voting trust
- Deposit into or withdrawal from a voting trust.
- J Other
- Other acquisition or disposition (explained in a Form 4 footnote).
- K Equity swap
- Transaction in an equity swap or similar instrument.
- U Tender / buyout
- Disposition via tender of shares in a change-of-control transaction.
Compensation-plan codes (A, D, F, M) are routine and rarely directional. Open-market P (buy) and S (sale) carry the most signal.
| Date | Insider | Type | Shares | Price | Value |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-05-20 | Sznewajs John G | A-Award | 469.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-05-20 | Stotlar Douglas | A-Award | 469.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-05-20 | Seeger David W | A-Award | 469.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-05-20 | McEvoy Robert Ambrose | A-Award | 469.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-05-20 | Kamsickas James Kevin | A-Award | 469.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-05-20 | DELLAQUILA FRANK J | A-Award | 469.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-05-20 | Colonias Karen Winifred | A-Award | 469.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-05-20 | Baldwin Lisa | A-Award | 469.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-04-27 | Ajemyan Arthur | S-Sale | 1,822.00 | $357.61 | $651,565 |
| 2026-04-27 | Ajemyan Arthur | S-Sale | 1,604.00 | $358.64 | $575,259 |
| 2026-04-27 | Ajemyan Arthur | S-Sale | 74.00 | $359.18 | $26,579 |
| 2026-03-09 | Smith William A II | S-Sale | 1,707.00 | $302.59 | $516,521 |
| 2026-03-09 | Smith William A II | S-Sale | 4,908.00 | $297.23 | $1.5M |
| 2026-03-05 | Koch Stephen Paul | A-Award | 2,522.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-03-05 | Lewis Karla R | A-Award | 4,539.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-03-05 | Ajemyan Arthur | A-Award | 1,261.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-03-05 | Smith William A II | A-Award | 1,324.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-02-23 | Ajemyan Arthur | A-Award | 8,864.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-02-23 | Ajemyan Arthur | F-InKind | 4,511.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-02-23 | Smith William A II | A-Award | 8,864.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
Dividend History (Last 20)
Last updated: Jun 7, 2026 5:18pm (19d ago)| Date | Dividend | Declaration | Record | Payment |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-05-22 | $1.25 | 2026-04-17 | 2026-05-22 | 2026-06-05 |
| 2026-03-06 | $1.25 | 2026-02-13 | 2026-03-06 | 2026-03-20 |
| 2025-11-21 | $1.20 | 2025-10-10 | 2025-11-21 | 2025-12-05 |
| 2025-08-15 | $1.20 | 2025-07-22 | 2025-08-15 | 2025-08-29 |
| 2025-05-23 | $1.20 | 2025-04-21 | 2025-05-23 | 2025-06-06 |
| 2025-03-07 | $1.20 | 2025-02-18 | 2025-03-07 | 2025-03-21 |
| 2024-11-22 | $1.10 | 2024-10-22 | 2024-11-22 | 2024-12-06 |
| 2024-08-16 | $1.10 | 2024-07-23 | 2024-08-16 | 2024-08-30 |
| 2024-05-23 | $1.10 | 2024-04-23 | 2024-05-24 | 2024-06-07 |
| 2024-03-07 | $1.10 | 2024-02-13 | 2024-03-08 | 2024-03-22 |
| 2023-11-16 | $1.00 | 2023-10-24 | 2023-11-17 | 2023-12-01 |
| 2023-08-17 | $1.00 | 2023-07-25 | 2023-08-18 | 2023-09-01 |
| 2023-05-25 | $1.00 | 2023-04-25 | 2023-05-26 | 2023-06-09 |
| 2023-03-09 | $1.00 | 2023-02-14 | 2023-03-10 | 2023-03-24 |
| 2022-11-17 | $0.88 | 2022-10-25 | 2022-11-18 | 2022-12-02 |
| 2022-08-18 | $0.88 | 2022-07-26 | 2022-08-19 | 2022-09-02 |
| 2022-05-26 | $0.88 | 2022-04-26 | 2022-05-27 | 2022-06-10 |
| 2022-03-10 | $0.88 | 2022-02-17 | 2022-03-11 | 2022-03-25 |
| 2021-11-18 | $0.69 | 2021-10-26 | 2021-11-19 | 2021-12-03 |
| 2021-08-12 | $0.69 | 2021-07-22 | 2021-08-13 | 2021-08-27 |
Narrative Economics
market-narrative step).
Delvantic AI Findings
Looking at the raw numbers first: the most recent quarter (2026-03-31) shows revenue of $4.03B and NI of $266.3M for a 6.6% margin — that's actually the best print in the last eight quarters and a meaningful sequential jump from Q4-2025's $3.50B/3.3% trough. Annualizing that single quarter gets you ~$16B revenue and ~$1.06B NI, putting trailing earnings power well above the $739M FY2025 GAAP number the synthesis is anchoring on. TTM P/E of 25x and the "28x" the synthesis quotes both look backward at a cyclical trough; on the Q1-2026 run-rate the multiple compresses toward 19x, and on 2022 peak earnings of $1.84B it's 11x. That's a very different picture than "priced like a software compounder."
That said, I won't pretend one good quarter rewrites the cycle. The 5-year arc is unflattering: revenue CAGR -1.7%, earnings CAGR -25.6%, FCF CAGR -35.4%, gross margin compressed from ~30% to 26.8%, and FY2025 operating income of $1.02B is roughly 40% below the 2022 peak of $2.51B. The pre-flight engine is right that this is a spread business and 2022 was steel-price-juiced — mid-cycle NI is probably $900M–$1.1B, not $1.8B. Fair value on mid-cycle of $1B and a defensible 15–17x cyclical multiple lands at $15–17B market cap, or roughly $295–$335/share versus $394 today. So I land closer to the synthesis verdict directionally — overvalued — but the magnitude is 15–25% downside, not the "disconnected from fundamentals" language the synthesis uses, which implies far worse. The reverse-DCF claim of "implied 18.4% FCF growth" feels overstated when you normalize off Q1-2026's snapback rather than FY2025's trough.
The contrarian case the models underweight: Q1-2026 margins genuinely re-expanded, current ratio is 4.88x (fortress balance sheet, $216M cash, modest leverage implied by 4.88x current), FCF quality flags as good, and the narrative engine correctly notes this is a 60-year operator with disciplined M&A. If Trump-era tariffs sustain domestic steel pricing and industrial capex (reshoring, grid, data center build) accelerates into 2026–2027, you could see Reliance print $1.2B+ NI and the "expensive" multiple compresses fast. The insider data is also weaker as a bear signal than "Market Forces" implies — eight A-Awards of 469 shares look like routine RSU grants, and two S-Sales of ~1,800 and ~1,600 shares are immaterial for a company with insiders likely holding tens of thousands of shares. Calling that "low confidence in recovery" is overreading thin tape. I'd flag the Market Forces module as the weakest of the prior outputs here.
Net: I agree with the synthesis that RS is overvalued at $394, but I dissent on the framing. This isn't a stock priced like a SaaS compounder — it's a quality cyclical distributor priced as if mid-cycle earnings power is already back, when Q1-2026 is one data point and FY2025 was a trough. The right trade isn't "short the disconnect"; it's "wait for the cycle to either confirm via Q2/Q3 or roll back over." A 10–20% pullback to the $315–$340 range (≈15x mid-cycle NI of ~$1B on 51M shares) is a reasonable entry for a quality compounder you want to own through cycles. Above $390, you're paying peak multiple on trough earnings with a single good quarter as your only evidence of inflection. The 1.7% dividend yield doesn't pay you to wait. Sectors with this kind of operating leverage reward patience over conviction at the wrong price.
GPT Critique
My independent analysis of Reliance Steel & Aluminum Co. highlights several key elements that distinguish the company's current financial position. The most recent quarterly revenue of $4.03B reflects a notable increase from prior quarters, suggesting a potential recovery from a cyclical trough. The net income margin improved to 6.6%, which is the highest in the last eight quarters, indicating better operational efficiency or an improving market environment. However, when viewed in the context of the past few years, the overall trajectory remains concerning. The declining revenue CAGR of -1.7% and a dramatic earnings CAGR of -25.6% underscore the challenges the company faces in maintaining growth amidst a volatile market. The current P/E ratio of 25.27 is high for a company with a cyclical and commodity-dependent business model, which raises questions about the sustainability of its valuation.
Opus argues that the market is overvaluing Reliance Steel, suggesting a fair value range of $315–$340 based on mid-cycle earnings power. I agree with Opus that the stock is overvalued, as the current price of $394.41 is difficult to justify when considering the company's historical earnings and the cyclical nature of the steel industry. The assertion that the P/E multiple compresses to 19x on the Q1-2026 run-rate is a more realistic assessment than viewing it through the lens of a software-like compounder as the synthesis suggests. I also concur with Opus's view that the Market Forces module overstates insider activity as a bearish signal, given the routine nature of the recent awards and sales.
Where I diverge from Opus is in the degree of optimism regarding the recent quarter's performance as a sign of recovery. While Q1-2026 shows promising signs, one quarter does not establish a trend, especially in a sector as cyclical as steel. The broader five-year decline in margins and operating income suggests that structural challenges remain, and the high gross margin contraction from 30.2% to 26.8% cannot be ignored. Opus's suggestion that the market could see Reliance print $1.2B+ NI if certain macroeconomic conditions align feels overly speculative given the current trajectory and competitive pressures in the industry.
A careful skeptic might question both my and Opus's reliance on the potential for mid-cycle recovery given the persistent headwinds in the steel sector, including global supply chain disruptions and fluctuating raw material costs. They might argue that without significant structural changes or a shift in the competitive landscape, Reliance Steel's margins and growth will continue to face downward pressure.